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Abstract	
	
Mutiny	in	Hunan:	Writing	and	Rewriting	the	“Warlord	Era”	in	Early	Republican	Chinese	History	
	
By	
	
Jonathan	Tang	
	
Doctor	of	Philosophy	in	History	
	
University	of	California,	Berkeley	
	
Professor	Wen-hsin	Yeh,	Chair	
	
This	dissertation	examines	a	1920	mutiny	in	Pingjiang	County,	Hunan	Province,	as	a	way	
of	challenging	the	dominant	narrative	of	the	early	republican	period	of	Chinese	history,	often	
called	the	“Warlord	Era.”	The	mutiny	precipitated	a	change	of	power	from	Tan	Yankai,	a	
classically	trained	elite	of	the	pre-imperial	era,	to	Zhao	Hengti,	who	had	undergone	military	
training	in	Japan.	Conventional	histories	interpret	this	transition	as	Zhao	having	betrayed	his	
erstwhile	superior	Tan,	epitomizing	the	rise	of	warlordism	and	the	disintegration	of	traditional	
civilian	administration;	this	dissertation	challenges	these	claims	by	showing	that	Tan	and	Zhao	
were	not	enemies	in	1920,	and	that	no	such	betrayal	occurred.	
These	same	histories	also	claim	that	local	governance	during	this	period	was	
fundamentally	broken,	necessitating	the	revolutionary	party-state	of	the	KMT	and	CCP	to	
centralize	power	and	restore	order.	Though	this	was	undeniably	a	period	of	political	turmoil,	
with	endemic	low-level	armed	conflict,	this	dissertation	juxtaposes	unpublished	material	with	
two	of	the	more	influential	histories	of	the	era	to	show	how	this	narrative	has	been	
exaggerated	to	serve	political	aims.	Gradual	reform	and	innovations	like	federalism	have	been	
excluded	from	memories	of	the	era	in	favor	of	a	return	to	highly	centralized,	autocratic	rule.	
Tan,	Zhao,	and	their	peers	were	unable	to	adapt	to	the	emerging	mass	politics	of	their	era,	and	
thus	did	not	achieve	the	necessary	publicity	to	make	their	achievements	more	well-known.	
Another	dimension	to	the	dissertation	is	its	local	character.	At	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	
century,	Hunan	was	still	an	internal	frontier,	far	from	the	more	cosmopolitan	coast.	Moreover,	
it	lay	at	the	crossroads	between	north	and	south,	making	it	geostrategically	important	for	all	
those	who	wished	to	militarily	conquer	the	whole	of	the	former	Qing	empire.	Those	from	the	
province,	like	Tan	and	Zhao,	were	convinced	of	their	homeland’s	importance,	and,	cognizant	of	
the	prominent	political	role	that	their	predecessors	played	in	nineteenth	century,	sought	to	
emulate	their	example	through	good	governance	and	innovative	politics.		
By	redirecting	our	attention	to	these	local	successes,	however	limited,	and	reframing	
our	interpretation	of	the	1920	mutiny,	this	dissertation	argues	against	the	revolutionary	
paradigm	of	Chinese	history	to	highlight	an	alternative	possibility	for	how	local	governance	
could	have	worked,	demonstrates	how	elite	culture	enabled	the	success	of	Qing	elites	like	Tan	
and	Zhao	while	preventing	their	later	success	in	the	mass	politics	era,	and	suggests	new	
possibilities	for	future	research	on	the	politics	of	early	Republican	China.	
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Introduction:	How	Reinterpreting	a	Mutiny	Reframes	Modern	Chinese	
History	
	 On	November	25th,	1920,	Hunan	Governor	Tan	Yankai	(1880-1930)	resigned	from	office	
and	boarded	a	boat	that	would	take	him	to	Shanghai.	Mutineers	from	Pingjiang,	less	than	80	
miles	away	from	the	capital	of	Changsha,	were	approaching;	he	had	no	other	way	of	placating	
their	demands	but	to	flee	into	exile.	Tan	had	come	into	office	in	July	of	that	same	year	for	his	
third	tenure	as	governor	since	the	1911	Revolution;	now	he	was	being	forced	to	leave	his	home	
province	in	humiliation.	Authority	would	pass	on	to	his	supposed	subordinate,	Zhao	Hengti	
(1880-1971),	whose	reign	over	Hunan	would	last	for	six	years.	
	 This	dissertation	argues	that	descriptions	of	this	specific	episode	in	conventional	
narratives	of	China’s	early	republic	epitomizes	the	manner	in	which	the	era	as	a	whole	has	been	
characterized.	These	portrayals	emphasize	the	political	turmoil	and	social	disorder	of	the	period,	
with	the	republican	ideals	of	the	1911	Revolution	appearing	to	be	little	more	than	flimsy	
excuses	used	by	various	strongmen	to	selfishly	hoard	power	and	war	with	others	over	territory	
and	resources.	Though	there	were	efforts	to	implement	national	and	provincial	constitutions,	
and	proposals	for	new	forms	of	governance	like	federalism,	these	all	resulted	in	failure.	The	
betrayal	of	weak	civilian	bureaucrats	like	Tan	by	their	ostensible	military	subordinates	seemed	
so	prevalent	that	the	era	was	dubbed	and	caricatured	as	the	“Warlord	Period”	of	modern	
Chinese	history.	This	periodization	consciously	evokes	previous	eras	of	national	disorder,	like	
the	Warring	States	(475	BC	–	221	BC),	Three	Kingdoms	(220-280),	or	Five	Dynasties	and	Sixteen	
Kingdoms	(907-979).		
Given	the	above,	it	would	be	far	too	easy	to	see	the	“Warlord	Period”	as	merely	a	brief	
and	chaotic	interregnum	between	a	centralized	imperial	system	that	ended	in	1911	and	a	
centralized	party	state	that	achieved	a	partial	reunification	in	1926.	This	would	be	a	mistake,	as	
it	locks	our	understanding	of	what	China	is,	was,	and	could	possibly	become	into	a	unitary	and	
unchanging	ideal.	What	happens	when	this	coherent	narrative	of	progress	is	temporarily	set	
aside?	Is	it	possible	that	this	period	of	confusion	disguises	alternative	proposals	for	how	the	
Chinese	state	can	be	rethought?	This	dissertation	contends	that	the	revolutionary	Leninist	
party-state	that	partially	triumphed	in	the	late	1920s	and	achieved	near-total	victory	in	1949	
was	not	the	only	possible	conclusion	for	how	this	story	would	develop.	Military	conquest,	
revolutionary	violence,	and	the	radical	transformation	of	society	were	also	not	necessarily	the	
only	methods	by	which	the	nation	could	become	stronger.	Yet	this	teleology	persists.	
This	dissertation	challenges	this	dominant	narrative	by	arguing	that	1920	mutiny	and	
transition	of	power	described	above	occurred	because	Tan	Yankai	was	unable	to	adequately	
demonstrate	a	responsiveness	to	the	new	demands	of	mass	politics,	not	because	his	policies	of	
gradual	reform	were	inherently	flawed.	Revolutionary	historiography	has	attributed	the	fall	of	
Tan	and	regimes	like	his	to	the	moral	bankruptcy	and	factionalism	intrinsic	to	the	elite	class	to	
which	they	belonged,	as	political	leadership	swiftly	devolved	into	warlordism.	Deconstructing	
these	narratives	by	looking	at	how	they	have	emphasized	the	failures	of	elite	reform	constitutes	
the	first	step	in	moving	beyond	the	revolutionary	paradigm.	This	dissertation	joins	recent	
efforts	at	deconstruction	with	materials	concerning	provincial	governance	in	Hunan	to	show	
some	of	the	limited	and	overlooked	successes	enjoyed	by	elite-run	administrations,	like	that	of	
Tan,	during	this	period	of	time.	By	demonstrating	that	opposition	to	these	regimes,	as	
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epitomized	by	the	1920	mutiny,	was	less	connected	with	cultural	or	ideological	concerns	like	
revolution,	and	more	a	function	of	factional	infighting	and	material	demands	like	troop	pay,	this	
dissertation	argues	for	a	reconceptualization	of	early	Republican	China	that	highlights	the	
potential	for	gradual	reform.	
Politics	during	this	period	was	dominated	by	the	same	elites	who	had	who	had	held	a	
monopoly	on	the	practice	of	late	Qing	governance.	Their	reliance	on	extant	social	networks	and	
pre-revolution	culture	is	often	blamed	for	their	eventual	failures,	as	in	the	case	of	Tan	Yankai,	
who	embodies	the	stereotypical	elite,	more	concerned	with	preserving	the	traditions	of	the	
past	than	modernizing	state	and	society.	However,	if	the	1920	mutiny	and	Tan’s	subsequent	
exile	are	attributed	to	material	and	contingent	factors	rather	than	any	underlying	flaws	of	elite-
led	reform,	an	alternative	to	the	revolutionary	teleology	begins	to	emerge.	Tan	was	forced	to	
leave	because	of	discontent	among	lower-level	soldiers	and	internal	conflicts	within	his	
coalition.	This	is	not	to	say	that	he	never	committed	political	errors	or	always	governed	well,	
but	that	his	errors	should	not	be	conflated	with	the	failures	of	his	policies	or	disinterest	in	his	
experiments	with	federalism.	His	inability	to	successfully	appeal	to,	harness,	and	manage	the	
support	of	his	soldiers	mirrored	and	presaged	the	mass	politics	which	would	shortly	emerge.	
This	widening	chasm	between	elites	and	masses	is	worth	noting,	and	it	is	important	to	
use	class	to	disaggregate	the	militarism	of	the	age.	While	the	conventional	narrative	blames	
elite	strongmen	for	the	chaotic	musical	chairs	of	“warlord”	politics,	this	dissertation	shows	that,	
at	least	in	the	case	of	Hunan,	soldiers	wielded	a	great	deal	of	power	in	causing	transitions	in	
power	at	the	top.	This	was	true	for	Tan	Yankai’s	initial	accession	in	1911	as	well	as	his	departure	
from	the	governorship	nine	years	later.	Such	soldiers,	described	in	greater	detail	by	Diana	Lary,	
were	very	different	from	the	provincial	elites	who	had	often	received	modern	educational	
training	at	military	academies,	including	those	in	Japan,	and	constituted	the	majority	of	the	
officers	at	the	top.1	The	material	motivations	of	these	soldiers	were	not	necessarily	aligned	with	
the	political	reform	efforts	of	the	elites	who	were	their	ostensible	superiors;	it	was	the	periods	
of	greatest	discord	which	provoked	elite	turnover.		
The	significance	of	this	gap	is	barely	featured	in	the	two	influential	histories	of	early	
Republican	politics	that	have	constructed	the	conventional	narrative	of	the	“Warlord	Era,”	
which	have	instead	emphasized	the	necessity	and	inevitability	of	revolution.	The	first	of	these,	
Chinese	Political	History	in	the	Past	Thirty	Years	[最近三十年中国政治史]	was	published	in	
1930	and	written	by	Li	Jiannong	(1880-1963);	it	condemns	all	non-revolutionary	efforts	to	
modernize	China	as	retrograde	and	mistaken,	asserting	the	teleology	of	the	conventional	
narrative.	The	second,	Anecdotes	of	the	Beiyang	Warlord	Domination	Period	[北洋軍閥統治時
期史話]	by	Tao	Juyin	(1898-1989),	first	published	in	1957,	presents	a	sensationalistic	account	of	
warlord	factionalism	in	order	to	underscore	the	necessity	for	unity	and	centralized	rule.	Both	
histories	attribute	the	1920	mutiny	to	Tan’s	mistakes,	rather	than	mass	discontent,	as	an	
example	of	the	elite	failures	of	the	era.	The	non-revolutionary	character	of	Tan	and	
unsuccessful	regimes	like	his	serves	to	emphasize	the	positive	aspects	of	what	came	after.		
Just	as	recent	scholarship	on	the	1898	reforms	of	the	late	Qing	argues	that	that	the	
traditional	outcome-based	focus	on	their	failure	prevents	careful	consideration	of	their	
                                                
1	Diana	Lary,	Warlord	Soldiers:	Chinese	Common	Soldiers,	1911-1937	(Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	
1985).	
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possibilities,	this	dissertation	suggests	how	the	conventional	narrative	of	the	excesses	of	the	
“Warlord	Period”	precludes	a	full	consideration	for	its	achievements,	however	partial.2	Other	
historians	have	begun	to	make	similar	claims:	David	Strand,	for	example,	convincingly	describes	
a	level	of	popular	engagement	with	politics	during	this	time	period	that	constitutes	an	
underappreciated	degree	of	progress	away	from	the	autocracy	of	the	past,	and	that	laid	the	
foundation	for	what	was	to	come.3	This	dissertation	adds	to	this	body	of	scholarship	by	using	
previously	unpublished	archival	sources	to	suggest	how,	in	contrast	to	the	conventional	
narrative,	provincial	governance	thrived,	often	justifying	its	policies	based	upon	what	has	been	
mistakenly	perceived	to	be	empty	laws	like	local	constitutions.	The	“Warlord	Period”	warrants	
reexamination	that	both	accounts	for	and	moves	beyond	the	tropes	of	the	conventional	
narrative.		
	
Wen	and	Wu	in	Chinese	History	
The	1920	mutiny	is	often	used	as	an	illustration	of	the	overpowering	of	a	civilian	
bureaucrat	by	a	military	strongman,	and	the	bullying	of	the	weak	civilian	(like	Tan)	by	the	
military	is	arguably	the	oldest	and	most	potent	example	of	this	trope	for	the	warlord	era.	
However,	this	is	an	oversimplification.	Cultural	understandings	about	the	establishment	of	the	
Chinese	polity	have	been	framed	by	representations	of	“the	cultural”	(wen)	and	“the	martial”	
(wu)	and	require	an	appreciation	of	the	historical	significance	of	these	tropes	in	popular	
understandings	of	China’s	past.	As	recounted	in	the	Book	of	Rites,	one	of	the	five	Confucian	
classics	that	predate	the	221	BCE	imperial	unification,	“King	Wen	(of	Zhou)	used	culture	to	rule	
and	King	Wu	(of	Zhou)	used	military	power.”4	The	talent	of	King	Wen	was	in	his	benevolence	
and	civility,	which	had	the	power	to	transform	rivals	into	allies	while	maintaining	harmony	over	
all	he	ruled.	In	contrast,	his	son	King	Wu	was	skilled	at	war,	and	led	his	family	to	supremacy	
through	the	conquest	of	others.	These	two	figures	and	the	values	they	epitomize	articulate	how	
wen	and	wu	were	often	framed	as	opposing	ideals,	around	which	cultural,	social,	and	political	
organizations	would	structure	themselves.	However,	as	noted	by	Kai	Filipiak,	though	“Chinese	
administrations,	for	example,	made	a	clear	distinction	between	civil	and	military	officials	
(wenguan/wuguan),”5	neither	was	truly	given	primacy	over	the	other	in	a	theoretical	sense.	
That	is	to	say,	both	were	idealized	as	appropriate	and	legitimate	policy	orientations	by	the	
various	governments	that	ruled	China	in	the	thousands	of	years	afterwards.	This	included	the	
campaigns	to	unify	the	Chinese	polity	by	various	armies	during	periods	of	disorder	(luan),	as	
well	as	efforts	by	the	Chinese	state	to	manage	society	during	times	of	peace.6	Neither	could	
function	without	the	other;	both	were	necessary	for	success.		
                                                
2	For	one	example	of	this,	see	Rebecca	Karl	and	Peter	Zarrow,	eds.,	Rethinking	the	1898	Reform	Period:	Political	
and	Cultural	Change	in	Late	Qing	China	(Cambridge,	MA.:	Harvard	University	Press,	2002).	
3	David	Strand,	An	Unfinished	Republic:	Leading	by	Word	and	Deed	in	Modern	China	(Berkeley	CA.:	University	of	
California	Press,	2011).	
4	Quoted	and	translated	by	Kam	Louie	and	Louise	Edwards,	“Chinese	Masculinity:	Theorizing	‘Wen’	and	‘Wu’,”	in	
East	Asian	History,	no.	8,	(December	1994),	135-148,	140.	Original:	文王以文治，武王以武治 
5	Kai	Filipiak,	“Introduction:	Civil-Military	Relations	in	Chinese	History,”	in	Kai	Filipiak,	ed.	Civil-Military	Relations	in	
Chinese	History:	From	Ancient	China	to	the	Communist	Takeover,	(Routledge,	2015),	1-17,	4.	
6	James	Tong,	Disorder	Under	Heaven:	Collective	Violence	in	the	Ming	Dynasty	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	
Press,	1991).	
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While	the	relative	balance	between	the	two	values	would	wax	and	wane,	following	the	
Song	Dynasty	(960-1279),	wen	began	to	gain	greater	prominence	and	preeminence	over	wu.	As	
Joanna	Waley-Cohen	notes,	this	is	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	“classical	education	rather	
than	military	achievement	had	traditionally	[become]	the	path	to	political	power.”7	This	shift	
can	also	be	seen	in	the	oft-quoted	four-character	phrase	“place	greater	value	on	wen	than	on	
wu,”	which	gained	in	popularity	after	this	period.8	Though,	as	Nicolas	Schillinger	notes,	far	too	
much	can	be	read	into	this	phrase	that	itself	cannot	be	concretely	connected	to	state	policy,	its	
prevalence	is	indicative.9	Another	popular	saying	also	illustrates	this	post-Song	shift:	“good	iron	
is	not	used	for	nails,	good	men	do	not	serve	as	soldiers.”	This	adage,	which	was	particularly	
common	in	more	affluent	areas,	further	suggests	the	low	social	standing	of	soldiers	during	the	
later	imperial	period.	By	implication,	those	subscribing	to	this	philosophy	were	of	the	correct	
morality,	education,	and	upbringing,	and	would	therefore	be	actively	discouraged	from	seeking	
wu-oriented	careers.10	
By	the	beginning	of	the	Qing	dynasty	(1644-1911),	norms	were	beginning	to	shift	as	
emperors	encouraged	and	inculcated	more	wu	characteristics	like	courage,	physical	fitness,	and	
determination	among	the	Manchu	elite	who	ruled	the	empire.	The	policies	of	the	Qianlong	
emperor	(r.	1735-1796)	exemplify	this	rebalancing:	he	severely	punished	Manchu	and	
Mongolian	officials	who	did	not	meet	his	standard	for	skills	like	archery,	and	did	his	best	to	
exemplify	the	fighting	tradition	he	wanted	his	officers	to	emulate	by	staging	annual	hunts.11	
Qianlong	also	sent	his	armies	on	lengthy	and	expensive	campaigns	of	conquest	and	pacification	
that	expanded	the	borders	of	his	empire,	then	made	sure	that	his	leadership	was	given	full	
credit	for	these	victories,	particularly	in	court	paintings	that	depicted	him	as	a	brave	warrior	on	
horseback.12	In	short,	efforts	like	these	returned	wu	to	roughly	the	same	level	as	wen,	which	
represented	both	a	rebalancing	of	the	two	values	that	was	in	alignment	with	historical	(pre-
Song)	norms.		
That	being	said,	Qianlong	was	careful	not	to	overemphasize	the	wu	aspects	of	his	own	
character,	so	as	to	make	sure	the	wen-trained	bureaucrats	who	managed	his	empire	would	
respect	him.	To	accomplish	this,	he	sponsored	and	collected	fine	art,	financed	the	production	of	
an	astounding	complication	of	texts	he	called	the	Complete	Library	of	the	Four	Treasuries	(四库
全书),	and	wrote	his	own	poetry.	In	this,	as	Mark	Elliott	writes,	“Qianlong	also	sought	to	
embody	the	ideal	of	the	educated	man,	who	in	his	words	and	deeds	perfectly	balanced	wen	and	
wu	…	To	rule	successfully,	Qianlong	needed	to	establish	himself	intellectually,	to	show	himself	
                                                
7	Joanna	Waley-Cohen,	The	Culture	of	War	in	China:	Emperor	and	Military	Under	the	Qing	Dynasty	(I.B.	Tauris,	
2006),	4.	
8	Taken	from	Louie	and	Edwards,	“Chinese	Masculinity,”	145.	Their	discussion	of	Huang	Kuanzhong,	南宋军政与文
献探索[An	investigation	into	the	military	administration	and	texts	of	the	Southern	Song]	(Xinwen	Feng	Chubanshe,	
1980),	is	particularly	illuminating.	Original:	重文轻武.	
9	Nicolas	Schillinger,	The	Body	and	Military	Masculinity	in	Late	Qing	and	Early	Republican	China	(Lanham,	MD.:	
Lexington	Books,	2016),	8.	
10	See	Schillinger,	The	Body	and	Military	Masculinity,	25,	as	well	as	Lary,	Warlord	Soldiers.	Louie	and	Edwards,	
“Chinese	Masculinity,”	again	referencing	Huang	Kuanzhong	(1980),	assert	that	this	is	a	post-Song	maxim.	Original:	
好鐵不打釘，好男不當兵.	
11	Mark	Elliott,	Emperor	Qianlong:	Son	of	Heaven,	Man	of	the	World	(Pearson,	2009),	61-65.	
12	Ibid.,	86-106.	
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well	versed	in	the	poetry,	art,	history,	and	philosophy	of	the	ages	as	the	erudites	over	whom	he	
presumed	to	govern.”13	In	other	words,	the	ethnic	tensions	of	the	Qing	period	created	a	need	
for	greater	military	surveillance	over	the	civilian	population,	as	well	as	an	effort	to	demonstrate	
cultural	literacy	and	even	superiority	in	terms	of	China’s	traditions.	
There	are	indications	that	the	efforts	of	emperors	like	Qianlong	to	balance	the	two	
values	were	only	partially	successful,	as	the	post-Song	predilection	towards	the	wen	persisted	
during	the	Qing.	After	the	conquest,	the	Qing,	like	other	“alien	rulers,”	encouraged	Han	Chinese	
to	remain	in	civil	rather	than	military	roles,	thus	further	subscribing	wen	to	the	subdued	
population.	At	the	same	time,	the	court	also	grappled	with	how	to	select	“men	of	talent,”	
especially	given	natural	suspicions	against	the	overly	cultured	but	politically	resistant	elites	
from	the	Jiangnan	region.	While	reinstating	the	military	and	civil	service	examination	system	
from	the	Ming	dynasty,	the	Qing	made	important	innovations	in	educational	institutions,	
especially	for	the	sons	of	military	bannermen	and	other	elites.	Nevertheless,	the	civil	
examinations,	which	were	assessed	based	upon	knowledge	of	the	Confucian	classics,	were	
valued	much	more	highly	than	military	examinations.14	
More	importantly,	the	disastrous	failures	of	the	Qing	military	in	the	mid-nineteenth	
century	against	both	foreign	incursion	and	the	Taiping	rebels	signified	the	necessity	for	a	
reconceptualization	of	military	strategy	on	a	grand	scale	that	required	input	both	from	the	
classically	educated	and	the	martially	competent.	In	the	Self-Strengthening	Movement	(自强运
动),	the	state	attempted	to	halt	this	decline	via	the	learning	and	application	of	Western	military	
technology:	a	navy	was	built,	arsenals	were	erected,	and	the	army	was	retrained	to	use	modern	
weapons.	As	demonstrated	by	China’s	defeats	in	the	Sino-French	war	of	1884-1885	and	First	
Sino-Japanese	War	of	1894-1895,	these	efforts	ultimately	proved	unsuccessful.15	Although	
Elman	and	others	now	argue	against	the	teleological	reading	of	history	that	condemns	the	Qing	
for	these	military	defeats	as	cultural	failures,	the	political	legacy	of	this	history	was	a	turn	
against	traditional	forms	of	wen-wu	balance.	Critics	again	bitterly	decried	China’s	inability	to	
defend	itself,	with	officials	like	Li	Hongzhang	(1823-1901)	fully	accepting	the	military	and	even	
cultural	superiority	of	Japan’s	Meiji	reforms.	
Ironically,	Japan’s	victory	was	also	inspirational,	as	the	1868	Meiji	Restoration	served	as	
an	example	for	how	the	Qing	might	successfully	modernize	its	polity	and	society.	In	particular,	a	
key	factor	behind	Japan’s	transformation	was	the	priority	given	to	wu	by	providing	more	
evidence	that	a	rebalancing	was	long	overdue.	Moreover,	Meiji	success	suggested	a	new	kind	of	
wen	that	was	predicated	on	science	and	technology,	especially	in	the	domains	of	international	
law	and	military	technology.	This	new	appreciation	of	the	physical	world	beyond	China	and	the	
intellectual	world	beyond	the	Chinese	classics	integrated	wen	and	wu	in	a	way	that	
incorporated	European	sciences,	technology,	and	legal	studies	in	all	applicable	domains	of	
governance	and	security.	In	other	words,	victory	in	1895	demonstrated	that	Japan	was	not	just	
                                                
13	Ibid.,	107.	
14	Benjamin	A.	Elman,	Civil	Examinations	and	Meritocracy	in	Late	Imperial	China	(Cambridge,	MA.:	Harvard	
University	Press,	2013),	119-123.	
15	Mary	Clabaugh	Wright,	The	Last	Stand	of	Chinese	Conservativism:	The	T’ung-Chih	Restoration,	1862-1874	
(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	Press,	1962),	72.	
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a	matter	of	martial	valor	and	military	capacity,	but	also	a	comprehensive	reconfiguration	of	the	
domains	of	knowledge	as	well.	
Consequently,	the	years	after	the	war	created	what	Douglas	Reynolds	has	termed	a	
“Golden	Decade”	of	Sino-Japanese	relations,	when	the	Qing	state	actively	sought	to	emulate	
the	Japanese	example	in	the	form	of	the	New	Policies	(新政)	of	1901-1911.	During	this	era,	a	
variety	of	laws	were	passed,	including	ones	initiating	the	transformation	of	the	state	into	a	
constitutional	monarchy,	abolishing	the	traditional	civil	service	examinations	in	favor	of	
Western-style	schools,	allowing	for	provincial	assemblies	that	local	elites	a	platform	for	their	
voices	to	be	heard.	Other	laws	directly	contributed	to	a	much	more	thorough	integration	of	
wen	and	wu	than	before,	creating	a	New	Army	(新军)	comprised	of	professionally	trained	
soldiers	under	the	command	of	Yuan	Shikai	(1859-1916),	while	the	sons	of	elite	Chinese	society	
were	sent	to	Japan	under	state	sponsorship	to	pursue	a	military	education,	often	to	return	to	
their	homeland	as	instructors	and	mentors	to	cadets	in	Chinese	military	academies.16	
Compared	to	prior	efforts	by	the	Qing	to	rebalance	wen	and	wu,	the	impact	of	military	
education	in	China	as	a	specialized	branch	of	scientific	knowledge	represented	a	new	level	of	
integration	between	the	two	norms	as	well	as	a	new	conceptualization	of	both	norms	that	
would	have	far-reaching	consequences	for	China’s	politics	after	the	1911	revolution.	Those	
newly	trained	as	professional	soldiers	self-confidently	saw	themselves	as	the	future	of	their	
nation,	with	their	freshly	acquired	knowledge	as	the	much-needed	remedy	for	bringing	their	
people	into	modernity.	Yet	in	no	small	part	due	to	the	negative	connotations	with	which	wu	
had	been	freighted	for	so	long,	they	had	difficulty	convincing	the	civilian	population	of	their	
superior	ability	to	lead.	They	expected	that	their	new	knowledge	and	training	would	elevate	
them	into	the	ranks	of	elite	leadership,	and	that	membership	in	elite	circles	would	be	sufficient	
to	grant	them	legitimacy	to	govern.	This	is	perhaps	one	reason	that	so-called	warlords	were	so	
generous	as	philanthropists,	especially	for	experimental	social	programs	like	literacy	training.17	
But	because	their	military	vocation	had	been	long	associated	with	brute	force,	uncouth	
behavior,	illiteracy	and	inferiority,	their	reception	was,	at	best,	tepid	and	indifferent.	They	were	
also	wrong	about	the	durability	of	elite	cultural	leadership:	just	as	the	support	of	common	
soldiers	began	to	determine	their	officers’	authority	(and	not	the	other	way	around),	the	
inclusion	of	military	strongmen	among	elite	circles	was	soon	followed	by	the	eclipse	of	elite	
culture	by	mass	party	politics.	
	
A	Post-1911	Domination	of	Wu?	
Following	the	1911	Xinhai	Revolution	and	fall	of	the	Qing	dynasty,	China	seemed	to	
revert	to	historical	patterns	of	wu-supremacy,	in	which	the	former	empire	was	divided	up	
among	various	cliques	of	“Warlords”	who	ruled	their	territories	with	limitless	authority	and	
                                                
16	For	more	on	the	New	Policies,	with	particular	attention	paid	to	their	connection	to	the	Japanese	example,	see	
Douglas	Reynolds,	China,	1898-1912:	The	Xinzheng	Revolution	and	Japan	(Cambridge,	MA:,	Harvard	University	
Press,	1993).	For	a	significant	re-evaluation	of	Yuan	Shikai's	innovations	in	the	New	Army,	see	Hong	Zhang,	“Yuan	
Shikai	and	the	Significance	of	his	Troop	Training	at	Xiaozhan,	Tianjin,	1895-1899,”	The	Chinese	Historical	Review	26,	
no.	1	(2019):	37-54;	see	also	Patrick	Fuliang	Shan,	Yuan	Shikai:	A	Reappraisal	(Vancover,	BC:	University	of	British	
Columbia	Press,	2018).	
17	Xia	Shi,	At	Home	in	the	World:	Women	and	Charity	in	Late	Qing	and	Early	Republican	China	(New	York,	NY.:	
Columbia	University	Press,	2018).	
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endlessly	warred	with	each	other	for	prestige	and	profit.	With	frequent	betrayals	and	changing	
alliances,	the	rise	and	fall	of	each	of	these	cliques	is	complex	and	often	confusing	to	historians,	
and	even	more	so	to	those	who	were	forced	to	endure	their	tyranny.	18	If	Meiji	Japan	
represented	an	ideal	of	political	and	military	progress	that	integrated	and	reconceptualized	wen	
and	wu	in	order	to	form	a	more	modern	nation-state,	led	by	the	educated	and	moral,	the	newly	
formed	Republic	of	China	fell	far	short.	Instead,	it	was	dominated	by	men	who	were	perceived	
to	be	completely	lacking	wen:	uneducated,	uncultured,	and	selfish.		
It	is	unfair	to	characterize	all	of	these	men	in	this	way:	they	hailed	from	many	different	
types	of	backgrounds	and	are	difficult	to	characterize	with	broad	stereotypes.	Some,	like	Zhang	
Zongchang	(1881-1932)	and	Zhang	Zuolin	(1875-1928),	were	brutal,	illiterate,	and	might	be	
better	characterized	as	bandits	than	military	officers.	In	other	words,	they	were	modern-day	
embodiments	of	historical	fears	of	wu	without	wen.19	Others,	like	Yan	Xishan	(1883-1960),	
benefitted	from	conventional	Confucian	childhood	educations	as	well	as	Japanese	military	
training.20	Still	other	warlords	defy	classification	into	either	group:	for	example,	Feng	Yuxiang	
(1882-1948),	who	worked	his	way	up	the	military	ranks	to	become	a	major	army	leader	was	
perceived	to	be	“shrewd,	ruthless,	and	notoriously	slippery,”	while	also	“a	Christian	modernizer	
with	feminist	and…	socialist	tendencies.”21	In	short,	there	were	many	kinds	of	warlords,	all	of	
whom	exhibited	varying	degrees	of	wen	and	wu,	in	spite	of	stereotypes	to	the	contrary.22	
While	military	generals	seemed	to	fail	due	to	their	lack	of	wen,	civilians,	particularly	at	
the	national	level,	appeared	incompetent	because	they	lacked	the	courage	and	conviction	
associated	with	wu.	These	civil	officials	appeared	to	be	meek,	recessive,	and	compliant:	failing	
to	keep	up	with	the	modern	trends,	they	epitomized	the	worst	aspects	of	wen	in	the	dynastic	
literati	tradition.	They	supposedly	thrived	in	conspiratorial	schemes	in	dark	corners,	becoming	
colorless	bureaucrats	who	advanced	no	one’s	interest	but	their	own	and	those	of	their	cliques.	
What	time	they	spent	at	work	was	wasted	arguing	over	constitutions	and	policies	that	had	little	
relevance	to	the	life	of	the	average	Chinese,	and	factionalism	paralyzed	the	state.23	
In	sum,	a	republic	had	replaced	an	empire,	but	little	else	seemed	to	change;	if	anything,	
things	grew	even	worse	without	a	unifying	ideology	like	Confucianism	or	central	authority	like	
                                                
18	Good	summaries	can	be	found	in	David	Bonavia,	China’s	Warlords	(Oxford,	UK:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995),	
Hsi-sheng	Ch’i,	Warlord	Politics	in	China,	1916-1928	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	Press,	1976),	and	Arthur	
Waldron,	From	War	to	Nationalism:	China’s	Turning	Point,	1924-1925	(Cambridge,	UK.:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2003).	For	the	clearest	statement	about	warlords	lacking	wen,	see	Oderic	Wou,	Militarism	in	Modern	China:	
The	Career	of	Wu	P’ei-fu,	1916-1939	(Canberra:	Australian	National	University	Press,	1978).	
19	For	more	on	Zhang	Zongchang,	see	Bonavia,	171-182.	For	more	on	Zhang	Zuolin,	see	Gavan	McCormick,	Chang	
Tso-lin	in	Northeast	China,	1911-1928:	China,	Japan,	and	the	Manchurian	Idea	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	
Press,	1977).	
20	For	more	on	Yan,	see	Donald	G.	Gillin,	Warlord:	Yen	Hsi-shan	in	Shansi	Province,	1911-1930	(Princeton,	NJ.:	
Princeton	University	Press,	1967).	
21	Kate	Merkel-Hess,	“A	New	Woman	and	Her	Warlord:	Li	Dequan,	Feng	Yuxiang,	and	the	Politics	of	Intimacy	in	
Twentieth-Century	China,”	in	Frontiers	of	History	in	China,	11,	no.	3	(2016),	431-457,	435-6;	see	also	James	
Sheridan,	Chinese	Warlord:	The	Career	of	Feng	Yü-hsiang	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	Press,	1966).	
22	For	more	on	how	the	“Warlord”	label	was	pejoratively	used,	see	Arthur	Waldron,	“The	Warlord:	Twentieth-
Century	Understandings	of	Violence,	Militarism,	and	Imperialism,”	in	The	American	Historical	Review,	Vol.	96,	No.	
4,	(Oct.	1991),	1073-1100.	
23	Andrew	Nathan,	Peking	Politics,	1918-1923:	Factionalism	and	the	Failure	of	Constitutionalism	(Berkeley,	CA.	
University	of	California	Press,	1976).	
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the	Qing	Court.	Furthermore,	this	new	republic	seemed	even	more	unable	to	fend	off	the	
continued	predations	of	foreign	powers	like	Great	Britain	and	Japan.	One	monograph	detailing	
the	factionalism	that	paralyzed	the	central	government	goes	so	far	as	to	call	this	era	“the	
darkest	corner	of	twentieth-century	Chinese	history…	the	most	disorderly	period	in	the	history	
of	modern	China.”24		
Standard	narratives	of	the	period	focus	on	how	the	absence	of	wen	contributed	to	a	
nation	in	chaos	that	was	eventually	saved	by	revolution	and	centralized	party	politics.	This	
dissertation	challenges	this	narrative	by	describing	how	wen	not	only	persisted,	but	did	so	in	a	
way	that	enabled	local	elites	in	Hunan	to	survive	during	a	period	of	broader	unrest.	In	parallel	
and	partial	challenge	to	more	conventional	narratives	that	privilege	social	revolution	and	
radical	cultural	change	as	the	only	means	by	which	China	would	recover	wen	and	eventually	
thrive,	this	dissertation	describes	how	local	elites	in	Hunan	relied	upon	wen,	not	only	in	the	
form	of	new	technologies	and	domains	of	knowledge,	but	also	in	personal	networks	and	older	
forms	of	cultural	capital.	These	elites	used	these	traditional	forms	of	wen	to	advocate	for	
gradual	reform	and	to	achieve	a	measure	of	stability	in	their	spheres	of	influence.		
Traditional	values	persisted	in	the	twentieth	century,	especially	among	lower-ranking	co-
provincial	military	men	who	were	more	versed	in	The	Romance	of	the	Three	Kingdoms	than	in	
contemporary	military	theory.	Wen-hsin	Yeh	has	shown	that	these	men,	in	fact,	were	
“profoundly	suspicious	of	the	May	Fourth	rhetoric	of	cultural	iconoclasm	and	social	revolution	
brandished	by	the	educated	elite,	which	had	embraced	a	Westernized,	urban	style	of	life.”25	
Many	such	men	in	the	juntong,	the	KMT	military	intelligence	agency	prior	to	1946,	hailed	from	
Hunan	as	well	as	Zhejiang	and	Guangdong.	In	touch	with	the	mores	of	his	men	but	primarily	in	
response	to	the	direction	of	Chiang	Kai-shek	(1887-1975),	juntong	general	Dai	Li	(1897-1946)	
deliberately	employed	rhetoric	concerning	chivalry	and	heroism	to	appeal	to	the	loyalty	of	his	
subordinates	during	a	later	period,	in	spite	of	the	ideological	transformations	that	had	occurred	
in	the	intervening	years.26	This	language,	being	drawn	from	popular	fiction	and	historical	
romance,	suggests	how	wen	and	wu	remained	significant	norms	around	which	individuals	could	
orient	their	behavior,	even	after	1911.	Yeh	shows	that	this	rhetoric	could	also	serve	as	a	
constraining	force	of	Dai	Li’s	efforts	by	binding	him	to	traditional	bonds	of	duty	among	his	high-
ranking	subordinates	in	the	field,	even	when	he	suspected	them	of	disloyalty.27	Given	the	
endurance	of	these	constraining	values	into	the	period	of	the	second	Sino-Japanese	war,	it	was	
still	so	much	more	true	before	the	advent	of	mass	party	politics.	Likewise,	this	dissertation	
argues	that	traditional	elite	culture	continued	to	bind	statesmen	of	the	post-1911	era	to	adhere	
to	the	mores	within	their	networks,	even	when	they	might	have	suspected	each	other	of	
disloyalty	or	treachery.		
	
	
                                                
24	Ibid.,	2.	
25	Wen-hsin	Yeh,	“Dai	Li	and	the	Liu	Geqing	affair:	Heroism	in	the	Chinese	Secret	Service	During	the	War	of	
Resistance,”	in	The	Journal	of	Asian	Studies,	Vol.	48,	No.	3	(Aug.	1989),	545-562.	550.	
26	Ibid.,	545-562.	
27	This	rhetoric	is	also	employed	by	Tao	in	Anecdotes,	with	the	various	figures	of	the	era	filling	in	for	the	historical	
romances	and	classics	of	chivalry	he	evokes.	
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Re-assessing	Reform,	Revolution,	and	the	“Warlord	Decade”	
By	addressing	the	questions	outlined	above,	regarding	the	transformation	of	wen	and	
wu	in	transitions	of	power,	this	dissertation	re-examines	standard	periodization.	The	1916-1926	
period	in	which	these	Hunanese	elites	enjoyed	the	most	autonomy	from	central	control	merits	
its	own	designation	as	a	decade	of	exploration	and	indeterminacy	in	Chinese	political	history.	
This	period	is	usually	termed	the	“Warlord	Decade,”	as	it	represents	the	period	of	time	in	which	
the	central	state	was	particularly	weak,	giving	local	militarists	the	freedom	to	carve	out	territory	
for	themselves.	The	first	five	years	after	the	1911	revolution	enjoyed	a	limited	degree	of	
political	stability,	but	the	death	of	Yuan	Shikai	in	1916	marked	a	turning	point	in	the	end	of	the	
old	order.	This	end,	however,	did	not	necessarily	set	the	nation	upon	any	specific	course	of	
action,	including	revolutionary	change	or	Leninist	party	politics.	In	contrast	to	the	manner	in	
which	this	history	is	typically	told,	these	transitional	years	were	not	simple,	straightforward,	
clear-cut	and	predetermined;	this	was	a	time	of	contingency	and	indeterminacy	in	which	
multiple	possibilities	for	China’s	future	coexisted.	
In	keeping	with	this	challenge	to	the	standard	teleological	history	of	the	period,	this	
dissertation	highlights	the	often-overlooked	potential	of	gradual	reform	instead	of	radical	
revolution.	The	founding	of	the	CCP	in	1921	and	Leninist	reorganization	of	the	KMT	in	1923	
signaled	a	turn	towards	the	latter	framework	for	advancing	lasting	change,	but	this	was	not,	to	
borrow	from	the	title	of	Chiang	Kai-shek’s	later	articulation	of	these	ideas,	“China’s	Destiny.”28	
As	Hans	van	de	Ven	has	noted,	both	parties	asserted	the	necessity	for	a	violent	revolutionary	
break	with	the	past	that	both	embraced	militarization	and	absorbed	its	lessons	while	also	
distancing	themselves	from	a	mythos	of	militarism	in	the	so-called	warlord	period.29	The	
revolutionary	discourse	of	those	parties	eventually	overwhelmed	those	of	reform,	making	it	
difficult	for	the	reformist	agenda,	despite	its	aspirations	for	disruptive	change,	to	be	
appropriately	appreciated.	The	revolutionary	agenda	valorized	the	necessity	of	violence.	Only	in	
hindsight	can	historians	come	to	recognize	and	appreciate	the	contained	tension	within	a	
reformist	agenda	of	managed	transition.	In	this	dissertation,	reformist	agendas	are	primarily	
seen	through	experiments	with	federalism	and	constitutionalism,	which	declined	in	favor	as	a	
result,	of	Yuan	Shikai’s	assassination	of	popular	KMT	politician	Song	Jiaoren	(1882-1913).	
Notwithstanding	these	political	failures,	Tan	Yankai’s	public	discourse	on	federalism	deserves	to	
be	taken	seriously	as	a	reformist	effort.	
By	showing	the	importance	of	reform,	this	dissertation	uncovers	a	heretofore	
understudied	version	of	history.	In	Hunan,	perhaps	like	other	provinces,	factors	like	
personalized	politics,	personalities,	memories	of	family	and	lineage	ties,	individual	styles,	
accrued	prestige,	past	favors	and	grievances,	all	carried	greater	weight	than	the	generalizing	
and	abstract	appeal	of	political	ideologies	that	print,	centering	in	Shanghai,	would	propagate	in	
the	subsequent	decades	to	the	masses.	Nicole	Barnes	reminds	us	that	much	of	the	
historiography	of	twentieth-century	China	is	focused	on	a	nationalism	that	was	centered	on	
print	culture,	even	when	personal	bonds	were	forged	and	reinforced,	especially	among	non-
                                                
28	Chiang	Kai-shek,	China’s	Destiny	&	Chinese	Economic	Theory,	With	Notes	and	Commentary	by	Phillip	Jaffe	(Roy	
Publishers,	1947).	
29	Hans	van	de	Ven,	“The	Military	in	the	Republic,”	China	Quarterly,	Vol.	150,	(June	1997):	352-374.	
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elites	in	the	countryside,	by	physical	contact.30	By	shifting	from	major	national-level	centers	of	
culture	and	politics	like	Beijing	and	Shanghai	to	the	local	conditions	in	inland	provinces	like	
Hunan,	and	by	critically	examining	the	assumptions	made	by	our	present	revolutionary	
interpretation	of	this	period,	this	dissertation	disentangles	elite	and	non-elite	military	culture,	
as	well	as	the	different	kinds	of	events	that	lead	to	transitions	in	power.	
	
The	1920	Mutiny		
Given	the	above,	this	dissertation’s	focus	on	the	November	1920	mutiny	that	forced	
Hunan	governor	Tan	Yankai	from	power	might	seem	curious,	as	this	event	ostensibly	
epitomizes	the	standard	paradigm	of	the	“Warlord	Decade”—specifically,	how	the	cultural	elite	
embodied	by	then-governor	Tan	made	way	for	martial	rule	embodied	by	then-general	and	
future	governor	Zhao	Hengti.	According	to	this	narrative,	one	would	expect	Tan	and	Zhao	to	be	
bitter	enemies,	and	for	Zhao	to	be	a	martial	ruler	with	little	to	no	sense	of	decorum,	civility,	or	
culture	as	he	betrayed	his	former	superior.		
Tan	Yankai	was	mere	months	into	his	third	term	as	Hunan	governor	at	the	time	of	the	
mutiny,	and	his	background	as	a	former	scholar-official	of	the	Qing	regime	make	him	a	prime	
candidate	to	be	displaced	by	the	violent	currents	of	the	time.	Born	as	a	member	of	the	gentry	
and	the	son	of	a	nationally	prominent	Qing	bureaucrat,	he	was	one	of	the	last	to	pass	the	
highest	levels	of	the	imperial	civil	service	examination	before	they	were	abolished.	Though	
trained	from	a	young	age	to	be	a	supporter	of	the	Qing,	he	joined	the	resistance	to	imperial	rule	
and	became	a	leader	of	the	newly	formed	provincial	assembly.	When	the	Qing	collapsed	in	
1911,	he	became	governor	of	the	province	for	the	first	time,	before	being	removed	from	power	
as	a	result	of	his	opposition	to	Yuan	Shikai’s	ambitions	to	resurrect	the	dynastic	system.	Tan	
returned	to	his	former	position	in	1916	but	was	again	deposed	in	1918.	His	third	term	lasted	
from	July	to	November	of	1920.	
Just	as	Tan	appears	to	exemplify	the	easily	displaced	cultural	elite,	Zhao	Hengti,	his	
replacement,	appears	to	exemplify	the	martial	class	which	would	supposedly	commandeer	
power.	Though	born	the	same	year	as	Tan	and	also	a	member	of	Hunan’s	gentry	class,	Zhao’s	
prestige	was	far	more	locally	based.	In	contrast	to	Tan’s	success	in	the	national	civil	service	
examinations	and	in	local	Hunanese	politics,	Zhao	studied	in	Japan,	where	he	specialized	in	
artillery	and	graduated	in	1908	from	the	Japanese	Officer’s	Academy.	Appointed	to	command	
the	New	Army	cadets	in	Guangxi	at	the	time	of	the	1911	revolution,	he	was	reassigned	to	
Hunan	in	1912	in	order	to	help	Tan	with	his	disbandment	program,	where	he	rose	to	command	
regiments,	divisions,	and	the	army	itself.	Over	the	next	eight	years,	Zhao	and	Tan	remained	
close	allies	who	followed	a	similar	path:	both	removed	from	power	for	their	opposition	to	Yuan	
Shikai	in	1913,	returning	to	power	in	Hunan	in	1916,	removed	again	in	1918,	and	returning	a	
third	time	in	July	1920.		
In	November	1920,	a	mutiny	in	the	province’s	northeast	precipitated	Tan’s	exile	and	
Zhao’s	elevation.	As	before,	Tan’s	third	rise	to	the	apex	of	political	and	military	power	had	been	
supported	by	disparate	factions	that	had	allied	with	each	other	against	the	previous	regime.	
Victory	and	peace	were	accompanied	by	demands	for	a	more	equitable	sharing	of	power	
                                                
30	Nicole	Elizabeth	Barnes,	Intimate	Communities:	Wartime	Healthcare	and	the	Birth	of	Modern	China,	1937–1945.	
(California:	University	of	California	Press,	2018).		
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among	these	groups.	Though	Tan	had	been	able	to	manage	these	demands	in	the	past,	his	
inability	to	do	so	this	time	led	to	a	mutiny	that	broke	out	on	the	13th	of	the	month;	by	the	27th,	
he	was	forced	onto	a	boat	bound	for	exile	in	Shanghai.		
According	to	various	firsthand	accounts,	Zhao	was	the	prime	conspirator	behind	Tan’s	
downfall:	an	interpretation	of	events	that	corresponds	with	the	national	narrative	of	soldiers	
seizing	power	from	civilians	during	this	period	of	time.	The	precedent	had	been	set	on	the	
national	level	earlier	by	Yuan	Shikai,	whose	assassination	of	KMT	leader	Song	Jiaoren	and	later	
attempt	to	reestablish	the	dynastic	system	with	himself	at	its	head	strangled	the	nascent	
democracy	of	the	new	Republic	in	its	cradle.	The	KMT	would	later	be	betrayed	again	by	its	
erstwhile	military	allies	in	1922,	when	the	military	leader	Chen	Jiongming	(1878-1933)	
infamously	attacked	Sun	Yat-sen	(1866-1925)	in	Guangdong.	Thus,	when	Mao	Zedong	(1893-
1976),	describing	the	events	of	November	1920,	claimed	that	“T’an	Yen-kai	[Tan	Yankai]	was	
driven	out	of	Hunan	by	a	militarist	called	Chao	Heng-t’i,	[Zhao	Hengti]	who	utilized	the	‘Hunan	
independence’	movement	for	his	own	ends.	He	pretended	to	support	it,	advocating	the	idea	of	
a	United	Autonomous	States	of	China,	but	as	soon	as	he	got	power	he	suppressed	the	
democratic	movement	with	great	energy,”31	these	events	seem	to	be	yet	another	example	of	
this	pattern.	
However,	narratives	of	Zhao’s	treachery	are	oversimplifications	of	a	more	complex	
reality.	Unsurprisingly,	Zhao’s	memoirs	concerning	this	affair	assert	that	he	has	no	
responsibility	for	the	mutiny,	and	did	not	want	Tan	to	leave	Hunan.	Moreover,	he	declares	that	
he	succeeded	to	the	position	with	great	reluctance,	and	only	after	much	pleading	on	the	part	of	
Tan.	While	his	protestations	of	innocence	might	seem	to	be	precisely	what	a	conspirator	might	
claim,	letters	sent	from	Zhao	to	Tan	in	1921	suggest	the	persistence	of	a	cordial	relationship	
between	the	two.	Tan’s	diary	entries	from	November	of	1920,	wherein	he	and	Zhao	are	
depicted	as	having	multiple	conversations,	further	support	Zhao’s	claims.	Integrating	these	
materials	into	the	extant	literature	on	this	event	suggests	how	those	who	argue	for	the	betrayal	
narrative,	like	Mao	are	deliberately	interpreting	these	events	in	a	way	that	advances	their	own	
political	purposes.32	
Reexamining	this	transition	of	power	from	Tan	to	Zhao	in	1920,	this	dissertation	argues	
that	Zhao’s	apparent	betrayal	has	been	overemphasized	in	order	to	fit	these	events	within	a	
broader	argument	concerning	the	disorder	and	violence	of	the	“Warlord	Era”	that	necessitated	
radical	change,	fully	ridding	China	of	its	feudal	past	and	fulfilling	the	expectations	set	in	1911.	
The	trends	and	currents	at	the	national	level	all	seemed	to	have	parallels	in	Hunan:	reformist	
experiments	with	provincial	autonomy,	federalism,	and	constitutionalism	mirror	the	
bureaucratic	bickering	in	the	rival	national	capitals	in	Beijing	and	Guangzhou.	Zhao’s	ostensible	
betrayal	seems	simultaneously	like	one	more	example	of	factional	politics	as	well	as	the	
increasing	militarization	that	was	inundating	China.	The	Hunan	peasant	uprising	led	by	Mao	in	
1927	that	represents	intractable	fissures	within	rural	society	was	a	precursor	to	his	eventual	
                                                
31	Edgar	Snow,	Red	Star	Over	China,	(New	York:	Grove	Press,	1968),	138.	
32	For	an	example	of	this,	see	Mao’s	critique	of	how	Zhao	Hengti	manipulated	the	Hunan	Provincial	Constitution	to	
serve	his	own	ends,	“Hunan	Under	the	Provincial	Constitution,”	(July	1,	1923)	in	Stuart	Schram,	Mao’s	Road	to	
Power,	Vol.	2:	National	Revolution	and	Social	Revolution,	December	1920-June	1927.	(Armonk,	NY.:	M.E.	Sharpe,	
1994)	166-167.	
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triumph	in	1949	at	the	national	level.	Hunan’s	history	during	this	period	seems	to	be	a	
microcosm	for	broader	issues	beyond	its	borders.	
However,	a	closer	examination	of	this	self-fulfilling	mythos	yields	significant	differences	
as	well.	Analyzing	the	mutiny	yields	a	picture	of	local	politics	that	differs	significantly	from	the	
mainstream	narrative.	At	the	very	least,	Tan	and	Zhao	were	not	cartoonishly	self-interested	
buffoons,	and	their	relationship	was	not	suffused	with	failure	and	treachery.	Recovering	their	
limited	successes	as	allies	and	administrators	suggests	the	degree	to	which	our	understanding	
of	these	events	has	been	grossly	oversimplified.	
In	choosing	to	reconstruct	the	mutiny,	its	causes,	and	its	interpretations,	this	
dissertation	reinterprets	an	ostensible	nadir	of	local	politics	to	subvert	the	dominant	history	of	
the	province	and	thus	the	nation.	The	primary	focus	is	on	the	lives	and	careers	of	Tan	and	Zhao,	
the	two	key	figures	in	this	mutiny,	as	former	Qing	elites	who	became	local	reformers	during	this	
era	of	Chinese	history.	The	lives	of	fellow	Hunanese	Li	Jiannong	and	Tao	Juyin	are	also	
introduced,	as	their	narratives	of	this	era	have	shaped	how	it	is	remembered	still.		
Born	in	the	same	year	as	Tan	and	Zhao,	Li	Jiannong’s	studies	in	Japan	and	Great	Britain	
fueled	his	fervent	advocacy	for	federalism	and	constitutional	reform.	He	first	published	his	own	
periodical	in	Shanghai	that	outlined	the	ways	in	which	federalism	could	save	China	before	
becoming	the	chair	of	the	committee	charged	with	designing	a	provincial	constitution	for	his	
home	province	as	well	as	a	senior	bureaucrat.	Following	his	retirement	from	local	politics,	he	
became	a	professor;	his	lectures	on	modern	Chinese	history	were	collected	into	a	textbook	that	
divides	those	advocating	for	change	in	the	late	Qing	and	Republican	eras	between	reformers	
and	revolutionaries.	His	sympathy	for	the	latter	over	the	former	both	represents	and	shapes	
how	the	era	is	classified	to	this	day.	
In	contrast	to	Li’s	more	scholarly	perspective,	Tao	Juyin’s	writings	were	designed	to	
appeal	to	a	wider	audience;	an	approach	informed	by	his	occupation	as	journalist	for	a	number	
of	Shanghai-based	dailies	during	this	period.	Two	decades	later,	he	drew	on	his	experience	in	
this	role	to	write	an	influential	eight	volume	“historical	romance”	on	the	warlord	era.	Filled	with	
lurid	detail	and	evoking	the	spirit	of	other	fictionalized	martial	histories	like	Romance	of	the	
Three	Kingdoms,	Tao’s	epic	emphasizes	the	intrigue	and	brutality	of	the	era,	implicitly	
suggesting	how	the	violent	social	revolution	of	the	CCP	saved	China	from	itself.	Together,	Li	and	
Tao’s	portrayals	of	the	warlord	period	have	dominated	our	understanding	of	these	years.	
The	Limits	of	Revolutionary	History?	
How	can	historians	move	beyond	the	narratives	established	by	Li	and	Tao,	given	their	
continued	influence?	What	might	a	non-revolutionary	history	of	Hunan	or	China	look	like?		
Answering	these	questions	entails	critically	reflecting	upon	our	current	paradigm,	
deconstructing	its	implicit	teleological	assumptions	concerning	the	necessity	of	radical	change,	
and	uncovering	the	unfulfilled	possibilities	for	what	could	have	been.	At	the	time	of	their	
writing,	Li	and	Tao	were	sympathetic	towards	the	KMT	and	the	CCP,	respectively.	Though	the	
two	Leninist	parties	are	typically	seen	as	diametrically	opposed,	they	share	an	ostensible	
distaste	for	the	past,	and	stress	the	need	for	radical	transformation	at	the	expense	of	managed	
and	gradual	change.	The	narratives	constructed	by	Li	and	Tao	follow	in	this	vein	and	therefore	
local	history	of	the	1920	mutiny	is	made	to	fit	the	larger	national	narrative	of	“warlord”	betrayal	
and	the	necessity	and	inevitability	of	revolution.	The	contrast	between	the	more	private	
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writings	of	elites	Zhao	and	Tan	with	the	Li	and	Tao	narratives	that	are	created	to	appeal	to	a	
wider	audience	is	worth	noting.	
Moreover,	though	Li	and	Tao	are	natives	of	Hunan,	they,	like	most	others,	write	from	
the	perspective	of	the	more	westernized	and	modernized	coast.	Inland	provinces	like	Hunan	
were	often	measured	against	the	cultural	and	economic	flourishing	of	the	Yangtze	and	Pearl	
River	Delta	areas	and	found	wanting.	Popular	fiction	like	Ba	Jin’s	Family	would	categorize	these	
areas	as	hopelessly	backward	and	underdeveloped,	contributing	to	perceptions	of	a	vast	chasm	
between	places	like	modern	Shanghai	and	the	rest	of	the	nation.33	
Consequently,	when	Tan	and	Zhao	initiated	the	development	of	Hunan	provincial	
constitution	and	became	leaders	in	the	short-lived	federalist	movement	that	advocated	for	the	
provinces	and	the	central	government	to	share	political	power,	their	efforts	were	viewed	with	
intense	skepticism.	In	histories	like	those	written	by	Li	and	Tao,	these	projects	are	little	more	
than	excuses	for	warlords	to	selfishly	further	their	own	prosperity	at	the	expense	of	the	nation.	
Indeed,	the	belief	that	federalism	is	perceived	to	be	a	key	contributor	to	an	increasingly	divided	
nation	is	deeply	ironic	for	Li	Jiannong	in	particular,	given	his	past	advocacy	for	this	form	of	
national	organization	as	a	way	of	managing	China’s	size	and	diversity.	His	description	of	the	
eventual	failure	of	federalism	in	Political	History	neglects	its	appeal,	however	short-lived.	
Hunan	thus	provides	a	window	for	an	alternative	history	of	the	transitional	decade	
between	the	death	of	Yuan	Shikai	in	1916	and	the	Northern	Expedition	in	1926.	With	Hunan	at	
the	center,	this	period	can	be	seen	as	one	of	reform	and	militarization	(defined	as	“the	spread	
of	organizational	techniques,	routines	and	attitudes	characteristic	of	the	military	to	other	
realms”)	rather	than	solely	revolution	and	militarism	(defined	as	“the	domination	of	the	
political	by	the	military”—or,	in	our	terms,	the	takeover	of	wen	by	the	wu).34	This	decade	saw	
militarization	of	institutional	changes	first	begun	by	late	Qing,	predicated	on	Confucian	norms,	
giving	way	to	militarism	of	the	Nationalist	Party	with	its	ideological	underpinning	in	the	
disciplining	of	the	entire	population.	Hunan	in	particular	demonstrated	the	possibilities	of	a	
form	of	militarization	that	worked	in	partnership	with	provincial	self-governance	with	
constitutional	aspirations.	In	other	words,	the	wu	did	not	overwhelm	the	wen.	Indeed,	the	
civility	between	Tan	and	Zhao	represents	the	elite	facilitation	of	this	possibility.		Challenging	the	
mythos	of	warlord	misrule	and	the	teleology	of	revolutionary	change	reveals	previously	
understudied	possibilities	of	how	Hunan—and	perhaps	even	China—could	have	been	under	
different	circumstances.	
	
Dissertation	Chapter	Outlines		
The	first	chapter	introduces	the	young	lives	of	Tan,	Zhao,	Li,	and	Tao	in	the	context	of	
Hunan’s	reforms	during	the	late	Qing,	leading	up	to	the	1911	Revolution.	The	topography	and	
local	history	of	Hunan	in	the	19th	century—particularly	in	regard	to	the	success	of	the	scholar-
general	Zeng	Guofan	(1811-1872)	in	the	Taiping	Civil	War	as	well	as	the	martyrdom	of	Tan	
Sitong	(1895-1898)	in	the	short-lived	1898	national	reforms—were	influential	in	shaping	their	
worldview.	This	is	most	clearly	demonstrated	by	the	answers	given	by	Tan	Yankai	in	the	1905	
                                                
33	Kristin	Stapleton,	Fact	in	Fiction:	1920s	China	and	Ba	Jin’s	Family,	(Stanford	CA.:	Stanford	University	Press,	2016),	
is	quite	astute	on	this	point.	
34	van	de	Ven,	“The	Military	in	the	Republic,”	353.		
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civil	service	exams,	in	which	his	ambiguity	concerning	the	importance	of	central	state	control	
over	local	governments	was	rewarded	with	one	of	the	highest	scores	possible.		
The	second	chapter	stays	with	the	four	in	the	years	following	1911,	now	young	men	
rising	to	positions	of	prominence,	but	shifts	the	focus	to	the	dichotomies	of	reform	and	
revolution.	During	this	period	of	time,	the	failed	efforts	to	promulgate	a	national	constitution	
and	the	attempt	by	Yuan	Shikai	to	reestablish	the	dynastic	system	with	himself	at	the	head	
were	seminal	events	that	informed	how	each	of	these	four	would	view	power	and	authority.	It	
was	also	during	this	period	that	Tan	became	provincial	governor	for	the	first	time,	following	the	
assassination	of	his	predecessor,	presaging	the	betrayal	narrative	of	1920	while	simultaneously	
inverting	it	by	having	a	bureaucrat	replace	a	soldier.	Li’s	Political	History,	which	stresses	the	
necessity	of	revolution	and	inadequacies	of	reform,	is	the	text	used	to	summarize	these	events;	
this	chapter	juxtaposes	its	narrative	with	several	documents	that	describe	the	gradual	reform	of	
Hunan’s	postal	system	to	suggest	the	policies	that	Li	overlooks.	
The	third	chapter	describes	the	political	vacuum	that	was	formed	after	Yuan	Shikai’s	
1916	death,	as	a	way	of	giving	further	background	for	the	1920	Mutiny.	Tao’s	Anecdotes	is	used	
as	the	primary	lens	through	which	these	events	are	recounted,	as	a	way	of	highlighting	how	his	
sensationalistic	style	has	shaped	our	understanding	of	the	period.	This	dissertation	argues	that	
the	sources	used	for	narrating	the	history	of	the	“Warlord	Era”	are	crucial	to	how	it	is	
conceptualized,	as	demonstrated	by	juxtaposing	the	conventional	narrative	of	chaos	as	
epitomized	by	Tao	with	a	1917	petition	from	the	Hunan	Provincial	Assembly	to	the	central	
government	that	represents	the	persistence	of	bureaucratic	communications	during	this	
tumultuous	time.	This	chapter	also	examines	two	of	Li’s	essays	on	federalism	as	a	way	of	
describing	the	influence	of	the	movement.	
The	fourth	chapter	closely	examines	common	depictions	of	the	1920	mutiny	and	
subsequent	exile	of	Tan	Yankai	that	emphasize	the	culpability	of	Zhao	Hengti	in	order	to	show	
how	the	event	has	been	narrated	to	fit	the	paradigm	established	by	Li	and	Tao.	Here,	the	
various	textbooks	and	oral	histories	on	this	event	are	compared;	in	this	narrative,	Tan	appears	
to	be	the	hapless	victim	who	is	betrayed	by	the	militarist	Zhao,	thus	fulfilling	the	common	
stereotypes	of	warlord	perfidy.	The	fifth	chapter	challenges	the	perspectives	set	forth	in	the	
fourth	chapter	in	both	interpretation	as	well	as	sources,	integrating	the	conventional	wisdom	
with	evidence	from	Tan’s	diary	and	Zhao’s	letters	that	have	only	been	made	available	within	
the	past	twenty	years,	far	after	the	publication	of	Political	History	and	Anecdotes.	Here,	the	
chapter	articulates	a	revisionist	history	of	the	mutiny	that	suggests	how	the	broader	
historiography	can	be	changed.	The	dissertation	concludes	with	an	epilogue	detailing	the	lives	
of	these	four	men	after	1920.	
Through	the	prism	of	provincial	politics	and	the	1920	mutiny,	we	can	see	how	failed	
experiments	with	federalism	were	retroactively	eclipsed	by	Leninist-style,	mass-party	politics	
on	a	national	scale.	By	carefully	comparing	and	adjudicating	different	sources,	especially	in	their	
shaping	of	narratives	and	historiography,	this	dissertation	also	tries	to	acknowledge	the	gap	
between	mythos	and	possibility	and	to	capture	those	years	prior	to	the	advent	of	mass	party	
politics,	when	elite	reformers,	using	Confucian	norms	and	practices,	directed	Hunanese	politics,	
with	provincial	self-governance	and	provincial	constitution	as	unique	contributions.		In	contrast	
to	conventional	narratives	of	revolutionary	transformation,	this	dissertation	argues	that	
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substantive	and	reformist	political	change	was	occurring	after	1911,	even	if	some	of	the	its	
rhetoric	and	norms	were	built	upon	traditional	institutions	and	forms	of	communication.
		 16	
Chapter	1:	Education,	Application,	and	the	History	of	Hunan	
	
Introduction	
	 This	chapter	briefly	outlines	the	nineteenth-century	history	of	Hunan	as	well	as	the	lives	
of	four	of	the	province’s	young	elite.	Its	purpose	in	doing	so	is	to	demonstrate	the	importance	
of	this	region	to	the	rest	of	China,	to	discuss	the	reasons	why	so	many	of	modern	China’s	
political	and	intellectual	leaders	come	from	this	area,	and	to	describe	some	of	the	options	
available	to	this	generation	of	ambitious	young	men.	Han	Chinese	born	in	the	last	two	decades	
of	the	nineteenth	century,	like	these	four,	represented	a	transitional	cohort	that	was	caught	
between	the	traditional	political	order	of	the	past	and	the	uncertain	future.	In	many	ways,	the	
material,	geostrategic,	intellectual,	and	political	conditions	in	Hunan	afforded	them	the	
appropriate	balance	of	flexibility	and	confidence	to	take	advantage	of	the	opportunities	that	
the	coming	era	would	present.	Hunan’s	material	conditions	as	well	as	its	intellectual	legacy	
imbued	Tan	and	Zhao	with	the	confidence	and	ambition	to	take	advantage	of	the	opportunities	
inherent	in	the	chaos	of	the	early	Republic.	However,	building	their	authority	upon	this	legacy	
would	eventually	limit	their	broader	appeal	and	prospects	for	advancement	as	the	mass	politics	
of	the	new	era	began	to	gain	traction.	
	
Hunan	as	a	“Between”	Place	
In	the	late	Qing,	Hunan	was	a	space	to	respond	to	the	military	affront	of	the	Taipings	
and	the	uneasy	appearance	of	foreigners.	In	this	cross-section	of	martial	innovation,	extra-
bureaucratic	restructurings,	and	new	schools,	Hunan’s	elites	and	especially	its	youth	developed	
new	strategies	for	advancement	and	new	conceptions	of	wen	and	wu	that	both	challenged	and	
resonated	with	those	of	prior	generations	of	Chinese	elites.	Its	history	as	an	internal	frontier	
and	as	the	home	to	the	saviors	of	the	Qing	produced	the	appropriate	conditions	for	
experimentation	with	new	ways	of	thinking	that	would	not	alienate	the	broader	nation.	
Hunan’s	armies	had	defended	the	empire	and	defeated	prior	attempts	to	subvert	Confucian	
traditions	during	the	mid-nineteenth	century;	in	the	process,	the	defenders	of	tradition	led	a	
conservative	reformist	agenda	called	the	Statecraft	School	(經世派).	Ironically,	by	the	late	
nineteenth	century,	inheritors	of	that	legacy	would	present	themselves	as	working	within	that	
tradition	to	modernize	and	even	overthrow	that	same	empire.	1	
Physically,	Hunan—so	named	because	of	its	position	south	(nan)	of	large	lake	(hu)	
Dongting—can	be	categorized	as	a	“between”	place	in	multiple	ways.	Spatially,	it	is	between	
several	provinces:	Hubei	to	its	north,	Sichuan	and	Guizhou	to	its	west,	Guangxi	and	Guangdong	
to	its	south,	and	Jiangxi	to	its	east.	As	a	result,	unlike	provinces	like	Yunnan	or	Guangxi	that	
                                                
1	For	more	on	these	texts	and	the	statecraft	school,	see	Benjamin	A.	Elman,	“The	Relevance	of	Sung	Learning	in	the	
Late	Ch'ing:	Wei	Yuan	and	the	Huang-ch'ao	ching-shih	wen-pien,”	Late	Imperial	China	Vol.	9	No.	2	(Dec.	1988),	56-
85;	Philip	A.	Kuhn,	Rebellion	and	Its	Enemies	in	Late	Imperial	China:	Militarization	and	Social	Structure,	1796-1864	
(Cambridge,	MA.:	Harvard	University	Press,	1970);	Daniel	McMahon,	Rethinking	the	Decline	of	China’s	Qing	
Dynasty:	Imperial	Activism	and	Borderland	Management	at	the	Turn	of	the	Nineteenth	Century.	(Routledge,	2015);	
William	T.	Rowe,	Saving	the	World:	Chen	Hongmou	and	Elite	Consciousness	in	Eighteenth-Century	China.	(Stanford,	
CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	2001);	Frederic	Wakeman	Jr.,	“The	Huang-ch'ao	ching-shih	wen-pien,”	Ch'ing-shih	
wen-t'i	1.10	(1969),	8-22	
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border	a	foreign	state,	or	maritime	provinces	like	Fujian	or	Guangdong,	Hunan	is	not	a	
borderland	area,	and	therefore	not	a	natural	recipient	of	the	influence	of	any	non-Chinese	
culture	or	tradition.	Geopolitically,	Hunan	is	also	a	strategic	military	space.		
Hunan’s	waterways	constitute	a	second	factor	that	contributes	to	its	integration	with	
the	rest	of	China.	The	aforementioned	Dongting	Lake	was	a	major	center	of	commerce	that	
joined	with	the	Yangzi	river,	making	connections	to	the	tri-cities	of	Hankow-Hanyang-Wuchang	
in	Hubei	province	(now	better	known	as	Wuhan)	as	well	as	the	more	physically	distant	Jiangnan	
region	easy	as	well	as	economical.	By	the	late	nineteenth	century,	Hunan	had	become	
integrated	with	the	national	market,	taking	advantage	of	“climactic	conditions	that	were	very	
favorable	to	high-yielding,	intensive	agriculture”2	to	become	a	net	exporter	of	rice,	tea,	and	
other	agricultural	products.3	With	the	opening	of	Hankow	to	foreign	trade	in	the	middle	of	the	
nineteenth	century	the	orientation	of	the	province’s	export	shifted	away	from	the	south	
towards	the	north.4	
Yet	Hunan	was	also	a	“between”	place	in	its	geographical	features,	being	dominated	by	
waterways	as	well	as	mountains.	While	the	four	major	rivers—Xiang,	Yuan,	Zi,	and	Li—that	fed	
into	Dongting	Lake	in	the	north	created	valleys	with	fertile	soil	that	enabled	intensive	
agricultural	production	and	dense	settlement,	the	province	was	bordered	on	the	west,	south,	
and	east	by	mountain	ranges	that	created	a	clear	separation	from	neighboring	provinces.	G.	
William	Skinner	classifies	Hunan	as	one	of	the	constituent	polities	of	the	“Middle	Yangtse”	
macro-region	along	with	its	northern	neighbor	Hubei,	as	these	drainage	basins	and	mountain	
ranges	closely	linked	the	two	provinces	with	regards	to	commerce	and	trade.5	The	two	were	
only	separated	into	separate	political	entities	under	the	Qing	dynasty;	even	then,	many	
administrative	functions	were	based	in	Wuhan,	under	the	office	of	the	Huguang	Zongdu,	or	
Viceroy	(總督).	Wuhan’s	greater	size	and	economic	dominance	over	the	macro-region	made	it	
the	more	logical	location	for	this	office,	but	the	effect	of	this	political	choice	was	to	reduce	
Hunan	in	relative	political	importance,	effectively	rendering	the	province	distant	from	the	rest	
of	the	empire	during	the	majority	of	the	dynasty.	This	topography	had	the	effect	of	turning	
Hunan	economically	inward,	with	the	majority	of	its	economic	activity	and	attention	focused	on	
itself	and	its	neighbor,	in	line	with	Skinner’s	findings	concerning	the	importance	of	physical	
features	in	determining	commercial	interchange.	In	other	words,	using	Skinner’s	vocabulary,	
the	bureaucratic	and	administrative	boundaries	of	the	province	that	had	been	imposed	by	the	
central	state	corresponded	with	the	topographic	boundaries	set	by	the	mountains,	contributing	
to	a	strong	provincial	identity.	In	other	words,	Hunan’s	this	terrain	made	frequent	inter-
                                                
2	Peter	Perdue,	Exhausting	the	Earth:	State	and	Peasant	in	Hunan,	1500-1800	AD	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	
University	Press,	1987),	27.	
3	See	also	Evelyn	Rawski,	“Regional	Diversity	in	the	Development	of	Hunan”	in	Evelyn	Rawski,	Agricultural	Change	
and	the	Peasant	Economy	of	South	China	(Cambridge,	MA.:	Harvard	University	Press,	1972)	for	more	on	Qing-era	
Hunan.	
4	William	T.	Rowe,	Hankow:	Commerce	and	Society	in	a	Chinese	City,	1796-1889.	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	
Press,	1984)	58,	88.	
5	For	one	example	of	his	articulation	of	these	ideas,	see	G.	William	Skinner,	“Regional	Urbanization	in	Nineteenth-
Century	China,”	in	G.	William	Skinner,	ed.,	The	City	in	Late	Imperial	China.	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	Press,	
1969),	211-252.	
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provincial	movement	difficult,	yet	not	insurmountable	enough	to	prevent	flourishing	trade,	
creating	connection	as	well	as	division	between	its	different	regions.6		
The	combination	of	these	features	caused	Hunan	to	be	a	“between”	place	with	regards	
to	any	division	between	north	and	south	China.	In	the	first	decade	and	a	half	after	the	1911	
Revolution,	when	various	factions	of	militarists	contended	with	each	other	for	hegemony	over	
the	remnants	of	the	fallen	empire,	geography	proved	to	be	one	of	the	fault	lines	along	which	
alliances	were	formed.	In	order	to	move	goods	or	troops	between	north	and	south,	travel	
across	Hunan	was	all	but	inevitable.	Angus	McDonald	Jr.	concisely	describes	these	
circumstances	and	how	they	affected	Hunan:	
During	the	Period	of	Confusion	(1913-1928),	the	province	was	a	springboard	for	
Southern	warlords	interested	in	moving	against	the	North,	for	the	Wuhan	cities	
were	 nearly	 on	 its	 border	 and	with	 them	 lay	 control	 of	 the	 commerce	 of	 the	
middle	Yangtze	basin.	Hunan	was	not	a	good	springboard	for	an	attack	upon	the	
South:	 there	 are	many	 natural	 barriers	 across	 the	 border,	 including	 the	 easily	
defended	Nanling	Mountains	in	southern	Hunan	itself;	but	a	Hunan	in	the	hands	
of	the	South	posed	a	real	strategic	threat	to	the	north.7			
	
In	short,	Hunan’s	central	location	made	it	a	crossroads	and	therefore	a	key	target	for	conquest	
by	any	faction	that	aspired	to	control	the	nation.	Historically,	this	had	also	been	the	case:	Philip	
Kuhn	makes	the	point	that	the	Taiping	Army	enjoyed	their	most	success	after	1852,	once	they	
had	progressed	“out	of	rivers	draining	toward	the	south	coast	and	into	rivers	draining	towards	
the	Yangtze.”8	In	other	words,	control	over	Hunan	and	its	surroundings	provided	the	resources	
that	fueled	the	subsequent	Taiping	victories	in	the	wealthy	Lower	Yangtze	area.	Lyman	Van	
Slyke	concurs,	noting	that	“in	so	many	instances	in	Chinese	history,	control	of	the	middle	
Yangtze	was	the	key	to	the	lower	river,”	making	Hunan	an	essential	stepping	stone	for	any	
military	force	wishing	to	control	the	river	and	the	nation.9	These	geopolitical	circumstances	
meant	that	violence	was	practically	endemic	to	the	area	during	the	early	Republic,	with	
Hunanese	and	non-Hunanese	armies	alike	being	continually	stationed	in	any	area	that	offered	
economic	and	military	benefits.		
The	mountainous	regions	of	the	province,	particularly	in	West	Hunan,	also	represented	
another	type	of	between-state	for	Hunan:	both	civilized	and	barbarian.	People	groups	like	the	
Miao,	Tujia,	and	Yao	living	in	these	areas	were	culturally	distinct	from	the	majority	Han	that	
populated	the	river	valleys.	These	ethnic	minorities	were	perceived	to	be	“raw”	or	“barbaric”	in	
nature,	ostensibly	needing	the	civilization	that	the	empire	would	bring.	What	was	more	
important,	perhaps,	was	the	valuable	land	upon	which	they	resided;	the	desire	to	“tame”	and	
                                                
6	For	more	on	the	peculiarities	of	this	internal	frontier,	see	also	Jerome	Ch’en,	The	Highlanders	of	Central	China:	A	
History,	1895-1937	(Armonk,	NY.:	M.E.	Sharpe,	1992).	
7	Angus	W.	McDonald,	The	Urban	Origins	of	Rural	Revolution:	Elites	and	the	Masses	in	Hunan	Province,	China,	
1911-1927	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1978),	7.	
8	Kuhn,	Rebellion	and	its	Enemies,	114.	
9	Lyman	Van	Slyke,	Yangtze:	Nature,	History,	and	the	River,	(Addison-Wesley,	1988),	150.	
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“enlighten”	these	peoples	strongly	paralleled	the	impulse	of	Han	immigrants	and	the	imperial	
state	to	clear	and	settle	their	land.10		
After	the	destruction	of	the	Taiping	Rebellion,	estimates	of	Hunan’s	population	at	the	
turn	of	the	century	vary.	One	1885	census	of	the	Qing	empire	estimated	this	figure	to	be	21	
million,	with	the	1910	figure	falling	somewhat	to	20.5	million.11	Historian	Chang	P’eng-yuan	
suggests	this	figure	omits	data	from	14	of	the	province’s	75	prefectures,	and	approximates	the	
1911	population	at	about	24	million.12	Luo	Huanzhen	argues	that	these	figures	require	further	
revision	still,	citing	a	1912	survey	that	put	the	population	of	Hunan	at	27.6	million.13	These	
numbers	are	confused	further	by	Hunanese	leaders	during	the	1911	Revolution	proclaiming	
themselves	to	be	representing	their	30	million	fellow	provincials.14	As	Tong	Lam	demonstrates,	
the	desire	for	census	information	sometimes	led	to	inflated	estimates	of	China’s	population.15	
Stepping	away	from	a	definitive	conclusion	about	the	exact	figure,	there	is	perhaps	enough	
evidence	to	surmise	that	the	population	was	both	sizeable	and	growing.		
This	large	increase	in	population	size	strongly	suggests	the	continued	prosperity	of	
Hunan	during	in	the	post-Taiping	era.	The	reliability	of	tax	records	or	provincial	budgets	make	
concrete	estimations	of	provincial	affluence	speculative,	at	best.		Chang	P’eng-yuan	argues	that	
Hunan’s	tax	revenues	in	1900	were	roughly	three	million	taels;	a	figure	that	doubled	by	1911	
and	was	roughly	in	balance	with	expenditures	by	that	point.16	His	figures	are	worth	noting	in	
the	context	of	later	claims	by	provincial	leaders	that	Hunan’s	treasury	was	empty,	and	lacked	
funds	to	pay	for	military	and	education	expenses.		
Hunan	possessed,	and	continues	to	possess,	a	climate	and	topography	favorable	for	
highly	productive	agriculture,	a	spatial	location	between	thriving	ports	like	Hankow	and	
Guangzhou,	and	the	navigable	waterways	to	make	interchange	possible	among	all	of	these	
regions.	Travelers	during	the	late	Qing	in	particular	expressed	shock	at	the	high	volume	of	trade	
along	Dongting	Lake.	Rice	could	be	harvested	as	many	as	three	times	in	a	year,	and	its	annual	
export	during	the	late	Qing	exceeded	67,000	tons	annually.	Tea,	minerals,	timber,	bamboo,	coal,	
and	many	other	natural	resources	were	exported	by	the	province,	contributing	to	the	tax	
revenues	of	the	provincial	government	as	well	as	the	wealth	of	the	elites	who	controlled	these	
businesses.	These	material	conditions	persist	across	political	regimes,	so	it	is	not	unreasonable	
                                                
10	For	more	on	Qing	attempts	to	pacify,	but	not	conquer,	this	‘barbarian’	minority	region,	see	Donald	Sutton,	
“Ethnicity	and	the	Miao	Frontier	in	the	Eighteenth	Century,”	in	Pamela	Crossley,	Helen	Siu,	and	Donald	Sutton,	
eds.,	Empire	at	the	Margins:	Ethnicity	and	Frontier	in	Early	Modern	China	(Berkeley,	University	of	California	Press,	
2006),	190-228;	Donald	Sutton,	“Ethnic	Revolt	in	the	Qing	Empire:	‘The	‘Miao	Uprising’	of	1795-1797	Reexamined,”	
in	Asia	Minor,	3rd	Series,	Vol.	16,	No.	2	(2003),	105-152;	Daniel	McMahon,	Rethinking	the	Decline.	For	a	discussion	
of	this	area	during	the	Ming,	see	Yonglin	Jiang,	“The	‘Southern	Great	Wall	of	China’	in	Fenghuang	County:	
Discovery	and	Restoration,”	in	Ming	Studies,	68	(2013),	57-82.	
11	W.W.	Rockhill,	“The	1910	Census	of	China,”	in	T’uong	Pao,	2nd	Series,	Vol.	13.,	no.	1.	(1912),	117-125.	
12	Chang	P’eng-yuan	[Zhang	Pengyuan]	張朋園,	中國現代化的的研究：湖南省，1860-1916	[Research	on	the	
Modernization	of	Different	Regions	of	China:	Hunan	Province,	1860-1916].	(Taipei:	Academia	Sinica,	1983),	13.	
13	Luo	Huanzhen,	“民国人口：研究史の整理と展望”	[The	Population	of	the	Republic:	A	Summary	and	
Observation	on	Historical	Research]	Hitotsubashi	University	Discussion	Paper	No.	D97-9,	August	1997.	
14	McDonald,	Rural	Revolution,	7.	
15	Tong	Lam,	A	Passion	for	Facts:	Social	Surveys	and	the	Construction	of	the	Chinese	Nation	State,	1900-1949	
(Berkeley,	CA.:	University	of	California	Press,	2011).	
16	Chang	P’eng-yuan	[Zhang	Pengyuan],	Hunan	Province,	232.	
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to	speculate	that	the	province	during	the	late	Qing	and	early	republican	periods	was	relatively	
affluent,	though	certainly	in	an	uneven	and	unequal	fashion.17		
One	final	point	remains	concerning	Hunan’s	material	conditions:	its	large	area	of	about	
84,000	square	miles,	its	topography	of	mountains	and	rivers,	and	its	relatively	rural	population	
created	a	space	that	was	diffuse	and	separated.	The	various	dialects	of	Chinese	that	are	spoken	
in	Hunan	today	are	often	mutually	unintelligible;	this	level	of	linguistic	diversity	in	the	present	
era,	even	after	considerable	effort	to	push	the	National	Language	(Guoyu)	Movement	in	the	
1920s	and	thereafter,	strongly	suggests	an	even	greater	degree	during	the	late	Qing.18	Thus,	
while	Hunan	had	a	strong	provincial	spirit	that	linked	its	people	together	beyond	its	borders	in	
places	like	Beijing	or	Tokyo,	there	existed	such	intra-provincial	diversity	that	real	rivalries	might	
persist	between	different	regions	and	prefectures.	West	Hunan,	as	noted	above,	is	one	example,	
but	the	stark	differences	between	the	broad	plains	of	the	east	and	the	mountainous	south	
created	a	division	there	as	well.	In	other	words,	though	Hunan	might	have	appeared	unified	and	
cohesive	to	outsiders,	the	province	was	actually	linguistically	and	ethnically	diverse	and	
somewhat	fractured.		
The	combination	of	all	these	material	factors	creates	a	province	that	required	
competent	political	leadership	and	innovative	policy	solutions	for	solving	new	problems	of	
administration	and	control.	The	Hunanese	elites	of	the	late	nineteenth	century	were	inheritors	
of	a	provincial	tradition	of	cultural	and	economic	integration	within	the	larger	Qing	empire	as	
well	as	a	history	of	needing	the	military	administration	befitting	a	frontier	area.	By	the	start	of	
the	nineteenth	century,	much	of	the	formerly	empty	lands	had	been	filled	with	Han	migrants,	
and	friction	with	the	native	“minority”	tribes	was	widespread.	In	the	empire	as	a	whole,	the	
limited	state	capacity	of	the	Qing	was	colliding	with	the	skyrocketing	population	growth	that	
had	accompanied	the	peace	and	prosperity	of	the	eighteenth	century.	In	Hunan,	these	issues	
were	even	more	acute,	necessitating	competent	management	of	public	infrastructure,	like	the	
dikes	that	had	been	constructed	around	Dongting	lake.19		
By	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	capable	local	administration	was	also	needed	to	
control	another	phenomenon	with	which	the	rest	of	the	nation	was	grappling:	foreign	influence.	
Hunan’s	economic	prosperity	and	strategic	importance	had	made	it	an	object	of	envy,	yet	it	
retained	a	reputation	for	being	fervently	anti-foreign	and	its	leaders	had	successfully	postponed	
the	establishment	of	the	treaty-ports	that	had	been	established	along	China’s	east	coast	
decades	prior,	and	had	begun	to	make	their	way	along	major	waterways	towards	the	interior.	
However,	in	no	small	part	because	“Hunan	had	been	one	of	the	major	targets	of	the	Japanese	
in	their	negotiating	of	the	Treaty	of	Shimonoseki	after	the	1894-1895	Sino-Japanese	War,	and	
of	the	Sino-Japanese	Trade	Treaty	signed	in	1896,”20	four	treaty	ports	were	established	in	
                                                
17	Charlton	M.	Lewis,	Prologue	to	the	Chinese	Revolution:	The	Transformation	of	Ideas	and	Institutions	in	Hunan	
Province,	1891-1907	(Cambridge,	MA.:	Harvard	University	Press,	1976),	6-8.	
18	For	a	survey	of	the	various	Hunanese	(Xiang)	dialects,	see	Bao,	Houxing	鲍厚星	and	Chen	Hui 陈晖,	“湘語的分
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19	See	James	Lee,	“The	Legacy	of	Immigration	in	Southwest	China,	1250-1850,”	in	Annales	de	Démographie	
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Hunan	in	just	eight	years:	Yuezhou	in	1899,	Changsha	in	1904,	Changde	and	Xiangtan	both	in	
1906.	With	these	new	forms	of	semi-colonial	administration	came	the	attendant	merchants	and	
missionaries,	as	well	as	their	new	ideas.	
Hunan’s	long	tradition	of	intellectual	scholarship	thus	clashed	directly	with	these	
influences	from	abroad,	causing	the	province	to	be	caught	“between”	in	yet	another	way.	This	
conservative	tradition	is	epitomized	by	the	Yuelu	Academy	in	the	mountains	of	Changsha.	
Founded	in	the	early	Song	dynasty,	Yuelu	Academy	had	hosted	famed	scholars	Zhu	Xi	(1130-
1200)	and	Zhang	Shi	(1133-1180),	and	was	almost	certainly	the	best-known	institute	of	higher	
learning	in	the	province.	A	number	of	important	early	nineteenth-century	scholar-officials	were	
associated	with	this	school,	including	Wei	Yuan	(1794-1857)	and	He	Changling	(1785-1848),	the	
editors	of	the	“Collected	Essays	about	Qing	Statecraft”	(皇朝經世文編].	Wei	and	He,	along	with	
their	academic	anthology,	represent	a	statecraft	tradition	that	is	directly	linked	to	Hunanese	
concerns	with	political	administration	and	frontier	management.21		
In	short,	the	material	and	geographical	conditions	in	late	nineteenth-century	Hunan	
imbued	its	people	with	a	combination	of	confidence	in	their	own	ability	to	lead	and	ambition	to	
bring	those	talents	to	the	national	level.	To	repurpose	Skinnerian	language,	it	was	a	province	on	
the	economic	periphery	of	the	nation	when	compared	with	more	core	areas	like	the	Lower	
Yangtse	or	Pearl	River	Deltas,	or	even	its	neighbor	Hubei	to	the	north.	Yet	it	retained	aspirations	
to	political	leadership,	assisted	by	the	widely-held	belief	that	control	over	its	Middle	Yangtse	
macro-region	was	essential	for	broader	control.	In	a	sense,	Hunan	during	the	late	Qing	had	a	
sense	of	its	own	cultural	and	political	importance	that	were	in	tension	with	its	comparatively	
lower	economic	importance.22	
	
The	Legacy	of	Zeng	Guofan	
That	being	said,	Hunanese	were	not	well-represented	in	the	Qing	state	until	after	the	
triumph	of	Zeng	Guofan	(1811-1872)	and	his	Hunan	Army	over	the	Taiping	Heavenly	Kingdom	in	
their	long	and	bloody	war	of	1850-1964,	which	simultaneously	reinvigorated	interest	in	the	
conservative	Confucian	tradition	and	created	a	relatively	new	trend	of	Hunanese	rising	to	
extremely	senior	positions	of	political	power.	Zeng	was	a	jinshi,	or	metropolitan	scholar,	and	a	
member	of	the	Hanlin	academy:	the	two	most	impressive	academic	qualifications	that	a	civil	
official	could	have,	thus	demonstrating	his	grasp	of	wen.		
Zeng’s	national-level	prestige,	coupled	with	truly	dire	circumstances,	allowed	him	to	
experiment	with	new	system	of	wu.23	Although	China	had	long	prohibited	officials	from	serving	
in	their	home	towns,	according	to	the	Law	of	Avoidance,	Zeng	happened	to	be	mourning	the	
loss	of	his	mother	at	precisely	the	time	that	the	Taiping	Army	was	encroaching	upon	Hunan.	
Because	the	Green	Standard	(Han	army,	綠營兵)	had	declined,	Zeng	created	an	auxiliary	
                                                
21	For	more	on	Wei	Yuan,	see	Philip	A.	Kuhn,	“Participation	and	Authority	in	the	Thought	of	Wei	Yuan,”	in	Philip	A.	
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22	The	tension	articulated	here	can	be	compared	to	that	identified	for	Zhejiang	in	Wen-hsin	Yeh,	Provincial	
Passages:	Culture,	Space,	and	the	Origins	of	Chinese	Communism,	(Berkeley,	CA.:	University	of	California	Press,	
1996),	262-3n3.	
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(New	York,	NY.:	Knopf,	2012).	
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military	corps	called	the	Hunan	(Xiang)	Army	(湘軍),	which	was	built	on	the	basis	of	gentry-led	
militia	units.	In	other	words,	Zeng	used	personal	knowledge	and	cultural	capital	to	recruit	
soldiers	locally,	and	units	were	comprised	of	family	members	(for	example,	uncles	and	nephews	
in	the	same	unit).	Zeng	also	led	his	protégé	Li	Hongzhang	李鴻章	(1823-1901)	in	the	formation	
of	the	Anhui	(Huai)	Army	(淮軍).	Because	the	militia	followed	kinship	networks,	there	was	a	
possibility	of	internal	loyalty	rather	than	the	top-down	mobilization	characteristic	of	the	Qing	
banner	system.	The	militia	were	also	financed	locally	through	an	additional	“likin	tax”	(written	
alternatively	as	厘金	or	禮金),	as	a	conversation	surcharge	that	was	unevenly	levied,	and	not	
controlled	by	the	court.	Most	importantly,	Zeng	created	a	“tent	government”	(幕府)	of	
extralegal	employees	to	help	him	buy	Western	weapons.	Famously,	Zeng	recruited	Yung	Wing	
(1828-1912),	among	the	first	boys	sent	to	study	abroad	in	the	United	States	and	who	had	
graduated	from	Yale	University,	to	purchase	modern	weaponry	abroad.	Because	these	efforts	
shifted	control	from	the	central	court	to	the	province	(in	terms	of	local	militia,	local	taxes,	and	
para-governmental	bureaucracy),	the	Self-Strengthening	Movement	is	often	considered	a	turn	
toward	“devolution”	of	power	from	the	center,	or	“decentralization.”	This	shift	led	Philip	Kuhn	
to	conclude	that	the	Self-Strengthening	Movement	perhaps	preserved	the	Qing	dynasty,	but	
actually	led	to	“civilizational	decline”	of	Confucian	China	as	a	whole.24	This	perspective	
essentializes	Confucian	China	as	somehow	centered	or	defined	by	the	court,	and	ignores	other	
ways	that	dynamic	traditions	could	legitimately	continue	in	the	provinces.		
Zeng	Guofan	certainly	saw	himself	as	a	defender	of	Chinese	traditions	rather	than	as	
someone	who	would	initiate	processes	to	undermine	them.	As	the	chief	architect	of	the	Qing	
victory	over	Taiping	forces,	Zeng	was	also	an	exemplar	of	wu	values	as	well:	neither	feeble	civil	
official,	nor	witless	soldier,	but	instead	the	ideal	embodiment	of	how	wen	and	wu	could	be	
integrated	in	a	traditional	form.25	Building	upon	the	statecraft	tradition	of	Wei	and	He,	Zeng	
integrated	Confucian	principles	into	the	training	and	organization	of	his	army,	and	his	victory	
was	seen	as	an	ideological	defeat	of	the	Taiping	rebels’	alien	pseudo-Christianity.	With	the	
extant	political	and	social	order	preserved,	Zeng	and	his	subordinates	were	promoted	to	
positions	all	over	the	empire.26		
Zeng’s	success	cemented	the	intellectual	trajectory	of	elites	all	over	the	empire.	The	
Self-Strengthening	Movement	was	inspired	by	Zeng:	his	Taiping	enemies	represented	a	new	
and	dangerous	ideology	that	might	have	toppled	the	Qing	and	taken	China	in	a	completely	
different	direction;	Zeng’s	victory	was	not	only	the	triumph	of	one	armed	force	over	another,	
but	also	of	the	conservative	tradition	over	a	possible	alternative	form	of	Chinese	culture,	state,	
and	society.27	Furthermore,	Zeng	and	his	lieutenants	were	“offered	bureaucratic	appointments	
and	promotions	on	the	basis	of	military	service,	rather	than	on	the	traditional	academic	system	
                                                
24	Kuhn,	Rebellion	and	Its	Enemies.	
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1964).	
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of	civil	service	examinations,”28	which,	as	these	officers	were	all	classically	trained,	represented	
a	rebalancing	of	wen	and	wu	that	was	closer	in	alignment	with	historical	norms	than	the	Qing	
had	seen	before.	More	importantly,	the	prestige	associated	with	Zeng	and	his	lieutenants,	who	
now	played	in	key	positions	all	over	the	empire,	meant	that	Qing	policy	would	move	in	a	more	
conservative	direction.	
To	characterize	this	direction	as	conservative,	however,	is	not	to	lose	sight	of	its	
reformist	ambitions.	As	encapsulated	by	the	slogan,	“Chinese	Learning	as	Substance,	Western	
Learning	as	Application”	(中學為體，西學為用),	or	“ti-yong”,	those	subscribing	to	this	
philosophy	advocated	for	a	fusion	of	philosophies	that	joined	traditional	China	with	the	new	
forms	of	knowledge	introduced	by	the	West.	The	resulting	order	would	not	be	the	complete	
revolution	that	was	represented	by	the	Taiping	threat,	but	neither	would	it	be	a	wholesale	
reversion	to	traditional	Confucianism,	as	if	the	Opium	Wars	and	other	foreign	incursions	had	
not	happened.	Proponents	would	try	to	work	within	the	system	to	ensure	future	generations	
would	be	much	better	equipped	to	deal	with	external	threats.		
The	Qing	official	most	associated	with	this	program	of	action	was	Zhang	Zhidong	(1837-
1909),	who	served	in	a	number	of	important	offices	across	his	long	career,	including	viceroy	of	
Huguang,	the	administrative	entity	that	combined	Hunan	and	Hubei.	Another	jinshi	concerned	
with	martial	matters,	he	sponsored	a	number	of	initiatives	that	built	upon	Zeng’s	legacy	as	the	
ideal	embodiment	of	wen	and	wu,	but	in	ways	that	were	more	suited	for	his	new	ti-yong	
philosophy.	These	included,	but	were	not	limited	to,	constructing	arsenals,	founding	military	
academies,	and	sponsoring	students	to	study	as	military	cadets	abroad.	In	the	case	of	Hunan,	
Zhang	worked	with	his	protégé,	the	open-minded	governor	of	Hunan	Chen	Baozhen	(1831-
1900),	to	nudge	the	province	away	from	reflexive	anti-foreignism	and	towards	a	broader	
acceptance	of	foreign	ideas.	Chen,	who	took	office	in	1895,	proved	to	be	an	ideal	partner.29		
That	same	year	marked	the	end	of	the	first	Sino-Japanese	War,	and	signaled	a	new	
urgency	for	elites	like	Zhang	and	Chen	who	supported	strengthening	China	and	the	Qing	state	
by	integrating	wen	and	wu	within	a	new	ti-yong	framework.	Humiliation	at	the	hands	of	
Imperial	Japan	made	the	prior	decades’	efforts	to	develop	a	modern	military	appear	futile.	
Further	change	was	clearly	needed,	and	emulating	the	newly	victorious	Japan	was	a	natural	
choice:	the	Japanese	Meiji	Restoration	that	had	begun	in	1868	showed	how	a	state	could	
rapidly	transform	society	without	the	radical	social	ruptures	that	seemed	to	accompany	
revolutions	in	other	places	like	France.30	Moreover,	this	cultural	shift	clearly	had	military	
consequences,	adding	existential	weight	to	what	might	have	previously	been	merely	an	
academic	exercise:	the	fate	of	the	empire	depended	upon	change.	
In	1897,	Zhang	and	Chen	permitted	the	founding	of	a	new	school	in	Changsha	that	
represented	a	clear	break	from	the	examination-centered	classical	learning	of	the	past.	Called	
the	“School	for	Current	Affairs”	(時務學堂),	it	was	directed	by	Liang	Qichao	(1873-1929),	who	
supported	a	version	of	Confucianism	that	was	oriented	around	change	and	progress	instead	of	
                                                
28	Platt,	Provincial	Patriots,	28.	
29	For	more	on	Zhang,	see	Hummel,	ed.,	Eminent	Chinese,	27-31.	
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to	the	threat	of	the	Taiping,	the	Meiji	policies	must	have	been	appealing.	For	more,	see	Daikichi	Irokawa,	The	
Culture	of	the	Meiji	Period,	trans.	Marius	B.	Jansen	(Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press,	1985).	
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conservatism	and	tradition.	Liang,	alongside	Tang	Caichang	(1867-1900)	and	Tan	Sitong	(1865-
1898),	two	natives	of	Liuyang,	in	Eastern	Hunan,	were	the	key	engines	for	the	flowering	of	
reform	over	the	next	year.	The	three	would	use	the	School	for	Current	Affairs,	as	well	as	
newspapers	and	study	groups,	to	spread	their	ideas	about	political	and	social	reform	among	
their	students	and	peers.31	
Though	the	ideas	advocated	by	Liang,	Tang,	and	Tan	would	ostensibly	fit	the	mold	that	
was	sought	by	Zhang	and	Chen,	they	represented	something	more	radical,	and	unsurprisingly	
provoked	a	conservative	backlash.	The	three	leaders	of	this	new	movement	were	all	classically	
trained	in	old	examination	system,	yet	their	agenda	included	policies	like	the	abolition	of	those	
same	exams	that	had	conferred	credentials	upon	them.	Though	their	ideal	program	of	change	
remained	elite-led,	some	ideas	seemed	uncomfortably	alien:	for	example,	Tan	Sitong	claimed	
that	China	had	no	privileged	access	to	special	knowledge,	but	was	merely	one	country	among	
many	in	the	world,	and	criticized	Zeng	Guofan	for	having	“committed	greater	atrocities	than	
had	the	Taiping	rebels.”32		Conservative	elements	of	the	Hunanese	gentry	were	disturbed	by	
this	extreme	perspective,	and	formed	counter-reform	organizations	in	response.	Viceroy	Zhang	
and	Governor	Chen	signaled	their	shared	concern,	and	many	of	those	in	the	leadership	of	the	
School	for	Current	Affairs	resigned	their	positions	in	1898.33	
By	this	point,	however,	the	winds	of	change	had	found	their	way	to	Beijing	in	a	short-
lived	period	where	it	seemed	as	though	the	Qing	state	was	about	to	embark	upon	a	radical	
restructuring.	In	the	summer	of	1898,	the	Guangxu	emperor	issued	a	flurry	of	edicts	that	would	
have	fulfilled	many	of	Liang,	Tang,	and	Tan’s	goals.	Indeed,	the	latter	two	had	been	summoned	
to	the	capital	to	assist	in	implementing	the	very	institutional	changes	they	had	called	for	as	
propagandists	in	Changsha.	The	three	would	go	on	to	champion	their	ideas	at	the	national	level	
in	Peking	the	next	year,	and	though	this	effort	would	end	in	a	coup	by	traditional	conservatives	
supporting	the	Empress	Dowager	Cixi,	the	exile	of	Liang	to	Japan,	and	the	death	of	Tan,	many	of	
their	proposals	would	be	largely	followed	by	the	Qing	in	the	years	afterwards.		
For	Hunan,	however,	political	reform	would	have	to	wait	another	decade,	as	the	
provincial	officials	after	1898	sided	with	conservatives	among	the	local	gentry	to	suppress	any	
subversive	thought	that	might	lead	to	anti-Qing	rebellion.	There	were	several	attempts	to	
foment	local	uprisings	that	might	lead	to	empire-wide	revolution,	but	they	were	discovered	and	
brutally	crushed,	as	in	the	case	of	Tang	Caichang	in	1900.34	For	the	most	part,	the	Zeng	Guofan	
legacy	of	Hunanese	wen-wu	integration	and	reconceptualization	that	had	seemed	so	promising	
from	1895-98	was	eliminated.	Though	there	remained	some	faint	embers	of	reformist	fervor,	
Hunan	had	become	a	province	of	conservative	thought.	The	center	of	possible	change	for	the	
Qing	was	now	relocated	to	the	national	capital	in	Beijing.	
	
Yuan	Shikai,	Reformer	
Perhaps	ironically,	one	of	the	senior	Qing	officials	promoting	reforms	after	the	1898	
failure	was	the	same	individual	who	has	often	been	blamed	for	instigating	Cixi’s	coup:	Yuan	
                                                
31	Platt,	Provincial	Patriots,	78-86.	
32	Lewis,	Chinese	Revolution,	59.	
33	Ibid.,	62-66.	
34	Lewis,	Chinese	Revolution,	93-109.	
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Shikai	(1859-1916).	From	the	perspective	of	balancing	new	conceptions	of	wen	and	wu,	Yuan’s	
political	career	provides	an	interesting	counterpoint	to	that	of	those	discussed	already,	because	
his	success	to	that	point	was	almost	entirely	attributable	to	martial	valor	as	opposed	to	
academic	achievement.	In	nineteenth-century	Qing	China,	officials	like	Zeng	Guofan	or	Zhang	
Zhidong,	as	well	as	activists	like	Liang	Qichao	or	Tang	Sitong,	were	all	able	to	contribute	their	
ideas	to	the	public	sphere	because	they	had	the	necessary	certification:	their	performance	on	
the	civil	service	examinations	had	demonstrated	their	intellects	as	well	as	their	cultural	capital.	
Most	exam	candidates,	like	Yuan,	did	not	pass	these	tests,	and	thus	had	no	opportunity	to	join	
public	office	or	the	elite	class;	Yuan	rose	above	this	vast	majority	through	military	service.	He	
distinguished	himself	during	the	violent	repression	of	a	mutiny	in	Korea	in	1881,	and	was	
thereafter	promoted	to	high	office	at	a	very	young	age.	He	served	as	imperial	commissioner	
there	for	over	a	decade,	and,	following	the	Sino-Japanese	war,	was	asked	to	create	a	unit	of	the	
Qing	army	with	modern	training	and	equipment.	35	Three	years	of	training	had	given	this	unit	a	
good	reputation,	so	it	was	in	his	role	as	a	commander	of	what	would	become	known	as	the	
“New	Army”	(新軍)	that	he	was	approached	by	Tan	Sitong	to	support	their	reform	efforts.	
While	it	is	clear	that	he	thought	the	1898	reforms	as	presented	were	too	radical,	his	
responsibility	for	the	conservative	coup	is	a	matter	of	some	historical	debate.36		
Yuan	represented	a	new	path	to	power	that	did	not	rely	upon	the	credibility	of	the	
traditional	examination	system.	This	is	not	to	say	that	he	lacked	training	in	the	Confucian	
classics,	or	that	came	from	humble	beginnings:	he	came	from	an	elite	family	with	high	officials	
as	close	relatives,	and	was	given	private	tutors	to	prepare	him	for	the	exams	and	thereby	allow	
preferential	treatment	in	the	army.37	Rather,	the	prestige	that	enabled	his	political	
advancement	came	from	his	impressive	record	as	a	practitioner	of	wu	instead	of	achievements	
in	wen,	and	thus	represented	a	new	way	of	balancing	the	two	values	as	well	as	a	
reconceptualization	of	how	they	could	both	be	applied	in	a	modern	setting.	Yuan’s	success	with	
the	“New	Army”	as	well	as	his	support	for	Cixi	in	1898	opened	up	further	opportunities	for	
political	advancement;	he	used	his	skills	as	an	administrator	and	willingness	to	advocate	for	
new	reforms	to	seize	those	opportunities	and	attain	even	higher	office.	
Yuan’s	successes	over	the	next	decade	were	rapid,	and	he	made	sure	to	implement	
policies	along	every	stop	that	would	foster	leadership	along	his	ideals	of	wen	and	wu.	He	
became	governor	of	Shandong	province	in	1899,	where	he	ruthlessly	suppressed	the	1900	
Boxer	Rebellion,	trained	another	modern	army	along	the	same	lines	as	the	first,	and	promoted	
a	number	of	political	reforms	that	would	presage	his	support	of	the	New	Policies	to	come.	He	
was	elevated	in	1901	to	the	position	of	Zhili	Viceroy,	where	his	support	for	political,	military,	
and	social	reform	intensified:	he	created	the	first	modern	police	force	in	China,	financed	new	
state	enterprises,	and	banned	traditional	practices	like	footbinding	and	opium	smoking.	He	also	
dramatically	transformed	the	provincial	education	system	in	quantity	(enrollments	exploded	by	
a	factor	of	25	within	five	years)	as	well	as	quality,	as	it	was	identified	as	a	national	model	for	
emulation	by	the	Qing	court.	In	other	words,	Yuan’s	concerns	over	wen	and	wu	were	not	
                                                
35	Shan,	Yuan	Shikai,	32-71.	
36	Ibid.,	81-87;	Shan	offers	a	summary	of	the	traditional	perspective,	wherein	Yuan	is	the	traitor	whose	actions	
precipitated	the	conservative	coup	against	Guangxu	and	the	reformists,	as	well	as	a	revisionist	view	that	dismisses	
his	culpability	in	this	matter.	
37	Ibid.,	24-31.	
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limited	to	military	reform	alone;	he	also	sought	to	transform	and	modernize	Qing	civilians	as	
well.38	
	With	Zhili	in	close	proximity	to	Peking,	Yuan’s	successes	as	Viceroy	gave	him	immense	
influence	in	the	Qing	New	Policies	that	proposed	the	institutionalization	of	many	of	the	
suggestions	made	by	activists	like	Tan	Sitong	in	1898.	He	was	a	key	figure	in	pushing	the	Qing	
court	to	agree	to	systemic	reform	in	the	direction	of	a	constitutional	monarchy,	in	direct	
emulation	of	the	Japanese	system,	which	was	a	platform	that	would	inspire	future	legal	
scholars	during	the	early	years	of	the	Chinese	Republic.39	Building	upon	his	accomplishments	
with	educational	reform	in	Zhili,	Yuan	joined	Zhang	Zhidong	and	other	ministers	in	successfully	
petitioning	for	the	1905	abolition	of	the	civil	service	examinations,	signaling	a	complete	break	
with	the	traditional	past	and	complete	reconceptualization	of	wen.	He	also	continued	his	re-
imagining	of	wu	in	the	modern	era,	retraining	and	reequipping	the	imperial	forces	in	the	image	
of	the	“New	Army;”	because	of	his	position	as	Superintendent	of	Trade	in	the	Northern	Ports,	
or	Beiyang	Dachen	(北洋大臣),	these	new	troops	would	be	called	the	“Beiyang	Army.”	To	
produce	sufficient	numbers	of	officers	to	staff	this	new	force,	Yuan	created	an	entire	ten-year	
system	of	military	education,	with	the	cream	of	the	crop	sent	to	Japan	for	further	instruction.	
Unfortunately	for	Yuan,	his	position	was	tied	to	his	relationship	with	Cixi,	so	upon	her	death	in	
1909,	he	was	forced	into	retirement.	Directed	by	the	Qing	Court	to	return	to	his	home	province	
of	Henan,	he	grudgingly	acquiesced	and	spent	three	years	in	quasi-exile,	writing	poetry,	raising	
funds	for	public	works,	and	maintaining	his	high	profile	in	the	last	years	of	the	Qing.40	Doing	so,	
Yuan	adopted	many	of	the	behaviors	practiced	by	prior	generations	of	officials	upon	departing	
public	life,	signaling	his	support	for	traditional	forms	of	wen	behavior.	Pairing	these	acts	with	
his	reputation	as	the	empire’s	foremost	innovator	of	wu,	he	was	clearly	positioning	himself	for	
a	possible	return	to	prominence.	The	outbreak	of	revolution	in	1911	enabled	these	
preparations	to	come	to	fruition.		
	
Four	Young	Men	of	Hunan	
It	was	in	the	context	of	failed	reform	and	gradual	state-led	change	that	the	principle	
figures	of	this	dissertation—Zhao	Hengti,	Li	Jiannong,	Tao	Juyin,	and	Tan	Yankai—came	of	age.	
All	were	born	into	positions	of	relative	privilege,	receiving	educations	in	the	Confucian	classics	
that	would	prepare	them	for	intellectual	vocations	like	teaching	or	government	service.	All	four	
would	also	play	key	roles	in	the	1920	mutiny:	Zhao	and	Tan	as	rivals	for	power;	Li	and	Tao	as	
witnesses	to	these	events	who	would	later	integrate	this	incident	into	the	larger	narrative	of	
the	Warlord	Era.	The	choices	that	these	four	elites	made	as	young	men	illustrate	the	range	of	
options	available	to	ambitious	men	of	their	generation	as	the	Qing	state	and	the	dynastic	
system	both	came	apart.	
Of	the	four	men,	Tan	Yankai	was	of	the	most	elite	background.	He	was	born	in	January	
of	1880,	in	Hangzhou,	Zhejiang	province,	where	his	father,	Tan	Zhonglin	(1822-1905)	was	a	
xunfu,	or	civil	governor.	The	elder	Tan,	58	at	the	time	of	Yankai’s	birth,	was	a	senior	Han	
                                                
38	On	the	transformation	of	Zhili	provincial	education,	see	Reynolds,	China	1898–1912,	83-84.	On	Yuan’s	policies	in	
Shandong	and	Zhili	more	generally,	see	Shan,	Yuan	Shikai,	88-126.	
39	Reynolds,	China	1898–1912,	186-191	
40	Shan,	Yuan	Shikai,	136-143.	
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Chinese	official	in	the	Manchu	Qing	bureaucracy	who	had	been	awarded	the	jinshi	degree	in	
1856,	and	had	enjoyed	a	steady	rise	up	the	ranks	ever	since.	After	his	son	was	born,	Tan	
Zhonglin	went	on	later	that	year	to	serve	as	xunfu	in	Shaanxi	province	before	rising	to	rank	of	
viceroy	administering	that	province	and	neighboring	Gansu	in	1881.	He	subsequently	held	the	
same	rank	for	Liangguang,	where	his	administration	suppressed	the	1895	Guangzhou	Uprising	
of	Sun	Yatsen,	and	where	his	conservative	opposition	to	the	Hundred	Days	Reform	of	1898	
earned	him	praise	from	the	Empress	Dowager	Cixi.	After	retiring	to	Changsha	in	1899,	he	died	
six	years	later.41	
Tan	Yankai	himself	seemed	destined	for	an	equally	stellar	career	in	the	bureaucracy.	At	
an	early	age,	he	was	identified	as	a	prodigy.	The	imperial	tutor	Weng	Tonghe	(1830-1904)	was	a	
peer	of	the	elder	Tan,	and	occupied	a	number	of	important	posts	in	the	civil	bureaucracy	during	
the	1880s	and	1890s.	In	his	diary,	he	recalls	meeting	his	colleague’s	13-year	old	son,	and	
remarking	that	the	boy	was	possibly	a	genius	in	writing.42	Weng’s	observations	were	prophetic.	
Tan	Yankai	would	go	on	to	pass	all	three	levels	of	the	civil	service	examination,	culminating	in	
the	award	for	highest	score	in	the	nation	on	the	1904	exams.	He	was	granted	a	position	as	a	
compiler	with	the	Hanlin	Academy	as	a	result,	and	it	appeared	as	though	he	would	follow	along	
the	same	conventional	and	conservative	trajectory	as	his	father	fifty	years	before.43	
However,	this	basic	outline	of	his	initial	academic	successes	overlooks	a	number	of	
interesting	features	about	Tan’s	early	life	that	suggest	a	far	more	complicated	perspective	on	
traditional	Chinese	culture	and	presage	his	post-1911	successes.	Without	these	peculiarities,	his	
transition	from	the	model	and	stereotypical	scholar-official	of	the	dynastic	system	to	becoming	
a	fairly	progressive	and	modern	politician	would	be	even	more	jarring.	The	high	official	position	
of	his	father	with	the	Qing	state	would	appear	to	fit	the	idea	that	he	was	groomed	and	
pampered	for	a	bright	future.	While	this	is	certainly	true	when	compared	to	the	vast	majority	of	
his	peers	across	China,	this	portrayal	ignores	the	difficulties	he	encountered	as	the	son	of	a	
former	maidservant	to	his	elder	brother.	The	only	reason	Tan	Zhonglin,	at	the	relatively	elderly	
age	of	56,	took	a	new	concubine	and	had	three	more	sons,	was	that	he	noticed	they	shared	the	
same	unusual	birthmark	on	the	soles	of	their	feet.	Because	of	her	former	status	as	a	servant,	
she	and	her	sons	were	treated	poorly	by	the	rest	of	their	family	until	Tan	Yankai	won	a	position	
at	the	Hanlin	Academy.	It	is	unclear	what	sort	of	direct	effect	this	combination	of	privileged	
upbringing	and	low	social	status	this	might	have	had	on	the	young	Tan,	but	it	surely	must	have	
inculcated	some	level	of	discomfort	with	the	established	Confucian	social	order.44	
                                                
41	For	more	on	Tan	Zhonglin,	see	Tan	Yankai	谭延闿，谭文勤公行状	[A	Brief	Obituary	of	Tan	Wenqin]	in	Zhou	
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Tan’s	support	for	progressive	and	modern	education	also	complicates	any	image	of	him	
as	a	stereotypical	conservative	Confucian	scholar.	In	1903,	he	contributed	a	large	sum	of	money	
to	the	new	Mingde	Academy	(明德學堂)	in	Changsha,	the	first	private	school	in	the	province	
that	explicitly	eschewed	a	focus	on	preparing	students	for	the	examinations.	This	organization	
also	attracted	a	number	of	radical	Hunanese	to	its	faculty	who	would	attempt	to	foment	
revolution	in	the	last	years	of	the	Qing.	For	his	first	job	after	leaving	the	Hanlin	Academy,	Tan	
served	as	principal	of	the	Changsha	Middle	Road	Academy	(長沙中路學堂)	from	1905-1906,	
and	pushed	the	curriculum	in	a	direction	that	was	modeled	on	the	Japanese	system,	possibly	in	
emulation	of	Yuan	Shikai’s	successes	in	Zhili.	His	progressive	inclinations,	though	perhaps	not	as	
radical	as	some	of	his	peers,	are	worth	noting.45	
Finally,	one	of	his	answers	on	the	1904	civil	service	examination	signals	the	same	
ambiguity	concerning	his	position	on	conventional	wisdom.	The	first	question	on	the	exam	
called	for	candidates	to	compare	and	contrast	the	decentralized	Zhou	and	Tang	systems	of	
governance	with	the	far	more	centralized	Qin	and	Wei	states.46	In	his	response,	Tan	argued	that	
the	“fengjian”	(	[封建]	often	glossed	as	“feudal”)	system	of	the	Zhou	were	suitable	for	that	time	
of	relative	decentralization,	until	it	ended	in	disaster;	its	replacement	by	the	“junxian”	([郡縣]	
or	“prefectural”)	system	of	the	Qin,	featuring	a	much	stronger	emperor,	was	a	natural	
progression	towards	a	more	harmonious	society	that	benefited	both	the	people	and	the	state,	
and	suited	the	subsequent	era	much	better.	Similarly,	the	attempt	during	the	Tianbao	(天寶)	
era	(742-756)	of	the	Tang	dynasty	(618-907)	to	devolve	local	governance	to	various	military	
governors,	or	“fanzhen,”	(藩鎮)	failed	to	address	local	conditions,	leading	to	the	fall	of	the	
dynasty.	In	short,	Tan	was	telling	his	exam	reviewers	that	the	successful	governance	of	a	polity	
requires	adaptation	and	flexibility	to	meet	current	needs	and	local	conditions.	One	might	
expect	a	traditional	scholar	of	the	Confucian	classics	to	rely	on	theoretical	frameworks	to	craft	
an	answer,	but	Tan’s	response	suggested	a	much	more	nuanced	and	pragmatic	perspective	that	
portended	his	later	turn	towards	republicanism	and	federalism.	For	him,	it	seems	as	though	
flexibility	was	more	important	than	fidelity	with	regards	to	the	application	of	past	examples	to	
present-day	problems.	This	attitude	explains	his	adaptability	under	various	regimes	over	the	
next	25	years:	as	a	local	elite	during	the	Qing	New	Policies,	as	provincial	governor	and	
proponent	of	local	autonomy	during	the	early	Republic,	and	as	Party	Elder	during	the	first	few	
years	of	the	Nanjing	decade.	While	some	might	critique	these	different	personae	as	the	
inconsistency	of	a	power-hungry	opportunist,	Tan’s	willingness	to	change	his	method	of	
governance	to	fit	his	political	circumstances	should	also	be	positively	interpreted	as	well.47		
As	the	New	Policies	championed	by	Yuan	Shikai	were	growing	in	popularity	and	
influence,	Tan	moved	into	a	more	prominent	role	as	the	leader	of	the	Hunanese	gentry.	At	first,	
this	was	an	informal	position,	based	largely	upon	the	social	connections	he	had	inherited	from	
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his	father	as	well	as	the	prestige	he	retained	from	his	famous	high	score	on	the	abolished	civil	
service	exams.	This	began	with	his	position	with	the	Hunan	First	Normal	School,	and	continued	
with	his	leadership	over	the	“Hunan	Constitution	Association”	(湖南憲政公會)	that	provided	a	
platform	for	elites	to	press	for	a	formal	provincial	assembly	that	could	represent	their	interests.	
The	ideal	of	the	constitution	was	linked	to	the	rule	of	law	and	provincial	autonomy,	in	
opposition	to	the	unlimited	despotism	of	the	dynastic	central	state.	Thus,	when	the	Qing	Court	
promulgated	a	law	in	early	1909	allowing	for	the	creation	of	provincial	assemblies,	Tan	became	
the	leader	of	the	Hunan	Consultative	Office	(湖南諮議局),	which	represented	the	interests	of	
the	provincial	elite	to	the	central	government.	
	 This	summary	of	Tan’s	life	suggests	an	“insider”	path	for	late	Qing	elites	in	the	last	years	
of	the	dynasty:	advancing	within	the	structures	of	the	Qing	state,	accumulating	cultural	and	
social	capital,	and	signaling	support	for	modernization	efforts,	particularly	in	education.	In	this,	
Tan’s	political	career	was	not	dramatically	different	from	the	scholar-elite	of	the	generations	
prior,	being	based	upon	the	prestige	of	his	family	and	his	examination	scores	to	maintain	
influence;	even	without	being	appointed	to	office	by	the	Qing	court,	his	cultural	capital	and	
social	prestige	remained	an	asset.	This	could	also	be	interpreted	as	an	extreme	use	of	past	wen	
norms	to	attain	power	in	a	changing	society.	
In	contrast,	Zhao	Hengti	chose	a	different	path	to	success,	oriented	not	on	“inner”	
traditions,	but	on	foreign	knowledge.	Though	also	born	to	an	elite	family	in	Hunan,	his	
background	was	far	less	prestigious	than	that	of	Tan,	and	had	no	connections	to	the	Qing	court	
or	past	relatives	in	positions	of	imperial	prominence.	The	self-presentation	of	the	Zhaos	
nevertheless	indicate	some	pretense	to	greatness.	The	Zhaos	were	based	in	Hengyang,	a	major	
city	in	Southern	Hunan,	and	able	to	trace	their	ancestry	back	to	the	Song	Dynasty.	They	
engaged	the	young	Hengti	in	the	sorts	of	activities	that	traditional	gentry	families	were	known	
to	do	in	the	late	Qing:	practice	poetry,	discuss	Neo-Confucian	philosophy,	and	the	like.	Such	
training	would	have	helped	Hengti	to	pursue	traditional	scholarship	in	the	civil	service	
examination.	Yet	by	sending	him	to	the	newly	renamed	Hubei	Translation	School	(湖北方言學
堂)	in	Wuchang,	his	family	broke	with	classical	educational	norms.	The	school	had	originally	
been	founded	by	Zhang	Zhidong	in	1893	as	the	Self-Strengthening	Academy	(自強學堂).	
Following	the	New	Policies	trends	emanating	from	Beijing,	the	school	was	renamed	in	1900	to	
focus	explicitly	on	Western	languages	and	learning.	Zhao	only	spent	a	short	time	there	before	
passing	the	examination	to	be	sent	to	Japan	under	state	sponsorship.48	
Zhao’s	orientation	to	the	outside	world	eventually	led	him	to	taking	a	far	more	
modernized	wu–oriented	road	to	power.	Zhao	arrived	in	Japan	expecting	to	study	education	at	
a	teacher’s	college;	he	quickly	changed	paths	with	the	expectation	that	military	matters	would	
be	more	beneficial	to	his	nation.	It	is	unclear	whether	or	not	this	shift	was	explicitly	inspired	by	
the	example	set	by	Yuan	Shikai’s	rebalancing	and	re-conception	of	wen	and	wu,	but	the	
connection	can	be	inferred.	Zhao’s	first	three	years	in	Japan	following	his	1901	arrival	were	
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holder,	he	makes	no	such	claim	himself,	instead	claiming	that	he	missed	the	cutoff	(49).	
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spent	at	the	Japanese	Military	School,	or	Shibu	Gakko	(日本振武學校),	a	special	institution	set	
up	by	Japan’s	Army	General	Staff	to	prepare	Chinese	military	students	for	further	training.	He	
passed	the	entrance	exam	for	the	Japanese	Imperial	Army	Academy,	or	Shikan	Gakko	(日本士
官學校),	where	he	studied	artillery	and	was	a	member	of	the	sixth	cohort	of	Chinese	military	
cadets.	There,	he	formed	close	bonds	with	many	classmates	and	overseas	Chinese	students	in	
Japan,	especially	those	from	Hunan,	and	was	introduced	to	the	revolutionary	movement.49		
Many	of	the	Chinese	who	studied	in	Japan	during	the	first	decade	of	the	twentieth	
century	rose	to	positions	of	political	prominence	in	the	years	following	1911.	Of	these,	three	
Hunanese—Huang	Xing	(1874-1916),	Song	Jiaoren,	and	Cai	E	(1882-1916)—represent	the	wide	
range	of	options	available	to	those	who	wished	to	pursue	new	possibilities	for	
reconceptualization	and	integration	of	wen	and	wu	norms	in	a	way	that	might	also	resonate	
with	efforts	by	their	traditional	literati	predecessors.	These	men,	like	Zhao,	were	of	same	
generation,	had	similar	backgrounds,	and	shared	the	same	desire	to	lead	their	nation	into	
modernity	via	revolutionary	means.	The	untimely	death	of	all	three,	within	five	years	of	the	
1911	revolution,	had	unforeseen	consequences	for	how	politics	would	be	practiced	during	the	
early	Republic.		
Huang	Xing	represents	an	extreme	version	of	wu	in	his	preference	for	direct	action	and	
open	confrontation.	A	native	of	the	Hunan	capital	of	Changsha,	he	had	been	sponsored	by	
Zhang	Zhidong	in	1902	to	study	aboard	at	the	Kobun	Institute,	or	Kobun	Gakuin	(弘文学院),	a	
school	whose	sole	purpose	was	to	prepare	Chinese	students	for	further	education	in	Japan,	but	
quickly	became	enamored	with	military	training	and	radicalized	towards	revolution.	He	
returned	to	Changsha	in	1903	in	an	attempt	to	foment	an	anti-Qing	uprising,	while	teaching	at	
the	same	Mingde	Academy	that	had	been	partially	financed	by	Tan	Yankai.	However,	Huang’s	
plot	was	quickly	discovered	in	1905	and	he	was	forced	to	return	to	Japan.	Over	the	next	decade	
he	would	lead	several	other	failed	revolutions	in	different	parts	of	South	China	before	
becoming	one	of	the	commanders	of	the	revolutionary	forces	against	the	Qing	in	late	1911,	and	
a	key	leader	of	the	KMT	during	the	first	years	of	the	Republic.50		
Song	Jiaoren,	one	of	Huang’s	1905	co-conspirators	who	followed	him	to	Japan,	
represents	the	opposite	extreme	of	wen.	A	native	of	Taoyuan,	a	relatively	isolated	village	in	
northern	Hunan,	he	was	equally	passionate	about	the	revolutionary	cause	but	chose	to	forgo	a	
military	education	for	more	literary	pursuits.	In	Japan,	he	was	an	editor	of	the	People’s	Journal	
(Minbao,	民报),	in	which	he	and	his	equally	erudite	colleagues	wrote	essays	vigorously	
advocating	for	the	violent	overthrow	of	the	Qing.	To	this	end,	the	journal	not	only	attacked	the	
Qing	state,	but	also	the	reformist	point	of	view	represented	by	Liang	Qichao,	which	they	viewed	
as	diverting	needed	resources	and	attention	from	their	agenda.	This	rivalry	between	the	
revolutionary	and	reformist	camps	was	not	only	intellectual,	but	became	physical	on	at	least	
two	occasions.	Following	six	years	largely	spent	in	Japan,	Song	left	for	Shanghai	in	1911	to	
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continue	work	as	an	anti-Qing	propagandist	and	political	journalist	before	becoming	one	of	the	
new	Republic’s	more	prominent	politicians	after	its	founding.51	
If	Huang	Xing	and	Song	Jiaoren	represent	two	extremes	of	the	wen-wu	spectrum,	Cai	E	
represents	a	Yuan	Shikai-like	balance	between	the	two.	Born	in	Shaoyang,	in	southwestern	
Hunan,	he	was	a	student	at	the	School	for	Current	Affairs	in	Changsha	for	a	short	time	before	
leaving	for	Japan	in	1899.	He	participated	in	Tang	Caichang’s	failed	rebellion	in	1900	before	
escaping	back	to	Japan,	where	he	was	one	of	the	earliest	Chinese	graduates	from	the	Japanese	
Imperial	Army	Academy	in	1904.	While	in	Japan,	he	authored	an	influential	article	in	Liang	
Qichao’s	reformist	periodical	that	called	for	all	Chinese	to	undergo	some	military	training,	as	
citizen-soldiers	would	be	the	best	possible	contributors	to	the	strength	of	the	state.	His	
participation	in	the	1900	rebellion	was	not	discovered,	and	so	from	1904-1910,	he	commanded	
the	Guangxi	military	academy,	which	put	him	in	a	position	to	find	and	mentor	other	like-minded	
revolutionaries.52	
Zhao	Hengti	would	form	close	relationships	with	all	three	fellow	Hunanese,	but	
especially	Cai	E.	Zhao’s	1908	graduation	from	the	Japanese	Imperial	Army	Academy	coincided	
with	the	deaths	of	the	Empress	Dowager	Cixi	and	the	Guangxi	emperor.	Their	passing	caused	
the	Qing	court	to	fear	the	revolutionary	potential	of	so	many	overseas	students,	prompting	
Zhao	and	many	of	his	fellow	cadets	to	be	recalled	home	instead	of	undergoing	further	training	
as	probationary	officers	in	the	Japanese	Army.	Following	a	brief	stint	as	a	staff	officer	and	
examination	administrator	at	Qing	army	headquarters,	he	was	recruited	to	work	with	Cai	E	in	
Guangxi	as	an	instructor	of	cadets.53	
When	the	Wuchang	revolution	broke	out	in	October	1911,	Zhao	was	placed	in	charge	of	
a	detachment	of	Guangxi	cadets	and	dispatched	to	the	front	in	support	of	the	revolutionaries.	
Travel	to	Wuchang	necessitated	transit	through	Hunan,	where	he	first	encountered	Tan	Yankai,	
who	proposed	a	Hunan-Guangxi	alliance	when	the	fighting	was	over,	foreshadowing	their	
relationship	in	the	decade	to	come.	Zhao	continued	towards	the	frontlines	in	Xiaogan,	where	he	
commanded	the	left	flank	in	a	stalemate	that	lasted	three	months.54	
The	choices	made	by	Tan	and	Zhao	were	not	the	only	options	available	to	the	ambitious	
elite	of	their	generation:	the	decision	by	Li	Jiannong	to	become	a	journalist	and	essayist	
represent	a	much	more	modern	choice.	Li	was	also	born	in	1880	in	what	is	now	Longhui	County,	
in	southwestern	Hunan,	near	the	birthplace	of	Cai	E.	He	attended	a	private	school,	and	then	the	
county	classical	academy,	receiving	a	Confucian	education	from	a	young	age	like	Tan	and	Zhao.	
However,	unlike	Tan	and	Zhao,	he	came	from	a	peasant	family,	and	exhibited	anti-traditional	
sentiment	from	a	young	age.	He	wrote	a	poem	that	compared	Confucian	officials	to	amoral	
bureaucrats,	wanting	only	money,	indicating	the	degree	of	disgust	he	had	for	the	traditional	
social	order.	
It	is	unclear	whether	or	not	he	took	the	civil	service	exams	as	a	young	man,	but,	starting	
in	1904,	Li	did	spend	four	years	at	the	Changsha	Middle	Road	Academy,	the	same	school	that	
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Tan	Yankai	would	later	head	for	a	brief	period	of	time.	There,	Li	studied	history.	Though	this	
advanced	education	suggests	that	Li	oriented	his	life	around	more	wen-based	values,	his	anti-
traditionalist	attitude	was	only	radicalized	further:	after	joining	the	Revolutionary	Alliance	in	
1906,	Li	continued	at	the	school	as	an	instructor,	where	he	did	his	best	to	inculcate	
revolutionary	sentiment	in	his	students.	In	1910,	he	moved	to	Japan	to	study	political	economy	
at	Waseda	University	in	Japan,	where	he	became	even	more	embedded	within	the	organization	
of	Revolutionary	Alliance	and	established	relationships	with	Song	Jiaoren	and	Huang	Xing.	In	
the	fall	of	his	second	year,	the	Wuchang	Uprising	began,	and	he	quickly	rushed	back	to	China	to	
join	the	revolution.55		
In	Wuchang,	Li	assembled	an	account	of	the	fighting	that	would	be	circulated	in	the	
newspapers,	and	launched	him	upon	the	vocation	of	political	journalism.	While	it	is	unclear	
precisely	when	he	was	able	to	arrive	in	Wuchang,	he	spent	his	time	there	observing	the	fighting	
and	collecting	information	from	those	who	had	participated.	His	report	was	published	in	the	
newspaper	Minguo	Ribao	a	few	months	later	as	“Remembering	the	Whole	Story	of	The	
Wuchang	Revolution,”	(武昌革命始末記)	which	recounted	in	great	detail	the	troop	
movements	and	skirmishes	that	comprised	the	larger	battle.		
According	to	Li,	the	Revolutionary	Army,	which	he	also	called	the	“people’s	army”	(民軍)	
was	able	to	prevail	over	the	imperial	forces	because	of	their	high	morale	and	courageous	
attitude.	Led	by	Li	Yuanhong	(1864-1928),	the	revolutionaries	were	aware	of	the	larger	import	
of	their	fight,	distributing	propaganda	materials	in	multiple	languages	to	the	various	foreign	
consuls	who	were	stationed	in	the	area,	and	sending	emissaries	to	encourage	uprisings	all	over	
the	nation.	Initially,	they	enjoyed	several	victories	over	the	imperial	forces,	allowing	them	to	
take	over	all	three	of	the	area’s	major	cities	surrounding	the	intersection	of	the	Yangzi	and	Han	
rivers:	Wuchang,	Hankou,	and	Hanyang.	However,	fierce	fighting	prompted	their	retreat	to	
Wuchang,	as	well	as	a	change	in	leadership	with	the	newly	arrived	Huang	Xing	replacing	Li	
Yuanhong,	who	had	only	very	reluctantly	taken	command.	Because	pockets	of	revolutionary	
resistance	remained	in	Hankou,	the	imperial	forces	razed	the	city,	creating	a	refugee	crisis	that	
prompted	a	rebuke	from	local	elites,	as	well	as	a	cease-fire.56	
Li’s	chronicle	of	the	Wuchang	uprising	is	worth	noting	because	of	its	clear	objective	in	
attracting	support	for	the	revolutionary	cause	through	readable	and	vivid	description.	In	his	
account,	the	government	troops	were	victorious	only	due	to	their	superior	arms	and	numbers,	
and	because	they	had	a	gunboat	to	provide	fire	support	that	the	revolutionaries	could	not	
match.	The	imperial	forces	were	the	clear	villains	of	the	battle,	looting,	raping,	and	setting	fire	
to	the	homes	of	innocent	bystanders.	By	contrast,	the	revolutionary	army	were	the	heroes,	
acting	with	perfect	propriety,	respecting	the	lives	and	property	of	the	local	residents.	In	spite	of	
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this	ethical	behavior,	higher	morale,	and	greater	courage,	they	lost	several	battles.57	Moreover,	
Li	hinted	that	Li	Yuanhong	was	not	as	respected	as	Huang	Xing,	when	he	asserted	that	morale	
skyrocketed	after	Huang’s	arrival.58	His	framing	of	the	narrative	not	only	encouraged	readers	to	
support	Huang	and	the	revolutionaries,	but	also	gave	him	a	key	role	to	play	in	shaping	public	
opinion	in	how	the	conflict	is	remembered.	In	a	sense,	this	is	an	extreme	version	how	a	wen-
oriented	elite	might	influence	the	making	of	modern	China.	
Tao	Juyin	was	another	Hunanese	elite	who	leveraged	his	education	and	composition	
skills	to	shape	his	nation.	Born	in	1898,	he	was	almost	two	decades	younger	than	Li,	Tan,	and	
Zhao.	The	Taos	originally	hailed	from	Nanjing,	where	his	father	taught	Chinese	medicine.	The	
younger	Tao	moved	with	his	family	to	Changsha,	where	he	was	admitted	to	the	same	Mingde	
Academy	where	Huang	Xing	had	taught	some	years	prior.	While	there,	Tao	demonstrated	a	
precocious	aptitude	for	the	journalism,	publishing	a	short	article	in	the	major	Shanghai	Daily	
Shibao	(時報)	on	February	12,	1910,	titled	“Remembering	the	Feeling	of	this	Day	Last	Year”	(記
去年今日有感)	that	satirized	the	seemingly	unchanging	state	of	politics.	That	his	short	article,	
however	childish,	was	published	in	a	major	newspaper	gave	Tao	much	delight,	and	signaled	not	
only	the	fact	that	he	could	succeed	as	a	writer,	but	that	he	could	forgo	further	formal	education	
in	order	to	join	the	profession	of	journalism.59	Though	still	a	student	when	word	of	the	
Wuchang	Uprising	reached	Changsha,	this	would	not	be	the	case	much	longer:	in	1912,	at	the	
age	of	14,	Tao	would	become	a	full-time	editor	with	the	Women’s	Rights	Daily	(Nvquan	Ribao).	
Reform	and	revolution	had	opened	up	new	educational	and	vocational	opportunities	for	young	
men.		
Conclusion	
	 Too	often,	intellectual	conceptions	of	“Confucian	China”	center	on	the	imperial	court	as	
the	locus	of	tradition	and	the	seat	of	power;	legitimate	dynastic	succession,	or	“zhengtong,”	[正
統]	required	unity	through	a	supposed	continuance	of	that	cultural	heritage.	By	shifting	our	
perspective	between	Beijing	or	Beiyang	and	Hunan,	we	can	discern	the	dynamic	ways	that	elite	
reformers	defended	Chinese	traditions	in	creative	ways,	in	dialogue	with	centers	of	power.	As	
power	dissolved	from	the	center,	the	geopolitical	importance	of	Hunan	grew	as	a	center	of	
conservative	reform.							
	 During	these	years,	new	educational	trends,	informed	by	new	views	of	both	wen	and	wu,	
played	a	significant	role	in	the	formation	of	generations	of	so-called	reformers	and	
revolutionaries.	Zeng	Guofan’s	tent	government	helped	to	introduce	new	vocational	
opportunities	for	those	who	had	sought	and	further	solidified	by	exams	for	returned	students	
from	abroad	in	the	latter	part	of	the	Qing,	young	men	like	Zhao	Hengti	could	opt	to	learn	
modern	subjects,	and	even	to	receive	government	funding	to	go	abroad.	As	indicated	by	Yuan	
Shikai’s	pioneering	example	with	reform	efforts,	Japan	served	as	both	a	model	for	and	a	center	
for	many	of	these	efforts.	One	of	the	most	important	centers	was	the	Japanese	Military	School	
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as	a	training	ground	for	a	modernized	military	elite.	Within	Hunan,	important	schools	were	the	
Changsha	Middle	Road	Academy	and	the	Mingde	Academy,	which	became	centers	for	
particular	political	environments.		
	 In	stories	of	revolution,	elites	are	often	considered	the	most	disinclined	toward	
necessary	and	urgent	change.	Instead,	elites	turn	toward	reform	in	order	to	protect	their	own	
privileged	status.	It	is	true	that	elite	status	meant	a	heightened	sensitivity	to	the	statecraft	
accomplishments	of	the	past,	such	as	those	of	Zeng	Guofan;	future	generations	inherited	that	
sense	of	responsibility	and	the	legacy	of	conservative	reform.	However,	in	the	historical	view	of	
late	nineteenth-	and	early	twentieth-century	Hunan,	elite	status	also	often	entailed	a	superior	
alertness	to	emerging	trends	from	beyond	the	province	thanks	to	the	networks	of	literacy	and	
print	that	were	above	and	beyond	the	commoners	of	the	province.	Hence,	Tan	and	Zhao	were	
both	guardians	of	a	provincially	based	tradition	and	first-respondents	to	trans-provincial	trends	
of	change.		
	 The	elective	affinity	between	the	elite	class	of	the	late	Qing	and	reformist	trends	in	the	
new	Republic	enabled	men	like	Zhao	and	Tan	to	attain	influence,	power,	and	high	office.	
However,	because	of	this,	they	were	unable	to	take	advantage	of	the	rhetoric	of	revolution	that	
was	designed	to	have	more	mass	appeal.	Their	training	in	the	classics	and	familiarity	with	elite	
networks	did	not	necessarily	preclude	them	from	participation	in	the	organizations	and	
instruments	of	mass	politics	like	newspapers	or	campaign	rallies;	after	all,	some	of	their	
revolutionary	counterparts	shared	the	same	background.	But	the	habits	and	culture	that	most	
belonging	to	this	class	had	developed	as	young	men	were	not	conducive	for	establishing	a	
persona	as	outsiders	who	could	appeal	to	more	modern	sensibilities,	like	Mao	and	Sun	were	
able	to	do.	As	a	result,	though	some	of	the	programs	and	policies	that	these	elites	proposed,	
like	federalism,	would	be	substantively	revolutionary,	their	inability	to	appropriately	frame	
these	concepts	for	popular	consumption	doomed	them	to	the	conservative	dustbin	of	history.		
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Chapter	2:	Reform,	Revolution,	and	the	Future	of	China	
	
Introduction	
This	chapter	reevaluates	the	early	years	of	the	Republic	of	China	from	a	standpoint	of	
reform	rather	than	revolution,	and	covers	the	period	between	the	1911	Revolution	and	1916,	
when	three	key	figures	in	Chinese	politics—Yuan	Shikai,	Cai	E,	and	Huang	Xing—died.	As	
epitomized	by	Li	Jiannong’s	Political	History,	the	narrative	of	1911-1916	period	emphasizes	how	
the	revolution	was	betrayed,	both	by	Yuan	Shikai	in	his	1913	attack	on	the	KMT	and	1916	ill-
fated	attempt	to	become	emperor	as	well	as	by	the	reformers	in	their	earlier	support	for	Yuan	
and	their	belated	criticism	after.	Consequently,	their	reputation	was	tainted	as	being	overly	
conservative,	thus	contributing	to	a	widely	perceived	dichotomy	between	their	ideals	with	that	
of	the	revolutionaries.	It	is	too	easy	to	follow	the	teleology	of	revolution	and	to	assume	that	
reformers	belonged	to	a	bygone	era.	However,	when	addressing	the	complexities	of	the	
“warlord	period,”	it	is	necessary	to	acknowledge	that	these	rival	epistemologies	existed	in	
concert	with	each	other.		
There	has	been	an	over-emphasis	on	revolution	instead	of	reform	in	interpretations	of	
the	political,	social,	and	cultural	changes	that	swept	through	the	nation	during	these	years.	
While	this	is	partly	due	to	the	far	more	visible	and	performative	aspects	of	revolution,	being	
defined	as	change	from	the	outside	that	overturns	the	established	order,	this	chapter	also	
argues	that	the	idea	of	vision	and	ideology	that	so	often	motivates	revolution	is	also	a	key	
factor	in	the	favor	it	enjoys	over	reform	in	historical	memory.	This	chapter	will	suggest	that	Li	
Jiannong’s	influential	narrative	of	Chinese	history,	covering	the	period	from	the	First	Opium	
War	to	the	1928	Northern	Expedition,	epitomizes	and	establishes	the	dichotomy	between	these	
two	concepts	of	reform	and	revolution.	Favoring	one	over	the	other	as	the	ideal	solution	for	
advancing	the	nation	and	state	into	the	future	is	aptly	demonstrated	by	the	1920	Pingjiang	
Mutiny,	the	subsequent	transfer	of	power	from	Tan	Yankai	to	Zhao	Hengti,	and	their	tenures	at	
the	apex	of	Hunan’s	provincial	political	and	military	structures.	Their	choice	to	adopt	pragmatic	
and	reform-oriented	approaches	to	governance	and	eschew	the	more	ideologically-oriented	
revolutionary	vision	that	animated	the	future	success	of	KMT	and	CCP	did	not	suit	the	growing	
influence	of	mass	politics.	Consequently,	their	limited	successes	are	overlooked,	by	Li	and	those	
who	followed	thereafter,	in	the	broader	narrative	favoring	revolution.	
Twentieth-century	Chinese	history	has	often	been	recounted	as	a	progression	of	
revolutions	that	broke	the	metaphorical	shackles	of	tradition	and	led	the	nation	towards	
modernity.	The	1911	Xinhai	revolution	that	ended	both	the	Qing	dynasty	as	well	as	the	imperial	
order	that	had	defined	the	ideals	by	which	China	had	been	governed	for	over	two	millennia	was	
a	landmark	event.	Yet,	to	paraphrase	historian	Joseph	Levenson,	this	transition	was	a	failure,	
though	not	a	mistake:	those	with	power	in	1911	retained	power	afterwards	despite	the	
abolition	of	the	Qing	court.1	Indeed,	the	1911	Revolution’s	destruction	of	the	imperial	system,	
without	any	strong	central	government	to	replace	it,	is	often	portrayed	as	leading	directly	to	
the	factionalism	of	the	warlord	era.		
                                                
1	Joseph	Levenson,	Confucian	China	and	Its	Modern	Fate:	A	Trilogy	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1958).	
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It	is	worth	noting	that	a	focus	on	revolution	is	one	of	the	few	commonalities	that	
historians	in	the	PRC	and	Taiwan	share.	On	the	one	hand,	this	shared	focus	speaks	to	the	
unmistakable	importance	of	the	1911	and	1949	revolutions	to	twentieth-century	Chinese	
history,	with	a	dynastic	system	of	governance	that	had	more	or	less	endured	as	an	ideal	over	
two	millennia	dramatically	collapsing	in	the	first	case,	and	a	radical	restructuring	of	society	and	
economy	in	the	second.	Yet	emphasizing	revolution	also	serves	the	purpose	of	both	the	ROC	
and	PRC	governments,	since	both	states	justify	their	existence	and	authority	as	having	rescued	
the	nation	from	the	chaos	of	the	immediate	post-1911	era.		
English-language	studies	of	twentieth	century	China	can	also	hardly	avoid	an	emphasis	
on	revolution.	The	focus	of	textbooks	like	Peter	Zarrow’s	China	in	War	and	Revolution,	1895-
1949,	Rana	Mitter’s	A	Bitter	Revolution:	China’s	Struggle	With	the	Modern	World,	or	Keith	
Schoppa’s	Revolution	and	Its	Past:	Identities	and	Change	in	Modern	Chinese	History	can	be	
easily	discerned	from	their	titles.2	While	this	interpretive	framework	makes	sense	given	the	
overall	telos	of	Chinese	history,	this	dissertation	suggests	an	alternative,	non-teleological	
reading	of	the	early	years	of	the	revolution.	This	revisionist	approach	has	even	extended	to	
Yuan	Shikai’s	presidency	in	the	early	years	of	the	Republic,	as	the	archvillain	of	modern	Chinese	
history	has	begun	to	be	recognized	for	his	efforts	to	implement	gradual	political	reform,	and	his	
catastrophic	attempt	at	crowning	himself	emperor	begins	to	be	reconsidered	as	his	failure	to	
appreciate	popular	opinion.	Given	this	revisionist	historical	framework,	this	chapter	re-
examines	the	conventional	historiography	as	a	lens	for	deconstructing	the	revolutionary	
narrative.3		
The	chapter	begins	with	a	brief	summary	of	how	the	1911	Revolution	unfolded	in	Hunan,	
with	the	murder	of	its	first	governor	that	has	been	interpreted	as	the	reassertion	of	gentry	elite	
power,	and	that	somewhat	augurs	the	division	between	elites	and	the	masses	that	would	
prompt	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny.	After	briefly	using	unpublished	archival	material	to	
challenge	the	stereotype	of	stagnant	and	useless	local	provincial	governance,	focus	is	shifted	to	
the	national	level,	and	the	assassination	of	Song	Jiaoren	that	signaled	the	beginning	of	the	end	
for	the	moderate	reform	movement,	as	interpreted	by	Li	Jiannong’s	Political	History.	The	
chapter	continues	with	an	examination	of	the	reformist	national	constitution,	often	critiqued	
for	its	toothlessness,	before	closing	with	the	power	vacuum	that	resulted	from	1916	deaths	of	
Yuan	Shikai,	Huang	Xing,	and	Cai	E,	and	that	prompted	the	beginnings	of	High	Warlordism.			
	
The	Aftermath	of	the	1911	Revolution	in	Hunan	
The	Wuchang	uprising	was	not	a	resounding	military	success,	but	the	event	sparked	the	
hoped-for	nationwide	rebellion,	and	led	to	the	collapse	of	the	Qing	and	the	dynastic	system.	As	
                                                
2	Rana	Mitter,	A	Bitter	Revolution:	China’s	Struggle	With	the	Modern	World	(Oxford	and	New	York,	NY:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2004);	Keith	Schoppa,	Revolution	and	Its	Past:	Identities	and	Change	in	Modern	Chinese	History,	
3rd	ed.		(Routledge,	2016);	Peter	Zarrow,	China	in	War	and	Revolution,	1895-1949	(Routledge,	2005).	
3	An	article	demonstrating	the	persistent	influence	of	the	revolutionary	paradigm	in	the	Post-Mao	era	is	Jin	
Chongji,	“The	1911	Revolution	and	the	Awakening	of	the	Chinese	Nation,”	in	Shinkichi	and	Schiffrin,	eds.,	The	1911	
Revolution	in	China,	3-17.	For	a	more	recent	argument	that	continues	to	stress	the	transformative	ruptures	
presented	by	revolution,	see	Chen,	Jianhua,	“The	Discursive	Turn	of	‘Revolution’	and	the	Revolutionary	Turn	of	
‘Discourse:’	From	Late	Qing	Until	the	End	of	1920s,”	in	Contemporary	Chinese	Thought,	Vol.	44.,	No.	1.,	(Fall	2012),	
pp.	8-35.	
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noted	by	Li’s	description	of	the	initial	stages	of	the	uprising	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	
the	correlation	of	forces	was	extremely	adverse	for	the	revolutionary	side	in	terms	of	both	arms	
and	men.	By	late	November,	Hanyang	and	Hankou	had	both	returned	to	Qing	government	
control;	the	Qing	forces	reported	only	seventy	casualties,	though	the	true	figure	was	almost	
certainly	far	higher,	possibly	even	reaching	2,000	dead.	Revolutionary	losses,	on	the	other	hand,	
far	exceeded	those	of	the	Qing,	with	one	observer	estimating	that	over	5,000	rebels	were	killed	
in	the	fierce	fighting.4		
In	spite	of	these	military	defeats,	the	extended	conflict	in	the	Wuchang	area	had	
achieved	its	goal	and	inspired	revolution	in	other	parts	of	the	empire.	On	October	22,	Hunan	
became	among	the	first	to	declare	for	the	Republican	cause,	with	Shanghai	and	13	other	
provinces	following	thereafter.	It	soon	became	clear	that	popular	and	elite	support	for	the	Qing	
was	low,	with	ethnicity-based	attacks	on	Manchus	and	counter-attacks	on	Han	Chinese	growing	
in	frequency	and	intensity.	Moreover,	both	the	Qing	and	the	revolutionaries	were	running	
extremely	short	on	funds	to	finance	their	respective	armies,	and	so	cease-fire	was	offered,	and	
an	agreement	negotiated	whereby	the	empire	would	be	converted	into	a	republic	and	the	
emperor	would	“willingly”	abdicate.	
The	individual	who	inherited	the	highest	executive	authority	from	the	Qing	court	was	
Yuan	Shikai.	The	former	New	Army	commander	and	reformist	official	had	been	forced	into	
retirement	in	1908	because	of	his	close	ties	to	the	Empress	Dowager,	but	now	his	prestige	and	
military	expertise	were	urgently	needed.	This	desperation	as	well	as	his	subsequent	military	
victories	over	the	revolutionaries	led	to	Yuan	becoming	the	natural	successor	to	the	defeated	
emperor	as	the	empire	transitioned	into	a	republic.	His	reputation	as	a	capable	administrator	
and	experience	with	national	politics	made	him	one	of	the	only	possible	candidates	to	lead	the	
new	state,	and	he	assumed	the	post	of	second	provisional	president	in	March	of	1912.	The	Qing	
court	was	pensioned	off,	and	the	national	revolution,	in	spite	of	its	bloody	beginning,	seemed	
to	end	with	a	bloodless	whimper.	
In	contrast,	the	transition	away	from	Qing	rule	in	Hunan	was	far	more	violent	and	
treacherous.	The	Wuchang	Uprising	of	October	11,	1911	took	place	in	Hubei,	the	province	
immediately	to	the	north	of	Hunan,	and	news	reached	Changsha	within	days.	On	the	22nd	of	
that	month,	the	provincial	governor	fled,	and	the	military	commander	was	killed.	Initially,	there	
was	an	expectation	that	Tan	Yankai,	who	had	been	leader	of	the	Provincial	Assembly	for	a	few	
years	by	that	point,	would	take	over	as	governor	in	the	post-Qing	era.	However,	a	young	
revolutionary	named	Jiao	Dafeng	(1886-1911)	announced	that	his	close	ties	to	the	Wuchang	
“revolutionaries”	made	him	the	best	fit	for	the	position,	and	he	took	over.	His	tenure	as	military	
governor	lasted	only	about	ten	days	before	he	and	his	deputy	were	assassinated;	Tan	Yankai	
assumed	his	place,	and	would	serve	as	chief	executive	of	Hunan	province	for	about	two	years.	
It	is	useful	to	return	to	the	wen-wu	framework	to	contrast	Jiao	Dafeng	with	Tan	Yankai.	Jiao	was	
born	to	an	affluent	family	in	Liuyang,	the	same	county	just	east	of	Changsha	as	Tan	Sitong	and	
Tang	Caichang.	However,	perhaps	because	he	was	of	a	later	generation,	he	joined	the	
revolutionary	cause	at	a	much	younger	age,	forgoing	the	civil	service	examinations	and	joining	
                                                
4	Figures	from	Shan,	Yuan	Shikai,	150-51,	who	draws	from	Yuan’s	initial	reports	to	the	court,	as	well	as	the	
observations	of	Francis	Stafford,	as	quoted	in	Hanchao	Lu,	Birth	of	a	Republic	(Seattle:	University	of	Washington	
Press,	2009).	
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the	local	militia.	After	some	engagement	with	failed	anti-Qing	uprisings,	he	fled	to	Japan	in	
1906,	where	he	was	“a	rather	undistinguished	student	at	a	railway	school	after	being	denied	
admission	to	any	of	the	military	academies.”5	While	in	Tokyo,	he	joined	the	Revolutionary	
Alliance	like	so	many	other	young	anti-Qing	overseas	Chinese,	but	soon	left	that	group	to	help	
create	the	Forward	Together	Society	(公進會).	This	group	sought	to	organize	the	various	local	
gangs	and	brotherhoods	to	which	peasant	and	underclass	urbanite	youths	belonged—known	as	
secret	societies—into	a	coherent	empire-wide	force	as	a	way	to	bring	down	the	Qing.	In	short,	
Jiao	not	only	seemed	to	lack	all	of	Tan	Yankai’s	wen	credentials	that	might	otherwise	have	
appealed	to	the	Hunanese	gentry	elite,	but	he	was	also	deficient	in	the	wu	prestige	that	he	
might	have	otherwise	attained	through	attending	one	of	the	military	academies	or	gaining	
experience	with	the	New	Army.	Indeed,	Jiao	represented	the	so-called	dregs	of	society,	in	sharp	
contrast	to	Tan	Yankai’s	elite	pedigree.	In	this,	the	disparity	in	social	status	between	the	two	
presages	the	events	of	November	1920,	when	Tan’s	inability	to	expand	his	support	beyond	the	
elite	led	directly	to	the	mutiny	that	prompted	his	resignation.	
Social	status	and	an	inability	to	fulfill	established	cultural	expectations	concerning	wen	
and	wu	were	a	key	factor	behind	Jiao’s	murder.	His	youth	and	casual	attitude	towards	social	
propriety	did	not	inspire	confidence,	and	he	made	little	effort	to	ingratiate	himself	with	the	
gentry	elite.6	Had	he	demonstrated	a	greater	facility	with	the	expected	norms	of	civilized	
behavior,	or	evinced	wen,	perhaps	he	could	have	gained	greater	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	local	
power-holders.	Moreover,	Jiao	seemed	incompetent	in	wu	matters	as	well;	he	was	assassinated	
by	dissatisfied	members	of	the	New	Army	who	questioned	his	ability	to	lead	the	provincial	
military.	The	leader	of	the	group	that	killed	him	was	Mei	Xing	(1878-1928),	a	New	Army	officer	
and	graduate	of	the	Japanese	Officers	Academy	whom	Jiao	had	ordered	to	Jiangxi	on	little	rest	
and	without	sufficient	supplies.	Showing	more	respect	for	Mei’s	experience	and	training	might	
have	placated	those	military	elements	that	would	otherwise	have	supported	his	administration.	
One	aspect	of	his	assassination	warrants	further	scrutiny:	the	culpability	of	Tan	Yankai	
and	other	gentry	in	inspiring	Mei	to	action.	Esherick,	relying	on	oral	histories	from	those	
involved,	is	unsparing	in	assessing	blame.	He	writes,	“there	is	little	doubt	that	Tan	Yankai	had	
assented	to	the	revolutionary	plot	[to	kill	Jiao]—if	he	had	not	in	fact	directed	it.”7	It	warrants	
highlighting	that	this	kind	of	betrayal,	of	a	revolutionary	by	a	reformer,	fits	the	national	
conception	of	how	history	is	made	wherein	the	initial	revolution	was	truncated	by	the	
machinations	of	elites.	Here,	the	gentry	elite	of	Hunan	conspired	to	eliminate	Jiao	because	of	
the	threat	that	he	and	his	followers	posed	to	the	established	social	order.	Tan	had	expected	to	
gain	control	of	the	province	following	the	Wuchang	uprising,	and	had	been	continually	
manipulating	events	so	as	to	instigate	Jiao’s	death	and	ensure	his	own	subsequent	elevation	to	
the	position	of	Hunan	governor.	Witnesses	like	Zhong	Boyi	(aka	Zhong	Caihong,	1880-1961),	
another	member	of	the	elite	who	would	go	on	to	be	the	director	of	the	provincial	finance	
bureau	under	Tan,	contend	that	Mei	must	have	at	least	had	tacit	consent	from	Tan	before	
                                                
5	Joseph	Esherick,	Reform	and	Revolution	in	China:	The	1911	Revolution	in	Hunan	and	Hubei	(Berkeley:	University	
of	California	Press,	1976),	155.	
6	Esherick,	Reform	and	Revolution,	204.	
7	Esherick,	Reform	and	Revolution,	210.	
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arranging	Jiao’s	assassination.8	In	Esherick’s	analysis,	Tan	led	elite	interests	to	thwart	the	threat	
to	their	social	standing	that	Jiao	and	the	revolution	embodied.	He	and	the	local	gentry	wanted	
reform	and	change,	but	only	if	they	were	the	ones	controlling	the	pace	of	progress.	In	this	
interpretation,	Jiao’s	murder	was	a	tragedy	for	Hunan	and	China,	as	the	elite	classes	used	the	
rhetoric	of	revolution	to	commit	a	coup	against	the	Qing	court,	and	assert	their	political	
authority.	The	promise	of	substantial	change	that	Jiao	Dafeng’s	rule	represented	was	
supplanted	by	the	elite	government	of	Tan	Yankai.	Provisionally,	in	1911,	it	appeared	as	though	
the	revolution	had	been	defeated	by	the	late	Qing	elites,	who	preserved	their	power	by	
disguising	under	the	label	of	reform.9		
Yet	there	are	indications	that	the	true	cause	of	Jiao’s	downfall	was	his	lack	of	experience	
in	matters	of	administration,	which	attracted	ire	from	among	the	professional	soldiers	who	
comprised	the	core	of	the	Hunan	New	Army	like	Mei	Xing.	As	Zhao	Hengti	recounts	in	his	oral	
history,	Jiao’s	attempt	to	enlarge	the	provincial	military	would	have	made	payroll	untenable,	
and	produced	a	high	degree	of	chaos	and	disorder.	He	writes,	“[Jiao]	did	his	best	to	recruit	
soldiers	and	enrich	his	strength.	Consequently,	the	army	became	extremely	disorganized,	with	
the	regular	forces	being	reorganized	into	six	divisions.”10	Though	Tao	Juyin’s	history	of	the	era	
disagrees	with	this	last	figure,	claiming	that	it	was	not	six	but	five	divisions,	he	concurs	that	the	
proposed	expansion	of	the	military	was	extreme	in	both	speed	and	number,	with	Jiao	
attempting	to	increase	the	army	by	50,000	soldiers.11	Tan’s	biographical	chronicle	makes	the	
same	point;	the	entry	for	the	month	of	Jiao’s	rise	and	fall	points	out	that	Jiao	had	tried	to	send	
extremely	high	levels	of	material	support	for	the	Wuchang	uprising,	which	would	necessarily	
have	exacerbated	tensions	in	a	provincial	government	already	concerned	about	military	
expenditures.	After	Jiao’s	death,	Tan	Yankai	was	unable	to	renege	on	the	promised	salaries	for	
the	soldiers,	and	the	1912	Hunan	budget	for	this	item	surpassed	8.5	million	yuan.	Given	that	
the	entire	provincial	budget	for	1911	did	not	exceed	this	figure,	it	is	clear	that	military	expenses	
were	spiraling	out	of	control.	In	other	words,	it	was	not	necessary	for	Tan	and	his	peers	to	
conspire	in	the	creation	of	an	environment	that	would	have	led	to	Jiao’s	death;	Jiao	himself	
made	those	conditions	possible.		
Edward	McCord	offers	an	alternative	perspective	on	the	subject	of	Tan’s	complicity,	and	
the	significance	of	Jiao’s	murder	for	the	forces	of	local	reform	and	revolution.	Tan	did	not	
punish	Mei	and	his	soldiers	for	their	culpability	in	the	assassination,	apparently	signaling	
support	for	the	murder,	yet	Tan	was	apparently	surprised	when	initially	told	what	had	
happened.12	Perhaps	some	miscommunication	occurred	between	Mei	and	Tan,	which	led	to	
Jiao’s	death,	or	possibly	Tan	was	merely	reluctant	to	initiate	a	cycle	of	retribution	in	an	unstable	
political	environment.		
                                                
8	Zhong,	Interviews,	24.	Original:	事先或嘗獲組菴之默許.	
9	Minoru	Shimizu	also	supports	this	line	of	characterization	of	Jiao’s	death	as	a	elite-led	coup.	See	his	“The	1911	
Revolution	in	Hunan	and	the	Popular	Movement,”	in	Eto	Shinkichi	and	Harold	Z.	Schiffrin,	The	1911	Revolution	in	
China:	Interpretive	Essays	(Tokyo:	University	of	Tokyo	Press,	1984),	193-208.	
10	Zhong,	Interviews,	24.	Original:	儘量募兵，擴充實力，故部隊龐雜已極，即正规軍亦編下六師之衆。	
11	Tao	Juyin,	Anecdotes,	101.	Original:	這些功臣自居，驕傲自滿的將軍們都不把焦都督放在眼下。	
12	Edward	A.	McCord,	The	Power	of	the	Gun:	The	Emergence	of	Modern	Chinese	Warlordism	(Berkeley:	University	
of	California	Press,	1993),	95.	
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Whatever	the	case	might	be,	Tan,	as	Hunan	governor-general,	would	publish	a	
statement	at	the	end	of	November	in	Shibao	that	praised	Jiao’s	contributions	to	the	revolution	
and	mourned	his	death.13	One	year	later,	he	ordered	the	construction	of	a	bronze	statue	to	
commemorate	Jiao’s	martyrdom.14	As	McCord	speculates,	these	probably	were	efforts	to	
placate	Jiao’s	non-elite	comrades	who	remained	upset	at	both	his	death	as	well	as	the	return	to	
a	local	politics	dominated	by	the	same	class	of	late	Qing	elites.	It	took	the	prestige	of	Huang	
Xing,	who	had	viewed	these	events	in	his	home	province	of	Hunan	from	afar,	to	intervene	and	
tamp	down	ill-will	against	Tan	by	naming	him	head	of	the	provincial	branch	of	the	KMT.	This	
established	Tan’s	revolutionary	credentials	while	also	enhancing	support	for	the	party.	These	
immediate	motives	were	fused	with	repaid	favors	and	reciprocal	action	as	well:	Huang	had	
been	a	teacher	at	the	Mingde	Academy	during	the	period	of	Tan’s	financial	support	for	that	
institution,	and	had	benefited	from	Tan’s	intervention	during	his	1905	flight	to	Japan.	The	debt	
incurred	then	was	returned	six	years	later	when	Huang	supported	Tan	in	a	time	of	need.15	
Tan’s	subsequent	tenure	as	provincial	governor	lasted	only	two	years,	and	has	been	
criticized	for	doing	nothing	to	respond	to	the	drives	that	motivated	the	1911	Revolution.	In	this,	
it	seemed	no	different	from	the	other	elite-controlled	provincial	administrations	that	
dominated	local	governance	after	the	fall	of	the	Qing	state.	Esherick	notes,	“[t]he	trend	of	rising	
prices	and	taxes	which	accompanied	the	Qing	reforms	continued	unabated	under	the	liberal	
regimes	of	the	early	Republic.	The	peasantry,	for	its	part,	gained	nothing	from	the	revolution	
but	a	new	regime	in	which	gentry	and	officials	were	allied	even	more	closely	in	defense	of	the	
class	interests	of	the	elite.”16	Provinces	like	Hunan	and	governors	like	Tan,	in	other	words,	were	
merely	enriching	themselves	through	industrial	projects,	carrying	on	their	predecessors’	
tradition	of	peasant	exploitation.	
Previously	underused	archival	materials,	however,	suggest	a	more	complex	story.	Nearly	
all	the	oral	histories	of	non-elites	who	experienced	this	1911	transition	were	taken	after	the	
1949	Communist	victory,	and	thus	have	a	predisposition	towards	a	historiographical	view	of	
elites	as	being	selfish	and	greedy.	As	such,	arguments	that	are	based	on	such	materials,	like	
Esherick’s,	necessarily	share	the	same	perspective,	critical	of	post-1911	local	governance	for	
being	both	useless	to	the	masses	as	well	as	interested	only	in	strengthening	their	own	power.	
When	contemporaneous	materials	are	consulted,	the	supposed	fumbling	and	malicious	
behavior	of	elites	like	Tan	becomes	far	more	ambiguous.	Orders	concerning	the	establishment	
and	standardization	of	the	postal	service,	for	example,	suggest	an	exacting	attention	to	
mundane	detail	and	proper	bureaucratic	procedure.	Example	policies	issued	in	1912	include	
making	sure	dates	were	recorded	according	to	the	solar	calendar	rather	than	the	lunar,17	
                                                
13	Tan	Yankai	譚延闓,	“	悼焦、陈二督布告”	[Notice	of	Mourning	for	Officials	Jiao	and	Chen]	in	Shibao,	November	
28,	1911,	as	found	in	Zhou,	ed.,	Works,		9.	Original:	首倡义旗，厥功甚伟，悼惜殊深	
14	Tan	Yankai	譚延闓,	“为焦达峰、陈作新铸铜像令	”	[Directive	for	a	Bronze	Statue	of	Jiao	Dafeng	and	Chen	
Zuoxin]	in	Shenbao,	September	1,	1912,	as	found	in	Zhou,	ed.,	Works,		18.	Original:	秉旋乾转坤之才，建耀日回
天之烈，充宜铸金以祀，志纪念而长存.	
15	McCord,	Power	of	the	Gun,	96-101.	
16	Esherick,	Reform	and	Revolution,	252	
17	“為傳諭事陽曆千九百四年正月七日安奉”	[Instructions	on	Using	the	Solar	Calendar]	(Order	#	14,	July	12,	1912)	
File	90-1-497,	page	27,	Hunan	Provincial	Archives,	Changsha,	Hunan,	People’s	Republic	of	China.	
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instruction	on	how	offices	should	treat	foreign	requests	to	exchange	currency,18	and	
admonishments	concerning	the	irregular	size	of	official	correspondence.19	These	regulations	
might	not	be	as	exciting	or	impactful	as	some	of	the	radical	proposals	put	forward	by	more	
revolutionary	regimes,	but,	as	David	Henkin	has	shown	for	the	nineteenth-century	United	
States	postal	service,	communications	networks	were	crucial	for	binding	together	both	state	
and	society,	and	thus,	facilitate	revolutionary	change.20	Moreover,	while	there	are	certainly	
ways	in	which	regimes	might	be	able	to	use	an	institution	like	a	postal	service	to	enhance	its	
own	power,	surely	there	are	benefits	as	well	that	should	not	be	overlooked.	
In	any	event,	the	political	position	of	Tan	Yankai	as	the	new	provincial	governor	after	
1911	illustrates	the	ambiguous	relationship	between	what	Li	Jiannong	would	later	categorize	as	
opposing	reformist	and	revolutionary	factions.	As	a	member	of	the	late	Qing	elite	who	pushed	
for	constitutional	monarchy	prior	to	the	revolution,	he	embodied	the	established	order	that	the	
revolutionaries	wanted	to	overthrow.	During	the	brief	administration	of	Jiao	Dafeng,	Tan	was	
not	a	part	of	the	revolutionary	movement	and	had	arguably	become	its	chief	obstacle,	yet	he	
was	given	a	high	position	in	the	local	branch	of	the	KMT	soon	after.	To	be	sure,	there	were	
divisions	between	the	two	movements,	but	Tan’s	attempt	to	join	the	two	together	suggests	
that	the	boundary	was	porous,	in	contrast	to	how	the	Li	Jiannong-influenced	historiography	
would	later	depict.	Indeed,	a	radical	in	one	era	might	be	a	moderate	in	the	next,	suggesting	the	
meaninglessness	of	the	definition.	
	
Revolution	and	Reform	after	1911	in	Li	Jiannong’s	Political	History	
The	ambiguity	and	contentious	relationship	between	reformers	and	revolutionaries	in	
Hunan	were	mirrored	at	the	national	level.	The	two	loosely-defined	groups	had	worked	in	
concert	against	the	Qing,	but,	since	the	success	of	the	1911	revolution,	were	now	rivals	for	
power.	Liang	Qichao	and	Kang	Youwei	(1858-1927)	are	usually	interpreted	as	quintessential	
examples	of	the	reformers	for	their	willingness	to	work	with	the	Qing	Court	during	the	failed	
1898	reforms	and	their	subsequent	advocacy	for	constitutional	monarchy	in	the	years	after.	
Liang	and	Kang	stand	in	sharp	contrast	to	Huang	Xing	and	Sun	Yatsen,	who	continually	pushed	
for	the	overthrow	of	the	dynasty,	and	who	are	often	portrayed	as	the	primary	contributors	to	
the	success	of	that	effort.21		
Yet	these	categories	are	problematic.	On	a	political	level,	these	were	labels	that	were	
attached	to	rivals	in	pejorative	ways:	reformers	were	attacked	for	their	collaborationist	
tendencies,	while	revolutionaries	were	critiqued	for	unrealistic	ambitions.	Even	when	both	
groups	were	in	Japan	as	exiles	because	of	their	anti-Qing	organizing,	they	competed	with	each	
                                                
18	“為傳諭事照得各支局於匯票即對據上所粘郵票多有不甚留意待收洋人優到特票”	[Instructions	to	each	
suboffice	concerning	money	orders,	postage,	and	Westerners]	(Order	#29,	September	4,	1912)	File	90-1-497,	page	
35,	Hunan	Provincial	Archives,	Changsha,	Hunan,	People’s	Republic	of	China.	
19	“為傳諭事照得本分界各分局暨二等支局來往公函向來大小不一無一正式殊非辦公之道死為劃一辦公”	
[Instructions	concerning	the	uniform	size	of	official	documents]	(Order	#30,	September	9,	1912).	File	90-1-497,	
page	37,	Hunan	Provincial	Archives,	Changsha,	Hunan,	People’s	Republic	of	China.	
20	David	M.	Henkin,	The	Postal	Age:	The	Emergence	of	Modern	Communications	in	Nineteenth-Century	America	
(Chicago,	IL.:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2006)	
21	For	a	modern	example	of	this	categorization,	see	Timothy	Cheek,	The	Intellectual	in	Modern	Chinese	History	
(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015),	7.		
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other	for	financing	and	attention.	This	competition	did	not	end	after	the	1911	Revolution,	as	
the	two	groups	coalesced	into	two	factions:	the	revolutionaries	into	the	KMT,	or	Nationalist	
Party	associated	with	Sun,	Huang,	and	Song,	and	the	reformers	into	what	would	later	become	
known	as	the	Progressive	Party	associated	with	Liang.	
This	political	rivalry	informs	how	the	two	groups	are	historically	depicted,	as	
demonstrated	in	Li	Jiannong’s	influential	overview	of	the	late	Qing	and	early	republic.	As	
discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	Li	had	been	a	member	of	the	Revolutionary	Alliance	and	
worked	with	the	anti-Qing	forces	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Wuchang	uprising	to	portray	their	
struggle	in	the	most	heroic	light	possible.	While	he	was	still	a	journalist	in	the	Wuchang	area	in	
1912,	by	1930	he	had	become	a	professor	of	history,	in	which	capacity	he	gave	a	number	of	
lectures	on	the	politics	of	the	prior	thirty	years.	These	lectures	were	eventually	collected	into	a	
monograph,	Chinese	Political	History	in	the	Past	Thirty	Years	(最近三十年中国政治史)	covering	
the	period	from	the	1898	reforms	to	the	1928	Northern	Expedition.22	In	1948,	this	text	was	
expanded	and	republished	as	Political	History	of	China	in	the	Past	Century	(中国近百年政治史).	
This	second	version	of	the	text	was	translated	into	English	in	1956,	where	it	became	a	
foundational	text	for	the	study	of	modern	Chinese	history	in	the	West.23	Li’s	paradigm,	in	which	
the	interplay	between	revolutionaries	and	reformers	provides	the	driving	mechanism	behind	
the	development	of	modern	Chinese	politics	during	the	period	in	question,	and	in	which	the	
former	are	the	heroes	and	the	latter	are	but	impediments	to	progress,	remains	influential	to	
this	day.	One	Western	scholar	summarized	its	importance	as	follows:	“[the]	book	was	regarded	
as	a	standard	work	by	Chinese	and	looked	upon	by	others	as	the	[emphasis	his]	political	history	
of	the	period	in	question.”24	
The	introduction	and	the	first	three	chapters	of	Political	History,	covering	Qing	rule	in	
the	nineteenth	century	until	the	Sino	Japanese	War	of	1894-1895,	are	worth	reviewing	in	order	
to	grasp	how	Li	interprets	the	underlying	reasons	for	the	imperial	system’s	collapse	in	1911,	
and	how	those	factors	shape	his	conceptualization	of	reform	and	revolution.	In	these	chapters,	
a	number	of	comparisons	are	made	between	the	late	Qing	and	early	Republican	eras	within	the	
broader	sweep	of	Chinese	history.	Chinese	antiquity	is	commonly	remembered	as	a	golden	age	
that	was	followed	by	the	“Warring	States”	period,	wherein	a	number	of	different	kingdoms	vied	
for	power	before	imperial	unification	in	212	BC.	According	to	Peter	Zarrow,	as	they	focused	on	
the	importance	of	national	unification	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	historians	increasingly	
categorized	Chinese	history	in	terms	of	the	periods	before,	during,	and	after	imperial	
unification.25	After	imperial	unification,	the	same	pattern	of	dynastic	rise	and	fall	repeated	itself	
throughout	Chinese	imperial	history:	smaller	kingdoms	fought	with	each	other	for	hegemony	
before	eventually	being	unified	through	military	force.	In	the	same	way,	the	post-1911	period	
                                                
22	Li	Jiannong,	Zuijin	Sanshi	Nian	Zhongguo	Zhengzhi	Shi	[Most	recent	thirty	years	of	Chinese	political	history]	
(Shanghai:	Taiping	Yang	Shudian,	1930).			
23	Li	Ch’ien-nung	[Li	Jiannong],	The	Political	History	of	China,	1840-1928,	Trans.	Teng	Ssu-yu	[Deng	Siyu]	and	Jeremy	
Ingalls.	(Princeton,	NJ:	Van	Nostrand	Co.,	1956).	All	references	to	Political	History	will	be	from	the	Teng	and	Ingalls	
translation	unless	otherwise	noted.	
24	Norbert	Meienberger,	The	Emergence	of	Constitutional	Government	in	China,	1905-1908:	The	Concept	
sanctioned	by	Empress	Dowager	Tz’u-Hsi	(Bern:	Peter	Lang,	1980),	65.	
25	Peter	Zarrow,	Educating	China:	Knowledge,	Society	and	Textbooks	in	a	Modernizing	World,	1902-1937	
(Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015),	53.	
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of	warlord	division	was	often	seen	as	temporary.	Romance	of	the	Three	Kingdoms,	a	work	of	
historical	fiction	that	describes	the	post-Han	period	of	division	and	reunification,	speaks	to	this	
sentiment	in	its	famous	epigraph:	“The	empire,	long	divided,	must	unite;	long	united,	must	
divide.	Thus	it	has	always	been.”26	Li	alludes	to	this	cyclical	conception	of	Chinese	history	in	his	
Political	History,	explicitly	referring	to	the	Mencian	phrase	“period	of	order,	period	of	chaos.”27	
Indeed,	he	noted	that	dynasties	had	a	tendency	to	rule	for	two	or	three	hundred	years	before	
disintegrating	into	chaos,	implying	that	the	268	year	tenure	of	the	Qing	fit	nicely	within	this	
model.	Yet	while	Chinese	historians	had	traditionally	described	the	causes	of	dynastic	decline	in	
terms	of	the	mandate	of	heaven	or	state	corruption,	Li	argues	that	a	conservative	and	
backwards	cultural	orientation	promoted	an	inward-looking	culture	wherein	scientific	and	
technological	achievements	beyond	China’s	borders	were	insufficiently	appreciated.	
In	his	short	introduction	to	Qing	China	prior	to	the	mid-nineteenth	century,	Li	describes	
a	stagnant	and	fundamentally	unchanging	political	and	social	system	which	was	in	dire	need	of	
radical	revolution	by	the	time	of	the	Opium	War,	and	that	directly	led	to	the	collapse	of	the	
imperial	system.	His	ending	analysis	of	the	nationwide	reaction	to	the	Opium	War	is	
emblematic	of	his	critical	attitude	towards	the	actions	of	both	state	and	society	following	this	
event.	For	him,	even	after	the	war’s	end	in	1842,		
…	 the	Chinese	 still	maintained	 that	China	was	 the	 source	of	 civilization	 for	 the	
whole	world,	that	the	Western	barbarians	had	no	culture	worth	regarding,	and	
the	 power	 of	Western	 guns	was	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	Western	 science.	 They	
took	the	recent	defeat	by	the	barbarians	as	merely	an	accident	such	as	China	had	
weathered	many	times	in	her	long	history.28		
	
The	general	tone	that	Li	takes	towards	the	Chinese	reaction	to	defeat	is	one	of	indignant	
incredulity:	what	could	justify	such	faith	in	their	own	culture?	Why	do	they	have	such	hostility	
towards	progressive	change?	How	could	their	rout	at	the	hands	of	the	British	be	so	willfully	
ignored?	For	him,	this	blindness	on	the	part	of	the	Chinese	towards	their	own	lack	of	
knowledge	represents	a	key	factor	behind	the	fall	of	the	Qing.	
Perhaps	the	more	pressing	question	was:	how	can	this	attitude	be	changed?	According	
to	Li	Jiannong,	only	a	sweeping	revolution	would	be	able	to	eradicate	the	vestiges	of	traditional	
Chinese	culture	and	the	state.	This	is	first	suggested	by	his	description	of	the	dramatic	political,	
social,	and	cultural	transformations	represented	by	the	pseudo-Christian	Taiping	state,	which	
lasted	11	years	and	stalemated	the	military	of	the	central	government	before	being	defeated	by	
the	Hunan	Army	of	Zeng	Guofan.	Yet,	despite	the	radical	social	change	that	their	regime	
enacted,	Li	criticizes	the	Taiping	state	for	being	insufficiently	revolutionary,	signaling	his	own	
attitude	towards	change:	
In	 form	 the	 Heavenly	 Kingdom	 of	 Great	 Peace	 seemed	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 total	
revolution	against	Chinese	 religion,	politics,	and	economics.	But	 this	 revolution	
actually	was	not	in	accord	with	modern	revolutionary	spirit.	The	Taipings	tried	to	
                                                
26	Luo	Guanzhong,	Romance	of	the	Three	Kingdoms,	trans.	Moss	Roberts	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	
1991),	5.	Original:	天下大勢	﹐	分久必合	﹐	合久必分.	
27	Li	Jiannong,	Political	History,	47.	Original:	一治一亂。	
28	Ibid.,	46.	
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put	new	wine	in	an	old	bottle;	the	flavor	of	the	new	was	soon	soured	by	the	old.	
The	Taipings	were	soon	permeated	with	old	Chinese	corruptions—nepotism	and	
debauchery—and	the	old	Chinese	habit	of	conservatism	and	fixed	ideas.29		
	
From	this	critique,	we	can	begin	to	get	a	sense	for	Li’s	fervent	desire	for	revolution	and	
transformation,	unsurprising	for	a	member	of	the	Revolutionary	Alliance.	In	his	assessment,	the	
Taiping	Rebellion	failed	not	because	they	were	too	radical	for	Chinese	society,	but	because	they	
were	not	radical	enough.	Had	they	been	less	moored	to	Chinese	culture—and	more	aligned	
with	a	vaguely	defined	‘modern	revolutionary	spirit’—then	they	might	have	been	able	to	
prevail.	Instead,	their	defeat	by	Zeng	Guofan	and	the	Qing	ensured	that	China	would	remain	
trapped	within	its	backwards-looking	attitude	for	decades	more.	
For	Li,	it	took	the	Sino-Japanese	War	of	1894-1895	to	finally	signal	the	end	for	both	the	
traditional	focus	on	the	past	as	well	as	the	imperial	system	itself.	Attempts	to	graft	Chinese	
culture	with	Western	science	had	been	made	by	both	the	Qing	court	at	the	center	as	well	as	
regional	leaders	like	Zhang	Zhidong	and	Li	Hongzhang,	with	mixed	results.	Though	Qing	China	
had	been	relatively	successful	in	fighting	the	French	in	Vietnam,	their	complete	rout	by	Japan	
strongly	suggested	the	need	for	radical	change.	Yet	even	this	resounding	defeat	was	not	
enough	to	convince	the	majority	that	such	change	was	necessary.	In	Li’s	words,	the	reforms	
proposed	after	this	war	were	insufficient:	
What	 was	 most	 needed	 in	 China	 also	 was	 a	 political	 revolution,	 but	 forward	
looking	 individuals	who	 promoted	 China’s	 adoption	 of	Western	methods	were	
restrained	by	the	conservatives,	and	the	Chinese	people	generally	had	no	spirit	
of	 adventure.	 How	 could	 they	 avoid	 failure	 in	 dealing	 with	 foreign	 countries?	
However,	 after	 the	 fiasco	 of	 the	 Sino-Japanese	 War,	 the	 prestige	 of	 the	
traditional	leaders	could	not	be	maintained	any	longer.	A	political	revolutionary	
force	began	to	emerge.30		
	
Thus,	with	this	overview	of	the	nineteenth	century,	Li	establishes	a	paradigm	that	will	carry	
over	into	his	discussion	of	the	last	years	of	the	Qing	and	first	years	of	the	Chinese	republic:	
necessary	change	is	stymied	by	well-meaning	reforms	that	only	postpone	the	inevitable	
revolution.	The	small	reforms	that	had	been	attempted	after	the	Opium	War	were	failures.	The	
changes	enacted	by	the	Taiping	rebels	also	failed	because	they	did	not	go	far	enough.	Even	the	
traumatic	defeat	by	Japan	in	1895	only	resulted	in	half-hearted	reforms,	and	not	revolution.	
The	distinction	is	clear,	and	his	preference	is	obvious:	between	reforms	and	revolutions,	Li	
clearly	believed	in	the	power	of	revolution	rather	than	the	possibility	of	reform.		
In	Li’s	Political	History,	though	reformers	and	revolutionaries	shared	the	desire	to	
improve	and	modernize	China,	they	were	fierce	rivals	first	and	foremost.	Prior	to	1911,	they	
fought	with	each	other	for	financial	support	from	the	same	group	of	overseas	Chinese	and	
strongly	disagreed	with	the	ideology	and	methods	of	the	other.	For	example,	Liang	Qichao	and	
the	reformers	during	the	late	Qing	“predicted	bad	effects	from	a	revolution	and	a	republic—
such	as	internal	dissension,	struggle	for	power	among	the	revolutionary	leaders	themselves,	
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and	endless	disorder,”31	correctly	anticipating	the	tumult	of	the	post-1911	era.	Their	enmity	
was	matched	by	their	counterparts,	who	viewed	prospects	for	gradual	reform	as	naïve:	
“[w]ithin	the	Constitutional	Party	[one	name	for	the	reformers]	there	were	a	great	many	people	
who	were	very	enthusiastic	and	worked	hard	toward	a	constitutional	government,	yet	their	
efforts	were	viewed	by	the	revolutionists	as	extremely	foolish.”32	Given	these	attitudes,	it	is	no	
surprise	that	Li	describes	their	relationship	after	the	revolution	as	antagonistic.	
Yet	to	what	degree	is	this	text	a	politically	informed	critique	of	the	reformers	instead	of	
the	objective	description	of	events	that	it	purports	to	be?	For	Li,	the	reformers	during	the	early	
republic	were	just	as	spineless	and	fawning	as	they	were	in	the	late	Qing:	too	timid	to	engage	
not	only	with	the	political	and	intellectual	changes	needed	to	modernize	the	nation,	but	also	
with	the	obstacles	to	the	work	of	substantive	revolution.	But,	as	demonstrated	by	the	case	of	
Tan	Yankai,	the	division	between	the	two	categories	is	not	as	clear-cut	as	he	might	have	his	
readers	believe.	Indeed,	the	differences	between	the	two	parties	can	be	thought	of	as	a	
disagreement	about	tactics	and	methods	rather	than	goals,	as	both	factions	wanted	a	modern,	
strong,	and	unified	state	that	could	preserve	peace,	economically	thrive,	and	defend	its	
territory	from	the	depredations	of	foreign	imperialists.	Given	these	shared	goals,	what	could	
explain	Li’s	venom	for	the	reformers,	aside	from	his	self-identification	with	the	revolutionaries?	
Surely	the	response	of	the	reformers	to	the	1913	assassination	of	the	revolutionary	leader	Song	
Jiaoren	contributed	to	a	KMT	narrative	of	betrayal.		
	
The	Assassination	of	Song	Jiaoren	and	the	Second	Revolution	
	 Song	Jiaoren’s	violent	death	in	March	1913	marked	the	end	of	a	precarious	peace	that	
had	existed	between	the	various	political	factions,	and	signaled	the	beginning	of	the	end	for	the	
viability	of	the	reform	platform.	Up	to	that	point,	the	majority	of	the	political	maneuvering	
between	these	groups	had	been	rhetorical;	afterwards,	a	violent	conflict	commonly	called	“The	
Second	Revolution”	erupted	that	resulted	in	a	complete	victory	for	Yuan	and	the	near	
destruction	of	the	Nationalist	Party.	The	Reform	Parties,	which	only	formally	amalgamated	into	
the	Progressive	Party	(進步黨)	in	May	of	1913,	largely	supported	Yuan	against	the	Nationalists,	
thus	paving	the	way	for	his	imperial	ambitions.	The	cause	of	reform,	as	opposed	to	revolution,	
was	thus	sullied	further	for	being	associated	with	the	late	Qing	reformer	Yuan	as	well	as	the	
political	parties	of	the	early	republic	which	supported	him	against	the	Nationalist	Party.	In	
Hunan,	Tan	and	Zhao	joined	in	the	fight	against	Yuan,	and	were	imprisoned	for	their	efforts.	Li	
Jiannong,	who	never	left	the	Nationalist	Party	and	had	written	newspaper	articles	warning	
against	Yuan’s	ambitions,	followed	the	example	of	Sun	Yatsen	and	Huang	Xing,	leaving	the	
country	for	overseas	study.		
	 After	the	1911	Revolution,	Yuan	became	Provisional	President	of	the	new	Republic	of	
China,	and	his	record	during	this	period	was	comprised	of	both	progressive	modernization	
reforms	as	well	as	measures	to	preserve	his	own	military	strength.	Upon	taking	office,	he	
pledged	to	step	down	in	favor	of	a	president	chosen	by	the	congress	that	was	scheduled	to	be	
formally	elected	within	the	year.	He	also	promoted	policies	like	Western	education,	anti-opium	
campaigns,	and	a	new	civil	service	examination	that	built	upon	the	reputation	he	had	achieved	
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during	the	late	Qing	as	a	modernizer	and	reformer,	and	won	the	support	of	those	in	the	reform	
faction,	who	were	most	naturally	predisposed	to	favor	such	measures.	Yet	he	also	pushed	
through	a	program	of	demobilizing	the	hundreds	of	thousands	of	soldiers	that	had	joined	the	
fight	in	against	the	Qing,	primarily	based	in	the	south,	where	his	influence	was	weakest.	This	
disbandment,	when	paired	with	his	borrowing	25	million	pounds	from	foreign	banks	at	high	
interest	rates	to	fund	his	own	troops,	provoked	no	small	amount	of	suspicion	concerning	his	
possible	ambitions	to	convert	the	republic	back	into	an	empire,	with	himself	at	the	head.	These	
suspicions	would	eventually	be	proven	correct,	as	this	financing	was	crucial	to	his	success	in	the	
civil	war	to	come.	The	juxtaposition	of	these	two	types	of	policies	caused	his	reform	efforts,	as	
well	as	the	alliances	he	forged	to	implement	them,	to	be	viewed	with	great	suspicion	and	
cynicism	by	his	political	opponents.	After	the	death	of	Song	Jiaoren	and	the	near	elimination	of	
the	Nationalist	Party,	this	suspicion	has	spread	to	the	histories	of	the	time	as	well.33	
	 As	a	major	figure	in	the	Nationalist	Party,	Song	Jiaoren	had	become	the	leader	of	the	
anti-Yuan	opposition	by	the	end	of	1912;	his	assassination	the	next	year	would	galvanize	the	
anti-Yuan	movement.	Elections	for	the	national	legislature	were	mandated	by	the	provisional	
constitution	for	the	beginning	of	1913,	and	Song	proved	to	be	a	tireless	campaigner,	
passionately	telling	crowds	that	their	votes	for	his	party	were	necessary	to	circumscribe	the	
danger	posed	by	Yuan.	On	March	20,	he	was	shot	in	the	Shanghai	railway	station	by	secret	
society	members	who	were	associated	with	Yuan’s	subordinates.	Song	died	two	days	later,	and	
Yuan	was	never	explicitly	connected	to	his	death,	though	the	killer	was	closely	connected	to	
one	of	his	chief	subordinates	and	never	punished.	Regardless,	the	Nationalist	Party	led	a	
military	uprising	against	his	rule	in	retaliation	but,	because	of	Yuan’s	military	superiority	and	
the	support	that	he	received	from	Liang	Qichao	and	the	reformers,	the	Nationalists	were	
defeated	within	months,	and	virtually	destroyed	as	a	political	party.	Integrity	and	martyrdom	
were	now	associated	with	revolution	and	the	Nationalist	Party;	collaboration	and	opportunism	
linked	with	reform	and	the	Constitutionalists.34	
	 In	Hunan,	Tan	Yankai	joined	the	Nationalists	in	their	opposition	to	Yuan,	but	in	a	
lukewarm	way,	encapsulating	the	awkward	position	as	a	member	of	both	the	reformer	and	the	
revolutionary	factions.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	the	military	forces	that	could	have	been	used	
to	support	the	Second	Revolution	and	resist	Yuan	had	been	disbanded.	Zhao	Hengti	had	
brought	his	Guangxi	troops	to	Changsha	in	the	beginning	of	1912	to	supervise	the	disarmament	
process,	and	his	success	was	nearly	total.	This	policy	was	necessary	to	preserve	provincial	
finances,	but,	as	Zhao	would	later	note,	disarmament	had	the	inadvertent	effect	of	eliminating	
Hunan’s	ability	to	defend	itself	from	invasion	to	the	north.35	Consequently,	Zhao’s	small	unit	
was	overwhelmed	at	Yuezhou,	where	Hunan	meets	Hubei,	and	he	was	captured	by	Yuan’s	
forces	and	sent	to	Beijing	as	a	prisoner	for	execution.	It	was	only	due	to	the	intervention	of	his	
former	classmates	from	the	Japanese	Officers	Academy	that	Zhao	was	able	to	survive	the	
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ordeal.	As	leader	of	a	rebellious	province,	Tan	Yankai	would	soon	join	him	there,	where	they	
would	both	stay	under	house	arrest	before	being	granted	amnesty	in	1915.	
	 Li	Jiannong	and	Tao	Juyin,	though	much	less	important	figures,	were	also	affected	by	the	
political	changes	of	the	Second	Revolution.	In	contrast	to	the	halfhearted	opposition	of	Tan	and	
Zhao,	Li’s	distaste	for	Yuan	was	never	in	doubt,	and	so	he	was	in	a	much	more	dangerous	
situation.	In	June	1913,	his	newspaper,	the	Wuchang-based	Republican	Daily	(民国日报)	was	
forced	to	shut	down	by	the	government,	and	four	of	his	fellow	editors	were	arrested.	His	was	
not	the	only	periodical	affected,	as	Yuan’s	regime	censored	all	publications	that	critiqued	his	
rule.	Ironically,	the	silencing	of	journalists	like	Li	presented	an	opportunity	for	15-year-old	Tao	
Juyin.	Tao	had	worked	for	Women’s	Rights	Daily	(女权日报)	in	Changsha	from	after	1911	until,	
like	Republican	Daily,	Yuan’s	government	forced	it	to	close	because	of	the	radical	positions	
taken	by	its	publisher:	the	radical	feminist,	one-time	Revolutionary	Alliance	member,	and	friend	
to	her	fellow	Hunanese	Song	Jiaoren,	Tang	Qunying	(1871-1937).	Because	so	many	local	
publications	like	Women’s	Rights	Daily	and	Republican	Daily	had	been	censored,	national-level	
publications	saw	an	opportunity	to	expand	into	new	markets.	Shibao	was	among	those	that	
capitalized	on	the	opportunity,	and	hired	Tao	to	write	for	its	short-lived	monthly	magazine	
supplement,	Excess	Excitement	(餘興),	which	would	give	the	young	journalist	a	broader,	
national-level	platform.	It	was	no	coincidence	that	Tao	advanced	to	his	new	role	just	as	Li	
departed	his:	this	pair	represents	the	transition	between	two	generations	of	intellectuals,	with	
different	perspectives	on	revolution.	In	historian	Timothy	Cheek’s	words,	reform	as	a	specific	
“ideological	moment”	may	have	been	coming	to	a	close	in	favor	of	revolution.36		
	 Despite	the	differences	of	the	historical	moment,	Li	continued	to	employ	the	same	
strategies	for	survival	and	advancement.	Meanwhile,	just	as	Li	had	escaped	the	Qing	in	1910	by	
fleeing	to	Tokyo	to	study	political	economy,	he	pursued	the	same	course	of	action	in	escaping	
Yuan	in	1914.	This	time,	however,	he	went	to	England,	where	he	audited	classes	in	political	
theory	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	for	three	years.	Given	the	ferocity	with	which	Yuan	
persecuted	his	political	opponents,	Li	was	worried	about	his	personal	safety,	and	thus	did	not	
return	to	China	until	1917,	after	Yuan	had	died.	It	was	while	in	England	that	his	interest	in	
federalism	and	constitutionalism	began.	Federalism	would	not	be	a	viable	political	option	for	
the	new	republic	so	long	as	Yuan	Shikai	and	his	desire	to	centralize	political	authority	remained,	
but	constitutionalism	was,	ironically,	about	to	experience	the	near	apex	and	nadir	of	its	
importance	in	China	for	the	20th	century.37	
	
National	Constitutions,	Frank	Goodnow,	and	Failure	
	 The	historical	foundations	of	Chinese	constitutionalism	predate	Li’s	1913	interest	by	
decades.	One	aspect	of	the	Qing	New	Reforms	was	a	proposal	to	convert	the	imperial	system	
into	a	constitutional	monarchy,	in	clear	emulation	of	Meiji	Japan,	whose	promulgation	of	a	
constitution	was	perceived	to	be	a	key	factor	in	its	modernization.	There	was,	however,	
ambiguity	concerning	what	this	political	theory	would	actually	look	like	in	practice:	did	it	mean	
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a	state	that	was	rigidly	governed	by	laws?	Some	sort	of	democracy	in	which	the	people	could	
participate	in	their	rule?	A	more	decentralized	nation-state	wherein	local	polities	had	more	
autonomy?	Japan’s	Meiji	state	seemed	to	include	all	of	these	aspects,	but	how	should	this	
system	be	translated	and	implemented	for	Qing	China?	Or	for	the	new	Republic?	It	seemed	as	
though	every	prominent	scholar	had	a	different	set	of	answers	to	these	questions,	creating	a	
lively	intellectual	climate,	but	little	consensus	emerged.	
	 Regardless	of	what	the	substance	of	constitutionalism	might	have	been,	it	was	desired	
by	the	late	Qing	reformers	because	of	how	it	had	clearly	helped	Japan,	which	was	perceived	to	
be	the	only	East	Asian	nation	to	successfully	resist	Western	colonialism	through	the	
construction	of	a	rich	economy	and	strong	state.	This	perception	was	only	strengthened	by	the	
Japanese	total	victory	over	China	in	the	1894-95	war,	and	then	by	Japan’s	unexpected	defeat	of	
Russia	ten	years	later.	This	latter	conflict	was	especially	surprising	because	this	was	understood	
to	be	the	first	time	an	Asian	state	had	triumphed	over	a	Western	one.	This	victory	was	
attributed	to	the	more	modern	character	of	Japan’s	state	compared	to	Russia’s	premodern	
despotism.	As	one	historian	notes,	
Many	Chinese	related	this	development	[Russia’s	defeat]	to	the	polity	of	the	two	
countries	concerned.	After	the	promulgation	of	the	constitution	in	1889	and	with	
the	 convening	 of	 the	 Diet	 in	 1890,	 Japan	 was	 a	 constitutional	 monarchy.	 In	
contrast	 to	 the	 other	 leading	 powers,	 Russia	 had	 neither	 a	 constitution	 nor	 a	
parliament.	From	this	state	of	affairs	the	Chinese	concluded:	Russia	lost	the	war	
because	 she	was	 ruled	 in	 an	 autocratic	manner;	 Japan	was	 victorious	because	
she	had	adopted	constitutional	government.38		
	
In	other	words,	Japan’s	victory	was	less	due	to	military	tactics	or	courage	on	the	field	of	battle,	
but	more	because	of	their	adoption	of	constitutionalism.		
According	to	Chinese	observers,	the	key	aspect	of	Meiji-inspired	constitutionalism	was	
its	ability	to	enable	the	state	to	respond	to	the	needs	of	its	people.	Other	features	were	
important,	like	the	rule	of	law	that	prevented	the	excesses	of	a	tyrant,	but	the	ability	of	the	
government	to	engender	loyalty	among	its	people	and	unity	between	state	and	society	was	
perceived	to	be	paramount.	The	mechanism	by	which	this	would	be	accomplished	was	a	
parliament,	or	national	assembly,	which	a	modern	constitution	would	construct	and	
empower.39	However,	as	the	subjects	of	the	Qing	empire	were	seen	by	their	state	as	
insufficiently	educated	and	civilized,	provincial	assemblies	in	1908	were	permitted	as	the	first	
step	towards	preparing	the	way	for	an	appropriately	cultured	citizenry	to	eventually	join	the	
elite	in	directing	their	nation.	The	Provincial	Assembly	in	Hunan	that	Tan	Yankai	led	during	the	
last	years	of	the	dynasty	is	thus	one	example	of	how	constitutionalism	was	interpreted	and	
implemented.40	
Moreover,	the	lack	of	any	explicit	revolution	in	Japan	clearly	appealed	to	those	elements	
in	and	out	of	government	who	were	more	disposed	towards	modernization	through	gradual	
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reform	as	opposed	to	radical	change.	The	Qing	Court	could	easily	point	to	constitutionalism	as	
proof	of	their	willingness	to	adjust	to	new	modern	realities.	If	Meiji	Japan	had	taken	nine	years	
to	promulgate	their	constitution,	should	not	the	Qing	state,	which	governed	a	far	larger	and	
more	heterogeneous	polity,	be	given	at	least	that	much	time,	if	not	more?	Yet	to	avoid	
accusations	of	procrastination,	the	Qing	Court	decreed	in	1906	that	it	would	become	a	
constitutional	monarchy	within	nine	years.		
	 The	connection	between	constitutionalism	with	modernity,	rule	of	law,	and	
representative	government	that	was	forged	during	the	late	Qing	had	consequences	for	the	
early	years	of	the	Chinese	republic.	The	1912	provisional	constitution	that	formed	the	basis	for	
the	new	state	echoed	many	of	the	same	features	as	those	drafts	and	featured	the	mandate,	as	
mentioned	previously,	that	elections	for	the	National	Assembly	should	be	held	within	ten	
months.41	Even	after	Song’s	death	and	the	near-destruction	of	the	Nationalist	Party,	the	
National	Assembly	continued	to	exist,	albeit	mainly	as	an	organization	populated	by	those	of	
the	Reform	Party	who	approved	of	nearly	all	of	Yuan’s	policies.	The	importance	of	
constitutionalism	continued	as	well,	as	demonstrated	by	the	May	1913	arrival	of	the	American	
legal	scholar	Frank	Goodnow	(1859-1939)	in	Beijing,	to	assist	in	the	development	of	a	new	
constitution.	
	 Goodnow	was	the	leader	in	his	field	of	comparative	constitutional	studies,	and	radiated	
confidence	throughout	his	year-long	sojourn	that	he	would	be	able	to	guide	the	Chinese	people	
towards	legal	modernity.	An	advocate	for	understanding	the	law	without	recourse	to	morality,	
he	believed	in	the	capacity	of	his	field	to	dispassionately	and	scientifically	effect	positive	change.	
Based	on	his	credentials	as	a	professor	of	political	science	at	Columbia	University	and	the	first	
president	of	the	American	Political	Science	Association,	as	well	as	his	academic	specialization	in	
the	subject,	he	was	sent	by	the	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace	to	China	to	assist	
the	young	republic	in	drafting	its	first	long-term	constitution.	His	first	impression	of	Yuan	Shikai	
was	extremely	positive,	and	he	enthusiastically	endorsed	him	as	someone	who,	as	he	wrote	to	
Columbia	President	Nicholas	Butler	(1862-1947),	“struck	me	as	a	man	of	great	force	and	withal	
quite	genial	and	kindly.”42	In	public,	Goodnow	expressed	a	deep	optimism	about	the	new	
constitution,	and	what	it	could	do	for	China.	
	 In	private,	however,	Goodnow	expressed	deep	pessimism	about	the	ability	of	the	
Chinese	people	to	practice	fidelity	to	the	law.	In	another	letter	to	Butler,	he	wrote,	“as	I	look	at	
it	these	Chinese	have	hardly	the	faintest	idea	of	what	a	constitution	is.	They	do	not,	I	think,	
even	know	what	law	is.”43	Coming	from	a	scholar	tasked	to	develop	a	constitution	in	China,	
these	are	harsh	comments.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	his	evaluation	is	accurate:	there	are	
clearly	laws	in	China	in	1913,	and	certainly	laws	for	the	centuries	prior	as	well.	Rather,	this	
shows	the	degree	to	which	Goodnow	believed	he	had	failed	in	persuading	his	interlocutors	to	
adopt	his	specific	conception	of	what	a	legal	system	should	be.	
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	 By	the	end	of	the	year,	he	would	accept	an	offer	to	become	president	of	Johns	Hopkins	
University,	cutting	short	his	planned	three-year	stay	in	China.	While	it	is	easy	to	see	how	
Goodnow	prematurely	ended	his	time	as	advisor	to	Yuan	in	order	to	assume	the	position	of	
university	president,	it	is	also	clear	that	his	frustration	with	his	lack	of	progress	played	a	
significant	role	in	his	decision	to	leave	China.	Just	before	his	departure,	he	wrote	another	letter	
to	Butler,	still	complaining	about	the	Chinese	unwillingness	to	conform	their	understanding	of	
the	law	to	his	own:	“[they]	will	not	live	up	to	any	constitution	they	adopted.	It	is	not	in	them.	
They	have	no	conception	of	the	rule	of	law.	They	have	no	courts	worthy	of	the	name.”44	The	
questionable	accuracy	of	his	evaluation	is	in	large	part	due	to	Goodnow’s	valorization	of	his	
own	(American)	version	of	the	law,	and	his	corresponding	inability	to	appreciate	alternative	
models.	In	this,	he	exemplifies	the	long	tradition	of	Western	legal	scholars	to	contrast	their	own	
‘civilized’	institutions	with	the	perceived	lack	of	those	same	systems	in	places	like	China.	Teemu	
Ruskola	summarizes	this	phenomenon	well:	
[T]here	is	indeed	a	strong	cultural	tendency	to	associate	the	United	States	with	
law	 (even	 if	 excessively	 so	 at	 times),	 and	a	 corresponding	historic	 tendency	 to	
associate	China	with	an	absence	of	 law	(whether	that	absence	be	considered	a	
vice	or	a	virtue).	The	distinction	is	crucial	because	the	emergence	of	law,	in	the	
sense	of	rule-of-law,	is	one	of	the	signal	markers	of	modernity.45		
	
In	other	words,	the	lack	of	“Western-style”	laws	in	China	meant	that	Western	scholars	like	
Goodnow	would	think	that	there	were	no	laws	at	all.		
It	is	unclear	how	much	contact	Goodnow	had	with	Chinese	scholars	on	these	topics,	or	
with	whom	he	was	speaking;	he	is	not	thought	to	have	been	able	to	understand	Chinese,	and	
he	rarely	left	the	city	of	Beijing	throughout	his	time	in	China.	Even	after	accounting	for	this,	the	
rhetorical	exaggeration	inherent	in	his	letter,	and	the	fact	that	that	Goodnow’s	inability	to	
understand	Chinese	meant	that	he	had	little	chance	of	grasping	what	Chinese	conceptions	of	
the	law	even	were,	these	are	scathing	and	unfair	critiques.	His	bitter	tone	is	all	the	more	
surprising	given	his	success	in	convincing	Yuan	to	adopt	a	constitution	that	reflected	many	of	
his	suggestions.46	
	 Stepping	back	to	reconsider	the	larger	context,	it	should	perhaps	come	as	no	surprise	
that	many	of	the	Chinese	with	whom	he	interacted	had	a	cynical	view	of	the	law	and	
constitutions,	given	the	violence	and	repression	of	1913	that	had	followed	Song	Jiaoren’s	
assassination.	It	is	unclear	how	aware	Goodnow,	who	arrived	in	China	barely	one	month	after	
Song’s	death,	was	regarding	the	political	atmosphere	but,	based	on	his	support	for	Yuan’s	ill-
fated	attempt	to	become	emperor	in	1915,	it	would	seem	as	though	he	did	not	have	an	
accurate	sense	of	public	sentiment	during	this	time.	Given	Yuan’s	draconian	repression	of	his	
political	opponents	and	the	historical	link	between	constitutions	and	political	representation	of	
the	public,	resistance	to	Goodnow’s	ideas	is	wholly	understandable.		
                                                
44	Ibid.,	564,	quoting	Goodnow’s	letter	to	Butler	of	May	18,	1914.	
45	Teemu	Ruskola,	Legal	Orientalism:	China,	the	United	States,	and	Modern	Law	(Cambridge,	MA.:	Harvard	
University	Press,	2013)	6.	
46	The	text	of	that	1914	constitution	can	be	found	in	The	Constitutional	Compact	of	the	Chung	Hua	Min	Kuo,	trans.	
Sao-ke	Alfred	Sze	and	T.Y.	Lo,	ed.	and	rev.	Frank	J.	Goodnow	and	N.	Ariga	(Peking:	n.p.,	1914).	
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That	resistance	would	have	been	compounded	even	further	following	the	debacle	of	
1916,	when	Yuan	attempted	to	declare	himself	emperor,	failed,	and	died.	This	validation	of	all	
the	revolutionary	suspicions	firmly	ended	the	viability	of	gradual	reform	in	China	at	the	national	
level	after	1916,	as	the	concept	was	inextricably	associated	with	the	traitor	who	betrayed	the	
republican	cause.	Yuan’s	cause	of	death	is	largely	unknown,	but	it	is	largely	held	that	his	
disappointment	with	his	formerly	loyal	subordinates,	from	whom	he	expected	unflinching	
support,	was	a	key	factor.	Goodnow	would	go	on	to	write	an	infamous	memo	that	defended	
the	would-be	emperor	in	the	Western	press,	claiming	that	China	was	ill-prepared	for	
representative	democracy,	and	that	an	enlightened	autocrat	such	as	Yuan	was	necessary	to	
preserve	public	order.47	
	 Yuan’s	death	in	June	1916	was	not	the	only	one	of	note	that	year:	the	Hunanese	Huang	
Xing	and	Cai	E,	who	had	fought	for	the	revolutionary	cause	in	opposition	to	the	Qing	and	then	
Yuan,	also	passed	away.	Huang	had	gone	into	exile	in	the	United	States	following	the	death	of	
Song	Jiaoren,	where	he	raised	funds	for	Anti-Yuan	military	forces.	He	only	returned	in	July	
following	Yuan’s	death,	but	soon	passed	away	in	October,	of	illness.48	Cai	was	one	of	the	
leaders	of	the	anti-Yuan	movement,	and	his	staunch	opposition	to	Yuan’s	imperial	venture	was	
one	of	the	key	factors	in	his	defeat.	He	died	in	November,	in	a	Japanese	hospital,	of	
tuberculosis.	Both	Cai	and	Huang	were	accorded	state	funerals	in	Changsha,	as	heroes	of	the	
nation.49	
	 The	governor	of	Hunan	who	presided	over	those	funerals	was	Tan	Yankai,	who	had	
reclaimed	the	position	after	Yuan’s	death.	Following	his	arrest	and	imprisonment	in	1913,	Tan	
had	been	pardoned,	and	fled	to	Shanghai.	Zhao	Hengti	was	still	under	house	arrest	in	Beijing	
until	1915	because	of	his	connection	to	his	former	superior,	Cai	E,	and	the	anti-Yuan	movement.	
After	escaping	Beijing,	he	was	able	to	link	up	with	Tan	and	sneak	back	into	Hunan,	where	they	
persuaded	Tan’s	successor	as	governor,	Tang	Xiangming	(1885-1975),	to	join	their	side.	This	was	
a	surprise	to	many,	as	Tang	had	been	widely	critiqued	for	his	brutal	administration,	and	
execution	of	many	gentry	who	had	been	loyal	to	Tan.	Moreover,	Tang	had	been	a	trusted	
subordinate	of	Yuan,	so	when	his	Hunan	declared	independence	from	Yuan’s	central	
government	in	May,	it	was	a	shock.	According	to	Zhao,	this	betrayal	directly	contributed	to	
Yuan’s	early	death	not	one	month	later.50	
	
Conclusion	
1916	marked	the	deaths	of	three	political	titans	of	the	early	Chinese	republic;	this	year	
also	marked	the	end	of	the	reform	movement	as	a	viable	alternative	to	revolution,	in	both	
practice	and	history.	Their	prestige	was	tainted	by	their	support	for	Yuan,	making	it	unrealistic	
for	other	political	factions	to	join	with	them,	and	they	would	be	remembered	thereafter	for	
their	lack	of	integrity.	Moreover,	Yuan’s	association	with	constitutionalism,	and	subsequent	
                                                
47	Kronicke,	“An	Early	Tragedy,”	564-9.	
48	Hsueh,	Huang	Hsing,	183-4.	
49	Platt,	Provincial	Patriots,	171;	Shuk-wah	Poon,	“國葬：民國初年的政治角力與國家死亡儀式的建構,”	in	中央
研究院近代史研究所集刊	[Bulletin	of	the	Institute	of	Modern	History,	Academia	SInica],	No.	83	(Mar.	2014),	47-
87.		
50	Zhao,	“Interview,”	54.	Original:	袁氏終以憤死	
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revision	to	Chinese	imperial	traditions,	only	made	attempts	at	reform	even	more	politically	
toxic.	The	effort	begun	in	the	late	Qing	to	create	a	constitutional	basis	for	China’s	new	polity	
was	thus	fatally	wounded;	in	condemning	Yuan,	contemporaries	and	later	historians	dismissed	
the	possibility	of	constitutional	reform.	His	actions	also	eventually	pushed	Sun	Yatsen	to	
embrace	military	power	and	a	Soviet-informed,	Leninist-style	restructuring	of	the	party	along	
decidedly	less	democratic	lines.	
This	chapter	has	traced	the	background	of	this	anti-reformist	and	pro-revolutionary	
mythos	in	Chinese	historiography	in	order	to	show	how	those	tarred	with	the	reformist	label,	
like	Tan	Yankai,	are	quickly	dismissed	as	sincerely	wanting	to	develop	their	polities.	Li	
Jiannong’s	influential	Political	History	has	created	a	paradigm	of	reform	against	revolution	with	
which	historians	are	still	grappling,	and	that	has	informed	our	neglect	of	provincial	governance	
or	Chinese	constitutionalism.	Yet	remaining	within	this	paradigm	locks	us	into	a	teleological	
framework	wherein	revolution	was	the	only	option	for	modernizing	China.	The	1920	Pingjiang	
Mutiny	constitutes	one	more	example	of	the	reformist	inability	to	appeal	to	the	masses,	and	
the	necessity	for	revolution.	
	The	next	chapter	explores	another	aspect	of	this	teleology,	in	which	the	chaos	of	high	
warlordism	after	1916	makes	revolution	seem	all	the	more	attractive.	Yet	just	as	this	chapter	
has	suggested	the	possibilities	of	constitutionalism	and	provincial	governance	as	a	counter	to	
the	dominant	paradigm,	the	next	will	use	federalism	and	inter-bureaucratic	communication	in	
the	same	way.	
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Chapter	3:	Warlordism,	Federalism,	and	Sensational	Narratives	
	
Introduction	
When	the	period	after	1916	is	compared	to	the	years	prior,	it	is	usually	described	as	the	
apex	of	modern	Chinese	warlordism,	in	which	factions	would	seemingly	coalesce	and	split	apart	
on	a	daily	basis,	and	the	attendant	violent	conflict	was	uniformly	endemic.	The	mutiny	of	1920	
matches	this	narrative	perfectly,	while	also	building	upon	themes	of	betrayal	at	the	national	
(Song	Jiaoren)	and	local	(Jiao	Dafeng)	levels.	While	not	contesting	the	undeniably	high	degree	
of	political	turmoil	during	his	period,	this	chapter	still	challenges	this	conventional	narrative	as	
being	overly	simplified.	Historical	studies	of	the	Early	Republic	are	typically	founded	upon	
sources	that	are	prone	to	sensationalistic	description,	and	that	are	not	often	critically	examined.	
This	is	exemplified	by	Tao	Juyin’s	influential	popular	narrative	of	the	era,	which	employs	
overdramatic	dialogue	seemingly	taken	directly	from	the	pages	of	traditional	historical	fiction	
like	Romance	of	the	Three	Kingdoms	to	appeal	to	its	readers.	By	emphasizing	chaos	of	the	era	
and	the	moral	bankruptcy	of	his	subjects,	Tao	implicitly	claims	that	the	coming	Communist	
Revolution	is	necessary	to	centralize	the	nation	in	order	to	save	it	from	itself.	
Yet	this	one-sided	account	overlooks	a	number	of	factors.	First,	the	continued	thriving	of	
local	administrations	in	provinces	like	Hunan	that	is	illustrated	by	continued	bureaucratic	
correspondence	between	the	center	and	the	periphery.	This	chapter	uses	these	materials	to	
suggest	the	persistence	of	a	shared	belief	in	legal	institutions	like	the	national	constitution,	or,	
at	the	least,	some	degree	of	common	respect	for	the	law,	however	it	may	have	been	
promulgated.	Widespread	predisposition	for	legal	obedience	is	worth	highlighting	because	it	
undercuts	conventional	narratives	of	the	period’s	anarchy,	and	is	worth	reconciling	with	the	
various	mutinies	and	betrayals	of	the	era.	Second,	this	chapter	also	analyzes	substantive	
proposals	for	political	transformation	like	federalism	and	provincial	autonomy.	The	two	terms,	
often	used	interchangeably	during	this	period,	represent	an	alternative	to	centralized	political	
control.	Li	Jiannong,	who	would	write	Political	History	nearly	a	decade	later,	was	one	of	the	
foremost	advocates	for	federalism,	and	two	of	his	1917	essays	on	the	topic	deserve	serious	
consideration.	The	1920	Mutiny	occurred	in	the	midst	of	Hunan’s	federal	movement,	which	
only	bolsters	those	who	criticize	the	concept	for	being	merely	an	excuse	for	local	rulers	to	
maintain	their	own	power;	taking	the	movement	seriously,	as	a	viable	possibility	for	political	
reform,	complicates	our	understanding	of	the	mutiny,	why	it	occurred,	and	its	significance.	
	
High	Warlordism?	
Yuan	Shikai’s	death	in	1916	was	important	as	both	a	signal	to	the	end	of	an	era	as	well	
as	the	impetus	motivating	a	rupture	in	relationships	and	alliances	that	only	his	prestige	could	
hold	together;	the	same	should	be	said	of	the	deaths	of	Huang	Xing	and	Cai	E	in	the	same	year.	
Huang	and	Cai	were	never	formally	head	of	the	Chinese	state	in	the	same	way	as	Yuan,	so	their	
importance	to	history	has	been	relatively	undervalued	as	a	result.	This	is	a	mistake:	Huang’s	
record	as	a	revolutionary	leader	was	second	to	only	Sun	Yatsen’s,	and	his	military	leadership	of	
the	anti-Qing	forces	during	the	Wuchang	Uprising	had	made	his	name	known	all	over	the	new	
Republic	as	a	major	hero.	His	death	meant	that	the	revolutionary	alliance	was	deprived	of	a	
possible	center	of	gravity	who	might	have	otherwise	been	able	to	keep	the	fragile	alliance	
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unified.	Without	him,	those	of	less	prominent	reputations	began	to	vie	with	one	another	for	
power.	Similarly,	if	not	as	famously,	Cai	E’s	reputation	as	a	leader	of	the	anti-Yuan	movement	
during	the	second	revolution	was	just	as	high,	and	he	had	a	comparable	capacity	for	attracting	
and	bringing	together	those	important	Chinese	military	cadets	who	had	studied	together	in	
Japan.	With	his	passing,	another	power	vacuum	opened	up,	again	allowing	for	those	of	more	
minor	status	to	compete	with	one	another.	In	other	words,	the	deaths	of	these	three	in	1916	
scrambled	what	was	already	a	confusing	and	complicated	political	environment.	Given	the	
different	directions	that	these	political	leaders	could	have	pulled	China	toward,	it	was	historical	
contingency	that	pushed	China	towards	further	decentralization	in	the	decade	after	1916	rather	
than	the	inescapable	forces.		
Perhaps	due	to	the	convoluted	nature	of	the	post-1916	period,	few	English-language	
academic	works	examining	the	political	history	of	the	early	republic	exist.	As	Edward	McCord	
notes,	“Lying	between	such	important	events	as	the	overthrow	of	the	imperial	state	in	1911	
and	the	rise	of	the	new	revolutionary	and	state-building	movements	of	the	Nationalist	and	
Communist	Parties,	the	confusing	and	disorderly	period	of	warlord	rule	is	often	ignored.”1	
McCord’s	observation	exemplifies	the	key	problem	all	historians	face	when	they	research	and	
teach	this	period	of	modern	Chinese	history:	its	lack	of	a	simple	and	unified	narrative,	especially	
when	compared	to	the	periods	of	immediately	before	and	after.	Furthermore,	this	period	
contains	high	spatial	diversity.	For	example,	not	only	is	what	happened	in	what	is	now	Liaoning	
province	in	the	northeast	different	from	what	occurred	in	Guangxi	province	in	the	southwest,	
but	the	politics	of	the	individual	counties	within	a	province	could	differ	significantly.	High	
temporal	variance	occurred	as	well,	as	the	era	can	be	characterized	by	the	constant	rise	and	fall	
of	various	individuals	and	cliques	competing	for	power.	Men	who	seemed	to	be	allies	in	1920	
might	be	bitter	rivals	five	years	later,	which	complicates	the	historian’s	efforts	to	arrive	at	a	
coherent	portrait	of	what	was	happening.	It	is	far	easier	for	a	book,	panel,	or	paper	that	
purports	to	discuss	a	China-wide	issue	that	stretches	across	decades	compared	to	the	same	
findings	that	cover	events	in	one	region	that	occur	across	the	span	of	months.		
In	order	to	find	a	coherent	focus,	works	that	do	cover	this	period	of	time	follow	the	
same	trope:	strong	leaders	asserting	their	will	and	exercising	power	through	personal	influence.	
Individuals	forged	armies	and	conquered	territory	based	on	the	strength	of	their	will	and	talent,	
with	little	room	for	morality.	James	Sheridan’s	perspective	on	this	period	is	suggested	by	the	
title	of	his	general	history	of	the	time,	China	in	Disintegration,	in	which	he	writes,	“a	warlord	
decided	his	own	policies	in	light	of	his	own	interests	and	goals.”2	Consequently,	alliances	and	
rivalries	were	not	ideological	but	rather	personal,	partly	explaining	the	persistence	of	conflict	
during	this	period.	Edward	McCord’s	1993	study	of	militarism	in	Hunan	also	follows	this	
assessment,	claiming	that	there	were	no	real	causes	or	movements	that	motivated	action	
during	this	time,	save	for	the	individual	ambitions	of	the	men	involved.	In	his	words,	“[T]he	
                                                
1	Edward	A.	McCord,	“Burn,	Kill,	Rape,	and	Rob:	Military	Atrocities,	Warlordism,	and	Anti-Warlordism	in	Republican	
China,”	in	Scars	of	War:	The	Impact	of	Warfare	on	Modern	China	eds.	Diana	Lary	and	Stephen	MacKinnon	
(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2001),	18-47.	
2	James	E.	Sheridan,	China	in	Disintegration:	The	Republican	Era	in	Chinese	History,	1912-1949	(New	York:	The	Free	
Press,	1975),	58.	
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triumph	of	warlordism	thus	constituted	not	only	the	domination	of	politics	by	the	military	in	
general	but	also	the	personal	political	domination	of	individual	military	commanders.”3		
Yet	focusing	on	personal	achievement	and	who	defeated	whom	prevents	both	
sophisticated	analysis	of	the	overall	political	culture	as	well	as	comparison	to	the	ideologically	
oriented	mass	politics	that	came	after,	and	that	proved	to	be	far	more	successful.	By	examining	
politics	of	the	“warlord	era”	within	this	framework,	the	potential	of	elite-led	reform	like	that	
practiced	in	Hunan	is	ignored.	Political	leaders	are	assumed	to	share	all	the	same	selfish	
motives,	and	have	no	substantive	ideological	agenda	when	compared	to	later	groups	like	the	
KMT	or	CCP.	The	betrayals	of	Jiao	Dafeng	and	Song	Jiaoren,	being	assassinations	based	upon	
individual	ambition	rather	than	ideological	disagreement,	fit	this	narrative	nicely;	the	1920	
Pingjiang	Mutiny	does	the	same.	The	seeming	uniformity	of	all	of	this	amoral	factionalism	is	
made	more	prominent	by	the	subsequent	triumph	of	those	who	can	portray	themselves	as	
revolutionarily	distinctive.	
Much	of	this	fixation	on	individual	achievement	is	due	to	the	nature	of	the	sources	used.	
Studies	of	the	period	have	typically	depended	upon	three	kinds	of	documents:	the	observations	
of	foreigners,	newspaper	reports	from	that	era,	and	memoirs	written	by	the	persons	concerned.	
Historians’	current	understanding	of	the	time	is	largely	informed	by	these	three	categories	of	
sources,	all	of	which	are	predisposed	to	favor	a	narrative	that	centers	on	a	history	made	by	
individuals.	The	observations	of	foreigners	offer	historians	a	window	into	everyday	life	that	
native	Chinese	might	consider	too	mundane	to	mention;	examples	of	these	sources	include	the	
impressions	of	life	in	Changsha	from	missionaries	stationed	there,	or	records	from	the	United	
States	consulate.4	Yet	these	temporary	sojourners	offer	only	the	outsider’s	perspective,	
wherein	one	warlord	easily	replaces	another,	and	little	insight	is	offered	as	to	the	underlying	
reasons	behind	these	shifts	in	power.	Periodicals,	authored	by	professional	journalists,	
represent	a	deeper	examination	of	the	best	possible	perspective	that	historians	can	have	on	
public	opinion.	However,	unlike	academic	works,	these	sorts	of	materials	typically	do	not	cite	
their	sources,	and	it	is	unclear	what	evidence	their	authors	used	to	draw	their	conclusions.5		
Memoirs	of	the	actors	themselves	constitute	a	third	category	of	sources	that	have	been	
used	to	analyze	the	early	Republican	era	in	Chinese	history.	Nearly	all	biographies	of	these	
figures,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	rely	heavily	upon	the	writings	by	those	same	individuals	
concerning	their	careers.	The	flaws	in	using	this	category	of	sources	is	readily	apparent:	time	
has	a	way	of	changing	one’s	memory	of	any	one	particular	event,	to	say	nothing	of	the	manner	
in	which	people	tend	to	retell	their	own	stories	in	a	way	that	makes	them	look	as	good	as	
                                                
3	Edward	A.	McCord,	The	Power	of	the	Gun:	The	Emergence	of	Modern	Chinese	Warlordism	(Berkeley,	CA:	
University	of	California	Press,	1993),	311.	
4	For	an	example	of	the	former	source,	see	Alice	Tisdale	Hobart,	By	the	City	of	the	Long	Sand:	A	Tale	of	New	China	
(MacMillan:	1926).		
5	Examples	of	the	most	frequently	used	Chinese	language	periodicals	include	Dongfang	Zazhi	東方雜誌	[The	
Eastern	Miscellany]	,	Shibao	時報	[Eastern	Times],	Chenbao	晨報	[Morning	News],	and	Shenbao	申報	[Shanghai	
News,	also	known	as	Shun	Pao].	Examples	of	the	most	frequently	used	English-language	periodicals	include	The	
China	Year	Book,	The	North	China	Herald,	and	The	North	China	Standard.	
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possible.6	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	many	works	that	heavily	rely	on	this	category	of	sources	are	
without	merit;	rather,	they	all	have	biases	that	skew	the	information	presented.7		
One	genre	of	sources	that	is	not	commonly	used	in	political	histories	of	the	early	
Chinese	republic	is	archival	material,	a	lacuna	that	only	supports	the	conventional	wisdom	of	
anarchy	by	making	it	seem	as	though	typical	state	bureaucracy	did	not	function	during	this	time.	
On	one	level,	this	is	an	understandable	omission,	as	the	institutions	preserving	these	materials	
have	frequently	discouraged	their	use	by	researchers.	Their	policies	notwithstanding,	
preservation	and	indexing	efforts	have	been	less	than	systematic,	making	it	difficult	to	get	a	
sense	for	how	any	single	given	institution	might	have	conducted	its	business	over	time	and	
across	political	rupture.	Furthermore,	it	is	difficult	to	get	a	sense	for	the	relationship	of	any	of	
this	bureaucratic	documentation	to	practice;	perhaps	these	communiques	were	merely	orders	
from	on	high	that	were	rarely	obeyed.	Whatever	the	case	might	be,	and	in	spite	of	the	
difficulties	in	acquiring	these	materials,	they	add	another	dimension	to	the	narrative	that	is	
worth	integrating	into	our	established	understandings	of	the	era.	The	unpublished	routine	
directives	to	the	various	postal	offices	around	Hunan	that	were	discussed	in	the	previous	
chapter	exemplify	this	issue	by	showing	how	reform	policies	tangibly	impacted	the	lives	of	local	
residents,	thus	challenging	revolutionary	narratives	that	portray	an	environment	wherein	only	
radical	change	is	possible.	Similarly,	an	unpublished	1917	petition	from	the	Hunan	Provincial	
Assembly	to	the	central	government	challenges	narratives	of	individual-centered	action	that	
dominate	the	historiography	of	this	era,	validating	the	truism	that	histories	and	sources	in	
inexorably	intertwined.	
For	these	reasons,	attention	to	sources	is	extremely	important	for	studies	of	the	
“Warlord	Era.”	Yet,	in	the	interests	of	constructing	a	smooth	narrative,	historians	frequently	
relegate	their	sources	to	footnotes,	thus	obscuring	their	possible	biases.	Because	the	dominant	
narrative	for	this	era	is	based	on	those	materials	like	newspaper	reports	and	autobiographical	
memoir	that	give	more	weight	to	individual	action,	the	net	effect	is	often	to	portray	the	politics	
of	the	time	as	being	ethically	empty	and	dominated	by	individual	caprice.		
	
Tao	Juyin’s	Sensational	History	and	the	Assassination	of	Song	Jiaoren	
No	text	exemplifies	the	characterization	of	this	period	as	ethically	empty	more	than	Tao	
Juyin’s	Anecdotes	of	the	Beiyang	Warlord	Domination	Period,	and	it	is	instructive	to	compare	
his	description	of	the	1913	assassination	of	Song	Jiaoren	with	that	given	by	Li	Jiannong	in	
Political	History.	In	the	years	following	1911,	Tao	was	still	a	young	journalist,	continuing	his	
work	as	a	special	correspondent	in	Changsha	for	various	Shanghai-based	periodicals	like	Shibao.	
His	formal	charge,	at	the	age	of	18,	was	to	pen	short	news	reports	about	local	events	in	Hunan	
that	were	then	circulated	around	the	nation,	which	helped	him	develop	a	writing	style	that	
lingered	on	the	details	and	drama	that	would	attract	readers.8	In	1957,	he	would	draw	on	his	
                                                
6	Gail	Hershatter,	The	Gender	of	Memory:	Rural	Women	and	China’s	Collective	Past	(Berkeley,	CA.:	University	of	
California	Press,	2014)	
7	Examples	of	studies	that	rely	on	the	writings	or	recollections	of	the	individual	featured	include	Sheridan,	Chinese	
Warlord;	Wou,	Militarism	in	Modern	China;	Leslie	H.	Dingyan	Chen,	Chen	Jiongming	and	the	Federalist	Movement:	
Regional	Leadership	and	Nation	Building	in	Early	Republican	China	(Ann	Arbor,	MI:	University	of	Michigan	Press:	
1999).	
8	Tao,	Memoirs,	13	
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experience	as	a	witness	to	these	events	to	author	a	highly	influential	eight-volume	narrative	of	
the	era.	Beginning	with	the	career	of	Yuan	Shikai	as	a	Qing	official	in	Korea	in	the	late	
nineteenth	century	and	ending	with	the	1927	establishment	of	the	KMT	state	in	Nanjing,	Tao	
fills	his	narrative	with	a	dizzying	range	of	detail	and	character	study	that	have	made	his	text	an	
indispensable	guide	for	scholars	of	the	period.	
Anecdotes,	perhaps	as	a	function	of	the	1957	context	in	which	it	was	published,	attacks	
its	subjects	for	being	both	stooges	of	foreign	imperialism	as	well	as	trapped	in	a	feudal	mindset.	
In	this,	he	was	likely	following	the	implicit	directive	of	the	CCP	to	adhere	to	the	narrative	best	
articulated	by	Fan	Wenlan	(1893-1969),	one	of	the	state’s	leading	historians	after	1949.	As	
summarized	by	Huaiyin	Li,	Fan’s	1946	Modern	Chinese	History	[中國近代史]	“emphasized	the	
Chinese	People’s	Revolution	against	imperialism	and	feudalism	as	the	“main	thread”	in	modern	
Chinese	history.”9	Tao,	writing	ten	years	later,	must	have	felt	pressure	to	ensure	his	text	fit	into	
this	historiographical	paradigm.	The	warlords	who	dominate	his	narrative	thus	become	the	
villains	against	whom	the	masses	make	revolution.	
Throughout	Anecdotes,	Tao	wastes	no	opportunity	to	assess	leading	figures	of	the	age	
as	deserving	of	his	readers’	scorn	and	distaste.	This	is	demonstrated	in	the	first	sentence	of	his	
preface:	“[i]n	the	modern	history	of	China,	the	Beiyang	Warlords	were	a	feudal	military	political	
group	whose	notoriety	advanced	the	revolutionary	cause.	They	inherited	the	evil	sins	of	those	
who	sold	their	nation,	like	Zeng	Guofan	and	Li	Hongzhang,	and	served	as	a	shameful	model	for	
the	military	dictatorship	of	Chiang	Kai-shek.”10	Here,	Tao	connects	the	depredations	of	his	
villains	with	the	success	of	the	1949	revolution	to	come:	backwards-looking	elites	like	Zeng,	Li,	
Chiang,	and	the	warlords	were	all	of	the	same	kind,	supporting	and	supported	by	foreign	
imperialism.	Their	unrepentant	greed	only	accelerated	the	growth	in	popularity	of	the	CCP,	as	
the	capitalistic	exploitation	of	the	masses	became	more	obvious.	
It	is	necessary	to	emphasize	this	aspect	of	Anecdotes	because	the	combination	of	his	
text’s	importance	as	a	guide	to	the	period	with	Tao’s	1956-influenced	desire	to	attribute	
imperialistic	and	feudal	motivations	to	its	subjects	creates	a	memorable	narrative	of	these	
years	that	colors	our	current	understandings	of	the	period.	Episodes	like	the	1913	assassination	
of	Song	Jiaoren	at	the	orders	of	President	Yuan	Shikai	are	described	in	a	breathless	fashion	that	
is	partially	understandable:	Song	was	the	national	leader	of	a	major	political	party,	and	his	
death	both	signaled	and	instigated	a	paradigm	shift	in	the	political	culture	of	the	early	republic.	
Prior	to	this	event,	there	was	hope	that	a	liberal	democracy	in	some	form	might	emerge	from	
the	fall	of	the	imperial	system,	but	Yuan’s	actions	asserted	his	near-despotic	authority	over	the	
state	and	foreshadowed	his	ambitions	towards	the	resurrection	of	monarchical	rule.	Whereas	
the	factionalism	and	party	politics	found	in	any	republican	system	seemed	to	be	a	viable	post-
1911	alternative	to	the	sort	of	leadership	centered	around	personal	networks	that	so	many	
feared	would	replace	the	imperial	state,	Song’s	death	marked	the	beginning	of	this	model’s	
                                                
9	Huaiyin	Li,	“Between	Tradition	and	Revolution:	Fan	Wenlan	and	the	Origins	of	the	Marxist	Historiography	of	
Modern	China,”	in	Modern	China,	Vol.	36,	No.	3	(May	2010),	269-301,	272.	
10	Tao	Juyin,	北洋軍閥統治時期史話	[Anecdotes	of	the	Beiyang	Warlord	Domination	Period]	3	Vols.	(Taiwan,	INK	
Literary	Monthly	Publishing	Co.,	Ltd.	2011;	originally	published	8	vols.,	Beijing:	Shenghuo.	Dushu.	Xinzhi	Sanlian	
Shudian.	1957.)	Vol.	2,	15.	Original:	北洋軍閥是中國近代史上繼往開來、臭名昭彰的一個封建軍事政治集團。
它繼承了曾國藩、李鴻章等出賣國家和反人民的罪惡事業，又替蔣介石政權提供了軍事獨裁的可恥榜樣。	
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prolonged	decline	and	the	end	of	its	viability	as	a	possible	model	for	China’s	future.	The	
warlordism	that	necessarily	accompanies	this	type	of	individual-centered	politics.	The	ups	and	
downs	of	the	era	are	dramatic,	making	the	period	a	perfect	fit	for	Tao’s	style	of	history	that	
emphasizes	the	villainy	of	its	key	figures.	
But	is	this	apparently	perfect	fit	a	function	of	the	events	described,	or	more	a	product	of	
the	author’s	desire	to	describe	the	era	as	highly	dysfunctional	as	possible	so	as	to	make	the	
years	afterwards	more	palatable	by	contrast?	This	counterfactual	question	is	perhaps	unfair	
and	impossible	to	answer	substantively,	but	it	is	worth	considering	in	light	of	the	text’s	
importance	in	shaping	our	perception	of	the	period.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	Tao’s	narrative	
does	not	perfectly	conform	to	Fan’s	paradigm,	as	the	masses	feature	far	less	in	Anecdotes	than	
a	more	Marxist	historian	might	want.	Indeed,	the	substantive	content	of	his	narrative	seems	
more	oriented	around	appealing	to	more	middlebrow	tastes	of	his	readers,	rather	than	
educating	them	about	concepts	like	class	struggle	or	imperialism.	Despite	its	ostensibly	
pedagogical	purpose,	the	text	seeks	to	entertain	his	readers	with	tales	of	heroism	and	tragedy,	
offering	insights	into	the	mindset	and	feelings	of	its	characters.	In	this,	Tao	draws	from	his	
background	as	journalist	to	pack	his	narrative	with	vivid	details	about	each	individual,	perhaps	
inspired	by	historical	fiction	on	past	dynasties,	like	Romance	of	the	Three	Kingdoms.	His	
dramatic	tone	produces	a	version	of	history	that,	while	engaging	as	a	story,	includes	a	high	
degree	of	speculation	that	veers	dangerously	close	to	embellishment	and	exaggeration.	
While	it	is	somewhat	unfair	to	fault	him	for	this	style,	as	fidelity	to	historical	accuracy	
was	clearly	not	his	aim	in	writing,	the	influence	of	Anecdotes	on	the	historiography	of	the	
“Warlord	Era”	cannot	be	denied.	His	narrative	remains	cited	to	this	day	as	an	“‘inside’	story”	of	
the	period,	implying	insight	and	access	that,	though	unsourced,	remains	valuable	and	reliable.11	
This	type	of	history	strongly	favors	stories	that	seem	to	hinge	on	interpersonal	conflict	and	
dramatic	reversals	of	fate	like	the	assassination	of	Song	Jiaoren	or	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny,	
which	informs	how	events	like	these	are	remembered.	Less	sensationalistic	historical	factors	
like	tax	revenues,	legal	reforms,	or	technological	advances	were	rarely,	if	ever,	mentioned.		
Tao’s	preference	for	vivid	detail	over	mundane	description	was	not	unique	to	the	field	
of	journalism	in	Republican	China.	Commercially	oriented	newspapers,	keen	to	attract	as	many	
readers	as	possible	so	as	to	sell	more	expensive	advertisements,	favored	articles	featuring	a	
similar	style	of	writing.	Bryna	Goodman,	writing	about	the	propensity	of	these	publications	to	
feature	stories	that	were	packed	with	lurid	detail,	argues	that	
journalists	seized	on	sensational	news,	manipulating	public	interest	in	the	truth-
value	 of	 suicide	 to	 press	 particular	 concerns:	 feminist	 or	 socially	 conservative,	
political	or	economic…	Newspapers	also	transformed	news	into	fiction,	with	such	
a	 rapidity	 and	with	 such	 intermingling	 of	 genres	 that	 the	 narrative	 and	moral	
frameworks	of	the	news	and	literary	pages	at	times	blurred.12	
	
                                                
11	This	characterization	of	Anecdotes	is	taken	from	Arthur	Waldron,	“Review	of	‘China’s	Warlords,’	by	David	
Bonavia,”	in	The	Journal	of	Military	History,	Vol.	61,	No.	2,	(Apr.	1997),	387-389	
12	Bryna	Goodman,	“The	New	Woman	Commits	Suicide:	The	Press,	Cultural	Memory,	and	the	New	Republic,”	in	
The	Journal	of	Asian	Studies,	Vol.	64,	No.	1	(Feb.	2005),	95	
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In	other	words,	the	industry	to	which	Tao	belonged	was	clearly	familiar	with	the	sort	of	
exaggerated	level	of	detail	that	he	featured	in	his	writing.	His	fellow	journalists	often	framed	
their	narratives	to	serve	a	specific	agenda,	without	adhering	to	ideals	of	objectivity	or	
detachment	from	politics.	They	wrote	in	the	vernacular	for	a	mass	audience	that	expected	to	be	
entertained,	and	that	was	accustomed	to	reading	about	reality	in	a	way	recalled	the	popular	
fiction	of	the	past	and	present.		
Tao’s	propensity	to	emphasize	the	personal	drama	of	these	years	in	Anecdotes	contrasts	
with	Li	Jiannong’s	more	measured	approach	in	Political	History	that	focuses	less	on	individual	
personalities	and	more	on	the	larger	ideological	contest	between	the	reformers	and	the	
revolutionaries.	The	clearest	example	of	the	contrast	between	the	two	styles	of	history	can	be	
seen	by	comparing	how	these	two	narratives	describe	Song	Jiaoren’s	death.	Both	relate	the	
same	basic	information	about	when	Song	was	murdered,	and	by	whom,	but	Tao	goes	into	far	
more	detail	about	how	the	act	was	carried	out,	and	how	conspiracy	was	uncovered.		
In	describing	the	episode	and	its	consequences,	Political	History	assumes	a	tone	that	
eschews	melodrama,	electing	instead	to	merely	list	off	the	relevant	facts.	Concerning	the	actual	
assassination,	Li	writes:	“[o]n	March	20,	1913,	Sung	Chiao-jen	[Song	Jiaoren],	on	his	way	to	
catch	a	train	northward	from	Shanghai,	was	shot	and	killed	at	the	railroad	station.”13	
Afterwards,	Wu	Shiying	and	Ying	Kuisheng,	the	two	criminals	directly	responsible	for	Song’s	
death,	were	immediately	arrested,	and	their	connection	with	the	two	government	officials	who	
masterminded	the	plot,	cabinet	secretary	Hong	Shuzu	and	premier	Zhao	Bingjun,	was	
discovered.	When	the	homes	of	Wu	and	Ying	were	searched,	their	correspondence	with	Hong	
and	Zhao,	using	telegrams	and	coded	language	to	coordinate	their	actions,	were	revealed.	Li	
reproduces	these	materials	in	his	narrative	so	as	to	clearly	demonstrate	the	guilt	of	all	the	
conspirators,	Yuan	included.14	This	is	an	understated	and	factual	chronicle	of	events,	supported	
by	the	textual	evidence	that	was	uncovered	by	the	subsequent	investigation	by	the	police.	Li’s	
stylistic	choices	here	relegate	one	of	modern	China’s	most	dramatic	affairs	into	a	mundane	
killing.		
In	contrast	to	Li’s	simple	summary,	Anecdotes	recounts	the	episode	in	a	far	different	
way,	full	of	poignant	dialogue	and	dramatic	detail.	Tao	describes	the	assassination	of	Song	by	
depicting	the	appearance	of	the	perpetrator,	the	reaction	of	the	shocked	witnesses,	their	
frantic	efforts	to	bring	Song	to	a	nearby	hospital,	and	his	final	naïve	hopes	that	Yuan	would	
eventually	become	a	moral	ruler.	On	this	last	point,	Tao’s	describes	Song	as	follows:	“[e]ven	on	
his	deathbed	he	did	not	forsake	his	illusions	about	Yuan,	and	still	hoped	that	Yuan	could	be	
moved	by	his	dying	words	to	change	his	false	nature	into	truth,	his	selfishness	into	selflessness,	
his	trampling	of	the	people	into	protecting	the	people,	his	disregard	for	the	law	into	respect	for	
the	law.”15	As	noted	in	the	previous	chapter,	Yuan	would	be	denigrated	as	one	of	modern	
China’s	great	villains	when	he	betrayed	the	Republican	cause	in	favor	of	his	imperial	ambitions	
three	years	later,	making	Song’s	words	here	all	the	more	wretched	and	foolish.			
                                                
13	Li	Jiannong,	Political	History,	286.	
14	Ibid.,	287.	
15	Tao,	Anecdotes,	Vol.	1.,	185.	Original:	他临死还没有抛弃对袁的幻想，还盼望袁能够为他的将死之言所感
动，能够化伪为诚，化私为公，化蹂躏民权为保障民权，化弁髦法律为尊重法律。	
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Tao’s	talent	for	amplifying	certain	details	to	attract	the	attention	of	his	readers	
continues	in	his	description	of	how	the	conspirators	were	discovered	and	apprehended.	An	
antique	dealer	came	to	the	police	with	the	story	that	Ying	had	offered	him	money	to	kill	a	
certain	man	in	a	photograph	whom	he	would	only	recognize	later	as	Song.	He	testified,	“Today,	
I	saw	a	picture	of	Song	Jiaoren	in	the	newspaper	[due	to	his	death].	This	was	precisely	who	Ying	
Guixin	[Kuisheng]	had	shown	me	a	picture	of	and	asked	me	to	kill.”	It	was	on	the	basis	of	his	
testimony	that	the	homes	were	raided	and	the	plot	unearthed.16	This	is	exciting	testimony	that	
Li	leaves	out	of	his	narrative	altogether.	Anecdotes	thus	emphasizes	the	contingent	nature	of	
how	Wu	and	Ying	were	caught,	with	the	implication	that,	were	it	not	for	the	guilty	conscience	
of	the	antique	dealer,	the	killers	would	still	be	unknown,	heightening	the	drama	of	this	incident,	
and	thus	the	era.		
Comparing	these	two	depictions	of	Song’s	assassination	and	aftermath	suggests	what	
each	historian	consider	to	be	important.	For	Li,	it	is	more	important	to	assemble	the	
inconvertible	evidence	that	Yuan	had	organized	a	conspiracy	to	kill	a	political	rival,	making	the	
intellectual	case	that	his	guilt	should	have	been	obvious	to	all,	implicitly	criticizing	those	in	the	
Reform	Party	who	continued	to	support	him.	The	KMT	Revolutionaries,	in	other	words,	not	only	
have	more	integrity	than	the	reformers	in	their	refusal	to	compromise	with	Yuan,	but	also	more	
intelligence	in	their	ability	to	discern	his	culpability	in	the	affair.	In	contrast,	Tao	is	far	more	
interested	in	connecting	with	his	readers	on	an	emotional	level,	drawing	them	into	the	
excitement	of	the	age.	He	does	so	by	highlighting	the	melodrama	of	this	episode,	amplifying	the	
tragedy	of	Song’s	death,	the	villainy	of	Yuan’s	ambition,	and	the	unexpected	willingness	of	an	
antique	dealer	to	expose	the	link	between	the	two.	Tao’s	inclination	to	emphasize	the	spectacle	
of	personal	interactions	is	also	illustrated	by	his	portrayal	of	factional	infighting	and	the	military	
strongman	who	dominated	the	years	immediately	following	the	death	of	Yuan,	Duan	Qirui.	
	
Sensationalistic	Portrayals	of	Duan	Qirui	and	Warlord	Rivalries	in	Anecdotes	
Anecdotes	categorizes	the	various	subperiods	of	its	larger	narrative	based	on	the	
dominant	figure	of	the	era;	for	the	1911-1916	period	this	is	Yuan	Shikai;	for	the	1916-1920	
period	this	is	Duan	Qirui.	Duan	was	yet	another	former	military	cadet	who	had	been	educated	
in	the	new-style	military	academies,	again	representing	a	new	and	modern	rebalancing	of	wen	
and	wu.	He	served	under	Yuan	during	the	1900	Boxer	Rebellion	and	the	1911	Wuchang	Uprising,	
and	was	an	instructor	in	the	Baoding	Military	Academy	that	produced	many	Beiyang	officers,	
allowing	him	to	form	his	own	group	of	loyalists.	The	two	were	also	tied	together	through	
Duan’s	marriage	to	Yuan’s	niece,	though	that	relationship	was	frayed	by	Duan’s	public	
opposition	to	Yuan’s	attempt	to	become	emperor.	Following	Yuan’s	death,	Duan	was	named	
premier	of	the	government,	but	was	actually	seen	to	be	the	true	power	in	the	government.	He	
was	also	head	of	the	“Anhui	Clique,”	one	of	the	factions	within	the	Beiyang	Warlords.	17	
Duan	may	have	been	the	true	power	behind	the	government,	but	its	nominal	head	was	
Li	Yuanhong	(1864-1928).	Also	a	graduate	of	one	of	the	late	Qing	military	academies,	Li	had	
been	stationed	in	Hankow	in	October	of	1911	as	a	loyal	officer	in	the	Hubei	New	Army.	
                                                
16	Ibid.	Original:	今天我在报上看见宋先生的照片，正是应桂馨叫我作为暗杀之对象的那张照片。	
17	For	more	on	Duan,	see	Hsi-ping	Shao,	“Tuan	Ch’i-jui,	1912-1918:	A	Case	Study	of	the	Military	Influence	on	
Chinese	Political	Development,”	(Ph.D.	Dissertation,	University	of	Pennsylvania,	1976.)	
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Following	the	outbreak	of	hostilities	between	the	Qing	and	the	revolutionaries,	he	was	forced	
to	defect	to	the	anti-Qing	forces,	which	he	then	led	until	the	cease-fire	was	declared.	For	his	
role,	he	was	named	vice-president	of	the	republic	under	Yuan	Shikai,	and	was	one	of	the	
leaders	of	what	would	eventually	be	called	the	Progressive	Party.	Though	he	supported	Yuan	in	
the	Second	Revolution,	he	did	not	do	the	same	during	Yuan’s	1916	effort	to	be	named	emperor.	
After	Yuan’s	death,	he	became	president.18	
In	spite	of	the	fact	that	Li	was	president	and	Duan	was	merely	his	premier,	the	latter’s	
decisions	were	more	important	than	the	former,	as	demonstrated	by	Zhao	Hengti’s	description	
of	the	post-Yuan	Beiyang	effort	to	bring	China’s	southwest	back	under	northern	control,	which	
he	characterizes	as	an	attempt	by	Duan	Qirui	to	stamp	out	opposition	to	his	personal	rule.19	
The	Southwestern	provinces	of	China—Yunnan,	Guangxi,	Guizhou,	and	Hunan—had	formed		
the	core	of	the	anti-Yuan	movement,	and	following	his	death,	they	remained	resistant	to	
Beiyang	influence.	Tan	and	Zhao	had	found	a	new	ally,	another	Japanese	Officer	Academy	
graduate	and	Revolutionary	Alliance	member	from	Hunan	named	Cheng	Qian	(1882-1968),	with	
whom	they	allied	to	eject	Tang	Xiangming	from	the	governorship	in	1916	and	appoint	Tan	
Yankai	in	his	place.	During	Tan’s	second	term	as	provincial	governor,	at	least	three	different	
factions	of	the	military	thus	emerged:	those	loyal	to	him,	those	loyal	to	Zhao,	and	those	loyal	to	
Cheng.20		
One	reason	why	Duan	was	unable	to	bring	Hunan	back	under	central	control	was	his	
problematic	relationship	with	Li,	his	ostensible	superior.	As	with	the	Song	assassination,	Tao	
Juyin’s	Anecdotes	stresses	the	drama	and	emotion	of	their	personal	interactions,	while	Li	
Yuanhong’s	Political	History	describes	these	relationships	in	a	far	more	clinical	and	distant	way.	
The	difference	in	emphasis	creates	an	additional	layer	of	historical	interpretation	that	still	
informs	our	current	understanding	of	the	period,	with	historians	continuing	to	subscribe	to	an	
interpretive	framework	oriented	around	individuals	and	alliances.		
One	relatively	ordinary	example	of	warlord	infighting	demonstrates	the	influence	of	the	
paradigm	found	in	Anecdotes.	In	the	fall	of	1916,	Duan	Qirui’s	associate,	Cabinet	Secretary	Xu	
Shuzheng	(1880-1925)	could	not	work	with	Li	Yuanhong’s	ally,	Interior	Minister	Sun	Hongyi	
(1872-1936).	As	an	assertion	of	his	power	over	Li,	Duan	wanted	Sun	dismissed	from	office,	and	
had	Xu	attempt	to	enforce	his	will.	Political	History	merely	describes	the	interactions	between	
these	four	as	a	relating	to	a	“quarrel”	during	a	tense	cabinet	meeting	concerning	the	central	
government	response	to	war	in	Guangdong	province,	far	to	the	south.	While	Sun’s	more	
conciliatory	approach	to	the	situation	was	supported	by	the	remainder	of	the	cabinet,	Xu	
pressed	for	an	immediate	military	response,	and	independently	directed	military	units	to	
assemble,	flouting	Sun’s	supposed	authority	over	domestic	security	matters	such	as	these.	
Unsurprisingly,	Sun	“rebuked”	Xu	for	his	defiance,	leading	to	a	“lasting	hatred”	between	the	
two	that	was	only	ended	when	Li	dismissed	the	former	from	office,	demonstrating	Duan’s	
ultimate	authority	over	state	affairs	during	this	period.21	With	the	economy	of	detail	that	
                                                
18	Surprisingly	little	has	been	published	in	English	on	Li	Yuanhong.	Standard	biographical	information	can	be	found	
in	his	entry	in	Howard	Boorman,	ed.,	Biographical	Dictionary	of	Republican	China,	5	Vols.	(New	York,	NY:	Columbia	
University	Press,	1967-1979)	
19	Zhao,	“Interview,”	56.	Original:	段祺瑞欲以武力蕩平西南護法勢力。	
20	Ibid.,	60.	
21	Li,	Political	History,	361.	
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characterizes	the	whole	of	Political	History,	Li	Jiannong	mentions	little	else	about	their	months-
long	conflict,	or	anything	more	about	the	various	personal	interactions	of	the	four.	
Anecdotes,	on	the	other	hand,	describes	this	same	incident	using	lines	of	dialogue	that	
could	be	taken	from	a	movie	or	television	drama.	For	example,	following	the	quarrel	between	
Sun	and	Xu,	Xu	is	described	as	barging	in	to	Li’s	office	several	times	with	an	order	for	Sun’s	
dismissal	that	he	(and	Duan)	want	Li	to	sign	with	his	seal,	since	only	Li,	as	President	of	the	
Republic,	has	the	legal	power	to	affix	his	seal	and	legally	certify	any	such	order	dismissing	a	
cabinet	member.	Li	refuses	each	time,	leading	to	the	following	exchange:	“[Xu	said],	brazenly	
and	impolitely,	‘If	the	President	does	not	seal	this,	Sun	will	be	forbidden	to	attend	cabinet	
meetings!’	Hearing	this	sentence,	Li’s	belly	erupted	with	uncontrollable	anger,	and	he	suddenly	
shouted,	‘What	did	you	just	say?!’”	22	A	few	days	later,	Duan	personally	intercedes	to	support	
Xu,	urging	Sun	to	move	on	to	a	face-saving	position	in	the	provinces,	or	travel	abroad	for	a	time.	
Sun	retorts	he	does	not	want	any	other	position,	and	must	protect	his	own	integrity.23	Duan,	
incensed,	responds	that	everyone	else	will	resign,	and	that	Sun	will	have	to	run	the	government	
by	himself.24	Tao	thus	describes	these	four	with	little	mention	of	their	ideological	background:	
Sun	Hongyi	was	a	Qing	scholar	and	revolutionary	activist	in	contrast	to	the	military	academy	
past	of	the	other	three,	but	this	background	has	no	relevance	to	this	dispute.	Instead	the	
disagreement	seems	primarily	predicated	upon	petty	squabbles	over	spheres	of	influence.	
The	level	of	petty	behavior	in	this	exchange	represents	the	style	of	narration	that	Tao	
uses	throughout	Anecdotes,	featuring	a	cast	of	characters	who	are	governed	merely	by	their	
own	individual	interests,	and	without	any	loftier	ideals	or	values.	Focusing	on	this	aspect	of	the	
text	illustrates	the	author’s	emphasis	on	the	quotidian	interactions	between	these	figures,	
rather	than	the	more	ideologically	minded	depiction	that	Li	Jiannong	confers	in	Political	History.	
Tao’s	source	for	the	dialogue	he	reproduces	is	unclear,	and	one	must	wonder	whether	or	not	
he	is	accurately	recording	that	which	he	has	been	told,	or	if	he	is	wholly	creating	these	verbal	
exchanges	in	order	to	make	his	point	about	petty	individuals	and	fraught	relationships	more	
vividly.	The	small-mindedness	of	his	subjects	and	dizzying	number	of	interactions	Tao	provides	
his	readers	culminates	in	a	portrait	of	an	era	in	chaos,	badly	in	need	of	rescue	by	a	regime	that	
can	bring	order	and	unity.	This	is	not	to	say	that	he	is	incorrect	about	the	political	turmoil	of	the	
post-Yuan	era,	but	rather	this	focus	on	the	more	sensationalistic	aspects	of	the	period	is	only	
one	part	of	the	fuller	history.	
That	being	said,	it	is	easy	to	see	how	scholars	studying	the	period	might	be	attracted	to	
Tao’s	narrative	of	political	disintegration.	By	May	1917,	Li	would	eventually	tire	of	Duan’s	
aggressive	behavior,	asking	for	his	resignation.	This	act	engendered	even	further	political	chaos,	
with	one	Beiyang	general	taking	over	the	capital	for	ten	days	in	an	unsuccessful	attempt	to	
restore	the	Qing	Dynasty	in	July	and	Sun	Yatsen	forming	a	rival	Chinese	state	in	Guangzhou	in	
August.	By	the	fall,	Li	resigned	the	presidency,	and	Duan	returned	to	power.	In	1918,	Duan	
dispatched	another	invasion	force	to	Hunan,	led	by	Wu	Peifu	(1874-1939)	and	Zhang	Jingyao	
(1881-1933),	which	compelled	Zhao’s	retreat	to	southern	Hunan,	and	established	Beiyang	
                                                
22	Tao,	Anecdotes,	Vol.	1.,	545.	Original:	很不禮貌地說：「總統不蓋印，就只能不准伯蘭（孫）出席國務會
議！」黎聽了這句話，他的一肚子火氣實在關不住了，陡然大喝一聲：「你說的一句什麼話！」	
23	Ibid.,	546.	Original:「甚麼官我都不要，只要維持我的人格。」	
24	Ibid.	Original:「好，我們大家都辭職，讓孫洪伊一個人去幹！」	
		 63	
hegemony	over	the	province	for	the	next	two	years.	Zhang	was	named	governor,	and	soldiers	
under	his	administration	were	notorious	for	atrocities	that	were	said	to	be	in	excess	of	any	
other	past	regime.	Having	wanted	the	position	for	himself,	Wu	signaled	his	dissatisfaction	by	
refusing	to	engage	in	further	combat,	preferring	to	preserve	his	forces	for	future	conflicts.	
Cheng	Qian,	who	was	then	provincial	army	commander-in-chief,	was	forced	to	leave	Hunan	in	
disgrace	after	his	secret	peace	negotiations	with	Duan	were	exposed.	Tan	Yankai	returned	to	
Hunan,	rejoining	Zhao	Hengti,	and	worked	with	intermediaries	to	communicate	with	Wu	Peifu,	
persuading	him	to	retreat	to	the	north	with	a	bribe	of	600,000	silver	coins.	Stripped	of	Wu’s	
military	support,	the	highly	unpopular	Zhang	Jingyao	was	forced	from	office	in	July	1920,	and	
the	stage	was	set	for	Tan’s	triumphant	return	as	Hunan	governor.25	
Petition	Calling	for	the	Removal	of	Tang	Xiangming	
Though	it	might	seem	from	the	above	summary	as	though	the	workings	of	the	provincial	
government	were	entirely	dependent	upon	individual	personality	or	relationships	between	
ostensible	rivals,	unpublished	archival	material	suggests	a	different	perspective.	Tan	Yankai’s	
second	term	as	governor	followed	the	three-year	reign	of	Tang	Xiangming,	who	was	appointed	
by	the	Beiyang	regime,	and	whose	tenure	was	universally	reviled.	After	his	departure	from	
Hunan	in	1916,	the	provincial	assembly	petitioned	the	National	Assembly	in	Beijing	for	his	
formal	impeachment	from	office	in	1917,	nearly	one	year	after	the	fact.26		
This	is	a	seemingly	mundane	document,	calling	for	retroactive	legal	recognition	of	what	
had	already	been	realized	in	practice,	but	closer	examination	reveals	its	significance	as	an	
appeal	to	the	national	constitution.	The	petition	begins	with	a	reference	to	a	finding	by	the	
Hunan	Provincial	Assembly	from	the	previous	December	that	investigated	Tang	Xiangming’s	
policies	and	crimes,	and	how	those	materials	had	been	formally	forwarded	to	the	National-level	
Interior	Ministry	in	March.27	Since	there	had	been	no	favorable	response,	the	assembly	writes,	
they	had	no	choice	but	to	lodge	this	petition,	as	a	form	of	censure	for	Tang.	Referring	to	the	
Republic	of	China	as	a	“Constitutional	State,”	(立憲國家),	the	petition	strenuously	argues	that	
Tang	as	a	bureaucrat,	should	be	punished	for	his	violations	for	the	law,	and	that	a	state	that	
does	not	enforce	the	law	sets	a	poor	example	for	its	people.	Moreover,	any	nation	governed	by	
such	a	state	is	hardly	a	nation	at	all.28	
Indignant	rhetoric	aside,	this	petition	is	significant	as	an	example	of	how	bureaucratic	
communications	as	well	as	the	value	of	obedience	to	the	law	still	functioned	during	the	
“Warlord	Era.”	Titles	like	“Provincial	Governor”	carried	significance,	and	the	same	constitution	
that	had	been	ridiculed	for	its	ineffectiveness	still	informed	political	conversations,	challenging	
the	scorn	expressed	by	Goodnow	concerning	Chinese	respect	for	the	rule	of	law	that	was	
described	in	the	previous	chapter	of	this	dissertation.	It	is	easy	to	be	cynical	about	many	of	
these	rules	and	regulations	that	seemed	to	have	no	effect	on	practice,	but	this	document	shows	
how	some	kind	of	standard	continued	to	persist,	despite	the	constant	flouting	of	those	
                                                
25	Zhao,	“Interview”,	59.	
26	Hunan	Provincial	Assembly,	“請願參眾兩院轉咨查辦前湘督湯薌銘文,”	[Petition	to	the	National	Assembly	and	
Senate	Concerning	the	Investigation	of	Ex-Hunan	Military	Governor	Tang	Xiangming]	(May	5,	1917),	in	File	23-1-27,	
page	46,	Hunan	Provincial	Archives,	Changsha,	Hunan,	People’s	Republic	of	China.	
27	ibid.	Original:	省議會暫行法第十七條之規定提出彈劾案	
28	ibid.	Original:	官吏柱法於上，政府不能執法以繩，將人人效尤而國不國矣	
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standards	by	men	like	Duan	or	Yuan.	Indeed,	one	scholar	studying	has	even	gone	so	far	as	to	
characterize	the	early	Republican	period	of	Chinese	history	as	a	‘golden	era’	for	the	ability	of	
local	concerns	to	bring	their	needs	to	the	central	state,	citing	other	examples	resulting	in	
concrete	action.	29		
Furthermore,	the	petition	against	Tang	builds	upon	a	long	historical	legacy	of	imperial	
China	that	had	encouraged	those	at	the	local	level	to	complain	and	remonstrate	against	their	
magistrate	or	even	their	provincial	governor	to	the	central	court.	For	example,	during	the	Ming	
Dynasty	(1368-1664),	systems	of	communication	were	created	to	make	sure	local	officials	could	
be	held	accountable	for	their	misdeeds,	to	the	point	of	truly	heinous	action	resulting	in	
impeachment.30	The	Palace	Memorial	system	was	created	during	the	Qing	to	supplement	the	
official	lines	of	communication	and	bypass	the	bureaucracy,	enabling	the	Emperor	to	ensure	
that	his	officials	were	honest	in	their	reports	to	him;	complaints	and	petitions	to	remove	bad	
officials	from	office	were	often	transmitted	in	this	way	as	well.31	This	1917	petition	by	the	
Hunan	Provincial	Assembly	clearly	falls	in	line	with	this	tradition.	
Beyond	its	symbolism	as	a	tie	to	the	imperial	past,	and	its	significance	as	an	appeal	to	a	
possible	constitutionally	governed	future,	this	petition	also	suggests	that	provincial	assemblies	
were	more	important	than	previously	suspected.	One	scholar	has	characterized	these	
organizations	as	accomplishing	“little	of	substance;”	they	were	more	honest	and	rational	prior	
to	1911,	but	became	more	corrupt	and	poorly-run	after	the	founding	of	the	republic.32	Yet	the	
political	courage	required	to	construct	and	send	this	petition,	asking	for	the	Beiyang	regime	to	
remove	its	own	member	from	office,	signals	that	the	Hunan	Provincial	Assembly	was	more	
important	than	previously	understood.		
Thus,	while	the	conventional	historiography	of	the	period	stresses	the	unilateral	and	
near	despotic	actions	of	the	Beiyang	state	appointing	and	removing	men	like	Tang	from	office,	
this	needs	to	be	juxtaposed	against	the	vocabulary	that	bodies	like	the	Hunan	Provincial	
Assembly	employed	in	protest.		Li	Jiannong,	Tao	Juyin,	and	other	historians	correctly	
characterize	the	warlord	period	as	one	of	great	disunity,	filled	with	conflicts	that	seemed	to	
have	little	reason	or	logic	beyond	the	selfish	desires	of	power-hungry	soldiers.	This	chaos	is	
contrasted	to	revolutionary	ideology	of	the	Nationalist	Party	that	Political	History	explicitly	
praises,	or	the	Socialist	ideology	of	the	Communist	Party	that	Anecdotes	implicitly	valorizes.	
According	to	them,	the	Republic	of	China	was	a	government	in	name	alone,	with	the	former	
Qing	empire	seemed	hopelessly	divided	between	rival	governments	as	well	as	brutish	warlords.	
The	farce	of	Yuan	Shikai’s	attempt	to	become	emperor	as	well	as	the	short-lived	Manchu	
restoration	created	enormous	cynicism	about	the	law	as	well	as	China’s	future	prospects	for	a	
                                                
29	Qiang	Fang,	“A	Hot	Potato:	The	Chinese	Complaint	Systems	from	Early	Times	to	the	Present,”	Ph.D.	Dissertation	
(University	of	Buffalo,	2006).	
30	Timothy	Brook,	The	Confusions	of	Pleasure:	Commerce	and	Culture	in	Ming	China	(Berkeley,	CA.:	University	of	
California	Press,	1998),	30-34.	
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32	C’hang	Peng-yuan	[Zhang	Pengyuan],	“Provincial	Assemblies:	The	Emergence	of	Political	Participation,	1909-
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unified	republic.	Yet	this	1917	petition	suggests	that	this	is	only	part	of	the	story.	Things	were	
not	as	dire	as	Political	History	or	Anecdotes	might	have	its	readers	believe;	there	was	clearly	
bureaucratic	communication	and	local	governance	in	spite	of	factionalism	and	discord	at	the	
center.	In	addition,	vibrant	discussions	among	the	nation’s	leading	intellectuals	were	emerging	
that	implicitly	valorized	peaceful	and	gradual	reform,	indicating	that	the	chaos	was	not	all-
encompassing.	One	of	these	was	Li	Jiannong,	who	had	recently	returned	from	England	with	an	
idea	that	he	thought	might	save	China	from	its	historical	cycles	of	unity	and	disunity:	federalism.	
	
Li	Jiannong	and	Federalism	
In	the	aftermath	of	Song	Jiaoren’s	assassination,	Li	Jiannong	had	fled	China	to	study	in	
England.	After	three	years	in	exile,	Li	Jiannong	returned	to	China,	where	he	found	a	second	
career	as	an	advocate	for	shifting	the	Chinese	state	from	a	unitary	to	a	federal	system	of	
governance.	In	1917,	he	and	some	other	returnees	founded	a	monthly	periodical	they	called	
The	Pacific	(太平洋雜誌).	In	its	pages,	he	authored	a	number	of	different	essays	concerning	
national	politics,	constitutionalism,	and	federalism.	Li’s	overall	tone	is	one	of	moderation	and	
objectivity,	depicting	a	model	of	how	the	modern	Chinese	state	should	look,	and	arguing	that	
this	ideal	needs	to	be	achieved	in	a	peaceful	fashion.	His	work	in	these	pages	thus	implicitly	
argues	for	a	wen-oriented	paradigm	that	creates	change	through	words	and	ideas,	and	against	
the	wu-model	of	military	conquest	that	had	been	the	method	of	both	the	Revolutionaries	as	
well	as	the	recently	deceased	Yuan	Shikai.	This	1917	attitude	needs	to	be	placed	in	the	overall	
context	of	his	support	for	the	Nationalist	Party	in	1911	and	his	antagonism	towards	the	
reformers	in	his	1930	Political	History:	during	this	stage	of	his	political	career,	he	would	be	
better	categorized	among	those	reformers	whom	he	had	criticized	so	heavily.	
In	the	latter	part	of	the	year,	he	wrote	an	essay	in	two	parts	titled	“The	Issue	of	Unifying	
the	Republic,”	(民國統一問題)	that	is	worth	examining	in	depth	to	get	a	sense	of	his	thought	
during	this	period	as	well	as	the	broader	intellectual	environment	in	the	post-Yuan	era.	In	1922,	
he	would	write	a	third	part	to	this	series	to	address	how	circumstances	changed	in	the	
intervening	five	years;	the	epilogue	to	this	dissertation	will	examine	that	text	in	more	depth.	
These	are	not	previously	unknown	essays:	for	example,	Jean	Chesneaux	draws	heavily	from	The	
Pacific	to	produce	one	of	the	few	Western-language	studies	of	the	federalist	movement.	He	
convincingly	shows	that	federalists	like	Li	were	both	inspired	by	the	West	and	part	of	the	
traditional	social	elite,	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	radicals	and	revolutionaries	who	would	later	gain	
power.	However,	he	focuses	largely	on	essays	published	after	1921,	after	provincial	
constitutions	proposing	a	federalist	system	had	been	promulgated,	arguing	that	these	authors	
were	merely	justifying	what	had	already	been	accomplished.	In	doing	so,	Chesneaux	avoids	
considering	how	earlier	debates	in	periodicals	like	The	Pacific	might	have	informed	those	same	
provincial	constitutions,	effectively	dismissing	whatever	influence	Li	and	his	colleagues	might	
have	had	on	the	process.33		
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China	(Cambridge,	MA.:	Harvard	University	Press,	2019).	For	a	historical	overview	of	federalism	that	includes	more	
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In	his	essays,	Li	is	clear	about	what	he	means	by	federalism:	a	system	of	governance	in	
which	national	power	is	shared	with	the	provinces	and	counties	instead	of	concentrated	in	the	
capital.	For	the	purposes	of	his	essay,	he	describes	three	different	systems	of	government:	a	
unitary	state	(單一),	a	federation	(聯邦),	and	confederation	(邦聯).	The	unitary	state	is	perhaps	
the	easiest	to	understand:	it	is	the	central	state	that	does	not	share	power	with	local	
government	but	instead	controls	all,	in	a	hierarchical	way.	In	Li’s	typology,	the	quintessential	
example	of	a	unitary	state	is	England,	where	political	power	emanates	from	Parliament	and	the	
central	government.	Pre-1911	China	might	also	be	understood	to	be	an	example	of	this	as	well,	
where	ultimate	authority	is	invested	in	the	person	of	the	emperor,	and	local	officials	at	all	levels	
are	selected	and	appointed	by	the	center.	This	is	a	form	of	government	in	which	power	
emanates	from	the	center	outward.	
The	difference	between	the	federation	and	confederation	models	is	a	bit	harder	to	
discern.	In	both,	power	is	shared	between	central	and	local	government,	but	the	proportions	
are	different.	A	confederation	is	a	political	system	wherein	authority	resides	with	local	
governments,	who	form	a	nation	together.	Li	believes	Switzerland	best	exemplifies	this	system:	
the	various	cantons	exist	as	independent	polities	that	work	in	cooperation	to	form	a	modern	
nation	state.	A	federation	is	system	where	that	same	authority	is	more	evenly	divided	between	
central	and	local	governments.	For	Li,	the	United	States	is	an	example	of	this	federal	system,	
and	is	the	best	possible	form	of	government	for	the	Republic	of	China	to	model	itself	after.	One	
might	think	of	a	spectrum	spanning	between	the	extremes	of	centralization	and	
decentralization;	unitary	rule	would	represent	the	first	extreme,	and	confederation	the	second.	
Federalism	would	fall	somewhere	between	the	two.	
Given	China’s	size	and	diversity,	Li	believes	it	should	transform	itself	into	a	federated	
system	of	governance,	in	which	power	is	shared	between	the	central	government	and	the	
provinces.	The	unitary	system	that	had	worked	under	the	Qing	would	not	allow	for	a	modern	
state	to	adequately	respond	to	so	many	of	its	people.	In	this,	Li	is	clearly	mindful	of	the	first	
years	of	the	republic	under	Yuan,	in	which	the	national	assembly	seemed	remote	and	separate	
from	the	needs	of	the	general	populace.	Moreover,	the	constitutional	ideals	inherited	from	the	
Qing	New	Reform	experiments	had	valorized	responsiveness	to	the	people	in	order	to	achieve	a	
union	of	state	and	society.	For	Li,	federalism	provided	the	best	mechanism	for	insuring	this	
needed	unity.	
In	this	first	essay,	Li	goes	on	to	vividly	describe	the	knee-jerk	reactions	that	the	term	
“federalism”	receives,	as	if	those	who	advocate	for	this	system	also	support	the	division	of	
China	into	independent	states.	He	is	clearly	mindful	here	of	the	larger	political	context,	with	
two	rival	national	governments	in	Beijing	and	Canton,	as	well	as	various	provinces	being	ruled	
by	individual	warlords.	He	is	also	aware	that	those	who	oppose	federalism	argue	that	
implementing	this	system	constitutes	a	dramatic	devolution	of	power	to	local	governments	that	
would	inevitably	result	the	disintegration	of	the	nation.	This	system,	in	other	words,	would	
create	a	new	set	of	nations,	perhaps	divided	along	provincial	boundaries,	where	there	had	
previously	been	one.	The	foreign	powers	who	had	carved	out	various	sphere	of	influence	since	
                                                                                                                                                       
of	the	twentieth	century,	see	Steven	Philips,	“The	Demonization	of	Federalism	in	Republican	China,”	in	Emilian	
Kavalski	and	Magdalena	Zolkos,	eds.,	Defunct	Federalisms:	Critical	Perspectives	on	Federalism’s	Failure.	(Aldershot,	
Hants,	England;	Burlington,	VT:	Ashgate	Press,	2008),	87-102.	
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the	Opium	Wars	could	only	be	pleased	by	this	result;	a	unified	nation	had	not	been	able	to	
resist	their	might,	and	so	a	divided	nation	could	only	be	weaker.	Li	was	surely	mindful	of	his	
own	background	as	one	who	had	spent	time	abroad,	and	so	open	to	the	critique	that	he	was	
merely	advancing	the	interests	of	foreign	imperialists.	
To	these	various	critics,	Li	counters	by	claiming	that	the	China	of	1917	is	unified	in	name	
only,	and	that	its	current	political	state	is	already	deeply	fragmented.	Paradoxically,	attempting	
to	continue	attempting	to	use	a	highly	centralized	system	for	unifying	China	would	only	result	in	
further	disunity.	The	previous	system	of	autocratic	despotism	makes	a	poor	fit	for	such	a	large	
population,	as	demonstrated	by	the	squabbling	and	factionalism	that	paralyzed	the	Republic	of	
China	during	its	first	years.	Furthermore,	the	example	of	two	attempts	to	restore	the	monarchy	
suggest	how	unitary	government	could	pervert	the	republican	state	from	reverting	to	the	very	
imperial	form	of	rule	that	so	many	had	fought.	Li	is	not	naïve	about	the	domestic	and	
international	challenges	that	transforming	the	state	might	entail;	this	is	not	a	problem	that	can	
be	resolved	quickly	or	easily.		However,	federalism	still	represents	China’s	best	hope	to	return	
to	a	position	of	true	unity	(真正統一),	as	distinguished	from	unity	in	name	only.34	
The	second	essay,	published	shortly	after	the	first,	is	thematically	very	close	in	tone	and	
substance.	Li’s	ostensible	motive	for	writing	is	to	address	the	support	for	federalism	as	
expressed	by	Xiong	Xiling	(1870-1939),	a	former	premier	of	the	central	government	under	Yuan	
Shikai	who	had	become	involved	in	charitable	social	causes	after	resigning	in	1914.	Xiong	was	a	
native	of	Fenghuang,	a	city	in	West	Hunan,	and	had	been	a	member	of	the	Qing	scholar-elite,	
obtaining	his	jinshi	degree	in	1894.	He,	along	with	Liang	Qichao,	had	been	one	of	the	leaders	of	
Changsha’s	School	for	Current	Affairs	during	the	late	Qing.	He	then	studied	in	Japan	for	several	
years	before	joining	the	1905	Qing	foreign	mission	that	examined	the	constitutions	of	other	
nations	and	encouraged	the	Qing	court	along	the	path	towards	constitutional	monarchy.	In	the	
post	1911	era,	he	was	a	prominent	member	of	the	Reform	party	that	had	worked	with	Yuan	
Shikai	against	the	Nationalists	before	retiring	from	public	life	by	1917	to	become	one	of	the	
nation’s	foremost	philanthropists.35	
For	Li	and	other	supporters	of	federalism,	Xiong’s	position	is	surprising	as	well	as	
gratifying,	as	he	was	previously	opposed	to	the	cause.	However,	Li’s	essay	cautions	his	readers	
to	avoid	interpreting	Xiong’s	change	of	position	to	mean	that	he	also	abandoned	his	earlier	
opinions	regarding	the	separation	of	military	and	civilian	power.	Evidently,	Xiong	had	been	a	
proponent	of	both	unitary	rule	as	well	as	the	peaceful	modernization	of	the	state	and	nation;	Li	
wants	to	make	sure	that	all	know	his	position	on	the	first	matter	changed,	but	not	his	position	
on	the	second.	Indeed,	Li	continues,	military	power	is	precisely	the	wrong	way	to	unify	a	nation.	
According	to	him,	Bismarck	did	not	unify	the	German	states	through	military	conquest;	he	
directed	the	Prussian	military	against	only	those	states	which	could	never	be	a	part	of	the	
future	federation.	In	contrast,	those	who	joined	Prussia	to	form	Germany	did	so	through	
peaceful	means,	without	being	forced	into	an	alliance.	The	actual	history	of	Germany’s	creation	
                                                
34	Li	Jiannong	李劍農,	民國統一問題	[The	Issue	of	Unifying	the	Republic]	in	Pacific	Magazine	[太平洋雜誌],	Vol.	1,	
No.	8,	1-15.	All	essays	from	Pacific	Magazine	are	taken	from	reproductions	available	via 大成老旧期刊全文数据
库	[Dacheng	Modern	China	Journal	Database]:	(http://laokan.dachengdata.com/tuijian/showTuijianList.action) 
35	For	more	on	Xiong	in	English,	see	Zhou	Qiuguang,	“Modern	Chinese	Educational	Philanthropy,”	trans.	Edward	
McCord,	Republican	China	19,	no.	1	(1994):	51-83;	for	information	on	his	wife,	see	Xia	Shi,	At	Home	in	the	World.	
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is	not	so	simple,	but	the	ideal	type	Li	creates	is	clear:	a	federalist	modernization	of	the	state	
that	is	accomplished	via	peaceful	means.	
	By	implication,	previous	Chinese	dynasties,	all	of	which	had	conquered	through	military	
force,	were	never	successful	in	creating	true	unity.	These	dynasties	came	to	power	through	the	
exercise	of	military	might,	maintained	their	authority	through	the	threat	of	military	might,	and	
fell	once	that	military	might	was	insufficient	for	controlling	the	empire.	The	rapid	disintegration	
of	the	republican	state	into	rival	polities	after	1911	shows	how	those	who	were	ostensibly	
unified	under	Qing	rule	were	not	truly	together	as	a	modern	nation.	The	fragile	unity	that	was	
produced	via	force	might	have	been	sufficient	for	territorial	security	and	economic	prosperity	in	
the	premodern	era,	but	modern	nations	required	a	much	more	substantive	unity.	36	
Li’s	advocacy	for	federalism	helped	to	start	a	larger	nation-wide	federalist	movement,	
and	he	was	given	the	opportunity	to	implement	some	of	his	ideas	as	the	chair	of	the	committee	
in	charge	of	drafting	Hunan’s	Provincial	Constitution	in	1920,	but	his	ideas	were	never	
implemented	on	the	national	level.	Perhaps	one	reason	for	this	is	because	he	was	never	as	
prolific	of	a	political	essayist	as	his	peers,	choosing	instead	to	work	in	provincial	administration,	
teach,	and	write	history.	These	methods	were	not	conducive	to	mass	politics	that	were	to	
emerge	in	China.	In	contrast,	intellectuals	like	Liang	Qichao,	Hu	Shi	(1891-1962),	and	Zhang	
Shizhao	(1881-1973)	were	all	more	nationally	prominent	as	writers	or	officials,	and	maintained	
higher	public	profiles	that	made	their	association	with	federalism	more	well-known.	
Federalism	was	also	opposed	by	many	who	believed	that	further	decentralization	would	
only	result	in	the	splitting	of	the	nation.	Wu	Peifu	argued	that	that	the	system	would	constitute	
“retrogression	from	centralization	back	into	separate	individual	states,”37	and,	with	the	carving	
up	of	the	empire	by	foreign	powers	into	various	spheres	of	influence	that	had	begun	after	the	
Opium	Wars,	it	seemed	as	though	Wu’s	fears	were	coming	to	pass.	Li’s	cause	was	not	helped	by	
the	fact	that	many	of	those	favoring	his	ideas	controlled	provinces	that	wished	to	maintain	their	
autonomy,	making	their	support	appear	blatantly	self-serving.	Finally,	the	association	of	
Federalism	with	Chen	Jiongming,	who	would	go	on	to	betray	Sun	Yatsen	in	Guangdong	in	1922,	
meant	that	the	concept	was	anathema	for	those	who	valorized	Sun	in	the	years	after.38		
Why	did	Li	advocate	for	this	form	of	political	change	in	1917,	merely	six	years	after	his	
fervent	support	for	the	violence	of	the	Wuchang	uprising?	Would	he	now	describe	himself	as	a	
reformist	instead	of	a	revolutionary?	Perhaps	he	had	come	to	favor	a	different	interpretation	of	
what	revolution	might	mean	to	China,	stepping	away	from	the	violent	overthrow	of	a	state	and	
towards	the	radical	transformation	of	attitudes	and	minds?	If	so,	his	perspective	on	change	
appears	more	conservative	than	not:	though	he	argues	for	what	amounts	to	be	a	radical	change	
in	political	structure,	he	does	not	address	social	change	at	all.	Moreover,	this	critique	of	military	
conquest	as	a	method	for	achieving	true	unity	adds	an	interesting	layer	to	his	1930	Political	
History	that	strongly	favored	revolution	over	reform.	After	another	seventeen	years	of	
witnessing	the	dysfunctional	politics	of	his	day,	it	is	plausible	that	his	perspective	on	this	topic	
                                                
36	Li	Jiannong	李劍農,	“Minguo	Tongyi	Wenti”	民國統一問題	[The	Issue	of	Unifying	the	Republic]	in	Pacific	
Magazine	[太平洋雜誌],	Vol.	1,	No.	9,	1-13.	
37	Wou,	Militarism	in	Modern	China,	43;	Arthur	Waldron	describes	the	debate	between	Hu	Shi	and	Chen	Duxiu	on	
this	topic	in	“Warlordism	vs.	Federalism:	The	Revival	of	a	Debate?”	in	The	China	Quarterly,	No.	121,	(Mar.	1990),	
116-128.	
38	Chen,	Chen	Jiongming	and	the	Federalist	Movement.		
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shifted	between	writing	these	essays	and	writing	his	textbook.	It	is	perhaps	more	interesting,	
however,	to	consider	how	his	conceptualization	of	revolution	might	have	changed	over	the	
years.	Redefining	it	in	a	way	that	prizes	federalism	as	the	“true”	political	revolution	that	China	
needed	in	1917	allows	his	readers	to	move	beyond	thinking	of	China	as	a	territory	that	needs	to	
be	centrally	governed,	and	that	allows	for	more	diversity	and	local	autonomy	than	we	
otherwise	might	believe	realistic.	
	
Conclusion	
The	years	immediately	after	1916	have	been	classified	as	the	era	of	high	warlordism	in	
modern	China.	On	the	national	level,	various	factions	seemed	to	be	endlessly	jockeying	for	
dominance,	making	the	political	history	of	the	period	complex	and	confusing.	Duan	Qirui	has	
been	described	as	the	key	mover	behind	national	politics	in	these,	but	his	supremacy	was	
clearly	not	as	unassailable	as	Yuan’s,	as	demonstrated	by	his	disagreements	with	Li	Yuanhong.	
Li	was	legally	in	a	superior	position	as	President	to	Duan’s	Premier,	but	their	titles	seemed	to	
matter	far	less	than	their	personal	connections	to	their	peers	and	subordinates.	
This	turmoil	in	Beijing	informed	the	independence	of	Hunan	from	the	central	
government,	as	local	leaders	took	advantage	of	national	uncertainty	to	assert	their	autonomy	
and	advocate	for	the	province’s	interests.	Yuan’s	weakness	following	his	failed	attempt	to	
become	emperor	enabled	Tan’s	second	tenure	as	governor.	When	Duan	was	able	to	assert	his	
power,	a	Beiyang	proxy	was	installed	as	Tan’s	replacement	yet	again.	By	1920,	when	his	hold	
over	the	province	had	weakened	again,	Tan	appeared	poised	for	a	third	term.	
The	chaos	of	the	era	is	accentuated	in	Tao	Juyin’s	Anecdotes,	in	a	way	that	skews	the	
perceptions	of	his	readers	towards	believing	that	the	key	actors	for	the	period	were	amoral,	
selfish,	and	power-hungry.	While	this	is	not	an	inaccurate	assessment,	his	efforts	to	provide	
entertaining	drama	join	with	his	position	as	a	writer	in	1956	China	to	overemphasize	these	
aspects	of	the	period.	His	tone	and	style	have	informed	the	manner	in	which	subsequent	
histories	have	been	written;	more	directly	for	the	purposes	of	this	dissertation,	emphasizing	
competition	between	ostensible	allies	who	are	actually	opponents	seems	to	match	well	with	
the	mutiny	that	occurs	in	November	1920,	and	the	subsequent	transfer	of	power	from	Tan	to	
Zhao.	
This	chapter	has	used	a	1917	petition	by	the	Hunan	Provincial	Assembly	to	argue	that	
this	narrative	of	political	chaos	is	oversimplified	and	warrants	reexamination.	This	content	of	
this	document	appeals	to	the	national	constitution,	suggesting	how	the	rule	of	law	was	an	
important	value	in	the	political	culture	of	China’s	early	republic,	in	spite	of	Tao’s	implications	to	
the	contrary.	Moreover,	the	very	existence	of	this	document	indicates	that	the	bureaucratic	
communications	that	had	unified	the	previous	imperial	system	were	still	in	operation,	
challenging	Tao’s	individual-centered	interpretive	paradigm.	
The	federalism	of	the	newly	returned	Li	Jiannong	constitutes	a	second	challenge	to	the	
dominant	narrative	given	by	Anecdotes.	While	his	ideas	did	not	seem	to	have	nationwide	
support,	his	reputation	as	one	of	China’s	leading	federalists	led	to	his	chairing	the	committee	
writing	Hunan’s	constitution,	showing	that	ideals	of	peaceful	reform	retained	some	influence.	
His	belief	in	the	ability	of	local	polities	to	join	with	each	other	as	well	as	the	central	government	
in	federated	unity	seems	poorly	timed	for	an	era	of	such	confusion.	Perhaps	his	ideas	would	
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have	gained	greater	traction	had	the	politics	of	the	era	been	more	stable,	and	the	fear	of	local	
governors	splitting	off	their	territories	into	independent	states	been	less	realistic.	On	the	other	
hand,	Li	clearly	saw	his	ideas	as	the	ideal	solution	for	the	problems	of	the	time,	since	the	
replacement	of	a	centralized	empire	with	a	centralized	republic	seemed	to	be	such	an	abject	
failure.	
Throughout	Anecdotes,	Tao	Juyin	depicts	warlords	as	separatists	rather	than	innovators	
who	experimented	with	constitutional	reforms,	educational	movements,	or	other	initiatives	in	a	
period	of	flux.	Regardless,	the	subsequent	military	unification	of	China	would	overshadow	any	
gains	that	they	had	achieved.	Furthermore,	by	the	1950s,	“centralized	unification”	as	a	
discourse	had	triumphed	completely	over	“constitutional	federalism,”	which	was	perceived	to	
be	an	empty	excuse	for	separatist	policy.	Anecdotes	thus	reflects	Tao’s	eagerness	in	the	1950s	
to	dismiss	provincial	self-governance	and	constitutional	federalism:	two	ideas	that	were	
particularly	relevant	for	Hunan	in	1920,	as	they	were	justifications	used	by	Tan	Yankai	to	
maintain	his	power	and	his	autonomy	from	the	central	state.	As	the	next	chapter	will	illustrate,	
Tan’s	efforts	had	mixed	results.	
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Chapter	4:	Factionalism,	Betrayal,	and	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny	
	
Introduction	
This	chapter	collects	and	analyzes	conventional	histories	of	the	November	1920	
transition	of	power	from	Tan	to	Zhao	to	illustrate	how	particular	aspects	of	this	event	have	
been	emphasized	in	a	way	to	exemplify	the	chaos	of	the	warlord	years.	These	include	the	
conflicts	between	wen-	and	wu-	oriented	individuals,	the	use	of	documents	like	the	Hunan	
Provincial	Constitution	or	concepts	like	federalism	as	thinly	veiled	excuses	for	self-serving	
behavior,	betrayals	by	erstwhile	allies,	and	the	necessity	of	revolutionary	unity	for	saving	China.	
While	the	subsequent	success	of	the	KMT	and	CCP	demonstrate	the	power	of	revolution	to	
bring	about	change,	this	dissertation	challenges	teleological	versions	of	this	argument	by	using	
previously	unpublished	archival	material	to	show	how	local	governance	in	provinces	like	Hunan	
was	far	more	functional	than	typically	portrayed.		
One	interpretation	of	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny	is	that	it	represents	the	nadir	of	local	
administration	in	Hunan,	in	which	an	ineffective	scholar-official	of	the	pre-1911	era	was	
replaced	by	a	new-style	militarist	minor	warlord.	This	chapter	deconstructs	how	this	narrative	
has	been	transmitted	and	challenges	one	of	its	key	points—that	civilian	governor	Tan	Yankai	
was	an	unfocused	and	effectual	leader—by	using	his	English-language	exercise	books	from	the	
year	he	was	exiled	to	southern	Hunan,	immediately	prior	to	the	1920	mutiny.	Examining	these	
texts	shows	that	his	seemingly	unrushed	and	pointless	daily	activities	should	be	better	
understood	conscious	efforts	to	enhance	his	wu-credentials	position	himself	for	future	
opportunities	to	gain	power.	Since	these	materials	were	not	intended	for	public	consumption,	
in	contrast	to	the	published	oral	histories	or	newspaper	articles	which	have	undergirded	the	
conventional	narrative,	they	offer	more	revealing	insights	into	his	character.	
At	first	glance,	it	is	easy	to	see	why	Tan	has	been	commonly	interpreted	as	an	elitist	
dabbler	in	politics,	unfit	for	the	turmoil	of	the	warlord	decade.	After	Zhang	Jingyao	left	Hunan,	
Tan	Yankai	became	governor	for	a	third	and	final	time,	from	July	to	November	of	1920.	During	
this	short	period,	Tan	engaged	in	a	number	of	policy	innovations,	including	advocating	for	a	
provincial	constitution,	which	built	upon	the	legacies	of	the	Qing	New	Policies	as	well	as	Frank	
Goodnow’s	abortive	efforts	to	bring	a	stronger	rule	of	law	to	the	new	Republic.	Because	this	
constitution	was	necessarily	provincial,	this	meant	that	Tan	was	advocating	for	a	similar	federal	
conception	of	Hunan’s	role	within	the	larger	Chinese	state	that	Li	Jiannong	had	proposed	in	
1917.	Using	the	general	slogan	of	“provincial	autonomy”	(地方自治),	he	declared	his	support	
for	a	policy	of	‘Hunanese	governing	Hunan”	(湘人治湘)	in	which	provinces	like	Hunan	would	be	
governed	by	local	elites	like	himself.1	While	critics	like	Tao	Juyin	saw	Tan’s	support	for	this	
movement	as	merely	scheming	to	enhance	his	own	power,	this	seems	implausible,	as	it	would	
have	been	far	more	pragmatic	to	disavow	federalism	and	join	any	of	the	other	extra-provincial	
alliances	if	that	was	his	only	goal.2	Instead,	Tan	was	more	likely	attempting	to	accomplish	
                                                
1	For	one	example	of	his	use	of	such	language,	see	his	October	25,	1920	speech	to	the	Hunan	Provincial	Assembly,	
in 湖南省議會第四次臨時會議事錄	[Minutes	from	the	Fourth	Meeting	of	the	Temporary	Hunan	Provincial	
Assembly]	in	File	23-1-35,	page	10,	Hunan	Provincial	Archives,	Changsha,	Hunan,	People’s	Republic	of	China		
2	The	fullest	expression	of	Tao’s	critique	can	be	found	in	Tao,	Anecdotes	Vol.	2,	520-3,	and	is	treated	in	more	detail	
towards	the	end	of	this	chapter.	
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multiple	goals	simultaneously:	creating	a	popular	mandate	that	might	enhance	Hunan’s	
independence	from	Beiyang	intimidation,	proposing	a	plan	by	which	the	constant	conflict	might	
cease,	and	preserving	his	own	position	as	governor.		
Aside	from	his	support	for	federalism,	Tan	also	pushed	for	democratic	elections	for	the	
position	of	provincial	governor,	as	well	as	a	further	reduction	in	military	expenses.	He	invited	
nationally	prominent	academics	like	Zhang	Taiyan	(1868-1936),	Zhang	Ji	(1882-1947),	and	Cai	
Yuanpei	(1868-1940)	to	give	public	lectures	on	the	subjects	of	federalism	and	constitutionalism.	
While	in	China,	John	Dewey	(1859-1952)	and	Bertrand	Russell	(1872-1970)	also	toured	Hunan,	
and	expressed	their	approval	for	Tan’s	policies.3	These	policies	were	not	just	meant	to	give	
credence	to	Tan’s	rule,	in	the	way	that	emperors	had	long	invited	reclusive	scholars	to	court	as	
a	form	of	validation;	nor	was	Tan	“soliciting	talent”	to	work	in	his	government,	since	they	were	
simply	sojourning	through	Hunan.	These	invitations	were	symbolic	of	a	true	effort	to	educate	
citizens	in	a	new	democratic	system,	and	to	legitimate	the	systematic	nature	of	democracy	
beyond	Tan’s	own	charismatic	or	personal	rule.	In	the	aftermath	of	Zhang	Jingyao’s	brutal	reign,	
Tan’s	third	term	as	governor	gained	enthusiastic	accolades,	as	he	promised	to	transform	the	
province	from	a	site	of	wartime	atrocities	to	a	model	for	local	governance.	
However,	military	conflicts	just	outside	Hunan’s	borders	created	great	tensions	within.	
As	noted	in	the	first	chapter	of	this	dissertation,	the	province’s	physical	location	along	the	
primary	north-south	routes	of	commercial	travel	meant	that	Hunan	was	militarily	important	as	
a	stepping-stone	for	the	rival	governments	in	Guangzhou	and	Beijing.	Moreover,	each	of	those	
northern	and	southern	states	were	themselves	riven	with	factionalism.	Sun	Yatsen	was	in	exile	
in	Shanghai,	having	been	recently	been	removed	from	his	position	as	head	of	the	southern	
Guangzhou	state,	and	was	seeking	allies	to	help	him	return	to	power.	In	the	north,	Wu	Peifu	
had	led	a	coalition	of	forces	to	victory	in	the	week-long	Zhili-Anhui	war,	and	Duan	Qirui	had	
fallen	from	power.	The	typically	fluid	nature	of	Chinese	politics	had	become	even	more	so,	as	
various	military	generals	vied	for	power	and	supremacy.			
Moreover,	the	surface	appearance	of	peace	and	prosperity	in	Hunan	after	Zhang	Jingyao	
masked	the	same	tensions	among	ostensible	allies	that	characterized	the	previous	eras	of	rule.	
Tan’s	actual	authority	over	the	province	as	a	whole	was	limited,	and	he	was	forced	to	send	his	
more	trusted	military	units	to	distant	counties	in	order	to	maintain	his	power	and	quell	possible	
challenges	to	his	rule.	On	November,	while	one	of	these	units	was	in	remote	West	Hunan,	
another	mutiny	broke	out	in	Pingjiang,	where	one	of	his	more	trusted	subordinates	was	killed	in	
the	fighting.	The	march	of	mutinous	troops	on	Changsha	forced	Tan,	who	had	little	military	
support	that	could	be	mobilized	to	his	immediate	aid,	to	resign	in	favor	of	his	military	ally	Zhao	
Hengti	and	to	flee	the	province	for	a	third	and	final	time.		
	
The	Betrayal	of	Zhao	Hengti	
	 Conventional	histories	attack	Tan’s	replacement	Zhao	Hengti	for	backstabbing	his	
erstwhile	ally	and	superior,	as	exemplified	by	the	description	of	events	given	by	Hunan’s	most	
famous	political	figure,	Mao	Zedong.	During	the	1918-1920	reign	of	Zhang	Jingyao	as	governor	
of	Hunan,	Mao	was	an	educator,	activist,	and	firsthand	witness	in	Changsha	to	the	tumult	of	
                                                
3	For	more	on	Russell’s	experience,	see	Bertrand	Russell,	The	Autobiography	of	Bertrand	Russell	(London:	
Routledge,	[1967-9],	1998),	174-5.	
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local	politics.	Though	he	was	a	relatively	young	man	in	1920,	and	not	a	key	player	in	the	drama	
that	would	follow,	his	prominence	over	China	in	the	years	to	come,	and	the	consequent	
influence	over	how	history	is	interpreted,	cannot	be	overstated.	Thus,	it	should	come	as	no	
surprise	that	his	perspective	on	this	transition	from	Tan	to	Zhao	has	set	the	tone	for	how	it	is	
remembered.	In	1936,	as	the	guerilla	leader	of	the	CCP	hiding	in	Yanan	from	the	KMT,	Mao	
gave	a	series	of	interviews	to	the	American	journalist	Edgar	Snow	in	which	he	described	the	
politics	of	his	home	province.	According	to	Mao,		
T’an	 Yen-kai	 [Tan	 Yankai]	 was	 driven	 out	 of	 Hunan	 by	 a	militarist	 called	 Chao	
Heng-t’i	[Zhao	Hengti],	who	utilized	the	‘Hunan	independence’	movement	for	his	
own	 ends.	 He	 pretended	 to	 support	 it,	 advocating	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 United	
Autonomous	 States	 of	 China,	 but	 as	 soon	 as	 he	 got	 power	 he	 suppressed	 the	
democratic	movement	with	great	energy…	when	Chao	Heng-t’i	seized	control	he	
betrayed	all	the	ideas	he	had	supported,	and	especially	he	violently	suppressed	
all	demands	for	democracy.4		
	
For	Mao,	the	mutiny	was	not	the	key	reason	behind	Tan’s	departure.	Instead,	Zhao	seized	
power	in	a	betrayal	of	not	only	his	one-time	superior,	but	also	the	ideals	of	democracy	and	
provincial	autonomy	that	he	had	supposedly	supported.	In	this,	Mao	builds	upon	the	overall	
portrayal	of	the	warlord	period	as	constructed	by	Tao	in	that	he	emphasizes	the	betrayal	of	a	
wen-oriented	bureaucrat	by	a	wu-oriented	militarist,	the	ease	with	which	ideals	are	cast	aside	
by	the	power-hungry,	and	the	bankruptcy	of	ostensibly	reformist	non-revolutionaries.	By	
implication,	a	true	revolution	that	is	led	by	an	organization	fulfilling	both	wen	and	wu	ideals	is	
necessary	to	save	Hunan	and	China	more	broadly.	It	is	not	a	coincidence	that	Mao	framed	his	
CCP	as	precisely	that	organization.	
	 A	few	other	aspects	about	Mao’s	relationship	with	Zhao	are	worth	noting.	First,	Zhao	
was	the	governor	in	charge	of	Hunan	from	1920-1926,	and	in	this	role	Zhao	suppressed	
communist	activity.	Famously,	it	was	at	his	order	that	the	anarchist	labor	organizers	Huang	Ai	
(1897-1922)	and	Pang	Renquan	(1897-1922)	were	executed	for	leading	a	strike	of	mill	workers.	
Because	Zhao	represented	the	state	against	which	Mao	and	the	communists	were	organizing	
for	much	of	the	1920s,	it	should	be	no	surprise	that	there	was	great	enmity	between	the	two	
that	surely	informed	Mao’s	perspective	on	the	1920	transition	of	power.5		
During	his	lifetime	and	after,	Mao’s	interpretation	of	modern	Chinese	history	dominated	
the	framework	within	which	events	like	those	of	November	1920	were	chronicled,	and	the	oral	
histories	that	were	recorded,	collected,	and	published	during	this	period	of	time	reflect	Mao’s	
power	and	authority.	The	memories	of	Yao	Daci	(1888-?),	a	disciple	of	Sun	Yatsen,	are	but	one	
example	of	this:	while	Tao	Juyin	claims	that	Zhao	failing	to	support	Tan	against	the	mutiny	
resulted	in	the	latter’s	departure,	Yao	contends	that	Zhao	was	actually	part	of	the	conspiracy	
that	instigated	the	mutiny.6	In	his	luridly	titled	memoir	of	the	event,	“Zhao	Hengti’s	Bloody-
handed	Plot	to	Rise	to	the	Top,”	Yao	alleges	that	Sun	Yatsen	and	other	conspirators	outside	
                                                
4	Edgar	Snow,	Red	Star	Over	China	(New	York:	Grove	Press,	1968),	138.	
5	Lynda	Shaffer,	Mao	and	the	Workers:	The	Hunan	Labor	Movement,	1920-1923,	(Armonk,	NY.:	M.E.	Sharpe,	1982)	
45-49.	
6	Biographical	information	on	Yao	is	sparse;	one	of	the	only	references	available	can	be	found	online:	
https://baike.baidu.com/item/姚大慈	
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Hunan	all	plotted	with	Zhao	to	remove	Tan	Yankai	in	order	to	lay	the	foundations	for	the	future	
Northern	Expedition.	Though	the	overall	argument	is	made	clear	from	the	title	of	Yao’s	history,	
it	is	worth	highlighting	the	logic	of	the	article,	as	suggested	by	its	first	paragraph:	
In	 the	 fall	 of	 1920,	 Sun	 Yatsen’s	 plan	 to	 expel	 the	 Guangxi	 clique	 from	
Guangdong	was	quickly	coming	to	fruition.	He	wanted	to	obtain	Hunan,	so	as	to	
make	troop	movements	in	future	Northern	Expedition	more	convenient.	At	that	
time,	Hunan	was	under	the	control	of	Tan	Yankai,	an	appointee	of	Lu	Rongting’s	
faction.	Cheng	Songyun	[another	name	for	Cheng	Qian]	was	in	Shanghai,	so	Sun	
Yatsen	 decided	 to	 scheme	 about	 Hunanese	 affairs	 with	 Cheng	 Songlao	 [yet	
another	 name	 for	 Cheng	Qian].	 Songlao	 knew	 that	 the	 situation	 in	Hunan	had	
changed	much,	and	he	was	unsure	about	what	conditions	there	were	like,	so	he	
ordered	my	older	brother	Dayuan	to	return	to	Hunan	to	investigate.	He	said,	“if	
Zhao	Hengti	can	cooperate	with	us	to	overthrow	Tan	Yankai,	afterwards	Hunan	
will	 obey	 the	 orders	 of	 Sun	 Yatsen	 and	 participate	 in	 a	 Northern	 Expedition.”	
(After	the	Guangdong	revolution	and	establishment	of	a	government	there,	Sun	
Yatsen	appointed	Zhao	Hengti	military	and	civil	governor	of	Hunan.)	7	
	
In	Yao’s	narrative,	Sun	and	the	Cheng	brothers	schemed	in	Shanghai	to	depose	Tan	for	their	
national	ambitions,	and	rewarded	Zhao	by	formally	confirming	his	positions	later.	Zhao’s	
culpability	is	implicit,	but	still	apparent.	As	with	Tao,	competition	between	factions	and	among	
individuals	is	the	primary	driver	of	events,	with	what	had	been	described	as	a	local	conflict	(in	
Tao’s	rendition)	now	more	explicitly	connected	to	the	larger	national	context	through	personal	
networks.	Sun	Yatsen’s	manipulation	of	local	politics	to	further	his	own	power	echoes	the	1913	
machinations	of	Yuan	Shikai	to	work	through	middlemen	in	the	assassination	of	Song	Jiaoren.	
The	name	of	Cheng	Qian,	the	former	army	commander	who	retained	some	followers	in	Hunan,	
is	also	mentioned	here,	and	it	becomes	clear	that	a	large	number	of	Tan’s	opponents	were	
conspiring	to	oust	him	from	Hunan.	What	binds	them	together	seems	to	be	shared	goals	and	
personal	connections,	rather	than	similar	ideologies	or	revolutionary	sentiments.	Thus,	both	
Tao	and	Yao	seemingly	point	to	a	lack	of	coherent	political	ideology	as	somehow	synonymous	
with	the	absence	of	moral	integrity.	
The	oral	history	of	Huang	Yi’ou	(黄一欧,	1892-1981)	echoes	many	of	the	same	points.	
Huang,	the	son	of	the	revolutionary	martyr	Huang	Xing,	states	that	he	was	closely	connected	
with	many	of	the	figures	involved	in	the	removal	of	Tan,	and	claims	some	of	the	credit	for	Tan’s	
departure	for	himself.	His	version	of	events,	“Recollections	of	Tan	Yankai’s	Fall	and	the	Deaths	
of	Li	Zhonglin	and	Others,”	goes	into	more	detail	about	the	mutiny	that	provoked	Tan’s	
departure.	In	this	text,	Huang	begins	by	recalling	being	sent	by	Sun	Yatsen	to	Changsha	in	order	
                                                
7	Yao	Daci 姚大慈,	“赵恒惕上台的阴谋和血手	[Zhao	Hengti’s	Bloody-handed	Plot	to	Rise	to	the	Top],”	in	湖南文
史资料选辑.	Vol	30.	(Beijing:	Zhongguo	Wenshi	Chubanshe,	1981)	129-139,	40:	Original:	1920 年秋，孙中山先生
在上海策划驱遂广东的桂系已相当成熟，并欲取得湖南，以为将来出师北伐的便利。是时湖南局面为陆荣
廷委派之督军兼省长谭延闓所统治。值程颂云先生亦在上海，中山先生乃以图取湖南事属之程颂老。颂老
以湖南迭经变化，情况不够明了，乃命先兄大愿回湘察看；语之曰：“若赵恒惕能与我合作倒谭，事成之
后，湖南须听中山先生之命参加北伐。（后来广东革命政府成立，中山先生尝令派赵恒惕为湖南督军兼省
长，赵恒惕没有接受。）	
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to	better	assess	the	situation	and	persuade	Tan	Yankai	to	more	unwaveringly	join	the	KMT.	As	
before,	it	seems	as	though	Tan’s	commitment	to	the	revolution	was	suspect,	as	with	many	
former	reformers.	According	to	Huang,	Sun	gave	him	the	following	command:	“if	Tan	Yankai	is	
unwilling	to	become	a	revolutionary,	then	remove	him	from	office;	whoever	does	so	I	will	make	
Hunan	provincial	military	governor.”	8	Hearing	this,	Huang	responded,	“He	is	used	to	seeing	
which	way	the	wind	blows,	and	speaking	to	the	revolutionary	party	yet	never	revealing	his	true	
thoughts,	so	it	will	be	hard	to	persuade	him	to	join	our	cause.”9	Huang’s	narrative	thus	reifies	a	
distinction	between	reformer	and	revolutionary	and	condemns	Tan	for	failing	to	properly	align	
himself	with	the	revolutionary	ideology	of	the	KMT.		
In	this	exchange,	several	themes	emerge	that	resonate	with	the	arguments	presented	in	
the	other	histories.	Tan	seems	to	have	a	propensity	to	reveal	little	about	his	own	intentions,	
waiting	until	the	majority	have	decided	upon	a	path	before	selecting	the	option	that	has	the	
least	amount	of	risk	for	himself,	which	shares	some	aspects	of	depiction	given	by	Tao	Juyin.	Sun	
Yatsen’s	desire	to	bring	Hunan	to	the	revolutionary	flag	also	echoes	the	claims	of	Tao	and	Yao	
concerning	extra-provincial	pressure	on	Hunan’s	internal	politics.	Finally,	the	realpolitik	of	the	
situation,	wherein	all	concerned—Sun,	Huang,	and	Tan	alike—are	merely	trying	to	determine	
how	best	to	preserve	their	own	interests,	also	supports	Tao’s	portrayal	of	the	period	as	a	time	
of	deep	factionalism	and	competition.	
On	November	13th,	the	mutiny	in	Pingjiang	county	broke	out	which	would	eventually	
cause	Tan’s	resignation.	According	to	Huang,	though	this	action	was	supposedly	concerning	
provisions	and	salary,	it	was	actually	based	on	loyalty	felt	by	the	mutineers	to	their	old	
commander,	Cheng	Qian,	and	their	resentment	towards	Tan	for	Cheng’s	departure.	Their	new	
commander,	Xiao	Changchi	(1879-1920),	was	a	trusted	subordinate	of	Tan’s	who	had	been	
stationed	in	Pingjiang	to	suppress	those	ill-feelings,	but	his	efforts	had	failed	and	he	had	died	
because	of	his	connection	to	Tan.	The	leader	of	the	mutineers	was	Yu	Yingxiang	(?-?),	who	had	
the	support	of	his	fellow	Cheng	Qian	clique	member	Li	Zhonglin	(1886-1920),	the	commander	in	
nearby	Liling	county.	On	the	18th,	Tan	held	a	meeting	to	abolish	the	position	of	military	
governor,	and	expressed	his	willingness	to	yield	the	post	of	Army	commander	to	Zhao.	This	
attempt	to	ensure	Zhao’s	loyalty	failed.	As	a	result,	according	to	Huang:	
Tan	Yankai	felt	utterly	isolated,	and	his	situation	was	becoming	more	and	more	
critical.	On	the	23rd	he	convened	another	emergency	meeting	of	the	military	and	
civilian	 authorities	 and	 their	 representatives	 and	 announced	 the	 immediate	
dissolution	 of	 the	military	 and	 civil	 governor	 positions.	 He	 also	 strongly	 urged	
Zhao	 Hengti	 to	 take	 the	 post	 of	 Hunan	 Army	 commander-in-chief,	 with	 the	
provincial	assembly	selecting	a	 temporary	civil	governor.	 In	 that	meeting,	Zhao	
affected	 an	 air	 of	 apathy,	 and	 announced	 only	 that	 he	 would	 not	 become	
                                                
8	Huang	Yi’ou 黄一欧,	“谭延闿被迫下台和李仲麟等被杀的回忆	[Memories	of	Tan	Yankai	Being	Ousted	and	the	
Death	of	Li	Zhonglin	and	others],”	in	湖南文史資料選輯	[Selections	from	the	Historical	and	Cultural	Materials	of	
Hunan],	Vol.	4.	(Changsha:	Hunan	Renmin	Chuban	She,	1981),	1-16,	4.	Original:	如果谭延闿不愿意革命，就把他
拿下来；谁把谭延闿拿下来，我就让他做湖南督军。	
9	Ibid.,	Original:	他惯于‘见风使舵’，对于革命党说话时，从不露一句真实话，所以很难望他同我们走一条
路。	
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commander-in-chief,	and	was	willing	to	only	use	the	title	of	division	commander	
to	maintain	peace	in	the	province.10	
	
Presumably,	this	November	23	meeting	was	the	same	as	that	identified	by	Tao	Juyin	as	the	
crucial	moment	when	Tan	realized	his	fate	and	wept.	In	contrast	Tan’s	previous	proposal,	this	
second	meeting	was	public,	making	Zhao’s	refusal	a	rebuke	of	Tan’s	authority.	Thus,	Zhao’s	
inaction	in	front	of	the	Hunan	political	elite	seems	to	be	what	pushes	Tan	out,	as	Tan	could	not	
maintain	power	after	such	a	humiliating	loss	of	face.		
On	this	last	point,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Zhao	made	no	overt	action	of	betrayal,	
demonstrating	how	the	appearance	of	loyalty	and	proper	behavior	retains	significance.	Even	if	
we	are	to	take	the	anecdotes	described	by	Tao	and	these	oral	histories	at	face	value,	Zhao	was	
still	unable	to	openly	defy	Tan	or	question	his	rule.	Instead,	it	is	his	inaction,	rather	than	any	
explicit	act,	that	causes	Tan	to	leave.	Huang	later	goes	into	detail	regarding	Zhao’s	execution	of	
Li	Zhonglin	and	the	other	mutineers,	so	it	is	unlikely	he	neglects	to	mention	any	obvious	enmity	
out	of	sympathy	for	the	individuals	involved.	Indeed,	hidden	antagonism	is	a	theme	that	Huang	
weaves	throughout	the	story,	describing	the	Tan-Zhao	relationship	as	“seemingly	united	but	
actually	estranged,	ostensible	partners	with	different	agendas.”11	In	other	words,	though	they	
both	pretended	to	be	allies,	in	reality	they	were	rivals.	This	reading	of	their	interactions	is	
important	to	remember	as	we	begin	to	consider	possible	alternatives	to	this	conventional	
interpretation	of	this	incident:	the	professed	friendship	between	Zhao	and	Tan	that	will	be	
described	in	the	next	chapter	could	merely	be	an	extension	of	these	deceptive	practices.	
In	the	aftermath	of	this	meeting,	Zhao	accepts	the	position	of	commander-in-chief	the	
next	day,	while	Tan	boards	a	boat	to	Shanghai	three	days	later.	Huang	laments	the	fact	that	Tan	
was	unable	to	stay	in	Changsha	the	one	day	more	necessary	to	receive	the	body	of	his	recently	
deceased	wife,	which	had	been	travelling	upstream	for	burial;	ironically	and	tragically,	their	
ships	pass	each	other	in	Yueyang,	but	neither	is	able	to	stop.	Afterwards,	according	to	Huang,	
Tan	found	100,000	silver	dollars	waiting	for	him	in	Shanghai,	and	would	receive	another	20,000	
yuan	as	a	gift	from	Zhao	every	year	thereafter.	In	spite	of	this	apologetic	bribe,	enmity	would	
persist	between	Zhao	and	Tan	for	years	afterwards.	Huang	concludes	by	noting	that	it	was	not	
unusual	for	Tan	to	hold	such	a	grudge,	as	he	himself	was	blocked	from	later	positions	in	the	
KMT	government	by	Tan	for	his	role	in	this	matter.	For	his	part,	Zhao	would	order	the	death	of	
Li	Zhonglin	and	other	conspirators	less	than	one	month	later,	in	what	Huang	described	as	
“friends	becoming	enemies	via	the	brazen	reach	of	a	bloody	hand,”12	eliminating	potential	
rivals	for	power	and	cementing	his	own	authority.	
In	Huang’s	account,	Zhao	Hengti	is	a	treacherous	and	power-hungry	militarist	who	
schemes	and	murders	his	way	to	the	highest	political	office	in	Hunan,	nicely	fitting	with	the	
overall	trends	of	the	warlord	era.	Pingjiang	garrison	commander	Xiao	Changchi	as	well	as	the	
conspirator	Li	Zhonglin	are	both	killed	because	of	Zhao’s	ambition,	much	in	the	same	way	Song	
                                                
10	Ibid.,	9.	Original:	谭延闿看到众叛亲离，形势越来越严重，于二十三日再次召集军政负责人和各团体代表举
行紧急会议，宣布即日解除军政职务，坚请赵恒惕继任湘军总司令，并由省议会另选临时省长。赵恒惕在
会上对谭延闿的求去没有挽留的表示，只声明不就总司令，愿以师长名义维持省会治安。		
11	Ibid.,	4.	Original:	貌合神离，同床异梦。	
12	Ibid.	Original:	刚刚上台一个月，就认友为敌，悍然伸出了血手。	
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Jiaoren	was	killed	in	1913	because	Yuan	Shikai	wanted	to	maintain	the	presidency.	At	the	same	
time,	there	are	certain	elements	of	Huang’s	recollections	that	are	worth	a	second	examination.	
First,	Tan	seems	to	hold	a	grudge	against	Huang	and	Zhao,	but	not	Sun;	he	joined	the	KMT	and	
became	a	close	ally	of	Sun	Yatsen	shortly	after	his	arrival	in	Shanghai.	Given	Sun’s	efforts	to	
depose	him,	what	accounts	for	this	difference	in	reaction?	Second,	the	bribe	that	Tan	received	
from	Zhao	seems	exceptionally	high,	especially	given	the	ease	with	which	he	was	removed	from	
office.	For	context,	the	bribe	to	Wu	Peifu,	who	commanded	a	much	more	dangerous	military	
force,	was	merely	six	times	as	much.	The	two	leaders	would	openly	war	with	each	other	in	1923,	
so	it	is	unclear	how	many	times	Huang’s	reported	figure	of	20,000	yuan	every	year	was	actually	
conveyed	to	Tan.	It	is	unclear	how	wealthy	Tan	was	in	Shanghai,	calling	into	question	whether	
or	not	Huang	is	accurately	describing	these	figures,	or	merely	repeating	rumors.	Another	
account	of	his	finances,	this	time	by	his	grandson	nearly	a	century	later,	notes	that	Tan	raised	
50,000	silver	dollars	to	support	Sun	and	the	KMT	by	selling	his	house	in	Shanghai	and	asking	for	
money	from	contacts	in	Changsha.13	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	grandson’s	figures	are	more	true,	
but	rather	to	say	that	Huang’s	numbers,	like	many	tales	from	the	warlord	era,	are	probably	
more	exaggerations	than	reality.	
	
Subsequent	Histories	of	the	Mutiny		
When	we	look	the	historiography	from	fifty	years	later,	it	is	clear	that	these	
exaggerations	and	embellishments	about	the	mutiny	and	the	warlord	era	have	been	uncritically	
incorporated	into	mainstream	historiography.	One	example	of	this	can	be	seen	by	in	the	text	
concerning	these	events	found	in	The	History	of	the	Republic	of	China,	Volume	4	[中华民国史，
第四卷	(1920-1924)]	by	Wang	Chaoguang,	a	member	of	the	Institute	of	Modern	History	at	the	
Chinese	Academy	of	Social	Sciences	in	Beijing.	Wang’s	text,	one	of	a	12-volume	series	published	
on	the	centenary	of	the	1911	revolution,	was	part	of	a	larger	“Republican	Fever”	trend	in	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China	that	aimed	at	reclaiming	the	era	as	a	part	of	the	CCP’s	own	history.14	
His	interpretation	of	events	largely	follows	the	narrative	outlined	by	Tao	and	Mao:	
The	activities	of	the	Cheng	faction	caused	Zhao	Hengti,	member	of	the	strength	
party	in	the	Hunan	military,	to	secretly	plot.	Because	of	pressure	from	the	Zhao	
and	 Cheng	 factions,	 Tan	 was	 forced	 to	 resign,	 and	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	
announce	the	continuation	of	government	by	the	people	and	the	abolition	of	the	
position	of	military	governor.	He	also	was	forced	to	recommend	Zhao	Hengti	for	
the	position	of	Hunan	military	Commander	in	Chief.	Tan	had	wanted	to	continue	
on	as	provincial	governor,	but	was	unable	to	secure	the	support	of	the	Zhao	and	
Cheng	factions,	and	so	could	only	leave	Hunan	for	Shanghai	in	secret.	Later,	Zhao	
used	strength	to	control	the	Cheng	faction,	and	controlled	the	political	situation	
to	become	ruler	of	Hunan.15	
                                                
13	Chen	Lu’an,	“Forward.”	
14	Zhang	Qiang	and	Robert	Weatherley,	“The	Rise	of	“Republican	Fever”	in	the	PRC	and	the	Implications	for	CCP	
Legitimacy,”	China	Information,	27,	no.	3	(2013),	3-26.	
15	Wang	Chaoguang	汪朝光,	中华民国史，第四卷	(1920-1924)	(Beijing:	Zhonghua	Shuju,	2011),	200-201.	Original:		
“程派的举动，得到湖南军人中的另一实力派赵恒惕的暗中纵容。谭延闿在程、赵两派的逼迫下，不得不宣
布	‘还政于民，’	废除督军，推赵恒惕担任湘军总司令。谭延闿本来还想由自己担任省长，但得不到程、赵
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Here,	Zhao	is	described	as	actively	plotting	his	rise	to	power,	and,	along	with	Cheng	Qian,	his	
efforts	are	given	the	majority	of	the	credit	for	why	Tan	leaves.	In	this,	Tan’s	culpability	is	
reduced	significantly,	as	no	mention	is	made	of	any	mistakes	or	errors	on	his	part;	rather,	he	is	
“forced”	[逼迫]	into	all	of	his	actions.		
What	explains	this	reduction	in	blame	of	Tan?	Wang’s	text	might	represent	an	effort	by	
an	official	history	to	rehabilitate	his	reputation	in	order	to	appeal	to	the	remnants	and	
descendants	of	the	KMT	on	Taiwan.	In	the	decade	after	the	mutiny,	Tan	would	align	himself	
with	Sun	Yatsen	and	rise	high	in	the	party	bureaucracy	as	a	relatively	apolitical	administrator	
before	dying	in	1930.	This	early	death	prevented	him	from	being	entangled	in	the	factional	
disagreements	between	the	left-	and	right-wings	of	the	KMT	and	associated	with	the	prominent	
corruption	of	the	Nanjing	decade.	Regarding	Hunan,	the	fact	that	he	was	apparently	deposed	
by	Zhao	Hengti,	who	was	an	enemy	of	the	young	Mao,	also	makes	him	a	figure	who	might	be	
worthy	of	historical	redemption.	From	this,	it	would	seem	as	though	Wang’s	text,	like	that	of	
Tao’s,	is	mean	to	serve	contemporary	political	ends	rather	than	academic	ones.	
The	role	of	Cheng	Qian,	leader	of	a	third	faction	of	important	military	figures	in	1920	
Hunan,	is	minimized	in	this	version	of	the	narrative,	perhaps	because	he	was	relatively	removed	
from	the	action,	or	possibly	because	of	his	later	celebrity	immediately	after	1949	as	one	of	
Hunan’s	most	prominent	political	leaders.	Cheng	was	not	physically	in	Hunan	in	1920:	He	had	
been	forced	to	leave	in	disgrace	after	being	exposed	as	negotiating	with	the	hated	Duan	Qirui	
administration	in	Beijing.	His	loss	of	prestige	for	doing	so	is	ironic,	given	the	relationships	
between	Beiyang	militarist	Wu	Peifu	with	both	Tan	and	Zhao	that	seemed	to	have	no	effect	on	
their	status.	Yet	there	are	no	indications	that	he	was	actively	directing	his	former	subordinates	
in	their	opposition	to	both	Tan	and	Zhao	in	1920	and	after,	so	his	role	in	the	mutiny	warrants	
minimization.	Another	reason	why	he	is	given	little	blame	for	Tan’s	removal	is	because	of	his	
reputation	with	both	the	KMT	and	CCP:	he	was	first	a	key	general	in	the	KMT	military	in	the	
fight	against	the	Japanese	was	promoted	to	Hunan	provincial	governor	as	a	result.	With	the	
victory	of	the	CCP	imminent,	he	defecting	to	their	side	and	gaining	even	more	influence	and	
power	as	a	result.16	
	 While	one	might	expect	a	lack	of	objectivity	and	critical	reflection	from	historians	in	the	
more	politically-minded	PRC,	the	same	unfortunate	tendencies	can	be	seen	in	English-language	
histories	as	well.	Angus	W.	McDonald	Jr.’s	1978	study,	The	Urban	Origins	of	Rural	Revolution:	
Elites	and	the	Masses	in	Hunan	Province,	China,	1911-1927,	examines	the	roots	of	Chinese	
Communism’s	first	failings	there,	as	initiated	by	Mao	Zedong.	The	book’s	overall	argument	
focuses	more	on	the	communist	shift	in	strategic	focus	from	urban	to	rural	areas,	and	
McDonald	builds	upon	Tao’s	interpretation	of	November	1920	to	fit	those	events	into	his	
narrative.	In	this	interpretation,	Tan	is	not	only	a	civilian,	but	also	a	member	of	the	old	
conservative	elite	who	are	unable	to	understand	the	new	methods	of	power	in	the	post-1911	
                                                                                                                                                       
两派的支持，只能于 11 月 27 日黯然离湘赴沪。随后，赵恒惕以实力抑制程派，控制了局势，成为湖南的
统治者。”	
16	For	more	on	Cheng	Qian	in	English,	see	his	entry	in	Boorman,	Biographical	Dictionary	of	Republican	China.	In	
Chinese,	see	Chen	Xianchu,	Cheng	Qian	yu	Jindai	Zhongguo	程潜与近代中国	(Changsha:	Hunan	University	Press,	
2004)	
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era.	As	a	result,	he	was	unable	to	lead	the	soldiers	who	are	ostensibly	loyal	to	him,	which	
results	in	the	following	chain	of	events:	
In	early	November	a	rebellion	broke	out	in	western	Hunan	under	the	leadership	
of	the	son	of	a	former	garrison	commander	determined	to	revenge	his	father’s	
dismissal.	As	Tan’s	most	trusted	troops	were	engaged	in	putting	out	that	distant	
fire,	 another	 broke	 out	 next	 door,	 in	 Pingjiang	 and	 Liling	 xians.	 Belatedly,	 Tan	
tried	 to	 secure	 again	 the	 support	 of	 Zhao	 Heng-ti,	 agreeing	 to	 turn	 over	 the	
military	governorship	while	retaining	the	civilian	post.	But	Zhao	would	have	none	
of	 it.	 Tan	 Yan-kai	 slyly	 shipped	 400,000	 strings	 of	 copper	 cash	 to	 Shanghai	 to	
cushion	 his	 coming	 retirement.	 On	November	 23,	 as	 fighting	 broke	 out	 in	 the	
streets	of	Changsha,	he	fled	aboard	a	river	steamer.	So	hot	was	the	breath	of	his	
enemies	 that,	 although	his	 boat	 passed	 the	 funeral	 barge	of	 his	wife	who	had	
recently	died	in	Shanghai,	he	could	not	pause	long	enough	to	attend	her	funeral	
in	the	hills	above	Changsha.17	
	
In	essence,	McDonald	is	here	agreeing	with	the	narrative	of	military	conspiracy.	There	is	also	a	
particular	urgency	to	the	story:	Tan	is	not	only	chased	out	of	Hunan,	but	must	leave	with	such	
haste	that	he	was	unable	to	receive	the	body	of	his	wife.		
Edward	A.	McCord’s	1995	examination	of	politics	in	Hunan	and	Hubei	builds	upon	the	
Tao	narrative	even	further,	arguing	that	the	replacement	of	the	scholar	Tan	with	the	soldier	
Zhao	was	merely	one	example	of	a	phenomenon	that	was	happening	all	over	China	at	this	time.	
In	this	interpretation,	civilian	leaders	like	Tan	routinely	assumed	that	they	could	control	military	
men	like	Zhao,	but	were	consistently	betrayed	and	ended	up	either	dying	or	fleeing.	This	
pattern	epitomized	the	longer-term	militarization	of	Chinese	politics.	Regarding	Tan	and	Zhao	
specifically,	McCord	writes:	
Ultimately,	 Tan’s	 ability	 to	 maintain	 his	 position	 at	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Hunan	
government	 and	 carry	 out	 his	 political	 goals	 depended	 upon	 Zhao’s	 continued	
support,	and	Tan	soon	 found	that	Zhao’s	 loyalty	had	 limits…	Tan	had	originally	
led	Zhao	to	believe	that	he	would	yield	the	military	governorship	to	him	in	return	
for	 his	 military	 support.	 Tan	 reneged	 on	 this	 understanding	 by	 retaining	 the	
military	 governorship	 and	 by	 announcing	 his	 plans	 to	 eliminate	 this	 office	
altogether.	 Although	 Tan	 awarded	 Zhao	 the	 vaguely	 defined	 title	 of	 ‘general	
commander’	(zongzhihui),	this	was	hardly	adequate	compensation…	Because	of	
the	 treatment	 Tan	 had	 shown	 him	 in	 the	 past,	 Zhao	 was	 indeed	 reluctant	 to	
come	 out	 in	 open	 opposition	 against	 Tan.	 There	 were	 other	 officers,	 though,	
who	lacked	this	inhibition.	In	November	1920,	a	group	of	commanders	formerly	
associated	with	Cheng	Qian	denounced	Tan	and	began	 to	march	on	Changsha.	
This	gave	Zhao	a	chance	to	reveal	his	own	dissatisfaction	without	taking	action	
against	Tan	himself.	 Instead	of	moving	to	block	this	military	threat,	Zhao	stood	
aside.	 Without	 Zhao’s	 support,	 Tan	 could	 not	 maintain	 his	 position.	 On	
November	23,	1920,	therefore,	just	six	months	after	his	return	to	Changsha,	Tan	
yielded	control	of	Hunan’s	government	to	Zhao	and	left	the	province.	Only	then	
                                                
17	McDonald,	Urban	Origins,	47.	
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did	 Zhao	move	 to	 suppress	 the	military	 revolt,	 in	 the	 process	 establishing	 his	
own	authority.18		
	
McCord	uses	this	example	to	make	an	argument	that	political	legitimacy	during	this	
period	served	merely	as	a	function	of	military	power.	In	this	interpretation,	loyalty	came	second	
to	self-interest,	with	treachery	practically	expected	by	all.	There	may	be	positions	like	governor	
and	commander,	but	real	authority	was	rooted	in	might;	Zhao	does	not	seem	to	be	placated	by	
titles.	According	to	these	narratives,	the	political	fragmentation	of	China	during	this	period	was	
thus	a	direct	result	of	these	amoral	behaviors	and	the	overarching	supremacy	of	wu	over	wen.	
	 McCord’s	framing	of	these	events	leaves	some	limited	space	for	those	networks	and	
ideals	that	this	chapter	contends	also	played	a	role	in	the	political	culture	of	China’s	early	
republic.	Since	Tan	was	at	least	somewhat	to	blame	for	Zhao’s	disloyalty	by	reneging	on	a	
promise	to	share	the	position	of	military	governor,	it	could	be	argued	that	titles	were	also	
somehow	or	somewhat	important	to	Zhao.	Zhao	was	also	unable	to	express	“open	opposition,”	
instead	letting	others	take	the	lead	in	calling	for	Tan’s	removal	from	office.	If	military	power	
were	the	sole	criteria	for	the	exercise	of	power,	then	Zhao	would	presumably	have	no	such	
compunctions,	indicating	a	performative	aspect	to	authority.	It	would	seem	important	that	
Zhao	at	least	appear	to	act	in	an	acceptable	way:	he	could	be	more	easily	criticized	for	acting	in	
clear	defiance	of	Tan,	rather	than	neglecting	to	act	in	Tan’s	defense.	
	 Yet,	when	reduced	to	its	simplest	form,	McCord’s	position	privileges	a	framework	of	
military	power	and	treachery	over	one	of	performed	ideals,	and	fits	within	a	larger	
historiography	that	does	the	same.	This	narrative	of	traitors	is	taken	to	its	extreme	by	Stephen	
Platt,	who	frames	the	whole	affair	as	a	seizure	of	power.	Platt	contends	that	Zhao	actively	
forced	Tan	out:	“on	November	24…	Zhao	Hengti	seized	control	of	the	Hunanese	military	in	a	
coup	d’état	and	drove	Tan	from	the	province	for	a	third	and	final	time.”19	Platt’s	book	is	more	
focused	in	intellectual	continuities	in	Hunan	from	the	sixteenth	to	the	twentieth	centuries,	and	
less	concerned	with	various	relationships	between	specific	elites,	so	Platt’s	distillation	of	a	
complex	chain	of	events	into	one	sentence	can	be	forgiven	for	being	over-simplified.	What	is	
more	significant	about	this	excerpt	is	that	the	idea	that	Zhao	ousted	Tan	through	military	might	
seems	cemented	into	Hunan’s	history;	an	idea	that,	as	the	next	chapter	will	suggest,	radically	
oversimplifies	an	otherwise	complex	history.	
	
The	Culpability	of	Tan	Yankai	in	his	own	Downfall	
Conventional	and	revisionist	histories	alike	agree	that	the	Pingjiang	mutiny	prompted	
Tan’s	resignation,	jeopardizing	his	elite	liberal	regime	and	Hunan’s	prospects	for	constitutional	
autonomy,	and	threatening	its	replacement	with	a	more	conservative	militarist	administration.	
However,	the	underlying	causes	of	the	mutiny	are	a	matter	of	fierce	debate.	Conventional	
interpretations	generally	attribute	Tan’s	fall	to	his	poor	leadership	of	the	province.	Tao	Juyin	is	
one	of	these;	he	argues	that	Tan’s	fall	was	due	to	the	following	interrelated	factors:	he	was	a	
weak	leader	who	did	not	enjoy	the	respect	of	the	soldiers	he	supposedly	commanded;	he	badly	
managed	the	province’s	internal	rivalries,	and	his	insincerity	in	relationships	led	to	an	
                                                
18	McCord,	Power	of	the	Gun,	301-2.	
19	Platt,	Provincial	Patriots,	206-7.	
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atmosphere	of	suspicion	that	left	him	bereft	of	necessary	alliances.	Each	of	these	factors	is	
worth	examining	separately.	
Tan	Yankai	was	supposedly	not	well	respected	by	the	soldiers	under	his	command.	He	
was	nicknamed	“Granny	Tan”	(譚婆婆)	for	his	gentle	demeanor:	not	a	moniker	that	any	military	
leader	would	want.	Not	only	was	he	indecisive,	he	also	lacked	moral	courage,	being	easily	
intimidated	by	the	threats	of	others.	The	point	is	further	illustrated	by	depiction	of	a	July	17,	
1920	meeting	for	the	province’s	leaders	that	was	held	immediately	after	Zhang	Jingyao’s	
departure	and	Tan	assuming	power.	Tao	describes	attending	this	event	in	his	capacity	as	the	
Changsha	special	correspondent	for	Xinwen	Bao	(新聞報),	and	the	details	he	recounts	in	his	
memoirs	of	his	early	years	as	a	journalist	are	worth	repeating	here.		
Tao	drew	a	stark	contrast	in	the	behavior	and	words	expressed	by	Tan	and	Zhao	upon	
assuming	power.	Tan	spoke	with	tears	running	down	his	face,	lamenting	the	fact	that	he	had	
been	unable	to	return	sooner	and	save	the	province	from	Zhang.	He	“admitted	his	errors,	asked	
for	the	brothers	and	sisters	of	Hunan	to	appropriately	punish	him,	and	credited	the	hard	work	
of	the	Hunan	Army	for	Zhang’s	expulsion.”20	In	other	words,	Tan	assumed	the	role	of	supplicant	
in	relation	to	the	soldiers	and	provincial	leaders	in	the	audience,	in	much	the	same	way	that	
emperors	under	the	dynastic	system	would	assume	responsibility	for	major	disasters	under	
their	leadership.	In	response,	Zhao,	who	is	sitting	by	his	side,	remarked,	“This	work	was	done	
through	the	leadership	of	I,	Director	General	Zhao	Hengti,	as	well	as	my	officers	and	soldiers.	
What	did	[Tan]	Yankai	do?”21	At	this	weak	apology	and	strong	response,	Tao	and	audience	
glanced	at	each	other	in	tacit	understanding,	secretly	admiring	Zhao’s	wit,	eloquence,	and	
modesty.22		
This	exchange	vividly	captures	the	tensions	between	Tan	and	Zhao,	and	foreshadows	
the	replacement	of	the	former	by	the	latter.	Moreover,	there	is	within	the	text	a	resonance	
with	both	the	traditional	tropes	of	traditional	wen	scholar-bureaucrats	in	opposition	to	wu-
oriented	soldiers	as	well	as	the	contemporary	ambitions	of	warlords	to	supplant	and	replace	
their	supposed	civilian	superiors.	On	the	other	hand,	Zhao	is	clearly	an	educated	and	
sophisticated	individual	who	is	worthy	of	admiration,	and	might	be	worth	considering	as	the	
successor	to	the	feeble	Tan,	who	seemed	out	of	his	depth.	Indeed,	the	degree	to	which	Tan	
begs	for	the	public’s	forgiveness	comes	off	as	simultaneously	insincere	and	overly	concerned	
about	the	opinions	of	others.	Tao’s	favor	is	clearly	with	Zhao	over	Tan.	
That	being	said,	the	performative	aspects	of	this	encounter	are	worthy	of	scrutiny.	
Norms	of	behavior	were	rapidly	changing	over	this	time	period,	and	the	apparent	conflict	
between	Tan	and	Zhao	noticed	by	Tao	here	might	have	been	less	about	personal	differences	
and	more	about	differing	ways	that	the	two	leaders	were	trying	to	exercise	their	authority.	Tan	
was	clearly	evoking	past	tropes	of	leaders	expressing	empathy	with	the	plight	of	their	people,	in	
the	traditional	wen-style	of	the	past.	Zhao’s	seemingly	callous	remarks,	on	the	other	hand,	
might	have	been	his	way	of	trying	to	position	himself	as	a	soldier	above	all	else,	decisive	and	
                                                
20	Tao	Juyin,	Memoirs,	38.	Original:	延闓應向三湘父老兄弟諸姑姊妹請罪。诸公认为驱张战事，湘军劳苦功
高。	
21	Ibid.	Original:	那是趙恆惕總指揮指揮若定之功，諸將士奮勇殺敵之功，延闓何功之有。	
22	Ibid.,	39.	Original:	我們同行不禁互遞了一個眼色，暗佩此公口才敏捷，態度也夠謙虛。	
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direct.	In	this	he	might	have	been	signaling	his	identity	as	a	new-style	militarist,	free	from	the	
trappings	of	the	old	ways,	and	able	to	lead	the	province	forward.		
Performance	aside,	the	dramatic	and	theatrical	nature	of	this	exchange	presented	by	
Tao	comes	off	as	exaggerated	and	false.	It	is	hard	to	imagine	Tan,	who	is	described	elsewhere	
as	socially	gifted,	as	being	unable	to	understand	Zhao’s	only	slightly	veiled	insults.	For	his	part,	
it	is	also	hard	to	imagine	Zhao	making	such	a	clear,	if	passive,	challenge	to	Tan’s	authority	in	
such	a	public	setting,	especially	given	how	closely	the	two	would	work	together	for	another	five	
months.	Finally,	the	idea	that	Tao	and	the	others	attending	the	meeting	are	surprised	by	the	
two	leaders	also	strains	credulity,	as	they	had	held	authority	for	many	months	in	the	past,	thus	
creating	opportunities	for	an	impression	about	to	be	formed	well	prior	to	this	point.	In	sum,	
while	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	Tao	is	giving	a	false	report	about	this	meeting,	it	is	
still	difficult	to	think	of	this	exchange	transpiring	exactly	as	he	says	it	did,	if	only	because	such	a	
frayed	relationship	would	not	have	been	able	to	last	another	five	months.	
A	similar	skepticism	should	also	be	applied	to	Tao’s	characterization	of	Tan’s	
appreciation	for	local	conditions.	A	balance	of	power	had	existed	in	late	Qing	and	early	
Republican	Hunan	that	divided	Hunan	and	the	Hunanese	into	three	regions:	west,	central,	and	
south.	Correspondingly,	the	three	key	figures	in	the	alliance	against	Zhang	Jingyao	had	been	
Tan,	who	was	of	the	central	region,	Zhao	Hengti,	from	Hengyang	in	the	south,	and	Lin	Zhiyu	
(1877-1930)	from	the	west.	Despite	this	careful	balancing	of	power,	the	second	charge	against	
Tan	is	often	his	mismanagement	of	Hunan’s	internal	rivalries;	as	the	first	chapter	of	this	
dissertation	showed,	Hunan	is	an	extremely	diverse	place	in	terms	of	ethnicity	and	language,	
and	so	it	could	be	difficult	to	coordinate	a	province-wide	bureaucracy	with	multiple	languages	
and	potentially	competing	interests.	Tao	suggests	that	Tan	tried	to	promote	too	many	of	his	
fellow	central-region	natives	to	senior	posts,	arousing	the	ire	of	those	from	the	south	and	west	
regions,	and	prompting	his	own	political	downfall.23		
As	with	the	previous	example,	Tao’s	characterization	of	Tan’s	does	not	fit	with	other	
descriptions	of	Tan	as	clever	politician	and	manager	of	people.	McCord,	for	example,	notes	that	
Tan	was	praised	for	his	ability	to	balance	allies	and	subordinates	against	each	other.	He	writes:	
One	quality	 frequently	attributed	to	Tan	was	bamian	 linglong,	 the	ability	 to	be	
pleasing	 to	 all	 parties…	 Tan’s	 detractors	 saw	 this	 quality	 as	 simple	 political	
opportunism,	 and	 charged	 him	 with	 the	 manipulation	 of	 factions	 for	 his	 own	
ends.	 Irrespective	 of	 whether	 his	 sincerity	was	 feigned,	 Tan	 used	 his	 personal	
skills	to	build	and	maintain	a	political	consensus	in	support	of	his	rule.	In	the	end,	
one	 of	 Tan’s	 main	 strengths	 as	 military	 governor	 was	 this	 ability	 to	 act	 as	 a	
political	mediator	among	Hunan’s	various	political	forces.24		
	
In	other	words,	Tan	knew	how	to	work	with	others	and	engender	affection.	While	the	situation	
described	by	Tao	might	merely	be	a	case	of	those	factions	realizing	the	depths	of	his	insincerity,	
it	still	seems	strange	that	such	an	experienced	administrator	would	make	so	basic	an	error	as	
                                                
23	Ibid.,	44.	Chinese:	譚為一省軍民兩政之長，用人權最大，所用中路人也最多，因此引起西南兩路人士的嚴
重不滿。	
24	McCord,	The	Power	of	the	Gun,	97-8.	
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not	distributing	power	equally.	Moreover,	as	a	native	of	the	province,	would	Tan	truly	have	
been	so	blind	to	the	traditional	division	of	power	between	the	three	regions?	
For	Tao,	even	Tan’s	effort	to	implement	the	popular	election	for	Provincial	Governor	is	
little	more	than	a	transparent	attempt	to	preserve	his	own	power	and	keep	Zhao	and	Lin	in	
subordinate	roles.	When	Zhang	Jingyao	left	in	July	1920,	political	and	military	power	in	Hunan	
were	concentrated	in	three	titles:	Military	Governor	(督軍),	Provincial	Governor	(省長)	and	
Army	Commander-in-Chief	(總司令).	Tan	succeeded	Zhao	in	all	three	positions,	but	promised	to	
eventually	yield	the	title	of	Army	Commander-in-Chief	to	Zhao	Hengti,	who	was	Army	Director-
General	(總指揮).	As	the	months	went	by,	his	procrastination	in	following	through	on	their	
agreement	strained	his	relationship	with	Zhao,	contributing	to	suspicions,	along	with	his	
favoritism	from	those	of	Hunan’s	central	region,	that	he	aspired	to	monopolize	power.	While	
factors	like	the	prestige	of	his	family	background,	educational	success	under	the	Qing,	previous	
tenure	as	governor,	and	connections	to	the	local	elite	in	Changsha	empowered	his	authority,	by	
1920	military	strength	had	become	more	important	for	securing	political	power.	Since	the	
majority	of	the	senior	officers	in	his	army	anticipated	Zhao’s	eventual	accession	to	the	
Commander-in-Chief	title,	and	their	own	promotions	to	follow	after	that,	Tan’s	broken	promise	
thus	induced	the	general	resentment	that	led	to	his	departure.25	
According	to	Tao,	these	forces	came	to	a	head	during	a	key	meeting	between	
governmental,	military,	and	civic	leaders	on	November	23	in	which	Tan	was	forced	to	finally	
offer	the	Army	Commander-in-Chief	position	to	Zhao.	News	of	the	Pingjiang	mutiny	made	Tan’s	
position	untenable,	and	he	pled	for	Zhao’s	support	and	guarantee	of	protection.	However,	Tan	
was	met	only	by	silence.	Tan	broke	down	in	tears	just	as	he	had	in	July,	perhaps	performing	
once	again	the	traditional	role	of	the	leader	taking	responsibility	and	empathizing	with	his	
people.	Tao	describes	this	act	as	epitomizing	the	trope	of	the	overwhelmed	bureaucrat	who	is	
insufficiently	strong	to	cope	with	his	circumstances.26	In	other	words,	in	Tao’s	narrative,	tears	
symbolize	wen-oriented	weakness.	
Tao’s	interpretation	of	Tan’s	behavior	is	that	he	refused	to	share	power	with	others	
because	of	his	own	ambition,	and	realized	all	too	late	the	fragility	of	his	support.	Because	he	
had	little	to	no	military	background,	Tan	could	not	expect	to	hold	positions	like	Military	
Governor	or	Commander-in-Chief	on	a	long-term	basis.	Therefore,	he	attempted	to	abolish	
these	positions	altogether	through	establishing	popular	elections.	Though	he	used	the	excuse	
that	civilian	and	wen-oriented	rule	was	needed	to	preserve	the	peace,	this	was	merely	a	
transparent	attempt	to	retain	all	power	for	himself.	Similarly,	Tao	criticizes	all	of	Tan’s	efforts	to	
push	for	a	provincial	constitution	and	a	federalist	system	of	central-local	relations	again	were	
motivated	by	his	own	personal	ambition	at	its	core.	Not	only	was	Tan	trying	to	preserve	his	own	
authority,	he	was	willing	to	split	apart	China	to	do	so,	very	much	like	other	separatist	warlords	
who	populate	Tao’s	Anecdotes.27	
                                                
25	Tao	Juyin,	Anecdotes,	Vol.	2,	520-1.	
26	Ibid.,	527.	Chinese:	他就情不自禁地哭起来。赵表示不就总司令，愿以师长名义维持省城秩序，但并不挽
留谭。他谈到于应祥以部下而杀害长官，如果我们不能加以制裁，也应当自杀，说着，他也哭出声来。	
27	Ibid.,	522.	Chinese:	这在表面上像是最彻底的一种“废督论”，但是，如果进一步加以观察，就不难看出这是
谭延闿耍的一套手法，因为他自己是一个文人，当督军常被别人指责，如果实现这种主张，他在当选省长
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Tao’s	negative	assessment	culminates	in	a	critique	of	Tan	as	not	only	weak	but	also	little	
more	than	an	unintelligent	puppet	for	others.	As	military	and	civil	governor	of	Hunan,	Tan	is	
usually	given	credit	for	formulating	and	advocating	for	both	federalism	and	the	Hunan	
provincial	constitution.	However,	Tao	alleged	that	Tan	did	so	only	because	the	idea	was	
suggested	to	him	by	Xiong	Xiling	and	Liang	Qichao,	based	on	the	close	relationship	the	three	of	
them	shared	as	former	members	of	the	Reform	Party	during	the	last	years	of	the	Qing	dynasty.	
Again,	it	is	unclear	where	Tao	drew	this	information;	he	makes	a	reference	to	a	secret	exchange	
of	telegrams	sent	by	Tan	in	Changsha	to	Xiong	in	Beijing,	but	he	does	not	reveal	how	he	learned	
of	this	communication.	This	stage	of	Tan’s	career	is	thus	transformed	from	an	episode	that	
potentially	demonstrates	his	progressive	and	original	thinking	to	an	example	of	his	willingness	
to	vacuously	parrot	others’	ideas	as	if	they	were	his	own.	
Tao	is	particularly	scathing	as	he	contrasted	the	support	of	Tan,	Xiong,	and	Liang	during	
this	point	in	time	to	their	erratic	support	for	the	same	effort	in	the	years	prior.	In	line	with	the	
critiques	made	by	Li	Jiannong	in	Political	History,	the	Reform	Party	to	which	these	three	
belonged	had	firmly	supported	of	Yuan	Shikai	during	his	brief	tenure	as	president,	signaling	an	
acceptance	of	centralized	rule	which	cannot	be	easily	reconciled	with	any	later	support	for	
provincial	constitutions	and	the	decentralized	national	authority	inherent	in	federalism	
immediately	after	Yuan’s	death.	They	changed	position	once	more	when	key	members	from	
their	circle	were	a	part	of	Duan	Qirui’s	cabinet,	and	shifted	yet	again	after	Duan’s	downfall.	
These	dramatic	shifts	in	loyalty,	in	Tao’s	analysis,	were	not	due	to	true	changes	of	opinion	on	
these	matters;	rather,	the	three	were	shamelessly	following	whatever	political	trends	seemed	
most	beneficial	to	their	own	personal	interests.	This	suggests,	according	to	Tao,	that	they	were	
solely	concerned	with	worshipping	power,	and	lacked	a	fixed	political	ideology.28	
For	Tao,	Tan’s	reluctance	to	support	the	beleaguered	KMT	in	1920	epitomizes	his	
propensity	to	employ	popular	rhetoric	to	disguise	his	own	quest	for	power.	During	his	short	
third	tenure	at	the	apex	of	the	Hunanese	political	and	military	systems,	Sun	Yat-sen	and	the	
KMT	in	Guangzhou	were	threatened	by	militarists	from	Guangxi.	Even	though	he	was	ostensibly	
a	loyal	member	of	the	party,	Tan	refused	(according	to	Tao)	to	accept	numerous	requests	from	
Sun	and	other	KMT	members	to	pledge	Hunan’s	support	for	their	cause.	Many	Hunanese	KMT	
members	came	to	Changsha	from	Shanghai	to	ask	for	Tan’s	support	but	he	assumed	the	
attitude	of	“respectfully	keeping	them	at	a	distance.”29	Though	his	Hunan	army	could	have	
easily	launched	a	surprise	attack	on	the	Guangxi	armies	that	were	threatening	Sun	and	the	KMT	
in	Guangdong,	Tan	remained	neutral,	instead	attempting	to	initiate	peace	talks	between	the	
two	sides	under	the	auspices	of	provincial	autonomy.	Tao’s	characterization	of	Tan’s	motives	is	
worth	repeating	in	detail:	he	claims	that	in	the	various	telegrams	exchanged	between	Tan	and	
the	two	sides	in	conflict	discussing	peace,	Tan	was	still	“peddling	the	political	‘false	goods’	of	
provincial	autonomy,”30	implying	that	he	was	taking	advantage	of	every	opportunity	possible	to	
                                                                                                                                                       
以后，就可以在实质上做到省长兼督军，避免另有一个掌握军权的人和他分庭抗礼，更便于借口地方分
权，维持他的地方割据。	
28	Tao,	Memoirs,	39.	Original:	他們一貫崇拜實力，在政治上毫無定見。	
29	Tao,	Anecdotes,	Vol.	2,	523.	Original:	因此，属于国民党的湘籍旧国会议员李执中、周震麟、李汉丞、陈嘉
祐等，均由上海回到湖南活动，但是谭延闿对他们采取了“敬而远之”的态度。	
30	Ibid.,	Original:	从这个电报看得出，他在调解粤桂战争中，还在贩卖联省自治这个政治	“私货”		
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push	forward	his	separatist	agenda.	More	interestingly,	Tao	notes	that	though	Tan	did	issue	
numerous	telegrams	and	circular	telegrams	for	public	consumption,	there	was	at	least	one	
instance	where	an	overeager	KMT	member	drafted	one	on	his	behalf,	without	his	permission,	
which	then	sparked	a	public	exchange	of	declarations	for	and	against	the	cause	of	provincial	
autonomy.31	In	other	words,	his	advocacy	for	ideals	like	these	was	merely	to	disguise	his	own	
secret	thirst	for	power.	
These	are	unfair	attacks	that	deserve	reconsideration.	The	overwhelming	negativity	that	
Tao	uses	to	characterize	Tan	is	without	nuance,	and	it	strains	credulity	to	think	that	such	an	
ineffective	and	feeble	bookworm	might	be	able	to	attain	high	office	in	his	home	province	once,	
let	alone	three	times.	Moreover,	his	doing	so	during	a	time	of	political	turmoil	also	strongly	
indicates	his	ability	to	win	the	respect	of	his	peers	and	deserve	the	obedience,	however	partial,	
of	his	subordinates.	By	explaining	his	eventual	failures	with	such	extreme	rhetoric,	Tao	makes	it	
impossible	to	understand	his	initial	successes.	This	not	to	say	that	Tao’s	interpretation	is	
without	value,	but	rather	that	his	portrayal	of	events	is	so	skewed	that	it	cannot	possibly	be	an	
accurate	representation	of	the	full	story,	and	needs	to	be	understood	as	such.	
This	leads	to	the	question	of	how	Tao	has	access	to	information	about	Tan’s	motives,	
especially	given	the	public	availability	of	editorials,	circular	telegrams,	and	other	documents	
that	purport	to	represent	Tan’s	true	position	these	matters.	As	before,	sources	for	his	
information	about	Tan’s	motives	are	not	given,	intimating	that	his	personal	experience	in	
Hunan	and	meetings	with	key	figures	during	this	time	offers	him	a	firsthand	look	that	supports	
his	argument.	Yet	it	is	somewhat	hard	to	believe	that	Tao	and	Tan	had	the	sort	of	close	
relationship	that	would	enable	the	former	to	have	significant	insight	into	the	personal	character	
of	the	latter.	Indeed,	while	there	is	no	evidence	that	can	challenge	Tao’s	characterization	of	Tan	
and	his	motives,	critical	reflection	on	these	episodes	shows	that	there	is	little	to	support	Tao’s	
assertions.	How	would	a	22-year	old	reporter	be	able	to	arrive	at	such	a	penetrating	diagnosis	
of	the	forty-year	old	politician	whom	he	did	not	know	personally?	Were	there	conversations	
between	the	two	wherein	Tan’s	true	ambitions	were	revealed?	Did	he	interview	Tan,	or	
perhaps	even	his	subordinates	for	insight?	In	the	absence	of	any	supporting	evidence,	one	must	
surmise	that	Tao	reduced	Tan	to	a	cartoonish	stereotype	and	had	attributed	Tan’s	intentions	
after	the	fact,	in	fulfillment	of	the	overall	argument	he	makes	in	Anecdotes.	The	cultural	and	
generational	gap	between	Tao	and	Tan	was	unable	to	be	bridged.	
	
Tan	Yankai’s	Life	in	Exile	
To	a	certain	degree,	Tao’s	criticism	is	understandable:	Tan’s	unpublished	English	lesson	
books,	recording	his	year	immediately	prior	to	the	1920	mutiny,	seems	to	support	the	image	of	
a	frivolous	and	hedonistic	elite.32	These	texts	constitute	a	chronicle	of	his	daily	activities	from	
March	10,	1918,	until	May	31	of	the	following	year,	along	with	a	record	of	his	interactions	and	
correspondence	with	others.	Aside	from	his	English	instructor,	who	made	corrections	to	Tan’s	
spelling	and	grammar,	there	are	no	indications	that	others	have	read	its	contents,	or	that	Tan	
himself	intended	for	others	to	view	these	thoughts.	In	other	words,	these	texts	offer	historians	
                                                
31	Ibid.,	524-5	
32	Tan	Yankai	譚延闓，譚府存練習本	[Tan	Yankai	Exercise	Books]	in	File	“甲	726-29,”	Library	of	the	Institute	of	
Modern	History,	Chinese	Academy	of	Social	Sciences,	Beijing,	People’s	Republic	of	China.	
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insight	into	a	Tan	Yankai	that	is	neither	filtered	through	the	recollections	of	others,	nor	
performed	for	the	public	in	the	same	way	his	essays	or	circular	telegrams	might	have	been.	
At	first	glance,	the	content	of	these	exercise	books	might	seem	mundane.	During	this	
period	of	time,	Tan	traveled	throughout	South	Hunan,	waiting	for	the	reign	of	Zhang	Jingyao	to	
end.	While	there,	he	began	to	study	English;	as	a	part	of	his	lessons,	he	practiced	writing	by	
recording	his	daily	activities	and	thoughts	in	a	lesson	book.	Perhaps	because	his	vocabulary	was	
limited,	the	content	within	is	repetitive	and	mundane.	For	example,	his	entry	for	March	13,	
1919	mentions	the	following:	“We	arrived	at	the	field,	our	horses	run	as	fast	as	their	legs	could	
carry	them	about	the	field,	which	is	about	three	hundred	meters	round	and	our	horses	could	
run	once	in	about	one	minute.	When	we	returned	and	took	baths,	how	delightful	we	felt.”33	
Here,	he	faithfully	describes	his	habit	of	riding	and	bathing	not	just	because	this	is	a	record	of	
his	activities,	but	also	because	these	are	relatively	simple	words	and	sentences	to	write,	
befitting	a	student	who	is	just	beginning	to	learn	the	language.	He	might	have	easily	engaged	in	
more	“serious”	political	activities	like	meeting	with	allies	or	gauging	popular	support	for	his	
administration,	but	such	behaviors	might	not	have	been	easily	describable	for	a	beginner	in	the	
language,	and	were	therefore	not	recorded.	In	short,	while	it	might	be	easy	to	think	that	Tan	
was	interested	in	little	else	besides	trivial	matters	like	horses	and	bathing,	this	was	not	
necessarily	the	case.		
At	the	same	time,	the	daily	activities	Tan	describes	in	these	materials	also	suggests	how	
he	might	have	been	performing	for	his	peers	in	a	way	that	historians	like	Tao	Juyin	have	
overlooked.	For	example,	even	if	the	plethora	of	references	to	horses	in	these	exercise	books	
accurately	reflected	his	daily	schedule,	and	Tan	devoted	a	high	proportion	of	his	time	to	riding	
and	observing	horses,	this	is	better	understood	as	an	attempt	to	display	his	martial	valor	and	
capabilities	on	the	part	of	Tan	rather	than	the	habits	of	an	affluent	man	of	leisure.	The	skill	of	
using	a	horse	in	battle	was	a	staple	of	nomad	tribes	from	the	steppe	like	the	Manchu,	it	would	
have	behooved	Tan,	who	was	struggling	to	attract	and	retain	the	loyalty	of	his	soldiers,	to	
appear	to	be	an	expert	in	this	area.	As	described	by	Mark	Elliot,	riding	was	one	of	the	key	
elements	of	the	“Manchu	Way”	that	was	heavily	promoted	by	the	Qing	imperial	court	for	its	
bannermen,	and,	as	such,	surely	retained	a	strong	association	with	wu	martial	culture	during	
the	Warlord	Period.34	This	is	a	point	emphasized	by	Schillinger,	who	notes	that	“[h]orsemanship	
was	viewed	as	one	of	the	most	sophisticated	martial	skill	during	the	Qing	and	earlier	dynasties,	
and	horses	often	symbolized	the	military,	wu	masculinity,	and	imperial	authority.35	Tan	was	also	
probably	very	aware	of	Zeng	Guofan’s	deficiencies	in	this	area;	he	is	described	by	Platt	as	being	
“physically	inept	and	could	barely	ride	a	horse.”36	Tan,	being	a	classically	trained	scholar	from	
Hunan	who	was	attempting	to	transition	into	military	leadership,	was	clearly	attempting	to	
imitate	Zeng’s	path	to	power,	and	so	may	have	been	attempting	to	supplement	a	shortcoming	
in	his	predecessor’s	skillset.	
An	appreciation	for	horses	might	have	also	stemmed	from	his	exposure	to	Western	
culture	in	Shanghai.	Ning	Jennifer	Chang	persuasively	argues	that	the	sport	of	horse	racing	was	
                                                
33	Ibid.,	March	13,	1919	entry.	
34	Eliot,	The	Manchu	Way	8.	
35	Schillinger,	The	Body	and	Military	Masculinity,	148	
36	Platt,	Autumn	in	the	Heavenly	Kingdom,	127	
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a	“driving	force	behind	the	transformation	of	urban	culture”37	in	treaty	port	metropolises	like	
Shanghai,	where	Tan	had	spent	some	time	after	the	failure	of	his	first	administration	and	1913	
arrest	by	the	Beiyang	central	government.	Tan’s	affection	for	horses	might	thus	have	been	a	
conscious	performance	to	enhance	his	reputation	as	a	cosmopolitan	and	sophisticated	elite,	
well-versed	in	culture	beyond	Hunan	and	China.	This	interpretation	parallels	his	new	English	
lessons	as	well.	
Banquets	and	feasting	constituted	another	regular	activity	that	Tan	often	recorded	in	his	
lesson	book,	contributing	to	his	stereotyped	portrayal	as	nothing	more	than	a	dilettante	
gourmand.	His	entry	for	April	30,	1919	is	but	one	example	of	this:	“In	the	evening,	we	made	a	
great	supper;	this	was	to	welcome	Mr.	Wang,	who	came	from	Changsha;	the	feast	lasted	till	
nine	o’clock,	because	we	conversated	[sic]	in	pleasure,	we	almost	forget	the	time.”38	Yet	while	
one	interpretation	of	meals	like	these	might	see	them	as	extravagant	or	wasteful,	another	layer	
worth	noting	is	their	utility	as	arenas	for	networking.	Tan	may	have	indulged	in	these	feasts	in	
order	to	maximize	the	time	he	could	spend	with	his	allies	and	would-be	allies,	thus	maintaining	
and	forming	relationships.39	The	same	might	be	said	for	Tan’s	other	activities	with	horses	and	
bathing,	which	were	also	often	communal	and	collective	in	practice.	
A	third	item	from	his	English-language	exercise	books	also	suggests	how	Tan	was	highly	
aware	of	broader	political	developments,	defying	the	image	of	a	disconnected	and	gentle	
intellectual.	On	December	31st,	1919,	Tan	describes	talking	with	a	friend	who	heard	about	
turmoil	within	the	Beiyang	regime,	and	the	death	of	a	former	leader.	To	this,	he	adds	the	
following:	“I	wish	that	Tuen	Che	Hiu	will	follow	to	die.”	40	This	Tuen	is	presumably	Duan	Qirui,	
whose	domination	of	the	national	government	was	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	The	
vitriol	for	Duan	challenges	previous	portrayals	of	Tan	as	soft,	gentle,	and	inoffensive.	Whereas	
Tao	and	McCord	had	characterized	him	as	a	people-pleaser,	this	expression	of	hatred	suggests	
surprising	depths	that	are	not	affected	or	faked.	Moreover,	Tan’s	familiarity	with	political	
developments	in	Beijing	signals	his	preparedness	to	retake	Hunan	from	the	Duan-led	Beiyang	
regime,	showing	that	he	has	been	patiently	waiting	for	the	appropriate	moment	to	make	his	
move,	rather	than	merely	puttering	about	with	trivial	affairs.	
Thus,	while	these	books	might	support	the	popular	image	of	Tan	as	an	indulgent	elite,	
unconcerned	with	political	realities,	a	closer	examination	suggests	otherwise.	He	was	clearly	
aware	of	the	larger	political	landscape.	He	may	have	engaged	in	luxurious	elite	behaviors	like	
horse	racing	and	banqueting,	but	these	also	seem	as	though	they	were	opportunities	to	extend	
his	political	influence	via	networks.	The	extravagant	nature	of	these	habits,	however,	also	
presage	the	gap	between	elites	and	masses	that	would	eventually	lead	to	his	resignation.	
	
	
                                                
37	Ning	Jennifer	Chang,	“To	See	and	Be	Seen:	Horse	Racing	in	Shanghai,	1848-1949,”	in	Toby	Lincoln	and	Xu	Tao,	
eds.	The	Habitable	City	in	China:	Urban	History	in	the	Twentieth	Century	(Palgrave	Macmillan,	2017),	91-112,	93.	
38	Tan	Yankai,	Tan	Yankai	Exercise	Books.,	April	30,	1919	entry.		
39	Mayfair	Yang’s	discussions	of	the	value	of	banquets	in	contemporary	China	can	easily	be	applied	to	the	same	
communal	and	ritual	consumption	of	food	practiced	by	Tan.	See	Mayfair	Mei-hui	Yang,	Gifts,	Favors,	and	
Banquets:	The	Art	of	Social	Relationships	in	China	(Cornell,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	1994),	137-9	
40	Tan	Yankai,	Tan	Yankai	Exercise	Books,	December	31st,	1919	Entry.	
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Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	outlined	the	conventional	narration	of	the	1920	mutiny	and	its	role	in	
prompting	the	resignation	of	Tan	Yankai,	arguing	this	interpretation	of	these	events	has	been	
emphasized,	embellished,	and	exaggerated	to	serve	the	tropes	that	undergird	the	dominant	
narrative	of	the	“warlord	era.”	Tan	is	depicted	as	an	indecisive	scholar-bureaucrat,	prone	to	
tears	during	periods	of	stress,	and	unable	to	cope	with	the	political	turmoil	around	him:	in	short,	
exemplifying	many	of	the	negative	stereotypes	of	his	wen-style	civilian	predecessors.	His	chief	
military	ally	Zhao	Hengti	is	the	opposite:	a	wu-style	soldier	who	betrayed	his	former	superior	in	
much	the	same	way	as	Yuan	Shikai	betrayed	the	revolution.		
The	division	between	revolution	and	reform	also	plays	a	role	in	this	drama,	with	the	key	
players,	whose	elite	backgrounds	make	them	the	targets	of	any	revolution,	implicitly	scorned	
for	the	lack	of	revolutionary	virtue	and	selflessness.	The	unified	party-states	of	the	KMT-led	
post-1927	Nanjing	regime	as	well	as	the	CCP-led	post-1949	PRC	regime	both	emphasize	
ideological	rigor	and	altruistic	behavior	as	defining	features	in	their	administrations;	the	
infighting	between	Tan	and	Zhao	serves	to	highlight	the	nadir	of	modern	Chinese	history	from	
which	the	nation	was	saved.	
The	sources	upon	which	this	narrative	has	been	constructed	all	have	political	motives	in	
mind:	using	this	historical	example	to	comment	on	their	contemporary	moment.	Should	it	be	a	
surprise	that	a	defector	from	the	KMT	to	the	CCP	like	Huang	Yi’ou	might	critique	Zhao,	who	had	
fled	with	Chiang	Kaishek	to	Taiwan	in	1949,	with	such	venom?	Or	that	Tao	Juyin’s	narrative,	
published	in	1956,	would	resonate	so	closely	with	the	ideological	tenor	of	its	time?	The	skewed	
history	of	the	1920	mutiny	produced	by	these	motives	has	continued	to	appear	in	recently	
published	academic	works	in	both	Chinese	and	English,	suggesting	how	the	necessary	critical	
perspective	on	this	historiography	has	yet	to	be	achieved.	
Yet	when	a	critical	perspective	is	used	to	evaluate	this	mutiny,	an	alternative	history	
emerges	that	is	far	more	complicated	and	nuanced	than	the	conventional	narratives	might	
otherwise	claim.	This	history	entails	the	persistence	and	continuation	of	traditional	values	and	
networks,	even	after	years	of	political	and	military	conflict,	subverting	depictions	of	the	
“warlord	period”	as	wholly	anarchical	and	amoral.	Moreover,	the	unpublished	exercise	books	
offer	up	a	different	image	of	Tan	that	challenges	conventional	narratives:	rather	than	seeing	his	
daily	activities	as	those	of	a	dilettante,	it	is	better	to	interpret	this	behavior	as	attempts	to	
create	an	image	of	a	vigorous	and	energetic	leader.	That	being	said,	these	were	all	elite	habits	
that	would	prove	to	be	poorly	matched	to	the	emerging	mass	politics	of	the	era,	foreshadowing	
the	coming	mutiny	of	common	soldiers	that	would	prompt	his	resignation	in	November	1920.	
While	this	chapter	has	focused	mainly	on	reproducing	and	deconstructing	the	conventional	of	
the	mutiny	and	Tan’s	resignation,	the	next	chapter	outlines	an	alternative	interpretation	that	
uses	more	unpublished	materials	like	Tan’s	diary	and	letters	sent	by	Zhao	immediately	after	
1920	to	argue	that	this	transition	of	power	was	less	caused	by	rivalries	among	elites	and	more	a	
product	of	contingent	circumstances.	
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Chapter	Five:	Culture,	Loyalty,	and	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny	
	
Introduction	
The	revisionist	perspective	on	the	Pingjiang	Mutiny	presented	in	this	chapter	aims	to	
challenge	the	mainstream	narrative	of	not	only	this	event,	but	also,	by	extension,	the	larger	
‘Warlord	Era’	period	that	it	supposedly	exemplifies.	The	previous	chapter	demonstrated	how	
political	motives	oversimplified	how	this	event	is	remembered	and	depicted,	emphasizing	the	
chaotic	and	anarchical	tenor	of	the	period	in	contrast	with	the	idealized	stability	of	a	centralized	
and	ideological	state.	This	chapter	will	juxtapose	that	narrative	of	the	mutiny	with	an	
alternative	interpretation	arguing	that	elite	factionalism	had	far	less	to	do	with	this	transition	of	
power	than	a	schism	between	leaders	and	disgruntled	common	soldiers.	While	internal	strife	
did	create	the	conditions	that	led	to	the	mutiny,	this	was	because	of	dissatisfaction	among	
those	who	had	served	under	Cheng	Qian.	The	machinations	of	KMT	emissaries	from	Guangzhou	
also	seem	to	have	played	a	role	in	fomenting	the	bad	feelings.	However,	Zhao’s	culpability	does	
not	seem	to	be	a	cause:	though	he	has	been	accused	of	conspiring	against	Tan	to	supplant	him,	
this	chapter	demonstrates	that	this	was	not	the	case,	in	contrast	to	the	conventional	
historiography.	As	with	previous	chapters,	the	arguments	here	are	largely	based	on	previously	
unused	materials,	like	the	diary	of	Tan	Yankai	and	letters	sent	by	Zhao	Hengti,	which	have	only	
recently	become	available.	In	making	these	specific	claims	concerning	the	Pingjiang	mutiny,	this	
chapter	and	dissertation	show	how	motive	and	intent	have	been	retroactively	attributed	to	not	
only	the	major	figures	in	local	Hunanese	politics,	but	also	the	broader	sweep	of	modern	Chinese	
history.	
The	chapter	begins	by	examining	the	explanations	for	the	mutiny	presented	by	Li	
Jiannong	in	Political	History,	as	well	as	those	produced	by	contemporaneous	texts	like	the	
major	Changsha	daily	Dagongbao	and	the	Tan	Yankai	diary.	These	latter	materials	demonstrate	
that,	contrary	to	the	portrayal	given	in	Anecdotes	and	elsewhere,	there	was	no	open	
antagonism	between	the	Zhao	and	Tan	factions.	The	memories	of	observers	like	Zhong	Boyi,	
Zhou	Zhenlin,	and	Zhao	Hengti	himself	also	support	a	different	narrative	of	the	mutiny:	instead	
of	a	wu-like	general	replacing	a	wen-like	bureaucrat,	symbolizing	the	decline	of	civilian	rule	and	
the	rise	of	warlordism,	the	two	leaders	seem	much	more	interchangable.	Letters	sent	by	Zhao	
in	the	year	afterwards	to	Tan	also	suggest	how	traditional	mores	and	personal	networks	
continued	to	play	an	important	role	in	politics	in	the	early	Republic.	These	sources	and	
narratives	are	infrequently	referenced	in	the	conventional	history,	perhaps	because	they	add	
unwelcome	complexity	to	an	otherwise	simple	and	elegant	story.	This	is	not	to	uncritically	trust	
these	sources	over	those	discussed	earlier,	since	the	authors	of	these	texts	also	had	their	own	
motives	in	writing	them.	Instead,	this	chapter	highlights	them	as	suggestions	of	a	history	that	
exist	outside	of	the	hegemonic	narrative	that	has	been	imposed	by	both	the	state	and	the	
attendant	culture.	
The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	not	to	completely	overturn	the	conventional	narrative	of	the	
mutiny	or	the	“warlord”	period;	there	are	no	extant	materials	incontrovertibly	proving,	for	
example,	that	Tao	Juyin	was	attempting	to	create	a	negative	perception	of	the	warlord	era	as	a	
broken	and	dysfunctional	time,	or	that	Zhao	Hengti	was	in	his	heart	truly	Tan	Yankai’s	ally.	
Indeed,	there	is	ample	reason	to	think	that	the	factional	politics	of	the	day	positioned	the	two	
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ostensible	allies	against	each	other.	Instead,	challenging	the	dominance	of	the	conventional	
perspective	creates	a	space	for	alternative	visions	of	this	period	that	do	not	easily	fit	within	a	
narrative	of	a	traditional	society	in	need	of	rescue	by	a	revolutionary	political	party.	This	
chapter	thus	suggests	that	Tan	and	Zhao	shared	a	common	culture	of	wen-like	civility	even	after	
Tan’s	removal	from	power,	challenging	narratives	that	use	the	mutiny	to	illustrate	the	
domination	of	wu	over	wen.	Instead,	the	way	that	leaders	responded	to	their	subordinates	and	
performed	in	culturally	appropriate	ways	for	their	peers	was	more	important,	suggesting	that	
wen-values	retained	a	high	degree	of	influence.	Finally,	this	chapter	argues	that	local	political	
turmoil	has	been	exaggerated	in	the	conventional	history,	which	has	stressed	the	disintegration	
of	local	society	as	exemplifying	the	need	for	a	strong	central	state.	Tan	Yankai	may	have	poorly	
managed	the	political	situation,	but	this	does	not	indicate	that	Hunan	was	in	complete	disarray.	
	
Political	History	and	the	1920	Mutiny	
To	begin,	it	is	worth	reconsidering	the	narrative	of	the	event	put	forth	by	Li	Jiannong	in	
Political	History.	As	one	might	expect,	his	summary	of	this	event	is	simple	and	concise,	focusing	
mostly	upon	the	details	surrounding	the	creation	and	promulgation	of	Hunan’s	constitution,	for	
which	he	gives	Tan	and	Zhao	much	credit.	Of	the	transition	from	one	to	the	other,	the	English	
translation	is	as	follows:	“in	November	Tan	was	compelled	by	his	own	subordinates	to	leave	the	
provincial	capital.	Chao	Heng-t’i	[Zhao	Hengti]	succeeded	him	as	commander	in	chief,”1	offering	
no	other	specifics.	Li’s	statement	is	ambiguous:	what	was	the	nature	of	this	compulsion?	Did	
Tan	do	something	to	provoke	this	act?	In	the	original	text,	Li	is	only	slightly	clearer.	He	writes,	
“In	November,	Tan,	due	to	internal	military	morale,	resigned,	and	Zhao	Hengti	became	Hunan	
Army	Commander-in-Chief.”2	While	this	difference	in	tone	might	seem	slight,	rereading	the	text	
in	its	original	language	emphasizes	the	bad	morale	among	soldiers	as	the	key	factor	behind	
Tan’s	departure,	not	some	sort	of	coup	on	the	part	of	Zhao	as	the	English	version	implies.	In	the	
translation,	Tan	was	compelled	to	leave,	but	in	the	original	text,	he	resigns,	though	almost	
certainly	not	entirely	of	his	own	volition.		
While	the	difference	in	meaning	between	the	original	text	and	its	English	translation	are	
relatively	slight,	the	political	orientation	of	the	text’s	two	translators	is	well	worth	considering.	
One	of	these	was	Jeremy	Ingalls	(1911-2000),	whose	academic	production	was	mainly	in	the	
field	of	literature	so	her	motivations	for	framing	Chinese	history	in	any	given	way	are	relatively	
unclear.	Though	she	is	relatively	unknown	in	the	academic	literature	on	modern	Chinese	history,	
the	same	cannot	be	said	of	her	translation	partner	for	Political	History,	Ssu-yu	Teng	[Deng	Siyu]	
(1908-1988).	Teng,	a	native	of	Hunan,	was	connected	to	a	number	of	influential	figures	in	the	
field	of	Western	Sinology,	working	for	Arthur	Hummel	in	the	compilation	of	Eminent	Chinese	of	
the	Qing	Period,	and	editing	China’s	Response	to	the	West:	A	Documentary	Survey	1839-1923	
with	John	Fairbank.	His	impact	on	the	emerging	field	was	large,	making	his	selection	and	
translation	of	Political	History	an	important	one	that	shaped	how	other	scholars	would	
                                                
1	Li,	Political	History,	405.	
2	Li	Jiannong	李劍農,	最近三十年中國政治史	[Thirty	Years	of	Chinese	Political	History],	(Shanghai:	Taipingyang	
Shudian,	1930.)	,	465.	Original:		到十一月譚氏因內部軍心不附去職趙恆惕繼任湘軍總司令。	
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conceptualize	and	teach	the	period.	Moreover,	Teng’s	international	reputation	meant	that	his	
selection	of	this	text	raised	its	profile	and	influence	in	China	as	well.3		
What	was	the	political	orientation	of	Ingalls	and	Teng,	and	did	this	influence	their	
understanding	of	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny?	In	their	introduction	to	Political	History,	they	
write	that	Li’s	views	were	“free	from	both	partisan	propaganda	and	undocumented	
speculation,”4	Given	the	strong	bias	in	the	text	against	reform-oriented	change	and	towards	a	
revolution-centered	view	of	modern	Chinese	history	that	was	previously	discussed	in	chapter	
two,	this	seems	slightly	disingenuous.	Perhaps	their	agreement	with	his	framing	of	these	
concepts	meant	that	they	were	prone	to	understand	his	portrayal	as	objective;	this	would	
suggest	their	favoritism	for	the	KMT,	and	inform	their	choice	to	emphasize	the	general	political	
chaos	in	Hunan	as	causing	the	mutiny,	rather	than	blaming	Tan	Yankai	or	Zhao	Hengti.	
Moreover,	Ingalls,	in	a	posthumous	volume	analyzing	the	poetry	of	Mao	Zedong,	evinces	an	
anti-CCP	sentiment	as	well:	according	to	one	reviewer,	she	attributes	“sinister”	motives	to	his	
writing	to	an	“absurd”	degree,	suggesting	support	for	the	KMT	party-state	to	which	Tan	and	
Zhao	would	later	belong.5	
Li	Jiannong	may	have	shared	this	perspective,	and	his	own	experience	with	the	key	
figures	of	the	mutiny	surely	informed	his	perspectives	on	framing	this	event.	By	November	
1920	he	had	become	a	professor	at	Mingde	University,	in	the	nearby	Wuhan	area,	for	about	a	
year.	While	there	are	no	indications	that	he	could	have	been	physically	present	in	Changsha	
during	this	time,	he	would	temporarily	leave	his	academic	position	to	chair	the	committee	
entrusted	by	Zhao	Hengti	with	the	composition	and	promulgation	of	the	Hunan	Provincial	
Constitution.	This	document	was	something	of	a	mixed	success,	since	its	authority	and	power,	
like	the	national	constitutions	before	it,	did	not	seem	to	cause	any	restraining	effect	on	the	
state.	Nevertheless,	Zhao	went	on	to	offer	Li	the	position	of	provincial	education	bureau	
director.	As	Hunan’s	senior	bureaucrat,	Li	would	also	be	Zhao’s	de	facto	civilian	chief	of	staff,	
responsible	for	the	implementation	of	domestic	non-military	policy.	Li	left	public	life	in	1925	for	
unknown	reasons	and	returned	to	teaching	and	writing	essays.6	On	the	one	hand,	his	
employment	under	Zhao	must	have	affected	his	assessment	of	the	mutiny,	as	he	might	have	
been	unwilling	to	critique	the	governor	with	whom	he	had	been	closely	associated,	perhaps	
making	the	brief	description	of	the	1920	mutiny	notable	for	what	it	does	not	say	and	for	who	it	
does	not	blame.	Conversely,	however,	Li	would	have	surely	known	all	of	the	key	figures	
involved,	thus	adding	weight	to	his	claims	as	a	counterpoint	to	those	more	conspiracy-minded	
narratives	by	authors	like	Tao	Juyin	or	Huang	Yi’ou.	
Beyond	his	personal	connection	to	the	persons	involved,	the	context	in	which	Political	
History	was	published	must	also	have	influenced	his	perspective.	By	1930,	ten	years	after	the	
mutiny,	Sun	Yatsen	had	died	and	Chiang	Kaishek	had	led	the	KMT	to	power	through	the	
Northern	Expedition	that	militarily	unified	much	of	the	nation	behind	his	party-state	rule.	Tan’s	
ties	to	the	KMT,	once	tenuous,	had	become	far	closer,	and	he	had	served	in	high-ranking	
                                                
3	For	more	on	Deng,	see	Chen	Runcheng,	“Deng	Siyu	[Teng	Ssu-yu]	and	the	Development	of	American	Sinology	
After	World	War	II,”	in	Chinese	Studies	in	History,	Vol.	41,	No.	1.	(Fall	2007),	3-40.	
4	Ssu-yu	Teng	and	Jeremy	Ingalls,	“Forward”	in	Li,	Political	History,	v.	
5	Paul	Manfredi,	“Dragon	in	Ambush:	The	Art	of	War	in	the	Poems	of	Mao	Zedong	By	Jeremy	Ingalls,”	MCLC	
Resource	Center	Publication	(October,	2015),	http://u.osu.edu/mclc/book-reviews/manfredi/.	
6	Hua	Chu	“Li	Jiannong,”	61-65.	
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positions	like	Party	Chairman	and	Premier	of	the	Executive	Yuan.	Given	his	position,	as	well	as	
his	apparent	proclivity	for	blocking	the	advance	of	those,	like	Huang	or	Zhao,	who	may	have	
attacked	him	in	the	past,	it	would	be	understandable	for	Li	to	shy	away	from	critical	language	
about	Tan	and	his	embarrassing	exile	from	Hunan.	In	other	words,	just	as	the	political	
circumstances	in	which	he	was	writing	informed	Tao	Juyin’s	Anecdotes,	the	context	within	
which	Political	History	was	written	and	translated	also	needs	to	be	considered.	
	
Local	Newspaper	Reports	
	 Since	retroactive	narratives	of	these	past	events	seem	overly	freighted	with	
contemporary	political	meaning,	consulting	texts	like	newspaper	articles	that	were	written	at	
the	time	of	the	incident	avoids	this	problem;	however,	doing	so	only	reveals	how	little	
journalists	seem	to	know.	Though	it	might	be	expected	that	a	local	newspaper	like	Dagongbao	
(大公報)	would	offer	historians	a	coherent	picture	of	the	chain	of	events	that	led	to	Tan’s	
departure,	this	is	not	the	case.	Founded	in	1915,	Dagongbao	is	one	of	the	only	periodicals	
published	in	Changsha	to	survive	to	the	present	day;	many	of	the	other	dailies	or	weeklies	are	
no	longer	extant.	Also	known	by	the	English	moniker	L’Impartial,	and	not	to	be	confused	with	
an	identically	named	periodical	first	published	in	Tianjin	that	continues	to	this	day	in	Hong	Kong	
under	the	name	Ta	Kung	Pao,	the	tone	of	the	newspaper	was	relatively	objective,	though	
perhaps,	as	noted	by	Edward	McCord,	slightly	in	favor	of	Tan	Yankai.	It	was	the	most	widely	
circulated	local	daily	in	Changsha.7		
The	basic	chronology	of	events	leading	to	Tan’s	removal	as	written	in	Dagongbao	is	
given	in	a	disjointed	and	confusing	way,	suggesting	that	those	responsible	for	producing	these	
articles	are	themselves	unsure	as	to	what	has	happened;	reconstructing	the	events	of	the	
mutiny	using	only	the	newspaper	accounts	would	be	difficult.	In	the	first	mention	of	any	trouble,	
an	article	from	November	17	titled	“Appalling	News	About	an	Unforeseen	Event	in	Pingjiang”	
(平江發生變故之駭聞)	mentions	the	rumor	that	District	12	commander	Xiao	Changchi	had	
experienced	an	unexpected	incident	in	Pingjiang	county	on	the	13th	of	that	same	month.	This	
was	all	according	to	a	letter	received	the	night	before,	and	because	there	was	still	no	telegraph	
line	set	up	between	Changsha	and	Pingjiang,	it	was	difficult	to	confirm	the	accuracy	of	the	
report.	The	article	reproduces	the	content	of	the	letter,	but	prefaces	it	by	saying	by	saying	that	
it	was	“difficult	to	understand”	(似通非通),	expressing	doubt	about	its	veracity.	The	letter	itself	
describes	the	tense	atmosphere	in	Pingjiang,	and	the	rumor	that	Xiao	had	been	captured	by	
soldiers	(被兵士捉了)	who	complained	about	not	being	paid	what	they	deserved.	It	was	clear	
that	something	had	happened,	but	there	was	no	way	of	discerning	truth	from	mere	gossip,	and	
there	was	no	sense	that	this	event	was	in	any	way	linked	to	discontent	with	Tan’s	rule.8		
On	the	20th,	three	days	later,	a	fuller	account	of	the	incident	was	published	in	the	same	
publication	making	it	clear	that	a	mutiny	had	occurred,	but	again	not	connecting	its	causes	to	
anything	related	to	Tan	or	Zhao.	In	an	article	titled	“News	About	the	Aftermath	of	the	Pingjiang	
                                                
7	Edward	A.	McCord,	“Cries	That	Shake	the	Earth:	Military	Atrocities	and	Popular	Protests	in	Warlord	China,”	
Modern	China	31,	No.	1	(Jan.	2005),	3-34,	5-9.	
8	Dagongbao	大公報	(November	17,	1920).	Reprints	of	this	periodical’s	1917-1927	issues	were	produced	by	XI’an	
Peoples’	Press	in	1980	and	are	available	in	many	North	American	academic	libraries	with	a	significant	East	Asian	
collection,	like	University	of	California,	Berkeley,	Princeton	University,	or	Yale	University.	
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Mutiny”	(平江兵變後之消息)	that	begins	with	the	phrase,	“Different	people	offer	different	
accounts”	(言人人殊)	to	caution	the	reader	that	perhaps	this	was	only	one	version	of	the	
mutiny,	the	author	describes	multiple	versions	of	Commander	Xiao’s	death,	according	to	the	
various	rumors	that	were	circulating.	In	one,	he	was	shot	by	rebellious	soldiers;	in	another,	he	
hung	himself	after	being	captured;	in	yet	another	he	was	killed	trying	to	escape.	The	leader	of	
the	mutiny	is	identified	as	Yu	Yingxiang,	and	two	officers	dispatched	from	Changsha	were	able	
to	confirm	only	this	fact.	Little	else	is	said,	no	sources	are	given	for	this	information,	and	what	
happens	next	is	unclear.9	The	information	given	in	these	two	articles	largely	matches	with	the	
names	and	dates	given	by	Yao	Daci	and	Huang	Yi’ou	in	their	oral	histories.	
However,	articles	published	the	next	two	days	complicate	the	narrative	of	Huang	and	
Yao	somewhat.	On	November	21st,	an	article	titled	“Zhao	Refuses	Post	of	Commander-in-Chief,”	
(趙師長力辭總司令)	reports	that	Tan	attempted	to	transfer	his	post	to	Zhao,	but	was	rebuffed.	
The	article	also	reproduces	a	circular	telegram	sent	by	Tan	to	the	various	commanders	and	
officials	of	Hunan	recommending	that	Zhao	be	elevated	to	that	position.	The	purpose	is	so	that	
Zhao	can	oversee	military	affairs	and	Tan	can	concentrate	on	civilian	matters.	On	that	same	day,	
a	telegram	was	reprinted	on	the	same	page	in	which	the	other	military	commanders	
throughout	Hunan	supported	this	transition,	apparently	for	the	good	of	the	“homeland”	(桑梓),	
but	it	still	seems	as	though	Zhao	was	unwilling	to	take	command.10	This	article	is	most	likely	
describing	the	first	attempt	by	Tan	to	surrender	the	leadership	of	Hunan’s	military	wholly	to	
Zhao	on	the	18th.	However,	Huang’s	oral	history	explicitly	claimed	that	“few	knew	about	the	
content	of	this	meeting,”	and	that	he	himself	was	only	able	to	learn	about	what	had	happened	
after	the	fact.	11	How	could	this	information	be	unknown	by	many	if	it	was	also	in	the	daily	
newspaper?	This	strongly	suggests	that	Huang	was	either	misrepresenting	or	misremembering	
the	level	of	secrecy	associated	with	this	first	meeting,	or	that	those	involved	might	be	talking	to	
reporters	in	order	to	present	ostensibly	confidential	information	into	the	public	sphere.	The	
reason	for	doing	so	might	be	to	increase	the	pressure	on	Tan	to	surrender	influence	in	a	more	
sincere	way,	or	to	provoke	Zhao	into	accepting	that	same	offer.		
This	latter	possibility	seems	more	probable	because	of	a	report	on	the	22nd	titled	“The	
True	Attitude	of	Tan	and	Zhao”	(譚趙之真實態度),	wherein	Tan	is	described	as	wanting	to	only	
surrender	his	title	of	commander-in-chief	while	retaining	the	governorship	for	himself.	
Moreover,	as	the	author	points	out,	Tan’s	simultaneous	advocacy	for	popular	elections	meant	
that	whoever	takes	the	position	would	only	be	doing	so	for	a	short	while	before	he	could	
possibly	be	forced	to	leave	office	by	the	will	of	the	people,	making	Tan’s	ostensible	desire	to	
step	down	seem	highly	suspect	(總之無論如人  當總司令省長。已即退居公民地位).12	
Because	the	author	takes	a	very	anti-Tan	tone	and	expresses	suspicion	about	his	genuine	
willingness	to	share	power,	it	would	seem	as	though	these	news	articles	are	being	used	to	
advance	Zhao’s	position	as	leader	of	the	province,	possibly	challenging	McCord’s	
characterization	of	the	publication	as	being	slightly	biased	towards	Tan. 
                                                
9	Ibid.,	(November	20,	1920).	
10	Ibid.,	(November	21,	1920).	
11	Huang	Yi’ou,	“Memories,”	Original:	这次会议内容，外间知道的人很少	
12	Dagongbao	(November	22,	1920).	
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Even	beyond	the	possible	bias	towards	Zhao	on	the	part	of	Dagongbao,	these	
newspaper	articles	concerning	the	November	1920	mutiny	in	Pingjiang	demonstrate	the	
questionable	reliability	of	information	during	this	time.	Given	the	fact	that	Tao	Juyin,	one	of	the	
key	authors	of	the	conventional	warlord	period	narrative,	was	himself	a	journalist,	this	
illustration	of	how	little	those	in	this	profession	seemed	to	know	is	worth	emphasizing.	
Pingjiang	county	is	located	to	the	northeast	of	Changsha,	roughly	120	kilometers	away,	so	the	
fact	that	newspapers	do	not	hear	of	a	major	incident	like	a	mutiny	for	four	days	indicates	how	
slowly	information	traveled	within	the	province.	According	to	these	Dagongbao	articles,	though	
the	mutiny	occurred	on	the	13th,	this	information	did	not	reach	the	newspaper	until	the	17th,	
with	a	fuller	picture	needing	to	wait	until	the	20th.	Moreover,	it	is	unclear	how	they	might	know	
about	the	motives	of	the	people	involved,	how	the	incident	could	possibly	lead	to	Tan’s	flight,	
and	why	Zhao	might	have	refused	the	position	of	Army	Commander	in	Chief.	Was	the	offer	
from	Tan	Yankai	genuine?	Was	the	refusal	merely	a	polite	show	of	modesty	to	avoid	the	
perception	that	he	was	ambitious?	Are	there	any	indications	that	Zhao	coordinated	the	mutiny	
in	order	to	be	offered	the	very	position	that	he	refused	on	that	day?	The	journalists	writing	
these	Dagongbao	articles	did	not	address	these	questions,	perhaps	because	it	was	not	within	
the	purview	of	their	genre	to	do	so;	what	is	more	complicated	is	that	others,	as	we	have	seen,	
did	not	shy	away	from	projecting	motives	onto	these	historical	actors.	
The	journalists’	inability	to	address	the	motives	of	the	key	figures	involved,	combined	
with	their	lack	of	basic	information,	is	worthy	of	reflection	when	considering	how	later	
historians	impute	cause	and	effect	to	their	subjects.	Those	writing	these	articles	presumably	
have	far	greater	access	to	the	key	figures	in	these	events	than	those	who	wrote	decades	later,	
yet	they	were	unable	to	discern	or	identify	why	events	unfold	as	they	do.	Their	silence	on	these	
matters	should	provoke	critical	readers	to	be	wary	of	any	attempts	to	attach	meaning	or	motive	
to	these	events.	Moreover,	the	journalistic	profession	during	the	early	Republican	period	of	
Chinese	history	was	not	held	in	high	regard,	as	journalists	were	known	to	support	a	particular	
political	patron	or	faction,	blackmail	people,	and	freely	make	up	stories.	The	situation	was	such	
that	major	publishers	and	contemporary	observers	advocated	for	the	construction	of	formal	
educational	institutions	for	training	young	journalists	and	establishing	standards	of	conduct,	
suggesting	the	low	quality	and	unreliability	of	their	industry	during	this	era.13	
Finally,	the	journalists	and	news	editors	had	their	own	motives	in	crafting	particular	
narratives:	they	wanted	to	attract	as	many	readers	as	possible.	While	the	urgency	to	entertain	
readers	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	they	had	overt	political	motives,	they	attracted	
customers	by	claiming	that	the	stories	they	were	relating	were	“true”	(真实),	as	in	the	title	of	
the	article	from	November	22nd,	even	if	there	might	be	exaggeration	for	dramatic	effect.	Again,	
this	aspect	of	the	newspaper	industry	and	its	effect	on	historical	narrative	is	worth	considering	
in	light	of	the	former	journalist	Tao	Juyin’s	immense	influence	on	the	how	the	period	is	
remembered.	What	is	needed,	therefore,	would	seem	to	be	a	contemporaneous	account	of	
                                                
13	For	more	on	these	phenomena,	see	Stephen	R.	MacKinnon,	“Toward	a	History	of	the	Press	in	the	Republican	
Period,”	in	Modern	China	Vol.	23,	No.	1,	(Jan.,	1997),	3-32	and	Timothy	Weston,	“Journalism	as	a	Field	of	
Knowledge	in	Republican	China,”	in	Robert	Culp,	Eddy	U,	and	Wen-hsin	Yeh,	eds.,	Knowledge	Acts	in	Modern	
China:	Ideas,	Institutions,	and	Identities,	(Berkeley,	CA.:	Institute	for	East	Asian	Studies,	University	of	California,	
Berkeley,	2016),	246-271.		
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these	events	that	is	written	by	an	individual	with	firsthand	knowledge.	The	diary	of	Tan	Yankai,	
at	first	glance,	might	serve	this	role.	
	
The	Diary	of	Tan	Yankai	
Tan	Yankai	was	a	political	figure	liked	by	his	peers	but	who	remained	aloof	and	
disinterested	from	the	politics	in	which	he	was	embedded;	similarly,	his	diary	maintains	the	
same	detached	tone,	offering	little	insight	into	his	own	motives	and	few	judgments	of	those	
around	him,	thus	duplicating	the	manner	in	which	many	perceived	him.	It	was	scanned,	edited,	
and	digitally	published	in	2011	by	the	Institute	of	Modern	History,	Academia	Sinica	in	Taiwan;	it	
has	since	been	published	in	2019	by	Zhonghua	press	in	the	People’s	Republic	of	China.14	Its	
main	utility	comes	as	way	to	track	the	interactions	of	individual	figures,	and	verify	facts	that	
described	in	other	sources.		
The	diary	largely	supports	the	chronology	of	events	found	in	Dagongbao,	but	with	a	few	
differences	that	speak	to	the	difficulties	in	acquiring	accurate	information	during	this	period	of	
time.	Dagongbao	first	reported	rumors	of	a	disturbance	in	Pingjiang	on	November	17th,	
suggests	that	they	first	heard	the	news	the	day	before;	Tan’s	entry	for	that	day	suggests	he	
heard	similar	information	on	the	same	day,	but	in	greater	detail.	He	wrote:		
At	11,	I	received	a	phone	call	from	Luman.	I	returned	home	after	the	call.	He	said,	
according	 to	 a	 person	 coming	 from	Pingjiang,	 there	was	 a	mutiny	 on	 the	 14th,	
and	Songjian	(Xiao	Changchi)	was	captured,	with	Yu	Yingxiang	declaring	himself	
as	 commander…	After	 dinner	 I	 received	 a	message	 saying	 that	 Songjian	 (Xiao)	
was	dead,	which	upset	me	greatly.15		
	
It	would	seem	as	though	Tan	heard	the	rumors	of	the	Pingjiang	mutiny	at	about	the	same	time	
as	Dagongbao,	though	he	had	a	much	clearer	picture	as	to	the	severity	of	what	had	happened.	
His	entry	for	the	next	day	shows	his	awareness	of	the	purpose	behind	of	the	mutiny	at	a	very	
early	point	in	time,	far	ahead	of	Dagongbao:	
At	5pm,	Taiyan	 (Zhang	Binglin)	 arrived,	 and	was	 scheduled	 to	give	a	 lecture	at	
the	Hunan	military	and	civil	sections.	We	took	in	some	sights	together,	and	had	a	
farewell	banquet,	where	he	gave	a	speech.	He	left	tonight.	After	he	left,	I	heard	a	
report	that	soldiers	and	officers	were	planning	to	mount	a	sneak	attack	tonight	
and	calling	it	the	“Anti-Tan”	movement.	My	hardships	are	year	in/year	out;	did	I	
ever	plan	(scheme)	for	my	own	benefit?	 	My	situation	requires	no	support,	nor	
does	 it	 await	 someone	 to	 topple	 it.	 If	 there	 is	 someone	who	can	be	entrusted	
with	all	of	this,	 it	would	be	a	great	relief	for	me	to	be	freed	of	these	burdens	 I	
bear	like	shackles.16	
                                                
14	These	diary	entries	were	originally	accessed	electronically	in	2011	at	the	Kuo	Ting-i	library	of	the	Institute	of	
Modern	History,	Academia	Sinica,	Taiwan.	They	have	recently	been	published	as	well:	see	Tan	Yankai	譚延闓，	譚
延闓日記	[Tan	Yankai	Diary],	20	Vols.	(Beijing:	Zhonghua	Shuju,	2019).	
15	Tan	Yankai	Diary	譚延闓日記,	November	16,	1920:	至十一時，得呂滿電話，乃歸，則平江人來，知十四早
兵變，松堅被執，于應祥稱司令。。。	晚餐後得信，松堅死矣，為之傷感不已。	
16	Ibid.,	November	17,	1920:	“五時，章太炎來，約在省軍政署，同撮景，餞飲，起演說。太炎今夜行也。客
去，得報告，有兵將來襲，以倒譚為名。吾辛苦頻年，豈為身計，本不須扶，何待人倒。	但令有可授受，
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Tan	did	not	seem	to	have	taken	the	mutiny	seriously	until	this	point:	instead	of	devoting	himself	
to	managing	the	crisis	or	fleeing	Changsha,	he	entertained	the	nationally	prominent	intellectual	
Zhang	Binglin	(章炳麟,	1868-1936)	who	was	visiting	to	lecture	on	the	subjects	of	the	Hunan	
constitution,	federalism,	and	the	larger	provincial	autonomy	movement.	At	the	same	time,	Tan	
vividly	expressed	the	pressure	he	felt,	practically	begging	to	be	relieved	of	his	responsibilities	in	
language	that	foreshadows	his	resignation	at	the	end	of	the	month.	It	was	a	common	trope	to	
assert	that	power	was	undesired	and	therefore	a	burdensome	responsibility	thrust	upon	
politicians;	even	the	Generalissimo	Chiang	Kaishek	made	a	show	of	stepping	down	many	times.	
Likewise,	Tan	could	have	been	signaling	to	posterity	that	he	was	not	power-hungry.	
Nevertheless,	placing	these	statements	in	the	context	of	entertaining	Zhang	indicated	Tan’s	
inherent	preference	for	the	scholarly	aspects	of	civil	governance	rather	than	responding	quickly	
to	a	military	situation.	His	apparent	reluctance	for	power	and	leadership	supports	the	historical	
stereotype	of	the	hapless	scholar	who	could	not	take	decisive	action,	or	the	trope	of	the	naïve	
civilian	bureaucrat	who	is	outmaneuvered	by	a	conspiracy	of	bloody-minded	militarists.	This	is	
not	to	say	that	the	diary	is	a	wholly	accurate	reflection	of	Tan’s	state	of	mind,	as	he	was	clearly	
writing	for	a	future	audience.	Rather,	highlighting	this	lament	emphasizes	the	way	in	which	Tan	
felt	the	need	to	perform	and	act	in	an	appropriate	manner,	in	line	with	traditional	norms	of	
behavior.	
	 At	the	same	time,	some	of	the	discrepancies	between	the	narrative	given	in	the	diary	
and	that	given	by	other	sources	are	too	disparate	to	be	attributed	to	human	error.	In	the	next	
diary	entry,	for	November	18,	Tan	wrote:		
The	 senior	 officials	 gathered	 and	 decided	 to	 announce	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	
military	 governor	 [督軍]	 position	 and	 divide	 the	 responsibility	 for	 civil	 and	
military	matters.	We	will	ask	Yiwu	[Zhao	Hengti]	to	become	the	commander-in-
chief,	 and	 have	 Tesheng	 [Lin	 Zhiyu]	 be	 governor.	 I	 spoke	 at	 some	 length	 and	
received	much	support.	So	it	was	successfully	decided.17	
	
The	meeting	described	here	is	chronologically	similar	to	that	found	in	the	Huang	Yi’ou	oral	
history	as	well	as	the	Dagongbao	article	from	November	21st,	yet	the	content	seems	completely	
different.	These	texts	claimed	that	Zhao	had	refused	Tan’s	offer,	while	this	diary	entry	describes	
the	exact	opposite.	Though	both	Tan	as	well	as	Huang	and	Dagongbao	might	have	their	own	
particular	motives	for	misrepresenting	what	had	happened,	it	is	far	more	likely	that	the	diary,	
being	the	contemporaneous	record	of	someone	who	was	present	at	the	meeting,	offers	a	more	
accurate	reflection	of	the	decisions	made	on	this	date	than	that	those	given	by	authors	who	
were	not	even	present.	Again,	this	is	not	to	say	that	this	depiction	should	be	uncritically	
accepted	at	face	value,	as	Tan	might	have	certainly	been	writing	his	diary	with	an	eye	towards	
future	perceptions	of	these	events.	Indeed,	Tan’s	attitude	towards	surrendering	power	here	
seems	disingenuous	at	best,	without	any	bitterness	or	resentment	about	being	forced	by	the	
mutiny	to	make	the	offer.	Moreover,	as	noted	by	the	Dagongbao	journalist,	his	efforts	to	
                                                                                                                                                       
去此如桎梏耳”	
17	Ibid.,	November	18,	1920:	“各高級官均集，乃宣布廢督軍民分治宗旨，請夷午任總司令，以省長讓特生，
發言甚久，諸君皆贊成，遂定局。”		
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separate	military	might	from	civilian	administration,	institute	popular	elections,	and	surrender	
some	power	to	Zhao	all	seemed	to	be	at	cross-purposes.	The	timing	of	all	three	makes	it	easy	to	
suspect	Tan	of	merely	attempting	to	offer	Zhao	the	highest	military	office	as	a	temporary	
stopgap	measure	that	was	aimed	at	the	preservation	of	his	own	position	as	an	official	elected	
by	the	general	populace	As	with	Tao’s	possible	propensity	to	exaggerate	and	strengthen	his	
narrative	of	a	chaotic	era,	Tan	might	be	misrepresenting	these	aspects	of	this	meeting	so	as	
make	his	own	decisions	appear	in	the	best	possible	light.	
	 Tan’s	diary	entries	for	the	next	two	days	continue	to	create	a	narrative	of	events	that	
challenges	that	given	by	the	other	texts,	in	that	his	relationship	with	Zhao	is	portrayed	as	one	
between	peers	and	companions,	far	from	the	image	of	antagonism	and	rivalry	seen	elsewhere.	
On	the	19th,	Tan	wrote,	
Yiwu	[Zhao]	came	over	to	say	a	few	things,	and	we	went	together	to	watch	the	
horses	 outside.	 The	 horses	 ridden	 by	 Mingqiu	 and	 Fang	 Boxiong	 that	 were	
bought	 and	 brought	 over	 from	 Japan	 were	 not	 of	 excellent	 caliber,	 but	 only	
ordinary.	We	went	back	inside	and	spoke	for	a	long	time.	We	spoke	honestly	and	
openly.	There	is	nothing	to	conceal	between	us.	The	only	thing	is	that	it	is	hard	
to	explain	one’s	feelings	to	others.18	
	
Though	the	Zhao-Tan	relationship	described	here	might	not	be	warm	or	intimate,	but	it	still	
seems	affable	in	contrast	to	other	depictions.	For	Tao	Juyin,	for	example,	Zhao	seems	to	be	
overpowering	and	intimidating	Tan;	in	contrast,	the	diary	suggests	that	they	are	equals	who	
often	discussed	difficult	issues	in	a	straightforward	manner.	There	does	seem	to	be	a	hint	of	
strain	between	the	two,	with	Tan	emphasizing	the	difficulty	in	achieving	true	candor	and	
guilelessness,	but	not	to	the	degree	found	in	the	open	completion	given	by	the	conventional	
narrative,	wherein	Zhao	pushed	Tan	aside.	Indeed,	in	his	diary	entry	for	the	next	few	days,	Tan	
writes	that	it	is	others	who	were	urging	him	to	leave,	with	Zhao’s	name	conspicuously	absent.	
On	November	20th,	he	wrote	that	Zou	Xubin	(1883-1943)	argued	that	staying	in	Hunan	is	unwise:	
“Tiansan	[Zou	Xubin]	again	consulted	for	a	long	time:	for	my	sake,	I	should	leave	as	quickly	as	
possible;	for	the	sake	of	Hunan,	I	should	not	leave;	for	the	sake	of	my	friends,	I	should	stay;	
from	a	realistic	perspective,	I	should	go.”19	Here,	Zou	appeared	to	be	stipulating	that	Hunan	
would	be	better	with	Tan	present,	but	that	because	this	was	impractical,	and	that	Tan’s	
personal	safety	was	at	risk,	he	should	leave.	Similarly,	during	the	crucial	meeting	on	November	
23rd	in	which	Tan	made	the	final	decision	to	leave	for	Shanghai,	Zhao	is	not	described	as	having	
precipitated	his	departure,	through	any	act	or	word	of	encouragement.	Instead,	the	diary	
describes	Lin	Zhiyu,	who	would	take	over	the	civilian	side	of	Hunan	governance,	as	“presenting	
reasons	[for	Tan]	to	leave,	thus	revealing	his	true	feelings	on	the	subject.”20	Thus,	according	to	
the	diary,	Zhao	does	not	seem	to	be	among	Tan’s	betrayers	at	all;	given	how	he	does	not	seem	
reticent	about	naming	Lin	Zhiyu	as	a	person	who	encourages	him	to	leave,	it	does	not	seem	
                                                
18	Ibid.,	November	19,	1920:	“夷午來言事，與同看馬門外。明秋及方伯雄騎之馬為日本買來者，不甚駿，普
通洋馬耳。入室，談久之，意至誠懇，吾輩無不可相見，以心特難為人言耳。”	
19	Ibid.,	November	20,	1920:	“天三复久談，為吾計，以速去為妙。為湘計，以不去為妙。為朋友計，以留為
宜。為事實計，以去為宜。”	
20	Ibid.,	November	23,	1920:	“次言辭職理由，後表明心迹。”	
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plausible	for	Tan	to	neglect	to	mention	Zhao	doing	the	same	thing.	While	Tan	was	forced	to	
leave	because	of	an	implicit	and	explicit	lack	of	support,	it	does	not	seem	as	though	he	believes	
Zhao	to	be	an	instigator	of	this	phenomenon.	
	 In	short,	Tan	Yankai’s	diaries	from	November	challenge	the	conventional	narrative	of	
betrayal	on	the	part	of	Zhao	Hengti.	The	relationship	between	the	two	appears	tense	at	worst;	
there	are	no	connotations	or	undertones	of	suspicion	or	distrust.	Furthermore,	though	Tan	was	
critiqued	for	being	overly	concerned	with	frivolous	matters	like	watching	horses	or	entertaining	
guests,	his	diary	entries	suggest	a	greater	awareness	of	his	political	situation	than	has	
previously	been	described.	His	efforts	to	interact	and	form	relationships	with	those	around	him	
should	not	be	interpreted	as	a	fascination	with	trivial	matters,	but	rather	his	successful	attempt	
to	ingratiate	himself	with	his	peers.	In	light	of	these	maneuverings,	his	claims	to	being	overly	
burdened	by	the	responsibility	of	his	office	seem	disingenuous	and	performative:	Tan	was	just	
as	ambitious	as	his	more	military-oriented	counterparts,	making	every	effort	to	extend	his	
influence	and	gain	power	during	this	time	of	political	turmoil.	
	
Exonerations	of	Zhao	
Other	oral	histories	support	Tan’s	assertion	of	Zhao’s	innocence.	Zhong	Boyi	was	
another	major	political	figure	in	Hunan	during	this	time	who	was	closely	linked	to	both	Tan	and	
Zhao:	Tan	Yankai’s	diary	frequently	mentions	meeting	Zhong	to	talk;	Zhong	would	later	become	
the	head	of	the	provincial	finance	bureau	under	Zhao’s	administration.	A	member	of	the	KMT	
who	fled	to	Taiwan	after	1949,	he	had	particular	motivation	to	frame	the	actions	of	Zhao	and	
Tan	in	the	best	possible	way.	As	a	result,	and	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	he	blamed	Li	Zhonglin	for	
the	mutiny,	and	described	what	he	perceived	to	be	the	reasons	for	why	the	mutiny	led	to	Tan’s	
flight	to	Shanghai.	According	to	Zhong,	in	November	of	1920,	
Tan	Yankai	replaced	Jiangdao	garrison	commander	Liu	Menglong,	who	belonged	
to	the	Cheng	faction.	In	this	military	reorganization,	Liu’s	unit	was	made	the	12th	
garrison,	stationed	in	Pingjiang;	Tan	ordered	Liu’s	garrison	vice	commander	Xiao	
Changchi	 to	 take	 over.	 Soldiers	 from	 this	 unit	 began	 to	 stir	 up	 trouble	 in	 the	
name	 of	 salaries.	 They	 viciously	 killed	 Xiao	 and	 declared	 Yu	 Yingxiang	 as	 their	
commander.	 This	 was	 all	 at	 the	 instigation	 of	 Li	 Zhonglin.	 When	 the	 news	
reached	Changsha,	Tan	felt	as	though	it	was	very	difficult	to	handle	these	affairs,	
and	so	called	for	an	emergency	meeting	where	the	key	military	and	civil	figures	
of	 the	 province	 were	 gathered.	 I	 attended	 as	 an	 observer.	 Third-division	
commander	 Lu	 Diping	 gave	 an	 impromptu	 speech	 “The	 Commander-in-Chief	
should	withdraw	 to	 take	 a	 break	 for	 a	 time.”	 (Afterwards,	 Lu	 actually	 became	
Zu’an’s	 (Tan’s)	 trusted	 subordinate	 and	 right-hand	man;	 personal	 relations	 are	
truly	hard	 to	understand!)	 Zhao	Hengti	 (Yanwu)	proclaimed	 that	he	would	not	
take	sides	in	a	conflict	between	Tan	and	Cheng.21	
                                                
21	Zhong,	Interviews,	88:	“譚延闓撤換程派將領江道區司令劉夢龍，改編該部為第十二區守備隊，駐平江，命
其副官長蕭昌熾出任該區守備隊司令，該部士兵以鬧餉為名，衝進司令部將蕭殺害，推營長于應祥為代理
司令，此事即為李仲麟主使。消息傳至長沙，譚氏極感難以處置，乃召集緊急會議，在省之軍事首長與重
要文職人員均出席，余亦應邀列席。第三旅旅長魯滌平竟即席表示［總司令稍事休息一段時期］，（以後
魯竟成組庵之親信股肱，人事離合誠難逆料。）趙恆惕（炎午）則表示對於譚、程之事不作左右袒。”		
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This	passage	gives	further	context	to	why	Xiao’s	men	betrayed	and	killed	him;	they	were	never	
truly	his	subordinates.	Tan	Yankai	had	removed	Liu	Menglong	and	elevated	Xiao	in	an	effort	to	
strengthen	his	control	over	the	area,	which	was	garrisoned	by	former	soldiers	of	Cheng	Qian.	In	
replacing	one	of	Cheng’s	former	subordinates	with	his	own	loyalist,	Tan’s	overextended	himself,	
provoking	the	mutiny,	and	causing	Xiao’s	death.	In	Zhong’s	version,	complaints	about	salaries	
were	only	a	pretext	that	the	dissatisfied	soldiers	used	to	stage	their	mutiny.	Zhao	thus	seems	to	
be	a	neutral	party	in	a	conflict	between	the	Tan	and	Cheng	factions,	and	the	connection	
between	the	mutiny	and	Tan’s	departure	is	clear:	there	were	doubts	among	some	of	his	
subordinates	regarding	his	ability	to	lead	that	were	only	brought	into	the	open	at	the	meeting	
on	November	18th	discussing	the	Pingjiang	mutiny.	Without	the	confidence	of	the	men	he	was	
ostensibly	leading,	Tan	had	no	choice	but	to	resign	and	flee	to	Shanghai.	Li	Zhonglin,	and,	by	
extension,	other	former	subordinates	of	Cheng	Qian,	are	given	the	majority	of	blame,	with	Zhao	
exculpated	from	all	complicity.	Moreover,	in	Zhong’s	telling,	not	only	does	Zhao	seem	to	be	
blameless,	but	the	issue	of	military	pay	is	what	was	driving	the	mutiny.	This	was	almost	
certainly	related	to	Tan’s	efforts	during	prior	administrations	to	reduce	military	expenditures	by	
disbanding	troops,	as	these	soldiers	clearly	had	an	expectation	concerning	their	pay	that	they	
felt	Tan	would	not	meet.	
	 Zhong’s	description	of	these	events	supports	the	conventional	warlord	narrative,	but	
only	to	a	point,	as	the	concerns	of	common	soldiers	seemed	far	more	important	than	the	
rivalries	between	commanders.	Tao’s	Anecdotes	emphasized	the	manner	in	which	military	
leaders	warred	with	each	other,	both	overtly	and	covertly,	with	the	conspiracy	surrounding	the	
mutiny	being	a	prime	example	of	these	acts.	This	competition	was	only	later	eliminated	by	the	
centralizing	state.	Zhong	also	portrays	an	environment	of	chaos,	but	he	does	not	blame	Zhao,	
instead	attributing	the	chaos	to	material	concerns	over	salary	as	well	as	Tan’s	promotion	of	
Xiao	Changchi	over	soldiers	in	Pingjiang	who	had	been	loyal	to	Cheng	Qian.	
Zhou	Zhenlin’s	oral	history	of	the	era	constructs	yet	another	explanation	of	events,	in	
which	Zhao	appears	innocent	once	again.	Zhou	(1875-1960)	was	also	a	member	of	the	KMT	like	
Zhong,	but	chose	to	join	the	CCP	later	on	like	Huang	Yi’ou.	His	exoneration	of	Zhao	is	convincing	
because	he	characterizes	himself	as	a	participant	in	the	anti-Tan	conspiracy,	and	would	thus	
know	whether	or	not	Zhao	had	been	directly	involved.	According	to	him,	
In	August	of	1920,	upon	hearing	of	 the	Fujian	and	Guangdong	armies’	 actions,	
Tan	Yankai	still	reacted	with	indifference,	and	asked	people	like	Wu	Jingheng	and	
Zhang	Taiyan	 to	come	to	Hunan	 to	 lecture,	 see	 the	sights,	and	enjoy	wine	and	
food.	He	 ignored	 Sun	Yatsen’s	 plans	 for	 a	Northern	 Expedition.	 I	 urged	him	 to	
send	 troops	 early,	 and	 spoke	 much,	 but	 he	 was	 still	 indecisive.	 As	 a	 result,	 I	
joined	officers	of	the	Hunan	military	in	their	Anti-Tan	movement.	We	decided	as	
a	group	that	Zhao	Hengti	should	be	Commander	in	Chief	and	Lin	Zhiyu	should	be	
Provincial	 Governor.	 At	 that	 time,	 Zhang	 Zhenwu	 killed	 Xiao	 Changchi,	 who	
would	not	go	along	with	our	plans,	which	forced	the	soldiers	under	Third	Division	
commander	Liao	Jiadong	to	enter	the	provincial	capital.	I	judged	that	the	time	to	
overthrow	Tan	had	arrived,	and	entrusted	Chen	Jiahui,	a	member	of	the	protect-
the-Constitution	 congress	 to	 persuade	 Tan	 Yankai	 to	 leave	 Hunan	 voluntarily.	
Tan	called	me	to	pitifully	plead	for	more	time	to	bury	his	wife,	who	had	died	in	
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Shanghai,	 and	 whose	 coffin	 was	 on	 the	 way	 to	 Hunan	 at	 that	moment.	 After	
which	he	would	go.	 I	answered	him,	“For	the	sake	of	preserving	social	order	 in	
Changsha,	 and	 for	 your	 safety,	 you	 should	 leave	 immediately.	 Regarding	 your	
wife’s	funeral,	I	will	soon	go	to	Shanghai	to	apologize	to	you	directly.”	He	could	
only	board	 the	boat	and	go	back	 to	Shanghai…	Unexpectedly,	when	 I	 reported	
back	to	Guangzhou,	Zhao	Hengti	broke	faith	with	those	in	Changsha,	massacred	
Li	 Zhonglin	 and	 the	 others,	 and	 became	 again	 an	 obstacle	 to	 Sun	 Yatsen’s	
Northern	Expedition.22	
	
In	this	narrative,	Zhao	Hengti	is	not	blamed	in	the	least	for	what	happened	in	November	1920,	
and	questions	of	pay	for	soldiers	does	not	seem	to	be	a	factor.	Instead,	KMT	influence,	in	the	
form	of	Zhou	Zhenlin,	seems	to	be	the	major	reason	why	the	mutiny	took	place,	with	Xiao	being	
murdered	because	he	did	not	wish	to	move	against	Tan.	Zhou	identifies	himself	as	the	key	
individual	who	persuaded	Tan	to	leave	voluntarily	for	Shanghai,	in	stark	contrast	to	those	
narratives	claiming	Zhao	forced	Tan	out,	and	in	contradiction	to	the	newspaper	articles	claiming	
that	the	concerns	over	salary	had	motivated	the	mutiny.	If	Zhao	were	somehow	involved,	it	
seems	inconceivable	that	Zhou	would	not	so	identify	him,	especially	given	his	critique	of	Zhao’s	
later	action.	Indeed,	there	is	no	motive	for	him	to	leave	Zhao	out	of	his	narrative;	as	a	former	
KMT	member	who	had	defected	to	the	CCP,	it	would	behoove	Zhou	to	imitate	Mao	and	critique	
Zhao	for	his	role.	Instead,	Zhou	emphasizes	Tan’s	carousing	with	his	elite	intellectual	friends	
and	his	apathy	for	the	broader	national	picture:	two	aspects	of	Tan’s	stereotyped	behavior	that	
were	addressed	in	the	previous	chapter’s	examination	of	his	unpublished	English	language	
exercise	books.	Moreover,	Zhou	here	claims	that	he	and	other	KMT	members	had	deliberately	
created	discord	between	the	various	political	factions,	which	is	not	something	that	has	been	
previously	described	in	the	literature.	Hunan’s	geostrategic	importance	emerges	once	more,	as	
the	central	location	of	the	province	made	it	a	key	target	for	KMT	agents.			
The	oral	histories	by	Zhong	and	Zhou	convincingly	support	the	idea	that	Zhao	Hengti	
was	not	an	active	participant	in	the	effort	to	remove	Tan	Yankai	from	power.	They	also	make	
the	claim	that	material	considerations	like	pay	were	secondary	to	factionalism	in	motivating	the	
mutiny,	but	that	Zhao	was	not	an	active	participant	in	this	factionalism.	Those	like	Mao	or	Tao	
who	argue	that	Zhao	was	a	traitor	of	some	sort	have	motives	for	doing	so:	Tao	Juyin	to	
emphasize	the	chaos	of	disunity	during	the	warlord	period;	Mao	to	critique	the	warlord	who	
suppressed	communism	in	Hunan.	Materials	from	those	who	do	and	do	not	share	those	
motives	suggests	otherwise.	It	is	clear	that	disunity	and	political	turmoil	existed	in	Hunan,	in	
                                                
22	Zhou	Zhenlin 周震鳞.	“谭延闿统治湖南始末	[The	Whole	Story	of	Tan	Yankai’s	Control	of	Hunan],”	in	湖南文史
資料選輯	[Selections	from	the	Historical	and	Cultural	Materials	of	Hunan],	Vol.	2.	(Changsha:	Hunan	Renmin	
Chuban	She,	1981)	1-8,	7-8:	“直到 1920 八月，授闽粤军如期发动了，谭延闓还是处之淡然，邀请吴敬恒、章
太炎等来湘演讲，游山玩水，酒食征逐，无视中山先生的北伐大计。我催促他早日出兵，说得舌敝唇焦，
他还是推诿不决。于是我决计和湘军将领合作倒谭。议定推赵恒惕为总司令，林支宇为省长。与此同时，
张振武杀了不服调遗的萧昌炽；廖家栋率第三旅会合各军，逼近省城。我认为倒谭时机已经成熟，就委托
护法国会议员陈嘉会劝谭延闓自动离开湖南。谭打电话向我哀请等安葬了他夫人再走，因为他夫人死在上
海，灵柩正在运回湖南的途中。我回答他说：“为了维持省城秩序，为了保证你的安全，务必马上离开。至
于使你不能够为夫人亲安葬事，我不久回上海当面道歉。”	他只得忍痛登舟，回倒上海去了。。。不料赵恒
惕在我赴粤复命的时候，竟背信弃义地在长沙惨杀李仲麟等，又成了中山先生北伐的障碍。”	
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which	there	was	factionalism	and	dissatisfaction	concerning	pay.	However,	it	does	not	seem	as	
though	Zhao	was	the	prime	instigator	behind	the	mutiny	and	Tan’s	departure		
	 The	image	of	Tan	peacefully	resigning	is	also	used	by	government	documents	from	this	
era,	suggesting	how	all	involved	want	to	portray	the	events	of	November	1920	as	a	relatively	
regular	transition,	whatever	the	truth	might	actually	be.	Lin	Zhiyu,	who	became	civil	governor	
after	Tan	left,	stated	in	his	letter	to	the	Hunan	Provincial	Assembly	accepting	the	position	that	
“Zu	[Tan]	resolutely	resigned.	He	wished	to	make	room	for	those	of	even	greater	talent	and	
virtue	than	himself.	Since	firm	efforts	to	persuade	[Tan]	to	remain	were	without	results,	
therefore	we	will	have	an	election	to	appoint	a	provisional	governor.”23	Contrasting	this	
description	of	Tan’s	departure	with	the	version	given	by	Zhou	Zhenlin,	who	stated	that	Tan	had	
to	leave	in	such	haste	that	he	was	unable	to	wait	for	the	body	of	his	wife	to	arrive,	it	is	difficult	
to	know	which	perspective	on	these	affairs	is	the	more	accurate.	While	it	might	be	easy	to	
reach	the	conclusion	that	Lin	might	merely	be	attempting	to	paper	over	open	hostilities	with	
flowery	rhetoric,	he	described	Tan’s	departure	very	differently	from	the	prior	ouster	of	Zhang	
Jingyao,	the	hated	militarist	who	had	preceded	Tan.	Trying	to	understand	why	men	like	Lin	
would	have	had	a	positive	perspective	on	Tan’s	resignation	suggests	that	there	was	a	perceived	
need	for	the	appearance	of	peaceful	transition,	thus	challenging	historiographies	that	
emphasize	naked	military	might	of	wu	over	the	culture	of	wen	in	the	warlord	period.	If	political	
power	came	through	guns	and	force	alone,	these	appeasing	words	would	not	be	necessary;	
appropriate	rhetoric	and	behavior	were	important	as	well.		
	 These	oral	histories	confirm	many	of	the	points	made	by	this	chapter’s	analysis	of	the	
Tan	Yankai	diary,	and	challenge	the	conventional	history.	Xiao	Chengchi’s	murder	becomes	a	
function	of	Tan’s	own	attempt	to	secure	control	over	Pingjiang,	again	suggesting	the	political	
savvy	of	the	seeming	bookworm.	There	is	mention	of	Tan’s	indifference	to	the	national	scene,	
but	this	is	contradicted	by	the	other	sources,	and	seems	to	be	an	inaccurate	characterization.	
Zhao	Hengti	appears	to	be	entirely	without	blame:	the	mutiny	and	exile	of	Tan	are	attributed	to	
factionalism	on	the	part	of	Cheng	Qian’s	subordinates	as	well	as	KMT	agents	sent	from	
Guangzhou.	This	is	not	the	triumph	of	wu	over	wen,	but	rather	the	intersection	of	material	
concerns	over	salary	with	factional	infighting.	
	
Zhao	Hengti’s	Declarations	of	Innocence	
Unsurprisingly,	Zhao	Hengti’s	oral	history	denies	any	guilt	in	arranging	for	Tan’s	
departure.	He	agrees	with	many	of	the	details	given	by	Tao	and	the	other	oral	histories,	but	
blames	the	forces	who	had	been	loyal	to	Cheng	Qian.	Tan	appears	to	have	made	the	decision	to	
flee	on	his	own,	without	pressure	from	his	erstwhile	allies.	According	to	Zhao,		
After	 the	Hunan	army	had	 retaken	 the	province,	 and	engaged	 in	a	program	of	
restoring	 peace	 and	 constructing	 roads,	 an	 undercurrent	 of	 conflict	 began	 to	
emerge	 in	 Changsha.	 The	 old	 forces	 under	 Cheng	 Qian	 agitated	 for	 the	
                                                
23	Lin	Zhiyu	林支宇.	“林君支宇請收回成議另舉賢能文	[Letter	from	Lin	Zhiyu	Requesting	Withdrawal	of	
Agreement	and	Other	Elections	for	Talented	and	Virtuous]”	in	Hunan	Provincial	Archives	file	23-1-28:	參議會四至
六臨時會報告書	(第二本公文),	1920-1924	[Written	Reports	of	the	Temporary	Representative	Body,	Books	Four	
Through	Six:	Official	Documents,	Volume	Two]	Hunan	Provincial	Archives,	Changsha,	Hunan,	People’s	Republic	of	
China:	350.	Original:		“組公毅然引退以讓賢能。去志既堅，挽留無術，於是敝會有選舉臨時省長選舉會之舉”	
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replacement	of	Tan	as	head	of	government	by	their	old	leader	Cheng.	As	a	result,	
the	subordinates	of	Tan	did	not	have	a	peaceful	relationship	with	these	elements	
of	 Cheng	 Qian’s	 old	 forces,	 and	 several	 politicians	 brokered	 intrigue.	 A	 frosty	
relationship	 soon	 developed	 between	 the	 two	 sides.	 In	 Liling’s	 sixth	 zone,	
garrison	commander	Li	 Zhonglin	was	previously	an	officer	 loyal	 to	Cheng	Qian,	
and	plotted	to	seek	the	overthrow	of	Tan	by	 instigating	a	mutiny.	He	started	a	
mutiny	and	killed	Lingling	garrison	commander	Xiao	Changchi,	a	subordinate	of	
Tan,	 in	Pingjiang.	Tan	had	no	way	to	make	peace	 in	that	region,	and	so	retired	
and	 fled	 to	Shanghai,	ordering	me	 to	 take	 the	post	of	 commander-in-chief.	He	
also	 assigned	 governmental	 affairs	 bureau	 chief	 Lin	 Zhiyu	 to	 the	 post	 of	
provincial	 governor,	 and	 thus	 separated	 out	 the	 civil	 and	military	 functions	 of	
government.24	
	
In	this	version	of	events,	Zhao	seems	to	be	little	more	than	an	innocent	bystander,	stuck	
between	the	Tan	and	Cheng	factions.	There	is	also	an	allusion	to	‘several	politicians’	brokering	
intrigue,	which	is	a	possible	reference	to	the	successful	efforts	of	Zhou	Zhenlin	and	other	KMT	
agents	to	create	discord.	Furthermore,	he	positions	himself	as	a	close	and	loyal	friend	to	Tan,	
even	claiming	that	Tan	ordered	him	to	take	over	the	top	military	position,	which	he	only	
accepted	under	protest.	Zhao’s	supposed	reluctance	to	assume	power	echoes	similar	actions	by	
Tan	in	1911,	when	he	demurred	to	Jiao	Dafeng’s	desire	to	become	governor	after	the	
revolution.	Though	both	employed	the	traditional	rhetoric	demonstrating	modesty	and	an	
aversion	to	authority,	their	eventual	elevation	to	high	office	strong	suggests	shows	that	this	was	
merely	a	mask	for	their	ambitions.	More	importantly,	it	shows	that	both	were	part	of	the	same	
cultural	circle	with	norms	that	prioritized	wen-style	politeness	over	naked	expressions	of	
ambition.	
	 It	is	in	this	capacity	as	his	loyal	friend	that	Zhao	describes	Tan,	in	a	way	that	is	both	
sympathetic	and	critical.	According	to	Zhao,	Tan	was	well	suited	for	politics.	Firstly,	he	was	of	a	
pleasant	disposition,	rarely	angry	or	upset.	Second,	his	interpersonal	skills	were	also	quite	good:	
no	matter	who	he	was	with,	he	knew	how	to	treat	them	with	courtesy	and	kindness.	His	near-
photographic	recall,	attention	to	detail,	and	energy	were	good	for	remembering	names	and	
receiving	guests.	Third,	he	was	also	skilled	at	managing	administrative	tasks	like	commenting	on	
memos	and	responding	to	telegrams.	Finally,	his	genuine	humility	regarding	these	talents	
meant	that	he	was	respected	and	admired	by	all.	Zhao	even	goes	so	far	as	to	favorably	compare	
Tan	to	his	mentor	Cai	E,	the	Hunanese	general	who	had	been	a	key	opponent	of	Yuan	Shikai’s	
attempt	to	become	emperor.	Given	the	respect	that	Zhao	had	for	Cai,	this	was	extremely	high	
praise.25	
                                                
24	Zhao,	“Interview,”	60-61.	Original:	湘軍既光復全省，原可從此走上安定建設之坦途，孰料省城又醖釀政爭
之暗潮。程潛舊部，方謀排擠譚公而迎程返湘主持省政。因此譚公部屬，遂與程潛舊部不睦，再益以若干
政客之從中搆搧，雙方遂成冰炭。駐紮醴陵之第六區守備隊司令李仲麟為程潛舊將，	圖謀驅譚尤急，竟發
動兵變，却殺譚公親信之零陵鎮守使蕭昌熾於平山，譚公無法安其位，乃引退赴滬，而令余代理湘軍總司
令，派政務廳長林支宇代理省長，分綰軍民兩政。	
25	Ibid.,	70-1.	
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	 Yet	the	image	of	Tan	in	these	interviews	was	not	entirely	positive.	Describing	the	
infighting	between	the	various	Hunanese	generals	in	1920,	Zhao	claims	that	Cheng	Qian	had	
been	“seduced	by	politicians	into	making	a	mistake,	and	seeking	a	negotiated	secret	peace.”	
When	word	of	such	appeasement	was	leaked,	Cheng	was	forced	to	resign.26	The	Chinese	word	
he	uses	here	for	politicians,	政客	[zhengke],	is	traditionally	one	that	is	employed	to	disparage	
bureaucrats;	here,	Zhao	is	making	the	claim	that	Cheng	might	have	been	able	to	retain	power	in	
Hunan	were	it	not	for	the	machinations	of	the	bureaucrats	and	politicians	who	supposedly	
supported	him.		
While	it	is	unclear	who	these	“politicians”	might	be,	there	are	hints	that	Zhao	was	
referring	here	to	Tan	Yankai.	This	only	other	time	the	term	“politician”	is	used	again	during	the	
interview	is	when	Zhao	was	describing	Tan’s	unsuccessful	efforts	to	court	the	former	
subordinates	of	Cheng	Qian	to	his	side.	After	Cheng’s	resignation,	Tan	did	his	best	to	appeal	for	
the	support	of	these	officers,	but	failed	because	his	character	as	a	politician	did	not	mix	with	
theirs	as	military	men.27	This	is	but	one	example	of	how	Zhao	complicated	his	praise	of	Tan:	not	
only	does	Tan	fail	in	this	instance	to	leverage	his	interpersonal	talents	to	win	over	Cheng’s	
former	commanders,	as	he	supposedly	successfully	did	with	many	others,	but	there	are	also	
hints,	within	Zhao’s	commentary,	that	Cheng’s	circle	saw	through	his	flattery	and	suspected	
Tan’s	hidden	aspirations.	
Thus,	Zhao’s	description	of	Tan	is	neither	fully	critical	nor	fully	hagiographical.	Instead	of	
a	villain	or	a	hero,	Tan	appears	to	be	something	in	between,	which	might	be	the	more	realistic	
interpretation	of	his	character	and	actions.	Tan’s	ability	to	flatter	and	build	personal	
relationships	was	clearly	a	talent	which	had	helped	advance	his	career,	but	there	also	appeared	
to	be	limits	to	how	effectively	he	could	deploy	this	skill.	In	this	sense,	Tan’s	knack	for	forging	
alliances	and	compromises	may	have	enabled	him	to	transcend	his	traditional	background,	but	
it	also	seems	to	have	circumscribed	his	rise	and	capacity	to	enact	meaningful	change.	Since	his	
ability	to	influence	others	was	founded	upon	his	skill	at	brokering	compromise	and	making	
others	feel	good	about	themselves,	then	he	had	far	more	difficulty	inspiring	others	towards	the	
sort	of	vision	of	the	future	that	more	successful	leaders	used	as	the	base	of	their	power.	Zhao’s	
nuanced	description	of	Tan’s	“politician”	skills	captures	this	ambiguity	well.	
	
Letters	from	Zhao	to	Tan	
	 Notwithstanding	his	subtle	and	nuanced	criticisms	of	Tan,	Zhao	himself	also	
demonstrated	many	of	these	‘politician’	skills	as	he	tried	to	reach	out	to	Tan	after	1920.	After	
Tan’s	resignation,	Zhao	eventually	became	the	civil	and	military	governor,	in	addition	to	the	
Hunan	Army’s	commander-in-chief,	while	Tan	retired	to	Shanghai.	In	spite	of	this	difference	in	
status,	Zhao	maintained	a	respectful	and	nearly	reverent	tone	suggesting	the	persistence	of	a	
relationship	between	the	two,	as	elites	embedded	in	a	network	of	shared	norms.	These	letters	
were	conveyed	through	trusted	intermediaries:	for	example,	a	July	8	letter	refers	to	Zhong	Boyi	
as	the	person	bearing	the	letter,	and	who	will	accurately	convey	information	back	to	Zhao.28	
                                                
26	Ibid.,	58.	Original:	誤受政客蠱惑，陰主議和	
27	Ibid.,	60.	Original:	益以政客搆煽,雙方遂成水火	
28	Letter	from	Zhao	to	Tan,	dated	July	8,	“請伯毅面陳”	This	and	other	letters	can	all	be	found	in	the	Kuo	Ting-i	
Library,	Institute	of	Modern	History,	Academia	Sinica,	Taiwan.	
		 104	
This	is	the	same	Zhong	whose	oral	history	is	recounted	above,	and	whose	name	occurs	
numerous	times	in	Tan’s	diary	in	a	positive	way,	so	it	does	not	seem	possible	that	he	would	also	
participate	in	some	sort	of	large-scale	conspiracy	against	Tan.	The	transmission	of	these	letters	
by	such	intermediaries	ensures	at	least	the	appearance	of	mutual	affection.	Words	of	contempt	
or	impertinence	on	the	part	of	one	to	the	other	would	be	rapidly	shared	among	the	peer	
network.	Similarly,	the	content	of	these	letters	shows	the	assumption	of	obligation	and	
responsibility:	what	one	does,	or	does	not	do,	to	or	for	the	other	seems	would	also	be	well	
known.	These	letters,	in	short,	suggest	how	traditional	rituals	and	rhetoric	of	affinity	continued	
to	persist	during	this	period	of	political	turmoil,	challenging	the	conventional	history	of	the	
warlord	era	as	popularized	by	Tao	Juyin.	 	
One	example	in	particular	demonstrates	this	intersection	through	the	request	of	a	favor.	
In	an	April	11	letter,	Zhao	Hengti	asked	Tan	Yankai	to	look	after	his	younger	brother,	Zhao	
Hengjing	(also	known	as	Zhao	Junmai,	1901-1988),	before	the	latter	left	Shanghai	to	study	in	
America.	29	Furthermore,	Tan’s	diary	for	April	19	of	the	same	year	also	described	this	
encounter.30	The	fact	that	the	elder	Zhao	asked	his	predecessor	for	this	favor	speaks	to	the	
networks	of	obligation	and	indebtedness	in	which	these	elites	operated.	
	 The	inclusion	of	personal	matters	within	these	letters	also	suggested	obedience	to	a	
certain	system	of	norms	that	compelled	at	least	the	appearance	of	affection	and	friendship	
between	the	two,	regardless	of	the	complications	of	their	internal	feelings.	In	a	letter	dated	
August	29,	Zhao	complained	about	his	foot	disease,	and	describes	its	painful	recurrence	in	spite	
of	treatment	with	Chinese	medicine.	He	then	inquired	after	an	illness	from	which	Tan	was	
apparently	suffering,	and	inquired	if	he	had	fully	recovered	yet.31	This	is	a	particular	sort	of	
rhetoric,	affected	or	otherwise,	that	signified	close	intimacy	and	friendship;	details	about	foot	
fungus	are	rarely	shared	among	mere	colleagues	rather	than	friends.	The	same	can	be	said	
about	the	gifts	that	they	exchanged:	in	that	August	29	letter,	Zhao	stated	that	he	was	moved	by	
Tan’s	gift	of	a	refrigerator	and	food,32	and	sent	an	electric	plate	along	with	the	December	6	
letter.33	Why	would	Zhao	pose	these	questions	and	offer	these	gifts	to	Tan,	the	man	whose	
removal	from	office	he	allegedly	engineered	not	two	years	prior?	Does	this	call	into	question	
his	culpability,	or	is	this	some	sort	of	Machiavellian	scheme	to	lull	his	rival	into	quiescence?		(If	
the	latter,	it	would	appear	as	though	Tan	retained	great	influence	in	Hunan,	even	after	his	
humiliating	departure.)	More	interestingly,	if	we	step	away	from	the	question	about	what	
happened	in	November	of	1920,	it	might	be	useful	to	think	that	the	tone	of	caring	and	empathy	
upon	which	these	phrases	is	something	mandatory	that	elites	like	Zhao	were	supposed	to	
exhibit.	
	 The	same	point	can	be	made	when	considering	Zhao’s	continued	pleading	for	Tan	to	
return	to	Hunan:	it	strains	credulity	to	think	that	Zhao	would	urge	precisely	the	opposite	of	
what	he	supposedly	plotted,	is	it	therefore	merely	another	example	of	following	the	obligatory	
                                                
29	Letter	from	Zhao	to	Tan,	dated	April	11:	“舍弟恆憼赴美留學定五月七日由滬放洋特令晋謁乞訓誨”	Though	no	
year	is	given,	we	know	from	the	“Database	of	Research	on	Culture	of	Chinese	Studying	Abroad”	that	Zhao	Junmai	
graduated	from	the	University	of	Wisconsin	in	1926,	suggesting	that	the	letter	was	sent	in	1922.	
30	Tan	Yankai	Diary,	April	19,	1922:	“趙恆憼來，夷午之弟也，將赴美留學，與談久之去。”	
31	Letter	from	Zhao	to	Tan,	August	29:	“近因足疾復發頗以為苦中藥雖效然時有反覆鈞座亦患此疾近已愈否”	
32	Ibid.:	“承賜制冰器食品心感無既”	
33	Letter	from	Zhao	to	Tan,	dated	December	6:	“仲奎兄邊部承贈電爐心感之至”	
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forms?	Examples	of	this	include	a	letter	dated	November	5,	in	which	he	vehemently	disagrees	
with	a	previous	statement	of	Tan’s	regarding	low	probability	of	returning.34	In	another	letter,	
dated	August	29,	Zhao	wrote	that	he	wished	for	Tan	to	return	to	Hunan	so	as	to	offer	him	
guidance	on	everything.35	Again,	these	words	might	be	merely	rhetorical,	and	Zhao	might	be	
attempting	to	deceive	Tan,	as	well	as	other	potential	readers	of	the	letter,	into	thinking	that	he	
has	been	always	been	an	ally	and	friend.	Indeed,	those	like	Mao,	Huang,	and	Yao	who	argue	
that	Zhao	betrayed	Tan	might	use	these	statements	as	evidence	to	support	their	claims,	and	
that	this	deception	demonstrates	how	nefarious	Zhao	could	be.	Whatever	the	case	might	be;	it	
is	instead	more	fruitful	to	step	back	and	use	these	letters	to	examine	the	norms	that	men	like	
Zhao	and	Tan	had	to	support—at	least	in	appearance,	if	not	in	substance.		
	 That	being	said,	these	unpublished	letters	challenge	the	conventional	narratives	of	
betrayal	and	factionalism	that	authors	like	Tao	Juyin	present,	and	show	that	Tan	and	Zhao	
continued	to	practice	the	traditional	cultural	behaviors	of	the	late	Qing	elite.	Their	persistence	
in	continuing	these	customs	suggests	their	separation	from	the	concerns	of	the	common	
soldiers	whose	dissatisfaction	prompted	Tan’s	resignation.	Moreover,	this	also	suggests	an	
unwillingness	to	change	their	personas	to	conform	to	the	emerging	mass	politics	of	the	era	and	
appeal	to	broader	concerns	like	ideology.	Instead,	they	seem	content	to	continue	to	ground	
their	influence	in	personal	relationships	and	elite	networks,	as	if	the	political	conditions	had	not	
dramatically	changed.	
	
Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	challenged	the	conventional	history	of	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny	and	
subsequent	transition	of	power	from	Tan	to	Zhao	by	using	unpublished	materials	to	show	how	
their	relationship	persisted	after	what	was	supposedly	an	acrimonious	split.	As	demonstrated	in	
Chapter	Four,	historians	have	typically	seen	this	event	as	a	betrayal	of	Tan	by	Zhao,	
exemplifying	the	manner	in	which	the	traditions	of	the	late	Qing	elite	quickly	devolved	into	
open	rivalry	for	power.	Yet	the	letters	sent	by	Zhao	as	well	as	Tan’s	own	diary	suggests	that	
their	relationship	remained	cordial	in	years	after,	and	that	Tan	was	targeted	for	the	same	sort	
of	retroactive	critique	by	the	provincial	state	that	former	governors	Tang	Xiangming	and	Zhang	
Jingyao	had	received.	This	is	not	to	definitively	argue	that	Zhao	was	not	a	factor	in	Tan’s	
departure,	since	the	sincerity	of	their	relationship	is	not	something	that	can	be	discerned	from	
these	materials.	Yet	what	is	important	is	the	rhetoric	of	courtesy	that	continued	to	link	them,	
and	preserved	their	standing	within	the	network	of	relationships	in	which	they	were	embedded.	
What,	then,	is	gained	by	this	chapter’s	analysis	of	these	unpublished	sources	and	oral	
histories?	First,	thinking	of	these	leaders	as	more	similar	than	different	challenges	the	dominant	
narrative’s	emphasis	on	warlord	rule	supplanting	civilian	administration.	The	mutiny	that	
precipitated	Tan’s	fall	from	power	occurred	because	of	the	factional	infighting	that	was	
endemic	to	the	political	culture	of	the	early	republic—and	was	arguably	present	during	the	
imperial	era	before	and	the	communist	era	afterwards.	The	transition	from	Tan	to	Zhao	did	not	
mark	the	betrayal	of	civilian	ideals	by	a	military	menace.	
                                                
34	Letter	from	Zhao	to	Tan,	dated	November	5:	“我公不能返湘之說惕极不謂然時局”	
35	Letter	from	Zhao	to	Tan,	dated	August	29:	“亟盼鈞座回湘指示一切此尤恆惕所私心切禱者也”	
		 106	
Second,	thinking	of	figures	like	Tan	and	Zhao	as	embedded	within	particular	networks	
instead	of	as	free-floating	actors	constitutes	a	challenge	to	the	narrative	of	individualistic	
warlords	fighting	amongst	themselves	for	power.	All	of	these	figures	are	linked;	what	one	does	
in	Changsha	is	made	known	within	days	in	Beijing	or	Shanghai.	The	efforts	of	Guangzhou-based	
KMT	agents	seem	important	for	explaining	why	Tan	was	exiled.	Moreover,	scattered	within	the	
letters	from	Zhao	are	references	to	prominent	figures	like	Chen	Jiongming,	Liang	Qichao,	and	
Liang	Shiyi	(1869-1933),	suggesting	that	figures	of	this	stature	cannot	truly	operate	
independently.	Instead,	they	must	build	coalitions	and	maintain	certain	moral	standards	in	
order	to	win	the	support	of	others.	This	shows	how	ethical	behavior	mattered	for	these	elites.	
Even	the	most	negative	interpretation	of	Zhao	needs	to	acknowledge	the	fact	that	he	could	not	
openly	admit	betraying	Tan,	signaling	the	existence	of	some	sort	of	understood	and	shared	
morality	that	he	could	not	overtly	defy	in	order	to	maintain	the	respect	of	those	around	him.		
Furthermore,	his	letters	to	Tan	in	the	years	following	1920	illustrate	the	traditional	
culture	in	which	they	were	embedded,	and	that	seemed	increasingly	detached	from	the	
concerns	of	the	majority.	Three	of	the	norms	characterizing	this	culture	can	be	easily	discerned	
from	these	letters:	an	evident	and	personal	caring	for	one’s	peers,	a	willingness	to	do	favors,	
and	the	employment	of	a	respectful	and	humble	tone.	In	this	light,	it	is	worth	repeating	here	
how	Zhao	characterized	Tan	in	his	oral	history:	“his	ability	to	connect	with	others	was	just	going	
through	the	motions.	He	believed	in	the	importance	of	planning	instead.”36	Perhaps	this	
suggests	Tan’s	rejection,	intentional	or	otherwise,	of	what	his	peers	understood	to	be	the	
proper	attitude.	Zhao	makes	him	seem	as	though	he	was	simply	unable	or	unwilling	to	respond	
to	the	others	in	his	network	in	a	way	that	engendered	loyalty.	The	insinuations	by	Zhou	Zhenlin	
and	his	KMT	colleagues	of	Tan’s	indifference	to	the	larger	national	picture	are	another	example	
of	this	critique:	this	callous	disregard	justifies	their	conspiracy	to	remove	him	from	power.	
Appreciating	the	importance	of	“proper”	rhetoric	and	behavior	suggests	how	elites	
aspiring	to	power	in	late	Qing	and	early	Republican	China	believed	that	they	needed	to	perform	
in	their	interactions	with	their	peers.	Tan,	Zhao,	and	their	counterparts	across	the	nation	were	
enabled	by	this	political	culture	and	these	networks	to	power	during	the	early	years	of	the	
republic.	As	such,	they	had	neither	the	incentive	nor	the	capacity	to	adapt	to	the	new	mass	
politics	that	emerge	in	subsequent	years,	Later	leaders	like	Sun	Yatsen,	Chiang	Kaishek,	or	Mao	
Zedong,	being	outsiders	to	this	culture,	were	better	able	to	adapt	their	methods	to	the	new	
mass	politics	and	begin	to	speak	to	broader	ideological	concerns	that	entailed	more	radical	
transformations	of	Chinese	society.	Elites	like	Tan	and	Zhao,	regardless	of	their	more	modest	
contributions	to	provincial	governance,	were	relegated	to	secondary	roles	as	a	consequence.	
	
                                                
36	Zhao,	“Interview,”	71.	Original:	“對人絕不敷衍，作事最重計劃步驟”	
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Epilogue:	Memories,	Politics,	and	Lives	
	
This	dissertation	has	made	three	main	historiographical	interventions.	First,	it	has	
demonstrated	that	the	Pingjiang	mutiny	was	not	an	example	of	warlordism’s	triumph	over	
civilian	rule.	Conventional	histories	typically	interpret	this	event	as	exemplifying	the	moment	
when	wu	fully	replaced	wen,	and	militarist	anarchy	descended	upon	China.	This	is	an	
oversimplification,	as	rhetoric,	courtesy,	and	other	‘proper’	standards	of	behavior	that	should	
be	categorized	as	wen	were	important	for	establishing	and	maintaining	power	during	this	time.	
Second,	it	has	shown	how	one	element	of	wen—traditional	elite	culture	from	the	late	
Qing—persisted	through	the	years	of	“Warlord	Era”	in	such	a	way	that	detached	men	like	Tan	
Yankai	and	Zhao	Hengti	from	the	larger	social	concerns	facing	the	Chinese	masses.	The	same	
background	that	empowered	these	elites	during	the	early	years	of	the	republic	prevented	them	
from	adapting	to	the	mass	politics	that	would	emerge	in	the	1920s.	Tan	was	exiled	after	the	
Pingjiang	mutiny	more	because	he	did	not	adequately	respond	to	the	demands	of	his	
subordinates,	and	not	because	Zhao	pushed	him	out,	as	the	conventional	histories	claim.	
This	connects	to	this	dissertation’s	third	intervention:	a	reexamination	and	
recontextualization	of	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny	that	shows	the	constructed	nature	of	
historical	writing	about	China’s	early	republic.	Immensely	influential,	both	Li	Jiannong’s	Political	
History	and	Tao	Juyin’s	Anecdotes	implicitly	commented	on	the	period	through	their	historical	
narratives.	Li	critiqued	those	interested	in	gradual	reform	in	favor	of	valorizing	those	advocating	
for	complete	political	revolution:	an	ironic	predisposition	given	his	own	past	advocacy	for	
federalism,	but	an	understandable	position	to	promote	as	an	intellectual	during	the	KMT	rule.	
Similarly,	Tao	Juyin	portrays	the	era	as	amoral	and	chaotic,	with	various	elites	forging	and	
breaking	alliances	in	a	competition	to	establish	hegemony	over	the	nation;	he	emphasizes	this	
aspect	of	the	“Warlord	Era”	in	order	to	highlight	the	ideological	unity	of	post-1949	China.	
Although	historians	readily	acknowledge	the	constructed	nature	of	narratives	as	a	general	
principle,	we	have	inherited	Li	and	Tao’s	interpretive	frameworks	too	uncritically.	We	still	think	
of	the	“Warlord	Era”	as	solely	a	time	of	anarchy	and	villainy.	
Why	is	it	so	difficult	to	be	critical	of	these	stereotypes	of	the	“Warlord	Era”?	The	reasons	
rest	in	the	ways	that	we	understand	the	evolutionary	movement	of	history,	in	terms	of	space,	
time,	and	particular	consequences	or	endpoints.	First,	in	terms	of	space,	certain	places	have	
been	deemed	“modern”	or	“progressive”	and	others	“backwards”	or	“conservative.”	Hunan’s	
constitutional	experiments	in	the	early	twentieth	century	demonstrate	that	a	confluence	of	
ideas	created	“progressive”	possibilities	in	a	“backwards”	space	that	are	beyond	that	linear	
binary.	Second,	in	terms	of	time,	not	only	were	certain	people	mischaracterized	as	either	wen	
or	wu,	but	certain	periods	have	been	exaggerated	as	either	wen	or	wu.	The	“Warlord	Period”	is	
one	of	these,	caricatured	as	a	militarized,	wu	period.	Based	upon	traditional	Chinese	
historiographical	tropes,	the	struggle	between	wen	and	wu,	as	well	as	the	idea	that	periods	of	
disunity	must	be	followed	by	unification,	lock	our	conception	of	China	into	a	fixed	image	that	is	
difficult	to	escape.		
China’s	revolutions	have	been	embedded	within	a	paradigm	that	traditional	society	
needed	to	be	transcended.	While	Tan’s	failures	to	adapt	to	mass	politics	suggest	the	truth	of	
this	statement,	this	revolutionary	framework	has	overwhelmingly	become	the	dominant	lens	
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through	which	Chinese	history	is	currently	interpreted,	and	erased	possible	alternatives	for	how	
the	early	republic	should	be	understood.	This	has	made	the	valorization	of	the	strong	
centralized	state	by	“revolutionary”	historians	a	far	more	conservative	and	retrograde	paradigm	
when	compared	to	more	innovative	proposals	like	federalism,	that	were	promoted	by	elites	like	
Li	Jiannong	or	Tan	Yankai	in	a	way	that	was	not	amenable	to	mass	politics.	This	conclusion	will	
help	to	explain	how	and	why	these	threads	of	space	and	time,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	mutiny,	
contributed	to	interpretive	frameworks	of	revolutionary	disparagement	of	the	period.	A	
comparative	focus	on	literature	and	fiction	will	also	highlight	the	constructed	nature	of	
narrative.	
	
Zhao	Hengti:	the	Ostensible	Victor	
	 Examining	the	aftermath	of	1920,	it	is	clear	that	the	Hunan	mutiny	was	crucial	for	
shaping	the	four	lives	who	are	the	focus	of	this	dissertation.	Immediately	afterwards,	it	
appeared	as	though	Zhao	Hengti	had	emerged	as	the	victor.	Following	the	mutiny,	he	
imprisoned	and	executed	those	responsible,	including	Li	Zhonglin.1	As	governor	of	Hunan	for	
the	following	six	years,	he	oversaw	the	passage	of	the	provincial	constitution	and	his	formal	
election	to	the	highest	political	office.2	He	was	relatively	successful	in	quelling	domestic	
disturbances	on	the	part	of	labor	activists	as	well	as	insurgent	communists,	and	he	led	an	
invasion	force	into	Hubei	under	the	pretense	of	rescuing	its	people	from	their	governor,	Wang	
Zhanyuan	(1861-1934).	This	expedition	overextended	his	troops	and	incited	an	attack	by	
northern	forces	led	by	Wu	Peifu,	but	he	was	able	to	retreat	and	mount	a	successful	defense.	In	
spite	of	the	continual	threat	of	invasion	from	north	or	south	that	required	half	of	provincial	
revenues	to	be	earmarked	for	to	the	military,	Zhao	was	able	to	financially	support	a	number	of	
infrastructural	programs,	including	road	construction,	entrepreneurial	efforts	like	a	spinning	
mill,	and	the	founding	of	Hunan	University.3	
	 Yet	the	political	turmoil	that	had	seemingly	ended	in	1920	was	soon	to	return:	in	1923,	
rumors	began	to	circulate	that	Tan	Yankai	was	plotting	to	retake	the	province.	According	to	
Zhao,	he	had	been	maintaining	close	communications	with	Tan,	and	had	even	sent	letters	
asking	him	to	come	back	to	become	governor	again	once	the	constitution	had	been	ratified	by	
the	provincial	assembly.4	Tan	supposedly	refused	this	invitation,	and	asked	Zhao	to	continue	in	
his	place.	But	because	intermediaries	interrupted	their	correspondence,	Zhao	was	apparently	
unable	to	defuse	the	crisis,	leading	to	the	fracture	of	the	fragile	peace	that	had	existed	since	
1920,	and	to	open	war	between	the	two	former	allies	that	Tan	would	lose.5	Those	who	had	
                                                
1	Huang	Yi’ou,	“Memories”	
2	The	text	of	the	Hunan	Provincial	Constitution	can	be	found	in	Miao	Quanji		[Miao	Ch’uan-chi]	繆全吉，	中國制憲
史資料彙編—憲法篇	[Collection	of	Documents	and	Data	in	Relation	to	the	History	of	the	Chinese	Constitution],	
(Taipei,	Taiwan:	Academia	Historica,	1991),	781-837.	
3	Zhao,	“Interview,”	66.	It	is	worth	nothing	that	Chang	P’eng-yuan	estimates	provincial	military	expenses	
constituted	80%	of	revenues,	Chang,	P’eng-yuan,	[Zhang	Pengyuan]	“The	Enactment	and	Enforcement	of	the	
Provincial	Constitution	in	Hunan,	1920-1925,”	in	Symposium	on	the	History	of	the	Republic	of	China,	Vol.	2	(Taipei,	
Taiwan:	China	Cultural	Service,	1981):	533-580.	
4	Presumably	these	are	the	letters	referred	to	in	Chapter	Five;	Zhao	even	makes	reference	to	the	fact	that	they	still	
exist	and	can	be	consulted.	
5	Zhao,	“Interview,”	69.	Original:	余屡電譚公返湘主政，而電訊均爲衡陽謝國光所截，故始終未獲電訊。	
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supported	Zhao	were	placed	into	positions	of	military	and	political	importance,	including	Tang	
Shengzhi	(1899-1970),	who	would	himself	rise	up	against	Zhao	in	1926.	Zhao,	supposedly	tired	
of	infighting	among	former	comrades,	retired	from	public	life	to	Shanghai.	He	eventually	
followed	the	KMT	to	Taiwan	in	1949,	where	he	would	live	out	the	remainder	of	his	days,	
studying	Buddhism	and	practicing	calligraphy.	He	died	in	Taipei	in	1971.6	
	 It	is	hard	to	take	Zhao’s	version	of	these	post-1920	events	at	face	value.	His	excuse	for	
Tan’s	continued	exile	was	that	the	constitution	prevented	his	return;	he	also	claimed	that	the	
breakdown	in	their	relationship	that	led	to	battles	between	their	supporters	in	1923	was	
caused	by	jealous	intermediaries.	These	justifications	are	self-serving,	there	is	little	else	to	
support	his	claims,	and	it	is	hard	to	imagine	how	their	relationship	could	deteriorate	so	rapidly	
without	at	least	some	culpability	on	his	part.	Decades	later,	Zhao	lamented	that	Tan	was	never	
able	to	return	to	Hunanese	politics:	a	lament	that	rings	oddly	false	given	this	1923	conflict.7	
	 It	was	Zhao’s	actions	in	1923,	rather	than	the	mutiny	of	1920,	that	help	to	explain	the	
historical	judgement	that	he,	as	a	wu	military	man,	had	replaced	the	wen	civilian	bureaucrat	
Tan.	Zhao	cynically	used	of	the	law	as	his	excuse	for	fighting	Tan	and	remaining	in	power,	
claiming	that	he	was	merely	obeying	the	will	of	the	people	and	defending	the	constitution.	Thus,	
Zhao’s	subsequent	treatment	of	Tan	had	ramifications	for	how	onlookers	adjudicated	Hunan’s	
experiments	with	constitutions	and	federalism.	This	is	most	clearly	demonstrated	in	the	
example	of	Li	Jiannong’s	increasingly	skeptical	and	disillusioned	attitude	towards	constitutions	
and	federalism	after	this	point.		
	
Li	Jiannong’s	Response	to	Zhao	Hengti:	Changing	Perspectives	on	
Constitutionalism	and	Federalism	
	 Li	evolved	from	actively	supporting	federalism	to	dismissing	reformers	as	regressive	
forces	from	a	bygone	era,	and	we	can	trace	this	process	through	his	actions	and	writings	from	
1920	to	1923.	In	1921,	Li	was	invited	to	chair	a	committee	charged	with	drafting	the	Hunan	
constitution.	The	process	took	roughly	one	year	before	the	document	was	revealed	to	the	
public	in	1922.	In	November	of	that	year,	Li	was	nominated	for	the	position	of	education	
department	director	for	Hunan	by	the	provincial	assembly,	and	he	assumed	the	role	in	
December.	He	was	then	elected	to	serve	as	the	chair	of	the	Provincial	Affairs	Council,	which	was	
effectively	a	provincial	premier-like	role	under	Zhao	Hengti.8		
It	was	in	the	summer	of	1922,	just	before	he	assumed	official	office	in	Hunan,	that	Li	
wrote	another	article	titled	“The	Issue	of	Unifying	the	Republic,”	a	sequel	to	his	two-part	essay	
from	1917.	In	it,	he	reiterated	his	argument	regarding	the	necessity	of	constitutional	federalism	
for	China.	Contrasting	the	fiction	of	China’s	unity	in	1922	with	the	reality	of	its	regional	
militarism	and	laughable	central	state,	Li	again	pressed	for	China	to	move	towards	a	federal	
system	in	order	to	achieve	true	unity.	
Yet	this	third	essay	displays	a	number	of	differences	from	its	two	predecessors.	The	
most	obvious	of	these	is	its	fixation	on	troop	disbandment	(裁兵),	which	is	how	the	essay	
begins.	In	his	1917	essay,	Li	had	written	that	the	military	was	an	obstacle	to	true	unity,	as	the	
                                                
6	Ibid.,	73.	Original:	不忍袍澤牺牲于內爭。	
7	Ibid.,	65.	Original:	譚公此時未能返湘，實爲一大憾事。	
8	Hua	Chu	“Li	Jiannong,”	61-65.	
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lack	of	central	authority	had	created	an	arms	race	between	the	various	militarists	who	were	
truly	controlling	China,	as	each	built	up	their	forces	in	order	to	compete	with	their	peers.	In	
1922,	he	built	upon	his	previous	claims,	arguing	that	peace	would	require	each	army	to	disband	
their	troops.	Since	none	would	be	willing	to	be	the	first	to	do	so,	the	stalemate	would	inevitably	
continue.	According	to	Li,	this	stalemate,	in	turn,	would	prevent	true	unity	from	occurring,	thus	
perpetuating	the	cycle.	Moreover,	Li	continued,	disbanding	these	troops	might	prove	to	be	
damaging	to	society:	in	an	economy	of	scare	resources,	and	even	scarcer	job	opportunities,	
disarmed	soldiers	frequently	resort	to	banditry	and	violence	in	order	to	earn	a	living.	Recalling	
how	Zhao	Hengti	and	Tan	Yankai	had	disbanded	much	of	the	Hunan	Army	after	1911,	Li	did	not	
have	to	look	to	contemporary	Europe	for	examples	of	the	dangers	of	military	disarmament	and	
widespread	unemployment.	
Another	key	difference	between	this	essay	and	its	predecessors	is	in	Li’s	apparent	
audience,	which	seems	to	be	more	aimed	at	a	non-elite	readership.	This	can	be	seen	in	his	use	
of	domestic	as	well	as	foreign	examples.	This	third	essay,	like	the	first	two,	draws	from	the	
knowledge	of	non-Chinese	political	systems	and	history	that	Li	likely	acquired	while	studying	
abroad.	However,	in	this	essay,	Li	inserts	many	more	references	to	specific	aspects	of	1922	
China	with	which	his	readers	would	presumably	be	familiar.	Among	these	are	descriptions	of	
the	behavior	of	militarists	like	Wu	Peifu	and	Lu	Yongxiang	(1867-1933).	Li	also	criticizes	both	the	
old	national	assembly	in	Beijing,	and	the	extraordinary	national	assembly	convened	in	
Guangzhou.	The	1922	essay	is	also	written	in	more	vernacular	Chinese	(白話)	compared	to	its	
1917	counterparts,	where	Li	uses	literary	Chinese	(文言文)	to	make	his	arguments.	This	change	
of	usage	both	speaks	to	the	overall	shift	in	language	and	discourse	heralded	by	the	1919	May	
Fourth	and	New	Culture	movements,	but	also	suggests	how	Li’s	intended	audience	may	have	
changed.	When	combined	with	his	inclusion	of	domestic	affairs	to	his	prior	method	of	foreign	
historical	precedents,	this	shift	in	his	language	pattern	suggests	Li	aims	this	1922	essay	at	a	
more	popular	audience	compared	to	his	1917	arguments,	suggesting	how	he	was	trying	to	alter	
his	arguments	to	better	fit	mass	party	politics.	
The	third,	and	perhaps	most	important	difference	between	the	Li	writing	in	1922	and	
the	Li	writing	in	1917	is	his	changed	perspective	on	the	efficacy	of	legal	theory.	In	1917,	he	put	
forward	extremely	theoretical	proposals	for	implementing	federalism	in	China,	as	if	he	were	
trying	to	persuade	his	elite	readership	to	spontaneously	institute	this	new	system	in	their	own	
political	lives.	By	contrast,	the	Li	of	1922	is	far	more	pragmatic	in	his	method,	explicitly	
responding	to	those	who	argue	for	the	necessity	of	proper	legal	procedures	and	representation	
to	establish	a	constitution.	The	discussions	about	federalism	thus	helped	to	inform	his	sense	of	
possible	counterarguments.	But	instead	of	having	debates	about	the	legality	of	a	constitutional	
convention,	or	whether	to	include	previously	elected	representatives	from	one	of	the	two	
extant	national	assemblies,	Li	writes	that	what	is	most	important	is	simply	establishing	that	
constitution.	
In	discussing	Li’s	critique	of	those	who	overly	focus	upon	legal	theory,	it	is	important	to	
clarify	that	he	is	not	against	the	necessary	role	of	legal	institutions	for	moving	China	towards	
unity.	For	him,	a	legal	document	like	a	constitution	will	serve	as	the	fundamental	political	
authority	that	will	preserve	the	peace	between	regions,	enable	the	discharge	of	troops,	and	end	
the	fighting	that	China	was	experiencing	in	1922.	His	critique	of	an	overemphasis	on	legal	
theory,	in	contrast,	is	aimed	at	those	who	want	to	make	sure	whatever	new	structures	of	
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government	emerge	are	legally	enabled	by	currently	extant	institutions.	For	Li,	this	is	a	non-
starter;	the	Beiyang	regime	and	the	old	national	assembly	are	overly	fixated	on	following	
traditional	paths	of	military	conquest,	so	whatever	national	unity	they	might	create	would	be	
nominal	and	not	substantive.	China	should	instead	look	to	the	history	of	other	nations	in	
convening	a	constitutional	convention:	he	points	out	that	the	United	States	successfully	held	
one	in	more	than	one	hundred	years	ago,	and	the	French	Third	Republic	had	done	so	as	well.	Li	
finds	inspiration	in	nations	without	formal	constitutions,	like	Great	Britain,	who	are	able	to	
pragmatically	deal	with	contemporary	political	circumstances.		
Li	was	thus	advocating	for	a	particular	legal	position	somewhere	on	the	spectrum	
between	obedience	to	the	law	at	all	times	and	pragmatic	compliance	with	the	law	only	when	it	
is	effective.	The	ideal	of	a	properly	working	political	structure	is	what	Li	was	working	towards	in	
1922,	but	he	was	not	so	naïve	as	to	be	blind	to	the	gap	between	that	ideal	and	reality.	For	him,	
fidelity	to	the	law	is	a	worthy	ultimate	goal,	but	only	instrumentally,	as	a	way	to	achieve	a	true	
unity	in	China.	But	that	was	probably	not	how	Li	himself	would	have	framed	the	issue;	
according	to	Li,	the	laws	are	only	worthy	of	obedience	when	they	are	either	just	or	effective;	
there	is	no	moral	obligation	to	the	law	in	itself.9	
Li’s	1922	cynicism	about	the	law,	in	sharp	contrast	to	his	optimism	from	1917,	suggests	
how	the	shift	in	his	political	circumstances	might	have	informed	a	transformation	in	his	attitude.	
Though	he	retained	his	enthusiasm	for	federalism,	his	complicated	position	concerning	when	
the	law	should	be	obeyed	hints	at	some	frustration	with	those	who	use	legal	and	political	
institutions	as	an	excuse	to	maintain	their	own	power,	perhaps	indicating	dissatisfaction	with	
Zhao	Hengti.	Li	would	resign	from	office	in	1924,	never	to	return	to	politics.	He	would	go	on	to	
write	Political	History,	teach	in	Wuhan,	and	support	a	number	of	philanthropic	activities	like	the	
construction	of	libraries	and	schools	in	his	home	county.	He	was	a	member	of	the	National	
Committee	of	the	Chinese	People’s	Consultative	Conference	after	1949,	and	died	in	Wuhan	in	
1963.10	
	
Tao	Juyin’s	Spatial	Politics:	Anecdotes	and	Other	Genres		
After	the	mutiny,	Li’s	fellow	historian	Tao	Juyin	went	on	to	become	a	prolific	journalist	
and	author.	His	works	included	biographies	of	military	figures,	essays	on	life	in	Shanghai	during	
World	War	II,	and	many	more.	His	work	often	followed	in	the	same	style	as	his	Anecdotes,	as	
demonstrated	by	his	biography	of	Yuan	Shikai,	Romance	of	Yuan	Shikai	[袁世凱演義]	that	
exposes	its	readers	to	private	conversations	between	its	key	actors,	in	a	way	that	suggests	
insider	information,	and	gives	his	readers	insight	into	the	motivations	and	personalities	of	these	
individuals,	as	if	he	had	firsthand	knowledge.11	However,	given	the	lack	of	evidence	that	Tao	
had	access	to	this	information,	as	well	as	the	propensity	for	journalists	in	Republican	China	to	
embellish	their	narratives	in	order	to	appeal	to	readers	and	address	larger	trends,	a	critical	eye	
is	required	when	reading	its	tales	of	heroism,	villainy,	loyalty,	and	betrayal.		
                                                
9	The	above	is	all	taken	from	Li	Jiannong	李劍農,	“Minguo	Tongyi	Wenti”	民國統一問題	[The	Issue	of	Unifying	the	
Republic]	in	Pacific	Magazine	[太平洋雜誌],	Vol.	3,	No.	7,	(1922):	1-10.	
10	Hua	Chu	“Li	Jiannong,”	61-65.	
11	Tao	Juyin	陶菊隐，	袁世凯演义	[Romance	of	Yuan	Shikai],	(Beijing:	Zhonghua	Shuju,	1979)	
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Anecdotes	is	only	one	example	of	how	stories	about	the	warlord	era	suffered	from	
sensationalism,	and	Tao	was	not	the	only	writer	who	purported	to	give	his	readers	a	glimpse	of	
what	life	was	like	beyond	their	city	or	town.	This	was	especially	true	for	writers	based	in	
Shanghai,	where	Tao	eventually	relocated	in	1936	to	become	editor	of	Xinwen	Bao	(新聞報).	
He	only	retired	from	journalism	after	1949,	when	he	became	the	deputy	director	of	the	
Shanghai	Research	Institute	of	Culture	and	History	(上海文史馆).	He	was	persecuted	during	the	
Cultural	Revolution	but	was	rehabilitated	before	passing	away	in	1989.12	
Given	the	importance	of	Tao’s	contribution	to	historical	narratives,	it	is	worth	briefly	
reflecting	on	the	genres	of	journalism,	history	writing,	and	fiction;	doing	so	helps	to	highlight	
the	role	of	space	in	constructed	historical	narratives.	Writers	with	Tao’s	background	would	
often	pen	stories	and	essays	that	described	their	hometowns	in	vivid	terms	that	have	since	
been	misinterpreted	as	thinly-veiled	chronicles	of	actual	events.	These	writings	were	incredibly	
Shanghai-oriented	in	perspective,	reflecting	the	background	of	so	many	of	these	writers,	who	
had	emigrated	from	their	supposedly	backward	and	traditional	hometowns	to	ply	their	trade	in	
the	nation’s	center	for	popular	culture.	Consequently,	histories	of	life	during	the	Republican	era,	
especially	of	places	outside	the	metropolitan	Shanghai	area,	have	been	heavily	informed	by	
these	works	of	literature.	This	has	the	effect	of	exacerbating	the	perceived	difference	between	
Shanghai	and	the	provinces,	distorting	subsequent	perceptions	of	how	truly	backwards	those	
places	were.	Being	a	native	Hunanese	residing	in	Shanghai,	Tao	is	a	clear	example	of	this	
group.13	
Another	is	Ba	Jin,	whose	vivid	literary	descriptions	of	complex	family	relationships	
Family	was,	and	still	is,	interpreted	as	an	accurate	representation	of	what	life	was	like	for	a	
those	belonging	to	that	social	class	in	the	years	following	1911.	In	1923,	19-year-old	Ba	Jin	left	
the	provincial	capital	of	Chengdu	in	Western	China	for	Shanghai	in	order	to	avoid	being	trapped	
by	the	feudal	traditions	of	his	hometown.	By	the	1930s,	he	had	become	an	editor	and	prolific	
writer	of	fiction,	often	serialized	in	various	Shanghai	periodicals;	it	was	in	this	latter	capacity	
that	he	penned	what	would	eventually	become	Family	in	the	literary	supplement	to	Shibao.	An	
overnight	success,	Family	depicted	the	suffocating	nature	of	traditional	culture	and	parental	
control	over	the	youth	of	China	by	focusing	on	the	saga	of	the	Gao	brothers.	
It	is	important	to	note	here	that	Ba	Jin	made	no	pretenses	towards	accuracy.	His	
characters	and	plot	are	wholly	fictional,	though	perhaps	inspired	by	his	own	experience	as	a	
young	man	who	fled	Chengdu	for	the	modernity	represented	by	Shanghai.	Moreover,	by	
eschewing	any	aspirations	concerning	literal	truth,	he	was	able	to	appeal	to	his	readers	with	
color	and	detail	that	a	more	ostensibly	objective	news	article	could	not	employ.	When	
historians	try	to	reconstruct	what	life	was	like	in	areas	beyond	the	metropolitan	coasts,	fiction	
like	Family	provides	a	resource	that	would	otherwise	be	inaccessible.	
And	yet	this	material,	like	Tao’s	Anecdotes,	should	only	be	utilized	with	caution	and	
discernment.	Kristin	Stapleton’s	recent	monograph	on	Ba	Jin	and	Family	makes	this	point	on	
multiple	levels,	showing	how	his	depiction	of	life	compares	to	less	fictional	materials,	like	
government	documents	or	business	records.	Slave	girls,	patriarchs,	and	soldiers	are	just	a	few	
                                                
12	https://baike.baidu.com/item/陶菊隱	
13	Ibid.,	see	also	Tao,	Memoirs.	
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of	the	interpretive	lenses	that	she	uses	to	examine	how	this	text	can	be	responsibly	deployed	
alongside	drier	and	less	exciting	texts	to	arrive	at	a	richer	understanding	of	what	life	was	like.	
Returning	to	the	divide	between	Shanghai	and	the	rest	of	China,	Stapleton	argues	that	the	
image	of	Republican	China’s	‘hinterland’	is	strongly	influenced	by	fictional	works	like	Family.	
There	is	no	small	degree	of	selection	bias	at	work,	with	only	those	who	have	left	places	like	
Chengdu	for	Shanghai	able	to	shape	perceptions	of	Chengdu;	those	who	retained	some	
affection	for	that	place	are	absent	from	the	public	conversation,	resulting	in	a	skewed	
perspective.	Accordingly,	Stapleton	notes,	
By	having	his	young	heroes	and	heroines,	such	as	Gao	Juehui	and	Gao	Shuying,	
escape	from	their	(and	his)	gloomy	hometown	to	a	life	of	freedom	in	Shanghai,	
Ba	 Jin	 contributed	 to	 an	emerging	 conception	 that	 a	huge	 cultural	 gap	existed	
between	 coastal	 cities	 like	 Shanghai,	 where	 foreign	 influence	 was	 strong	 and	
innovation	 flourished,	 and	 other	 parts	 of	 China,	 whose	 culture	 was	 seen	 as	
stagnant.	 Ba	 Jin	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 helping	 to	 create	 a	 stereotypical	
‘traditional’	China	 that	 could	be	attacked	by	political	and	 social	activists	of	 the	
1930s	and	1940s.14	
	
In	other	words,	Ba	Jin’s	descriptions	of	Chengdu	life,	despite	being	explicitly	fictional,	
contributed	to	the	widespread	belief	in	a	vast	chasm	between	modern	Shanghai	and	the	
backwards	hinterland.	In	the	same	way,	the	embellishments	and	exaggerations	in	Tao’s	
Anecdotes,	though	not	explicitly	fictional,	have	contributed	to	our	skewed	perception	of	China’s	
early	republic	as	nothing	more	than	amoral	anarchy.	While	it	is	possible	to	generously	interpret	
Tao’s	writing	unintentionally	creating	this	perception	of	the	hinterland,	the	attacks	of	Shen	
Congwen	(1902-1988)	on	his	contemporaries	for	this	very	practice	suggest	how	such	an	
interpretation	is	overly	charitable:	Tao	must	have	been	aware	of	the	effect	of	his	writing.	
At	first	glance,	Shen’s	identity	as	another	author	from	the	Chinese	hinterland	might	
make	his	stories	appear	to	be	another	inappropriate	attempt	to	blend	fact	and	fiction.	Shen,	a	
native	of	West	Hunan,	was	of	the	same	generation	as	Ba	Jin,	and	also	published	fiction	in	
Shanghai	periodicals	that	centered	upon	what	Chinese	society	was	like	outside	of	Shanghai.	
Akin	to	Stapleton’s	analysis	of	Ba	Jin,	Jeffrey	Kinkley	claims	that	Shen’s	fictional	descriptions	of	
his	native	place	were	and	are	frequently	interpreted	as	historically	accurate.	According	to	
Kinkley,	Shen’s	“biography	seems	most	closely	intertwined	with	great	events	in	Chinese	social	
and	literary	history	when	his	little	native	region,	West	Hunan,	is	the	backdrop.	Shen	created	a	
vision	of	the	place	so	alluring	that	critics	and	readers	still	argue	about	how	literally	his	regional	
works	ought	to	be	read.”15		Through	the	use	of	plot	and	narrative,	Shen	was	about	to	leave	his	
readers	with	a	deep	impression	of	a	place	that	very	few	of	them	would	ever	visit.	Given	the	
paucity	of	material	concerning	physically	and	culturally	distant	places	like	West	Hunan	that	
were	available	to	readers	in	Shanghai,	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	his	fiction	could	be	
misread	as	describing	social	realities.	Given	our	current	temporal	distance	from	that	setting,	
Kinkley’s	observation	that	concerning	the	literal	nature	of	these	texts	makes	sense.	
                                                
14	Stapleton,	Fact	in	Fiction,	5	
15	Jeffrey	Kinkley,	The	Odyssey	of	Shen	Congwen	(Stanford,	Stanford	University	Press:	1987),	4.	
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Shen	Congwen	critiqued	Shanghai	in	ways	that	can	help	us	reassess	the	Shanghai-
hinterland	divide.	Unlike	the	descriptions	of	Chengdu	found	in	the	works	of	his	contemporary	
Ba	Jin,	Shen	did	not	welcome	the	modernity	of	Shanghai	with	open	arms,	and	appeared	to	
strongly	resent	the	manner	in	which	his	native	place	was	utilized	in	a	quasi-orientalist	way	to	
extol	the	modernity	of	China’s	treaty	ports.	As	Kinkley	notes,	Shen	was	a	caustic	critic	of	the	
“Shanghai-type”	of	lowbrow	populism,	which	he	saw	as	pandering	to	the	lowest	common	
denominator,	using	gossip	and	scandal	to	draw	the	attention	of	readers	away	from	more	
serious	writing	on	politics	and	social	issues.	For	him,	this	form	and	style	of	writing	was	
emblematic	of	the	overwhelming	concern	for	wealth	and	fascination	with	celebrity	that	seemed	
to	suffuse	the	city,	and	which	he	deeply	resented.	He	faulted	foreign	influence	for	this	growing	
trend	among	metropolitan	elites	compared	to	“us	outside	the	concessions,”	suggesting	a	
cultural	chasm	between	the	coast	and	the	provinces	of	a	much	different	sort	than	seen	in	Ba	
Jin’s	fiction.	In	other	words,	the	real	rift	was	caused	by	industrial	commercialism	and	a	
disposable,	manufactured	celebrity,	which	indicated	the	moral	bankruptcy	of	the	imported	
Western-hybrid	culture	rather	than	traditional	Chinese	culture.		
In	contrast,	while	Family	was	a	story	that	supposedly	represented	the	rift	between	the	
traditional	China	of	the	hinterland	and	modern	China,	Shen	attacked	the	way	in	which	stories	
like	Family	actively	constructed	that	same	rift	it	was	supposedly	only	describing.16	In	this,	he	
suggested	a	line	of	critique	that	would	be	echoed	decades	later	by	Stapleton	on	the	Chengdu	of	
Ba	Jin’s	Family:		“Although	Chengdu	was	far	from	stagnant,	Family	and	its	sequels	established	
Chengdu	in	the	imaginations	of	the	educated	public	in	eastern	China	as	a	close-minded	city	of	
stifling	conservatism.”17	Though	Stapleton	is	specific	in	her	comparison	between	Shanghai	and	
Chengdu,	the	broader	point	applies	to	the	whole	of	the	area	beyond	the	more	modernized	
coast	as	well.	Furthermore,	though	Shen	did	not	explicitly	criticize	Tao,	Shen’s	critiques	can	be	
easily	levied	against	Anecdotes	for	overemphasizing	the	chasm	between	the	lives	of	his	readers	
in	the	PRC	of	1956	with	the	early	republic	described	in	his	text	in	order	to	appeal	to	potential	
readers’	sense	of	drama.	In	this,	it	is	again	worth	nothing	how	the	popular	appeal	of	texts	like	
Family	and	Anecdotes	speaks	to	the	rise	of	mass	culture	that	was	swiftly	growing	in	China.	
One	goal	of	this	dissertation	has	been	to	excavate	history	from	rumor	and	fiction,	or	at	
the	very	least,	to	take	seriously	the	historical	project	of	evaluating	and	assessing	sources	from	
the	past	as	modes	of	greater	or	lesser	factual	evidence.	In	personal	memoires,	contemporary	
news	accounts,	as	well	as	historical	overviews	like	Anecdotes	and	Political	History,	we	can	see	
as	much	fiction	as	fact,	both	in	the	construction	of	particular	narratives	as	well	as	in	the	
assertion	of	basic	events.	It	is	easy	to	oversimply	the	“plot”	of	Chinese	history,	and	to	assume	
cyclical	patterns	of	fragmentation	and	unification	rather	than	take	seriously	the	possibility	of	
true	historical	contingency	and	the	opening	up	of	unimagined	paths.	Too	many	stories	follow	
pre-proscribed	tropes	from	the	literary	world.			
									In	these	stories,	personality,	or	projected	personality,	played	a	significant	role	for	pushing	
the	plot	of	historical	narrative	forward.	Warlords	were	incredibly	diverse,	and	yet	they	have	
been	flattened	and	reduced	to	a	particular	typology	that	pigeonholes	them	as	villains	in	the	
narrative	of	Chinese	history.	The	story	of	warlordism	is	thus	reduced	to	the	personality	and	
                                                
16	Ibid.,	194-202.	
17	Stapleton,	Fact	in	Fiction,	183.	
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despotism	of	particular	individuals,	with	the	possibility	that	leaders	could	cooperate	together	as	
a	band	of	brothers,	in	keeping	with	tropes	from	Romance	of	the	Three	Kingdoms,	disappearing	
from	standard	historical	narratives.	
This	over-ascription	of	history	to	literary	genres	has	meant	that	significant	injustice	has	
been	done	to	our	understanding	of	the	countryside	and	its	contributions	to	modernity.	Despite	
Mao	Zedong’s	famous	deployment	of	rural	basecamps	for	the	revolutionary	cause,	so-called	
revolutionaries	and	scholars	have	long	continued	to	locate	modernity	in	urban	areas.	As	Wen-
hsin	Yeh,	Shakhar	Rahav,	and	others	have	begun	to	note,	the	Chinese	hinterland	offered	
substantive	values	in	the	dynamic	dialectic	that	produced	Chinese	revolutionary	modernity.	It	is	
the	contention	of	this	dissertation	that	the	so-called	hinterland	of	Hunan	could	actively	produce	
other	forms	and	visions	of	significant	change	and	modernity,	ones	that	potentially	rivaled	the	
mass	politics	of	Sun	Yat-sen	and	Mao	Zedong.18	
Instead	of	framing	this	history	as	a	tragedy,	this	dissertation	has	explored	Hunan’s	
forays	into	constitutionalism	and	federalism	as	a	failed	experiment.	Historical	imagination	
should	not	simply	mean	assuming	certain	things	to	follow	common	literary	tropes;	rather,	it	
means	understanding	the	value	of	contingency	in	forging	the	course	that	history	ultimately	took.	
Historical	imagination	enables	an	understanding	of	the	appropriate	boundaries	between	
related	concepts,	such	as	revolution	and	reform,	or	between	constitutionalism	and	federalism.		
	
Tan	Yankai:	Turning	to	the	Fold	of	Party	Politics	
The	mutiny,	of	course,	was	of	great	significance	for	Tan	Yankai.	Following	his	short	exile	
and	attempt	to	return	to	power,	he	became	a	disciple	of	Sun	Yatsen	and	an	elder	with	the	KMT,	
rising	to	high	office.	At	the	time	of	his	death	in	1930,	Tan	was	the	Premier	of	the	Administrative	
Yuan	in	the	KMT	National	Government	based	in	Nanjing.	The	head	of	the	legislative	branch	at	
the	time,	Hu	Hanmin	gave	a	speech	shortly	after	Tan’s	passing	in	which	he	mourned	the	loss	of	
his	comrade	and	greatly	praised	him.	According	to	Hu,	he	had	known	and	worked	with	Tan	in	
revolutionary	politics	for	ten	years,	and	so	was	in	a	position	to	assess	his	life	and	extol	his	
virtues.	In	a	speech	titled	“悼譚組菴先生”	[Mourning	for	Mr.	Tan	Zu’an]	(Tan’s	courtesy	name),	
he	spoke	for	some	time	on	the	loss	that	Tan’s	death	represented	for	the	nation,	the	party,	and	
the	people.	
According	to	Hu,	Tan	was	exceptionally	intelligent	and	able	to	deal	with	others	in	a	
polite	way.	Even	in	his	youth,	his	talent	at	composing	essays	was	well-known.	While	this	might	
be	expected	from	the	son	of	a	scholar-official	who	would	eventually	be	awarded	the	jinshi	
degree	and	a	post	with	the	prestigious	Hanlin	Academy,	Hu	goes	on	to	emphasize	Tan’s	talent	
for	solving	practical	problems	that	he	also	demonstrated	at	a	young	age,	when	his	father	was	
governor-general	in	Liangguang,	perhaps	indirectly	referring	to	the	praise	of	Weng	Tonghe.	
Furthermore,	the	manner	in	which	Tan	would	display	his	penetrating	insights	and	wisdom	was	
modest	and	humble,	which	meant	that	his	considerable	abilities	were	always	underestimated.19	
                                                
18	Wen-hsin	Yeh,	Provincial	Passages:	Culture,	Space,	and	the	Origins	of	Chinese	Communism	(Berkeley,	CA.:	
University	of	California	Press,	1996);	Shakhar	Rahav,	The	Rise	of	Political	Intellectuals	in	Modern	China:	May	Fourth	
Societies	and	the	Roots	of	Mass-Party	Politics	(New	York,	NY.:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015)	
19	Hu	Hanmin	胡漢民，	“悼譚組菴先生”	[Mourning	for	Mr.	Tan	Zu’an]	in	Zhu	Chuanyu	朱傳譽,	ed.,	譚延闓傳記
資料	[Materials	for	the	Biography	of	Tan	Yankai],	(Taipei,	Tianyi	Press,	1979),	19-29.	Original:	譚先生天資明敏，
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Tan	is	also	described	as	being	able	to	resolve	intractable	conflicts	between	his	peers,	and	that	
he	would	be	able	to	handle	any	situation	properly.20	
This	underestimation	of	Tan	was	compounded	by	his	typically	easy-going	and	mild	
demeanor,	but	Hu	claimed	that	this	surface	impression	masked	a	determined	core	that	could	
be	awe-inspiring.	His	personality	was	a	good	fit	for	the	position	of	premier,	being	“peaceful	and	
fair:”	precisely	the	bearing	that	prime	ministers	under	the	imperial	system	were	said	to	have.	In	
the	ten	years	that	Hu	worked	with	him,	there	were	no	harsh	words	or	ill	feelings	exchanged.21	
Given	the	infamous	infighting	endemic	to	KMT	senior	leadership	during	the	1920s,	this	point,	if	
true	and	not	an	exaggeration,	is	worth	emphasizing.	Moreover,	this	ability	to	forge	good	
relationships	with	all	he	meets	resonates	with	Tao’s	earlier	critique	of	Tan’s	propensity	to	be	a	
people-pleaser.	
There	are	some	differences	in	this	version	of	Tan	that	do	not	seem	to	fit	with	the	one	
described	earlier,	first	among	them	being	his	apparently	decisive	nature.	Hu	describes	Tan	as	a	
resolute	and	passionate	leader,	as	exemplified	by	his	actions	during	the	occupation	of	
Guangzhou	by	Yang	Ximin	(1886-1967)	and	Liu	Zhenhuan	(1890-1972).	Yang	and	Liu,	using	their	
armies	from	Yunnan	and	Guizhou,	took	over	the	city	in	June	of	1925,	shortly	after	the	death	of	
Sun	Yatsen	in	March	of	that	year.	According	to	Hu,	Tan’s	fiery	exhortations	were	responsible	for	
convincing	his	wavering	subordinates	to	stand	firm	and	counter-attack.	He	said,	“Destroying	
Yang	and	Liu	is	the	work	in	front	of	us	that	we	must	do.	Their	power	might	be	great,	but	if	we	
are	determined,	there	is	nothing	we	cannot	accomplish.”22	According	to	Hu,	the	same	
unwavering	commitment	to	success	under	all	circumstances	could	be	seen	later,	when	Tan’s	
command	over	troops	during	the	Northern	Expedition	began	to	fail,	and	his	soldiers	started	to	
disobey	his	orders.	Whereas	many	other	commanders	might	give	up	and	flee,	Tan,	in	contrast,	
“remained	committed,	and	would	not	give	up	when	confronted	with	hardship.	This	true	spirit	of	
loyalty	and	persistence	is	a	model!”	23		
Hu’s	eulogy	serves	as	a	reminder	to	be	wary	of	wen-wu	binaries.	His	praise	for	Tan’s	
military	leadership	here	is	especially	interesting,	given	Tan’s	lack	of	training	and	background	in	
the	subject.	Indeed,	in	his	narrative	of	the	initial	stages	of	planning	for	the	Northern	Expedition,	
Hu	recalls	his	misgivings	about	placing	Tan	in	a	central	role,	predicting	that	“even	if	his	orders	
were	followed,	he	is	not	a	military	man,	so	there	is	no	guarantee	that	his	decisions	would	be	
competent.”24	This	is	not	to	say	that	scholar-officials	of	Tan’s	class	could	not	become	
                                                                                                                                                       
自小便以能文章為士林稱賞，而其精到練達，更非普通人所能企及。As	with	the	Xu	Chongli	Biographical	
Chronicle	referenced	on	pg.	49	of	this	volume,	Tan’s	courtesy	name	(祖菴)	is	here	given	as	“組菴,”	and	it	is	unclear	
why:	it	is	possible	this	is	an	error,	or	that	he	went	by	multiple	names.	
20	Ibid.,	18.	Original:	有時有人為什麼問題互相爭持，譚先生一來，往往令人意消；遇到難以解決的事，一經
譚先生區處，也就十分妥貼了。	
21	Ibid.,	Original:	譚先生「休休有容」，具有古人所謂宰輔的氣度，他的性格，祇有「和平中正」四個字，
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22	Ibid.,	23.	Original:	消滅楊劉是我們目前必要的工作，楊劉的力量從然大，假如我們肯下極大的決心，便無
有不行。	
23	Ibid,	21.	Original:	可是譚先生還毅然為之，不辭艱苦，這種效忠主義、堅強不屈的精神，真可為我人的法
式！	
24	Ibid.	Original:	組菴究竟不是軍人，即使其他部隊，能受組菴指揮，但組菴是否勝任，也不能不稍稍顧慮。	
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competent	military	commanders,	but	rather	that	Tan’s	effectiveness	in	this	area	was	
supposedly	weak:	an	aspect	of	his	reputation	that	was	emphasized	Tao	Juyin’s	Anecdotes.	
Stepping	back	to	look	at	the	larger	context	of	Hu	and	his	audience,	his	effusive	and	lavish	
admiration	for	Tan	and	his	selfless	behavior	seems	to	be	an	explicit	critique	of	Chiang	Kai-shek.	
By	1930,	Chiang	had	risen	to	the	top	position	in	the	KMT	hierarchy,	while	Hu’s	rise	had	been	cut	
short	by	his	alleged	involvement	in	the	1925	assassination	of	Liao	Zhongkai.	As	a	result,	there	is	
a	distinct	air	of	jealousy	when	Hu	compares	Tan	to	Chiang.	He	notes,	“In	1926,	I	sent	an	army	
north	and	the	general	public	elected	Mr.	Chiang	Kai-shek	to	serve	as	the	Commander-in-Chief.	
In	reality,	Mr.	Tan	had	more	prestige,	seniority,	and	history,	and	in	every	respect,	was	superior	
to	Chiang.”25	The	tone	of	this	comparison,	combined	with	Hu’s	praise	for	Tan’s	modesty	and	
unambitious	nature,	suggest	that	the	explicit	admiration	for	Tan	is	also	an	implicit	critique	of	
Chiang.	Perhaps	Hu	exaggerates	Tan’s	strengths	and	minimizes	his	weaknesses	in	order	to	serve	
this	underlying	goal.	
Hu	also	characterizes	Tan	as	a	cultured	and	learned	individual	who	enjoyed	food	and	
drink;	this	also	is	perhaps	an	oblique	criticism	of	Chiang	Kai-shek’s	ascetic	behavior.	Hu	notes,	
“Tan	was	always	a	big	eater	who	loved	to	drink.	Therefore	when	he	found	doctors,	if	they	
would	allow	him	to	eat	and	drink	freely,	he	would	call	them	sensible.	But	if	they	gave	him	
restrictions,	he	would	not	listen	to	them,	saying,	‘In	the	past	I	have	eaten	and	drunk	many	
wrong	things,	so	why	forbid	them	now?’”	26	In	this	portrayal,	Tan’s	affection	for	food	is	less	
about	his	snobbish	tastes,	and	more	about	the	value	he	places	on	concrete	pleasures.	
According	to	Hu,	“Mr.	Tan	believed	that	death	is	a	change	that	comes	for	all	things,	and	cannot	
be	escaped.	If	the	spirit	of	joy	and	sorrow	are	calculated	against	preserving	one’s	life,	if	
moderation	is	necessary,	then	this	is	not	a	life	that	has	joy	in	it.”27		
Hu’s	use	of	Tan’s	life	to	critique	Chiang	parallels	the	narratives	found	in	Anecdotes	and	
Political	History,	as	they	all	construct	a	history	in	order	to	make	a	broader	point	about	the	
present.	His	use	of	Tan	here	makes	him	into	something	less	than	complex	individual,	and	
transforms	his	life	into	a	stereotype	to	serve	another	aim.	In	the	same	way,	Li	and	Tao	use	the	
story	of	the	early	republic	to	comment	on	the	political	circumstances	in	which	they	were	
writing.	As	historians	continue	to	critique	and	reconstruct	these	narratives	and	sources,	this	is	a	
point	well	worth	remembering.		
	
The	persistence	of	networked	interests	from	the	pre-1911	era,	as	represented	by	the	
interactions	between	Tan	Yankai,	Zhao	Hengti,	and	their	peers,	was	replaced	by	ideologically	
oriented	mass	politics	in	a	commitment	to	transcend	personal	relationships	and	provincial	
boundaries.	Texts	like	Political	History	and	Anecdotes	were	informed	by,	and	themselves	
informed,	a	set	of	values	and	norms	that	constructed	a	new	standard	for	revolutionarily	correct	
                                                
25	Ibid.,	24.	Original:	當十五年我出師北伐，公舉蔣介石先生任總司令，其實譚先生的資望歷史，都比蔣先生
好。	
26	Ibid.,	25.	Original:	譚先生從前豪飲健飯，因此凡找到醫生，如果許他飲食自如的，便以這位醫生為通達，
如果為他多立戒條的，他便以為不行。他說：「我以前已經吃錯喝錯，何必現在戒它，反令我感受痛苦
呢？」		
27	Ibid.	26.	Original:	在譚先生抱定生與死為萬物變化之迹—為人之所不能逃，如果悅之惡之神之為苟全命
計，勉強節制，便全然沒有生趣了。	
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behavior	that	was	epistemologically	different	from	the	political	behaviors	practiced	before.	As	a	
result,	the	vision	of	constitutionally	informed	federalism	that	first	Tan,	then	Zhao,	attempted	to	
espouse	was	swiftly	eclipsed	by	the	attractions	of	a	more	stable	centralized	party-state.	Their	
proposals,	as	well	as	the	limited	successes	achieved	via	gradual	reform	as	opposed	to	radical	
and	violent	revolution,	have	been	ignored	by	the	history	of	the	“warlord	era.”	
Indeed,	depictions	of	the	“warlord	era”	often	fall	into	one	of	two	camps,	both	of	which	
are	challenged	by	a	reevaluation	of	historical	events	as	described	in	this	dissertation.	The	first	
of	these	has	Zhao	as	a	warlord	pushing	out	Tan	as	a	civilian,	signaling	the	militarization	of	
modern	China	and	the	descent	into	endemic	warfare.	This	is	an	oversimplified	narrative	that	
strains	to	connect	the	ostensible	militarization	of	the	post-Taiping	Qing	with	the	wars	with	
Japan	and	the	KMT-CCP	civil	war	in	a	continuity	of	violence,	but	overlooks	the	efforts	made	by	
Tan	and	Zhao	alike	to	build	upon	the	traditions	of	the	past.	In	the	second,	the	period	between	
1912	and	1927	is	seen	as	an	aberration	between	two	stable	societies.	Here,	the	rupture	
represented	by	the	era	is	inherently	unstable,	and	the	heavily	centralized	imperial	state	of	the	
Qing	as	well	as	the	even	more	heavily	centralized	party-states	of	the	KMT	and	CCP	represent	
the	only	viable	configuration	of	society	that	can	hold	China	together.	
Yet	when	we	look	at	the	period	on	its	own	merits,	without	straining	to	find	its	root	
causes	in	the	past	or	its	consequences	for	the	future,	a	different	picture	appears.	It	was	during	
this	period	that	the	former	subjects	of	the	Qing	empire	emerged	from	the	yoke	of	formal	
central	government	control,	signaling	an	intellectual	space	in	which	new	models	of	government	
could	be	tried.	Attempting	to	tie	these	experiments	tightly	to	the	past	is	a	worthy	pursuit,	but	
obscures	the	merits	of	these	innovative	efforts.	So	too	with	trying	to	make	claims	about	the	
influence	of	these	years	on	the	central	party-state	of	the	KMT	and	CCP	to	come;	searching	for	
the	connection	of	this	period	to	the	future	causes	us	to	ignore	the	paths	not	taken	only	because	
they	failed.			
Of	course,	seen	from	another	light,	the	period	was	closely	connected	to	the	past	and	the	
future.	On	the	level	of	culture,	as	Levenson,	Esherick	and	Rankin,	and	others	have	persuasively	
argued,	the	ideas	of	the	past	retained	a	high	level	of	influence	on	Tan,	Zhao,	and	their	peers,	
which	prevented	them	from	fully	embracing	new	ideologies	and	social	theories	that	may	have	
been	more	productive	for	bringing	peace	to	society	and	stability	to	the	economy.28	This	
dissertation	has	further	argued	that	the	culture	of	elite	politics,	and	circles	of	elite	networks,	
continued	to	play	an	important	role	in	the	years	of	the	early	republic.	Furthermore,	the	political	
failures	of	this	period	influenced	subsequent	periods	by	serving	as	a	negative	example	for	the	
highly	centralized	states	that	would	rule	the	nation	in	the	future,	exemplifying	the	dangers	of	
too	much	freedom	over	local	government,	and	too	little	control.	
Isolating	the	1920	mutiny	as	a	specific	event,	as	it	occurred	in	this	particular	place,	has	
afforded	this	dissertation	a	greater	degree	of	nuance.	The	larger	power	struggle	in	Hunan	as	
well	as	the	specific	mutiny	that	prompted	the	Tan-Zhao	transition	in	the	fall	of	1920	might	
certainly	mirror	similar	events	in	other	regions,	but	cannot	possibly	represent	the	broader	
whole,	and	the	myriad	experiences	of	those	living	in	the	former	Qing	empire.	In	this,	this	
dissertation	parallels	recent	scholarship	that	disaggregates	the	nation	from	the	state,	and	
                                                
28	Levenson,	Confucian	China;	Joseph	Esherick	and	Mary	Rankin,	eds.,	Chinese	Local	Elites	and	Patterns	of	
Dominance	(Berkeley,	CA.:	University	of	California	Press,	1990)	
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emphasizes	the	variety	of	lived	experiences	in	history.	For	the	“modern”	period	after	1800	in	
particular,	new	scholarship	on	non-Han	ethnic	groups	like	Muslims,	the	Manchu	or	the	Miao	
demonstrates	that	prior	understandings	of	legal,	social,	cultural,	and	economic	interactions	
among	Qing	subjects	and	twentieth-century	citizens	has	understated	the	importance	of	ethnic	
diversity	within	what	we	now	call	China.29	Research	on	borderlands	topics	during	the	Qing	
highlights	a	similar	point	concerning	the	diversity	of	experiences	across	space	during	an	
ostensibly	unitary	state.30	Even	when	the	space	is	limited	to	a	place	like	Shanghai,	scholars	have	
suggested	that	differences	of	class	or	gender	strongly	inform	a	remarkably	different	set	of	
experiences.31	The	Chinese	experience	was	not	and	is	not	uniform;	the	years	of	the	warlord	
period,	when	a	feeble	centralized	state	governed	the	nation	in	name	alone,	epitomizes	this	
point.	
Indeed,	studying	the	warlord	period	as	a	whole	needs	to	be	interpreted	critically,	as	
each	year	brought	a	new	set	of	challenges	and	circumstances.	In	Hunan	specifically,	the	years	
between	1911	and	1920	were	all	quite	different	from	each	other:	for	example,	the	violence	and	
tyranny	that	is	said	to	have	characterized	the	tenure	of	rulers	like	Tang	Xiangming	or	Zhang	
Jingyao	contrast	sharply	with	the	relative	peace	of	other	leaders	like	Tan	or	Zhao.	Yet	when	the	
era	is	remembered,	it	is	mostly	with	reference	to	local	bullies	who	took	what	they	wanted	and	
left	only	chaos	and	sadness	in	their	wake.	There	is	a	reason	for	this;	this	dissertation	does	not	
advance	the	claim	that	these	years	were	some	sort	of	golden	era	that	has	been	overlooked	by	
historians.	It	is	worth	repeating	here	Jerome	Ch’en’s	poignant	remarks	to	all	who	study	this	
period:	“I	have	suffered	at	their	[warlord]	hands	when	I	was	a	young	citizen	of	China.	If	anyone	
comes	to	tell	me,	‘these	chaps	were	not	so	bad	after	all,’	my	advice	to	him	or	her	is	to	change	
hypothesis	rather	than	reality.”32	It	is	fairly	clear	that	most,	if	not	all,	who	lived	through	and	
survived	this	period	did	not	remember	it	fondly.	This	dissertation	has	not	tried	to	correct	these	
memories,	but	rather	to	suggest	that	there	was	contingency	for	different	types	of	futures,	and	
also	room	for	other	perspectives	as	well.	
                                                
29	See,	for	example,	Dru	Gladney,	Muslim	Chinese:	Ethnic	Nationalism	in	the	People’s	Republic	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	
Harvard	University	Press,	1991);	Pamela	Kyle	Crossley,	A	Translucent	Mirror:	Identity	and	History	in	Qing	Imperial	
Ideology	(Berkeley,	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	1999);	Mark	Elliot,	The	Manchu	Way:	The	Eight	Banners	and	
Ethnic	Identity	in	Late	Imperial	China	(Stanford,	CA.,	Stanford	University	Press,	2001);	Edward	J.	M.	Rhoads,	
Manchus	and	Han:	Ethnic	Relations	and	Political	Power	in	Late	Qing	and	Early	Republican	China	(Seattle,	WA.:	
University	of	Washington	Press,	2000);	Laura	Hostetler,	Qing	Colonial	Enterprise:	Ethnography	and	Cartography	in	
Early	Modern	China,	(Chicago,	IL.:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2001);	Thomas	S.	Mullaney,	Coming	to	Terms	with	
the	Nation:	Ethnic	Classification	in	Modern	China	(Berkeley,	CA.:	University	of	California	Press,	2011)	
30	Examples	include	Matthew	Mosca,	From	Frontier	Policy	to	Foreign	Policy:	The	Question	of	India	and	the	
Transformation	of	Geopolitics	in	Qing	China	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	Press,	2013);	Kwangmin	Kim,	
Borderland	Capitalism:	Turkestan	Province,	Qing	Silver,	and	the	Birth	of	an	Eastern	Market	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	
University	Press,	2016);	Jonathan	Schlesinger,	A	World	Trimmed	with	Fur:	Wild	Things,	Pristine	Places,	and	the	
Natural	Fringes	of	Qing	Rule	(Stanford,	CA.:	Stanford	University	Press,	2017)	
31	Examples	include	Emily	Honig,	Sisters	and	Strangers:	Women	in	the	Shanghai	Cotton	Mills,	1919-1949,	(Stanford,	
CA,	1986);	Gail	Hershatter,	Dangerous	Pleasures:	Prostitution	and	Modernity	in	Twentieth-Century	Shanghai	
(Berkeley,	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	1997)	S.A.	Smith,	Like	Cattle	and	Horses:	Nationalism	and	Labor	in	
Shanghai,	1895-1927	(Durham,	NC.:	Duke	University	Press,	2002);	Wen-hsin	Yeh,	Shanghai	Splendor:	Economic	
Sentiments	and	the	Making	of	Modern	China,	1843-1949	(Berkeley,	CA.:	University	of	California	Press,	2007)	
32	Jerome	Ch’en,	The	Military-Gentry	Coalition:	China	Under	the	Warlords,	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto-York	
University	Joint	Center	on	Modern	East	Asia,	1979),	iii.	
		 120	
A	major	issue	with	historical	memory,	writ	large,	is	in	the	paradigms	and	vocabulary	that	
dominate	our	thinking	about	the	period.	In	these	stories,	modernity	and	progress	is	
concentrated	in	the	relative	havens	of	the	cities	and	urban	areas,	particularly	along	the	coasts	
and	rivers,	with	the	rural	remainder	depicted	as	an	economic	and	cultural	backwater	whose	
refusal	to	embrace	the	western	modernity	prevents	the	nation	as	a	whole	from	progressing.	In	
our	urge	to	arrive	at	a	broader	argument	concerning	these	years	and	how	they	fit	into	the	
larger	scope	of	Chinese,	East	Asian,	and	world	history,	we	are	too	eager	to	repeat	and	
regurgitate	formulaic	tropes	about	the	state,	modernity,	and	tradition.	Scholars	have	begun	to	
rethink	the	way	that	May	Fourth	paradigms	and	tropes	have	influenced	our	understanding	of	
Chinese	traditions,	and	this,	too,	should	extend	to	remnants	of	traditional	elite	culture	that	
remained	during	the	Beiyang	period.	
Instead	of	ascribing	to	conventional	spatial	and	temporal	categories	of	coastal,	modern,	
and	progressive	in	opposition	to	hinterland,	backwards,	and	regressive,	this	dissertation	argues	
that	it	is	the	confluence	of	different	ideas	that	help	to	generate	knowledge	production,	such	as	
information	and	experimentation	with	federalism	and	constitutionalism.	The	synergy	of	new	
ideas	could	occur	even	in	a	so-called	conservative	context	such	as	Hunan.		
Of	course,	historians	have	often	had	to	grapple	with	the	diversity	of	experience	during	
the	warlord	era	and	to	acknowledge	it;	on	that	point,	what	this	dissertation	is	claiming	is	not	
entirely	new.	With	the	exception	of	a	few	efforts	to	make	larger	claims	and	characterizations	of	
the	period,	the	majority	of	historians	situate	their	work	around	specific	individuals,	places,	or	
factions.33	Nevertheless,	these	works	often	try	to	relate	their	stories	to	the	larger	whole.	
Instead	of	finding	significance	through	aggregation,	this	dissertation	has	tried	instead	to	
disaggregate	space	and	time	into	incremental	pieces,	and	to	question	each	piece	of	information.	
The	point	is	that	the	“warlord	era”	is	significant	not	for	its	connection	to	the	rest	of	Chinese	
history;	it	is	significant	as	a	time	of	multiple	contingencies	that	do	not	fit	within	state-led	
teleological	conceptions	of	what	China	was,	is,	or	could	ever	become.		
Closely	examining	the	1920	Pingjiang	Mutiny,	its	causes,	and	its	consequences	
demonstrates	that	this	event	has	been	retroactively	interpreted	to	fit	revolutionary	narratives	
of	warlord	betrayal	and	local	government	incompetence.	This	dissertation	has	used	
unpublished	materials	like	post	office	policies,	provincial	assembly	petitions,	diaries,	letters,	
and	English-language	exercise	books,	to	challenge	these	conventional	histories	and	suggest	the	
successes,	however	limited,	enjoyed	by	gradual	reform	as	opposed	to	radical	revolution.	These	
small	victories,	like	the	federalist	movement,	have	been	overlooked	not	only	because	they	do	
not	fit	the	standard	narrative,	but	also	because	Tan	and	Zhao	were	relatively	weak	at	
publicizing	their	policies	in	a	way	that	appealed	to	the	emerging	mass	politics	of	the	era	
compared	to	the	political	ideologues	who	succeeded	them.	
In	contrast	to	these	mundane	successes,	the	spectacle	and	drama	of	mutiny—which	
ostensibly	features	the	triumph	of	a	wu-warlord	over	a	wen-bureaucrat—would	seem	to	
epitomize	the	eroding	politics	of	the	new	nation,	desperately	in	need	of	centralization	and	
                                                
33	The	exceptions	might	be	Ch’en’s	“Military-Gentry	Coalition”	and	Ch’i’s,	“Warlord	Politics.”	Lary’s	“Warlord	
Soldiers”	also	provides	a	broad	overview,	but	from	a	much	different,	bottom-up,	perspective.	Studies	of	individuals	
include	McCormick,	Zhang	Zuolin,	Sheridan,	Feng	Yu-hsiang,	Gillin,	Yen	Hsi-shan,	and	Wou,	Militarism	in	Modern	
China;	studies	of	places	include	Sutton,	Provincial	Militarism,	and	McCord,	Power	of	the	Gun;	studies	of	factions	
include	Waldron,	From	War	to	Nationalism	and	Lary,	Region	and	Nation.	
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order.	Closely	examining	the	mutiny	shows	that	this	is	far	from	the	case,	since	Zhao	had	little	to	
do	with	Tan’s	downfall.	Indeed,	rather	than	Zhao	Hengti	betraying	Tan	Yankai	and	forcing	him	
into	exile,	this	transition	was	mainly	caused	by	Tan’s	overambitious	efforts	to	strengthen	his	
position	in	Pingjiang.	The	situation	exacerbated	further	by	KMT	agents	sent	by	Sun	Yatsen	in	
Guangzhou,	who	conspired	to	undermine	Tan’s	rule.	
In	this	light,	the	eventual	failure	of	federalism	and	gradual	reform	in	Hunan,	and	their	
eclipse	in	revolutionary	history	appears	even	more	tragic.	There	was	nothing	inevitable	about	
turmoil	in	Hunan,	just	as	there	was	nothing	inevitable	about	the	revolutions	that	changed	China.	
Provincial	autonomy	and	the	federalist	movement	did	not	gain	greater	currency	in	the	early	
republic	because	those	who	effectively	employed	the	new	rhetoric	of	mass	politics	and	
eventually	rose	to	the	top	favored	central	governance,	and	not,	as	some	have	postulated,	
because	the	culture	and	the	people	were	inured	to	autocratic	rule,	or	particularly	ill-suited	for	
republican	representation.	This	is	a	point	well	worth	considering	for	future	scholarship	seeking	
to	move	beyond	the	revolutionary	paradigm	of	Chinese	history.	
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